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Foreword 
The Foreign Trade Association, which represents the European and international distribution 
and retail sector, commissioned this study in light of the importance of China as a sourcing 
country and its attractiveness as a rapidly growing consumer market. We believe that open 
borders and free trade can contribute to a broader choice and lower costs for consumers 
and create growth and employment in both Europe and China. 
This independent study aims to provide an in-depth contribution on the status of bilateral 
economic exchanges and persistent trade barriers that exist between the European Union 
and China. The second objective of the report is to encourage a frank and open dialogue, 
based on a scientific evaluation and without prejudice, on the possibility of a preferential 
trade agreement between the two sides.  
This study should be read by anyone who is interested in economic relations between the EU 
and China and in trade policy in general. The report provides many interesting findings and 
raises a number of surprising points. Overall, this study is one of the most significant 
contributions to the discourse on EU-China relations in recent years. 
We hope that this study will stimulate fresh thoughts on the benefits of closer future 
cooperation between two regions that have been interlinked since the times of antiquity and 
the first Silk Road. 
 
Christian Ewert, FTA Director General 
Brussels, April 2016  
 
 
  
The Foreign Trade Association (FTA) is the leading  
business association of European and international  
commerce that promotes the values of free trade.  
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Preface 
The ancient Silk Road consisted of a network of paths, mountain passes and ‘branches’ used 
by daring traders to connect China and Europe via several intermediaries. There was no real 
infrastructure, just a near-endless chain of local and regional byways. Indeed, the Silk Road 
was not so much a ‘road’ but an expression of a fierce determination to connect markets 
and to seek the value-added of goods exchanged between different cultures and levels of 
development.  
Tomorrow’s Silk Road can add great value to what already is an intense economic 
intercourse between China and the EU. It is all about a similar determination as motivated 
the ancient traders. The present study shows that much could be achieved with ‘Tomorrow’s 
Silk Road’, in the form of a Free Trade Area Agreement between the EU and China, especially 
if it is a ‘deep and comprehensive’ one. Good for China and good for the EU.  
The authors would like to express their gratitude to many who have helped us with 
interviews, discussions, documents and otherwise. We wish to emphasise that the authors 
have been able to work in full independence at all stages of the work through to the very 
end when the results were available. In this respect, the Foreign Trade Association, having 
commissioned CEPS to carry out the study, with the critical contribution of the World Trade 
Institute in Bern as well, has fully respected the independence of CEPS.  
The authors are also grateful to the Chinese Mission to the EU, which has been very effective 
in supporting our visit to Beijing in December 2015, which proved most valuable. The same 
goes for the European Commission, which responded to our requests for specialised advice 
or comments on a number of occasions. Readers should be aware that neither the Chinese 
Mission nor the European Commission intervened at any moment while the authors were 
drafting this report.  
We hope that readers will find the study valuable. 
Jacques Pelkmans, Senior Fellow, CEPS, and study leader 
On behalf of his fellow authors 
Brussels, April 2016 
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Executive Summary 
In developing its international trade strategy since 2006, the EU has placed a strong 
emphasis on concluding Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with dynamic East Asian economies. 
Until very recently, however, no explicit mention has been made of China – the region’s 
largest and most dynamic economy – as a possible candidate for a FTA with the EU. This 
oversight becomes even more glaring if one considers the magnitude of the economic 
intercourse that already exists today between these two trading partners. China is the logical 
sequel in the Union’s trade strategy for East Asia. This study attempts to provide a solid 
analytical basis for negotiations on an EU-China Free Trade Agreement (formally, Free Trade 
Area treaty). The first official suggestion for such a FTA, made by Chinese President Xi Jin 
Ping in the spring of 2014, has recently been considered, cautiously and under various 
conditions, by the EU as well. This study deals with three principal aspects: 1) the ‘why’ of 
the FTA, 2) the ‘how’ to incorporate a broad spectrum of trade policy areas usually reserved 
found in ‘deep and comprehensive’ FTAs and 3) the stylised ‘economic impact’, based on a 
cutting-edge application of CGE modelling together with the newest GTAP database for such 
a demanding exercise.  
The rationale for an EU-China FTA 
The rationale behind a FTA between China and the EU – the ‘why’ – can be based on five 
arguments. More than one argument or all five of them might be valid for policy-makers at 
the same time. The keywords characterising these five arguments are: greater economic 
potential, comparative market access, mega-regionals, the link between Chinese reforms 
and exposure to foreign competition, and strategic and geo-political advantages.  
EU-China: Economic and trade indicators, 2014 
 GDP: €16,556.9 billion for the EU and €9,014.7 billion for China 
 GDP per capita: €32,307.7 for the EU and €6,468.2 for China 
 Total bilateral trade in goods and services: €518.8 billion 
 FDI-EU position with China (2013): Outward €130 billion, Inward €27 billion 
 Average applied tariffs in industry: 3.8% for the EU and 8% for China 
 Average applied tariffs in agro-food: 7.2% for the EU and 13.9% for China 
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Economic 
potential of a 
FTA 
The economic potential of EU-China trade and investment relations is far 
greater than what has proven possible until now (due to restrictions and 
bans), despite impressive growth of bilateral trade and investment in the 
recent past. The simulations in Part III of the study support the notion of 
much greater economic potential, insofar as such modelling can estimate 
such effects. The extensive qualitative evidence and business information in 
Part II of the study not only confirm this prognosis, but go far beyond what a 
quantitative simulation can calculate. For both the EU and China, tapping 
such economic potential is the principal mission of trade (and investment) 
policy; hence, this rationale is a powerful one.  
Comparable 
market 
access 
Another reason for the FTA may consist in the assurance of market access 
that is at least as good as is available with other relevant trading partners; 
otherwise, the competitive positions of EU and Chinese companies vis-á-vis 
companies from other trading partners may be damaged temporarily or 
permanently. This rationale is known as the ‘domino’ theory (or, 
alternatively, the ‘me-too’ rationale) for the incessant tendency to negotiate 
new FTAs. The EU and China each find that they are negotiating with trade 
partners having or planning to have an improved form of market access. This 
generates understandable pressures to improve market access also directly 
between themselves.  
Not losing 
out on mega-
regionals 
A third argument for a EU-China FTA is the emergence of ‘mega-regionals’, 
including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (without China), the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (under negotiation 
between the EU and the US), the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) (under negotiation, with China and the ASEAN countries 
as the main architects, but less ambitious) and, to a lesser degree, the EU-
Japan FTA (under negotiation) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada (yet to be ratified). These 
pacts have increased the incentives for China to turn to its largest trade and 
major FDI partner – the European Union – to improve market access, deepen 
investment relations and intensify economic and technical cooperation.  
Domestic 
reforms in 
China 
facilitate a 
FTA 
A fourth case can be found in the strong link between profound domestic 
reforms in China, as the next stage in its transition to becoming a well-
functioning, developed market economy and escaping the ‘middle-income 
trap’, and the exposure to foreign goods and services competition as well as 
more widespread FDI in all sectors. For China, it is the ‘new logic’. The 
fundamental connection is the drive to stimulate productivity growth over a 
long period of time, after the current model of mass production based on 
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low-skilled assembly and extreme export-led growth in such products has 
begun to run out of steam. Higher productivity growth trends also require 
better, more and higher-quality services, both domestically and as crucial 
elements in global value chains. Opening up the Chinese economy is 
therefore in the mutual interest of both the EU and China, and a deep 
partnership in the form of an ambitious FTA seems the most expeditious way 
to achieve that aim (compared to WTO plurilaterals and still more technical 
cooperation, as alternative approaches). 
Geo-political 
motivations 
An EU-China FTA can also be considered for strategic and ‘geo-political 
reasons’, although it would seem ill-advised to engage in a FTA solely for 
such reasons. China might be disappointed in Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), as the group is now split for the time being between a 
TPP club of twelve and the other APEC members, most of which are in RCEP. 
China’s cooperation with the BRICs is also not doing too well lately, and the 
One-Belt-One-Road initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) are only in the very early stages at best. With respect to the US, China 
might eventually join TPP, but this is not certain at the moment and a China-
US FTA seems hard to imagine politically (at least in the US). One might thus 
argue that the EU is an ideal geo-political partner for China, as the EU is a 
‘civil’ Union and serves as its largest trading partner and leading investor 
(with an upcoming EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment or 
CAI ), without being a Pacific power in any other than a distant diplomatic 
fashion.  
 
The economic and trade policy context  
For a proper appreciation of a possible FTA between the EU and China, one has to 
understand the economic, trade and reform context in which such an initiative would be 
negotiated. Since the study focuses quite extensively on the wide scope and the ‘how’ of the 
FTA, the contextual analysis is necessarily a bit sketchy. The following aspects are briefly 
discussed: the overall trade and investment significance of the bilateral relationship today 
and in the near future, the link between the domestic reforms in China and the FTA 
initiative, the nature of recent FTA and investment treaties that China has concluded, some 
indicators of the bilateral trade and FDI relationship, and the importance of global value 
chains for trade with China and the EU jobs connected with it.  
The significance of the bilateral trade and FDI relationship can hardly be underestimated. A 
FTA between the EU and China would be one between two trade giants. And the expectation 
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is that China would assume the largest trade share in the world economy by 2030, distinctly 
ahead of the US and on par or slightly ahead of the EU. No other BRIC will have reached 
anywhere near such trade shares, rendering a FTA even more crucial for both the EU and 
China.  
Chinese 
reforms to 
be foster 
trade and 
facilitate FDI 
 
Since 2013, the Chinese authorities have regularly announced the 
intensification of the country’s reform process. If one would take these 
pronouncements literally, the difficult transition further away from the old 
planned economy to a market-driven one, with the state solely in a role as 
legislator, supervisor and enforcer, would signal decisive progress for China 
itself, but also for the EU and other trade partners. The new reforms aim to 
move away from mass production of scale-based and low-skilled labour-
intensive goods (e.g. assembly) and to place greater emphasis on services to 
consumers (facilitating high-quality services to production processes in value 
chains) and less extreme emphasis on export-led growth at all costs and 
more domestic consumption by a rising middle class, supported – among 
other things – by more welfare state benefits, also for domestic migrant 
workers. These reforms are of course first of all good for China, but they also 
accord well with the opening up in services (now often restricted or banned 
for foreign providers) and investment, key offensive interests of the EU. In 
actual practice, reforms are always difficult to implement and China is no 
exception to this rule. Indeed, the resistance is likely to be deep, given the 
privileged status of SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and the overall 
protection of many services sectors. Also, China is more protectionist in FDI, 
despite the significant inflows and rising stocks, than any other relevant 
country, including other BRICs. Conscious of this all, top Chinese officials and 
ministers often suggest that external pressure would be helpful in 
accelerating domestic reforms. In a FTA, with the EU as a partner, it is 
possible that this may be realised in an acceptable fashion for both sides.  
Chinese 
trade policy 
and FTAs 
 
China’s trade policies have been active on the bilateral front, much less with 
respect to WTO plurilaterals and very little in the Doha Round. Its FTAs have 
typically been shallow (that is, focused mostly on tariffs, less or not at all on 
regulatory barriers). In terms of investment treaties, most of them are on 
narrow investment protection and not, or hardly, on effective market access 
(especially for services). But there are new signals, e.g. in its FTAs with 
Australia and Korea, which – in a staged approach – pretend to go into 
services and some regulatory issues in a WTO-plus fashion. As for 
investment, a recent treaty with Canada (Foreign Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement or FIPA) seems to show a new preparedness to 
become more ambitious, specifically with regard to the movement of natural 
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 5 
 
persons, linked to business, such as allowing senior management positions 
no longer to be restricted by nationality (basically, like CETA and TPP). This is 
hopefully preparing the ground for the greater ambition required when the 
EU would negotiate a FTA with China, following the current investment (CAI) 
negotiations, or if a CAI would eventually be integrated into an ambitious 
FTA (as was done in CETA and in the EU-Vietnam FTA).  
Bilateral 
trade and 
FDI 
 
Bilateral trade and investment trends between China and the EU are indeed 
remarkable. The US dollar value of total bilateral goods trade since 1995 has 
increased by a factor of ten, reaching some $600/€526 billion (at the April 
2016 dollar/euro exchange rate) in 2014! Services trade (mode 1 of the 
General Agreement for Trade in Services or GATS) is strongly rising (to over 
$70/€61.4 billion in 2014) over the past decade or so, despite restrictions in 
some sectors and the adverse effects of the crisis. The balance in goods trade 
leans heavily in China’s favour, if only because barriers on the EU side are 
lower than the relevant ones in China for goods that EU companies specialise 
in. The trade balance in goods hovers around a $200-plus billion (€175-plus 
billion) deficit for the EU ever since the crisis began ($230/€201.6 billion in 
2014); in services, the EU has a surplus, which recently climbed rapidly to 
some $12/€10.5 billion in 2014.  
Figure ES1. Total trade EU28-China in goods, 1995-2014 
 
Data source: UNCTAD (2015). 
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Figure ES2. Imports from and exports to China of services (left-hand axis) and 
EU trade balance (right-hand axis), 2010-14  
 
Data source: OECD Statistics (2015). 
The EU’s main imports from China consist of mass consumption goods (with 
sharp prices, helping EU consumers), but China has gradually accomplished a 
more balanced sectoral position. The EU exports in particular machinery and 
transport equipment (no less than $126 billion in 2014) and chemicals, but 
increasingly (albeit from a low base) also agro-food products.  
Figure ES3. EU 2014 imports of mass consumer goods from China, 2010-14 
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) (UNCTAD) trade data, mapped to 
ISIC3 categories. 
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The EU’s 2013 FDI stock in China is around €130 billion, with China’s FDI 
stock in the EU steadily growing to some €27 billion in 2013. Altogether, 
trade and investment interdependence between China and the EU has 
become of major importance. 
Figure ES4. EU FDI stocks towards China, € billion, 2013 
 
Data source: DG Trade, European Commission (2016). 
Dependence 
on bilateral 
trade 
The ‘relative trade dependence’ of the partners has been rising, but it is a 
little asymmetric. The Chinese goods market as a share of all EU exports of 
goods rose from 1% in 1995 to 3.5% in 2014, a strong growth but from a low 
base. China relies relatively more on goods exports to the EU with a share of 
15%, which has fallen in recent years to 12%. On the import side, EU imports 
from China have become, relatively much more important, rising from 1½% 
of all EU imports in 1995 to no less than 8% in 2014. For China, imports from 
the EU have, relatively, been on the decline from no less than 16% in 1995 to 
12.5% in 2014, presumably due to the strong rise of intermediate input 
imports of China in the East Asia region. 
China and 
global value 
chains  
Understanding the functioning of global value chains, a specialised subject in 
its own right, is critical to appreciate future trade trends between the two 
economies and the possible role of European business in China-EU trade and 
FDI. Suffice it to note that EU companies have many links with China via the 
now traditional export processing zones (where many value chains ‘end’) but 
also more and more with establishments in China itself, both as a supplier of 
intermediate goods (both inside multinationals and between otherwise 
independent enterprises) and indeed as a producer of final goods for China 
and abroad, including Europe itself. However, one should not exaggerate the 
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extent to which trade with China arises from global value chains. Importers, 
retailers and wholesalers alike, for example, rely on China for sourcing, 
leading to major trade flows irrespective of diversified value chains. The 
study presents trade statistics in value-added terms in which imported inputs 
(into China) are deducted from China’s exports, with the result that what 
remains is genuine value-added in China [made ’by’ China]. The upshot is 
that the EU’s trade deficit with China is lower, by removing the double-
counting.  
Jobs and the 
Chinese 
connection 
Value-added statistics also facilitate the linking of EU jobs directly with the 
value-added of exports to China, and even the jobs linked to imports from 
China. The study shows that five EU countries have prominent job figures 
connected with EU-China trade (in goods), with Germany having as many 
jobs linked to its exports to China [1.122 million] as the four EU countries 
next on the list [France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK] together. 
However, imports from China also provide lots of jobs in various ways. These 
imports may consist of intermediate goods but also, and for large import 
values, of so-called mass consumption goods, creating numerous jobs in the 
distribution sector. In Figure ES5, services are included insofar as services 
have been incorporated in goods exported.  
Figure ES5. Number of EU jobs supported by member states’ exports to China, 
2011 
 
Data source: DG Trade, Joint Research Centre Trade and Jobs (2015). 
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Design and substance of an EU-China FTA 
After first discussing the appropriate design of a FTA between the EU and China, the 
substance of a ‘deep and comprehensive FTA’ is elaborated in nine chapters, besides a brief 
excursion to trade defence instruments (TDIs), such as anti-dumping (which are not a 
genuine FTA topic). The nine building blocks of such a FTA are: 1) bilateral tariff removal in 
industrial goods; 2) removal of tariffs and enlarging tariff-rate quotas (bilaterally) for agro-
foods; 3) reducing technical barriers to trade; 4) reducing sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
barriers in ago-foods, 5) free or improved market access in services, 6) (non-discriminatory) 
access to public procurement, 7) TRIPs-plus regulation and enforcement of IPRs (intellectual 
property rights) and generous recognition of geographic indications (GIs), 8) market 
conformity of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other competition issues, and finally 9) 
investment (both protection for investors and market access). 
What kind of 
FTA: Shallow, 
or deep and 
comprehen-
sive? 
The design of FTAs is based on a preliminary choice: to make either a ‘deep 
and comprehensive’ FTA or a ‘shallow’ one. This black-and-white contrast is 
perhaps less relevant in today’s world economy but it is helpful to clearly 
identify the choices to be made. A ‘deep and comprehensive’ FTA is very 
wide in scope of trade and investment areas, covering all relevant areas of a 
regulatory nature that can unnecessarily raise the cost of market access. It 
is also ‘deep’, that is, with firm legal commitments and enforcement 
options that are credible to market players, as well as with joint monitoring, 
options for appeal and possibly even a ‘living agreement’ allowing a further 
‘deepening’ of commitments over time. A ‘shallow’ FTA focuses mainly on 
tariffs and (say) origin rules, possibly services (but barely or not beyond 
GATS commitments of partners) and sometimes other chapters of a 
regulatory nature but solely with ‘best endeavours’ and mere cooperative 
intentions beyond the regulatory statutes of the WTO, e.g. the technical 
barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) agreements.  
Why a deep 
FTA is good 
China and the EU will first have to agree on this fundamental design issue, 
prior to a possible scoping exercise as the basis for trade negotiations. For 
China, this will present quite a challenge. Although it has begun 
experimenting with slightly deeper FTAs – but only in a staged approach –
they are far removed, as yet, from the typical design that the EU will have 
in mind. On the other hand, it is surely in China’s interest. Precisely a ‘deep 
and comprehensive’ FTA is an ideal mechanism allowing China to expose 
some of its goods and many services sectors to competition, as well as to 
support better regulatory practices in several domains. This would be a 
perfect fit for its domestic reforms and would undoubtedly encourage 
them. The argument that an ambitious FTA would be ‘unbalanced’ (for 
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China) has to be assessed with care. One might just as well hold that a 
shallow FTA is unbalanced for the EU given its comparative advantages.  
But there is also the economic argument that an ambitious FTA is more 
effective. Recent empirical economic research has demonstrated, more 
rigorously than before, that ‘deep’ FTAs generate far more additional trade 
than do shallow ones. 
What goods 
dominate in 
bilateral 
trade? 
EU-China goods trade is huge (together some $640 billion in industrial 
goods and $21 billion in agro-food in 2014). The top-three industrial sectors 
exporting to China are ‘various machinery’ (22.5%), automotive (22.5%) and 
electrical machinery. EU imports from China are highly concentrated with 
nearly half in electrical machinery and various machinery. As far as 
consumer goods are concerned, Figure E.S. 3 shows that imports of apparel 
/clothing, baby articles and toys, sporting goods, domestic equipment, 
footwear, furnishings and textile fabrics are important.  
Figure ES6. Top 10 European exports to the world (shares in total exports 
and shares directed to China, 2014 
 
Data source: Authors’ own calculation using World Integrated Trade Solution 
(WITS) data.  
Is China 
moving up the 
ladder? 
One begins to discern patterns of intra-industry trade between the 
European Union and China, at least at the (high) two-digit level of sectors. 
This is measured with so-called Grubel & Lloyd indices [from 0 to 1, the 
latter showing that intra-sectoral two-way trade is at the maximum]. The 
relevance of these indices is that they are a first indicator that China is 
moving up the ladder of comparative advantages, away from mere 
assembly. The study uses broad (two-digit) sectors for these indices – to 
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verify this in more detail would require elaborate analysis at the 4-, 6- and 
8-digit level of sectoral activities. In 2014, three sectors have indices above 
0.3: optical instruments (etc.) of 0.9 (which is extremely high), for various 
machinery (0.64) and electrical machinery (0.35); automotive remains just 
below with 0.28. Interestingly, this intense intra-sectoral trade takes place 
despite considerable tariff barriers in these areas. 
Other signs of 
moving up 
Another way to underpin empirically that China is broadening its sectoral 
industrial export base and moving ‘up market’ is the revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) index. With sectoral RCAs above 1, one can trace (relative) 
sectoral exports better than the world average. The study finds that i) not 
only traditional low-skill intensive sectors have Chinese RCAs (far) above 1, 
such as clothing, footwear and intermediates made from hides and skin, 
but also machinery and electrical equipment (a very large trade category, in 
which EU industries are world leaders, except for electronic mass-produced 
goods like computers, etc.); and ii) the RCAs of other industries are 
increasing recently, such as chemicals, plastic/rubber products, ceramic 
goods and metals (although transport equipment is decreasing).  
Tariff peaks 
are the real 
hurdles  
Industrial (applied) average tariffs are a little below 4% for the EU and 8% 
for China. Although double the EU average, the Chinese applied tariff 
average is not a major problem as such. The real problem with Chinese 
tariff protection arises from the (applied) tariff peaks, with over 1,400 8-
digit peak tariffs as against 45 for the EU [a peak tariff is defined by the 
WTO as higher than 15%]. With no less than 940 of these in specific 
clothing items – no longer a significant export item for the EU – the focus 
should be on comparative advantage sectors of the EU, such as various 
machinery (66 Chinese applied peaks), electrical machinery (93 peaks) and 
automotive (171 peaks). China faces 26 EU tariff peaks in footwear and 
another 19 in automotive and other transport equipment. If one considers 
the spread of these Chinese peaks in tariff ranges above the 15%, in various 
machinery, electrical machinery and automotive, the peaks are often 20% 
or higher still, with quite a few tariff peaks in the 25-35% range, or 35-45% 
range and a few even higher than 45% (example HS 8711, motorcycles). 
The EU simply does not have such tariff peaks outside agro-food.  
A word on 
trade defence 
instruments  
 
Some border duties are a result of the application of so-called ‘trade 
defence instruments’ (TDIs), the most important one being anti-dumping 
duties. Such TDIs are highly country-, product- and firm-specific. Both China 
and the EU have been active on the TDI front for many years, but the EU 
has targeted China much more than China the EU. The share of China being 
targeted in anti-dumping cases (as a % of all cases by the EU) has gradually 
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moved up since 2001 (when China became a WTO member). In 2014, no 
less than 47% of all EU anti-dumping measures in force were against a 
Chinese enterprise (sometimes with firms from other countries). For China 
(in 2013), EU companies were targeted in only 15% of cases. Still, TDIs are 
not normally part of FTA negotiations. In 2016, the debate on TDIs with 
respect to China is dominated by the so-called MES (market-economy 
status in anti-dumping) question: Should China no longer be treated as a 
non-market economy in anti-dumping procedures but rather as a country 
(economy) like all others, that is, accepting internal Chinese market prices 
as driven by market processes? Again, this is not a FTA question at all. The 
present study incorporates a short review but only in an informative sense. 
Why? Because the present climate, dominated by MES debates, is less than 
ideal for initiating exploratory talks on a possible FTA and this has to be 
realised. On the other hand, the extreme overcapacities in steel, aluminium 
and ceramics that China has allowed to develop artificially and for so long, 
have such important negative international spill-over effects (also, but not 
only, in the EU), that, MES or not, it is in the interest of all major trading 
partners – first of all, China itself – to address them firmly without delay, no 
matter how painful.  
Market access 
in agro-food  
Market access in agriculture has traditionally been more difficult for very 
many WTO members almost everywhere across the globe. At first, China 
went even further. For centuries, the country has pursued self-sufficiency in 
agro-food, but gradually, it is changing its position, in part, because greater 
prosperity has generated more sophisticated demand than is less easily 
satisfied locally, and, in part, because food quality and safety are not fully 
trusted by Chinese consumers. The two traditional instruments of trade 
protection in agro-food are tariffs and TRQs (tariff rate quotas). Weighted 
MFN-applied tariffs in agro-food are 12.3% for China and 6.9% for the EU. 
EU and China’s bilateral agro-food exports are more or less balanced, 
although the trend shows that EU bilateral exports are growing faster (and 
reached a small surplus in 2014). The principal EU exports are beverages, 
meat and cereals, whereas China exports fish, products of animal origin and 
edible vegetables. However, many subsectors for both Parties participate in 
bilateral agro-food trade.  
More on agro-
food tariffs 
Tariffs for agro-food can be high. For the EU this is the case for dairy 
products (8.1%), processed agricultural products (PAPs; 14%), sugar and 
confectionary (11.4%) and beverages & tobacco (23.1%). For China these 
two-digit tariff averages are always higher, not least in sectors of EU export 
strength, such as beverages (26%), sugar & confectionary (25%), PAPs 
(17%), cereals (etc.) (18%) and dairy products (13%). Also, for various 
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animal products, where EU tariffs are low, Chinese tariff averages hover 
around 11%-12%.  
Tariffs peaks in 
agro-food 
Tariff peaks are relatively numerous. The EU and China exhibit some 
striking differences. Whereas the EU’s protection is very targeted, with 144 
(applied) tariff peaks at the 8-digit level in fish, 21 in fruit, 120 in prepared 
meat or fish and no less than 431 for prepared fruits & vegetables (with 
other subsectors having virtually no peaks at all), China has spread applied 
tariff peaks over practically all agro-food sectors. Two conspicuous 
subsectors are prepared fruit & vegetables with 104 peaks and fruit with 
52. Going to the 6-digit level, one observes that the EU has 60% of its tariff 
peaks in the 15-20% range (China only 17%), implying that Chinese peaks 
are very often higher than EU peaks, if and when they are in the same 
subsector.  
Why tariff-rate 
quotas matter 
but less 
TRQs are also quite different between China and the EU. A TRQ maintains a 
low or zero tariff for a certain volume of imports [the quota], and a high (or 
prohibitive) tariff for beyond-quota imports. On the one hand, the EU is far 
more protectionist than China in this respect: the EU maintains 269 8-digit 
TRQs as against China, with 47. Second, whereas the EU regime is very 
complicated (and partly seasonal as well), China’s TRQ regime is simple. But 
for the FTA, the good news is that only three subsectors overlap in terms of 
TRQs: cereals, milling products and sugar (etc.). This implies that one 
another’s bilateral exports are not or hardly hit by TRQs. For example, 
Chinese TRQs for wheat, cotton, rice and wool account for most of the 
TRQs, and these are not offensive interests for the EU. 
TBTs can 
severely 
hinder 
effective 
market access 
Technical barriers to trade are an important issue in EU-China goods trade. 
Both Parties are WTO members and hence subscribe to the WTO TBT 
Agreement. This includes a notification system to the WTO TBT Committee. 
The rates of notification (quite high for China, a little less high for the EU) 
are not a good indicator for the frequency and/or costs of TBTs. The so-
called ‘specific trade concerns’ are about notifications that raise TBT 
concerns with other WTO members. The EU has introduced 40 such 
concerns with respect to China (quite high for the WTO) and China has 
raised 26 such concerns with respect to the EU. The costs of TBTs have to 
be added to other market-access costs for industrial exporters. There are 
(rough econometric) estimates in the economic literature of such TBT costs 
(or, more precisely, any extra costs on top of tariffs, so this may include SPS 
measures or others), but these estimates are to be taken with several 
grains of salt. Nonetheless, what is clear is that these extra costs for market 
access are much higher than average tariffs, and hence, they often add 
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significantly to the costs of market access. In subsectors with a higher (say, 
a peak) tariff and TBTs, it might mean that effective market access is not 
feasible.  
Systemic TBT 
issues in China 
Chinese TBTs and EU TBTs appear to be not very different when looked at 
on a case-by-case basis, in their technical details, but there are differences 
in the two TBT regimes. By far the most important difference is systemic: 
the overall Chinese regime (governance) of technical regulations, standards 
and conformity assessment has emerged from a planned, top-down 
regulated economy, at first in relative isolation. The planned economy and 
the isolation are no longer true, but their legacies are found everywhere 
and shape many decisions and non-decisions. There is even a fundamental 
problem of terminology (for example, what a ‘technical standard’ really is) 
which is not in line with the TBT Agreement and its annex, applied by 
standardisation bodies worldwide. China – as part of this legacy – does not 
have standardisation bodies like most other WTO members have. These are 
private bodies creating market-driven standards, which – at times – can 
also be employed for regulation. Until 2015, standardisation was heavily 
done by ministries. The state influence is basically omnipresent, precisely 
because business standards bodies with open-inquiry procedures are 
absent. There is also fragmentation of the Chinese [not-so] single market as 
well as a legacy of far too many institutions, ministries, agencies and others 
having some ill-defined regulatory or standardisation competence (which 
they are loathe to give up), with uncertainty and unproductive overlap as a 
result. The Chinese leadership has therefore decided to start a genuine 
overhaul of the system, begun in 2015. This study makes an attempt to 
appreciate the nature and consequences of this systemic reform. However, 
the reform plans do not include the creation, in the market, of private, 
independent standards bodies like CEN/CENELEC or more or less similar US 
bodies.  
TBT details 
and examples 
Helped by systematic, annual reporting by EU businesses in China, this 
study attempts to illustrate many examples of TBTs, including problems of 
conformity assessment. On the Chinese side, no such reporting is known to 
exist, but WTO reporting does provide some insights into the character and 
magnitude of the barriers Chinese exporters face in the EU. China does not 
have a RAPEX (Rapid Exchange) alert system for dangerous non-food goods 
for consumers or workers. The EU system has functioned for one and a half 
decades now and China is by far the largest culprit in these reports. For 
consumers, in 2014, notifications of such dangerous goods coming from 
China were far ahead of any other country [1,462 as compared to the 
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second country, Turkey with 66 and the US with 60], and this has been a 
trend for the past decade. The EU and China have set up several technical 
cooperation programmes to address these problems. For workers, there 
were (in 2014) 37 notifications for China as against 25 for all other 
countries together. 
Systemic SPS 
issues in China 
SPS measures on food, feed and plant health, although different from TBTs 
in some respects, show similarities with the systemic issues in TBTs. It is 
clear that China struggles with (technical) capacity questions, and the EU 
has set up an extensive capacity-building programme with China in an 
attempt to bring the technical backing of authorities in SPS issues up to 
standard throughout this large country. In an unusually frank style, the 
WTO has criticised China’s approach to SPS issues thus far, focusing again 
on systemic questions. The thrust is that there are too many state organs at 
several levels of government and too many laws and regulations, without 
much transparency or discipline (e.g. long and indefinite waiting times). An 
unusual number of products are subject to possible SPS measures (indeed, 
some 2,032 tariff lines at the 8-digit level).  
SPS details and 
examples 
Again, WTO notifications are not a good indicator of SPS barriers; rather, 
they serve as an open invitation to other WTO members to be available for 
consultation, should this be seen as necessary. Nevertheless, China is an 
active notifier (but so is the US). It is striking that China seems incapable of 
solving outstanding trade irritants in SPS in a speedy manner: both the US 
and the EU have old trade concerns that have still not been addressed 
effectively. The top three concerns in more general terms with respect to 
China are: i) insufficient respect for international ‘standards’ from 
international organisations of which China is a member (e.g. Codex 
Alimentarius, the OIE for animal health and IPPC for plant health); ii) very 
lengthy, complex and non-transparent application procedures; and iii) 
‘embedded discrimination’ in several ways. For the EU, this latter is 
manifested principally in China’s lack of recognition that, in SPS issues, 
overwhelmingly, the EU is a single market with fully harmonised rules and 
inspection (nonetheless, China goes member state by member state, 
without any serious justification). The study lists specific EU and Chinese 
trade concerns in SPS matters. For the EU exporters, procedures can be 
extremely costly (a detailed example on accessing the meat market in 
China, after basic approval has already been granted, is provided in the full 
study).  
Export 
potential in 
It is clear that the tough transition from the old planned economy, together 
with China’s extremely rapid growth (which has catapulted the country in a 
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agro-food to 
be tapped 
short period to expectations of world levels of compliance), are the main 
reasons for these problems. It is important to urgently address SPS barriers 
because the incipient Chinese demand for EU agro-food products is very 
high, despite the extra SPS costs and often-high tariffs. The potential is only 
beginning to be tapped. 
Services trade 
restricted, 
mostly by 
China 
EU-China cross-border services trade is still underdeveloped. Moreover, 
mode 3 of the General Agreement for Trade in Services (GATS) – essentially 
FDI with a view to supply services locally – is also severely restricted (see 
further). The EU’s barriers to cross-border services trade are usually lower 
(or absent), but formally the EU maintains some barriers legally as a form of 
reciprocity. These EU barriers could easily be lifted in a FTA. There are two 
STRI (Services Trade Restrictiveness Index or STRI) indicators to measure 
the restrictiveness of services regulation in OECD/G-20 countries. The study 
shows that i) the regulatory restrictiveness of Chinese services markets is 
much greater than that of the EU and ii) some services markets in China are 
de facto closed for investors but also for cross-border trade. However, and 
despite an enormous database underlying them, these STRI indicators 
(from the World Bank and the OECD) have serious imperfections, such that, 
for transport and telecoms, they contradict each other in the case of China 
and the EU. Therefore, one should be cautious in relying on them too 
much.  
What lies 
behind 
Chinese 
restrictiveness 
in services? 
The study attempts to comprehend the serious transition problem China 
also faces in the case of services. It is far behind in services as a share of 
GDP, even compared to other BRICs, presumably due to its emergence 
from a planned economy (where services ‘did not matter’) as well as to the 
emphasis on export-led growth via assembly and (at first) little else. A 
cardinal problem for China is that, in order to make such a transition 
effectively, as one remembers from the experience in Eastern Europe, a 
hard, credible and consistent regime should reside at the basis of such deep 
reforms. It is nearly impossible to create such an ‘economic constitution’ 
from within, to serve as a proper, pro-competitive regulatory ‘anchor’ in 
the rough waters of transition. At the time of the East European transition, 
this ‘anchor’ was the EU and it was fully accepted as authoritative due to 
‘pre-accession’ and future EU membership. In China, effective 
transformation has to be based on internal political forces, lingering (but 
‘former’) institutions and legacies. Amongst these legacies are the SOEs, 
which are very prominent in services markets, via regulations (and bans for 
others) and extreme market power, and enjoy privileged access to finance 
and top political support (directly from the Party).  
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Details on 
services 
restrictions, 
also in China’s 
recent FTAs 
This study also goes into practical details. It comprises a list of regulatory 
and related aspects of services in China, with attention paid to the original 
GATS commitments of China, market access issues, national treatment, SOE 
presence and miscellaneous aspects. This survey covers 14 broad services 
sectors. A table surveying possible access barriers for Chinese companies to 
the EU (in seven sectors) based on WTO information is included as well. In 
order to gauge the prospects for a ‘deep and comprehensive’ FTA with 
China in this area, an attempt is made to compare two recent FTAs which 
seem relevant as a comparison: the China-Korea FTA of 2015 and the EU-
Vietnam (also emerging from a planned economy) FTA of 2015. The 
comparison deals with eight aspects including e.g. whether or not it is 
combined with investment, what services sectors are in, national treatment 
and MFN as well as competitive safeguards. One inference is that China is 
beginning to shift to slightly more ambitious FTAs, but cautiously as well as 
in stages. The China-Korea FTA does not incorporate a SOE chapter, but the 
EU-Vietnam agreement does, although not (yet) as ambitious as, for 
example TPP has, even though Vietnam is also a TPP signatory. A FTA 
between the EU and China cannot possibly be imagined without an 
ambitious services chapter (and – not to forget – in combination with 
drastic mode 3 (FDI) liberalisation, discussed below). At the same time, 
Chinese reforms would not be serious if far-reaching opening-up of services 
would not be accomplished. China can catch two birds with a single stone: 
bilateral (and perhaps also plurilateral) liberalisation of access to services 
markets in a FTA with the EU. 
Public 
procurement: 
no level-
playing field 
whatsoever  
The EU and China have very divergent regimes for public procurement. The 
EU adheres to the plurilateral WTO Government Procurement Agreement 
(GPA). In accordance with its WTO Accession Protocol, China started 
negotiations to accede to the GPA. After six offers from China, the 
negotiations are still ongoing. Essentially, China is closed for foreign 
competitors bidding for public procurement contracts, except in cases of 
shortages of technology or otherwise. Chinese companies have a much 
easier time in the EU and manage to obtain contracts in the public 
procurement market for substantial amounts. For example, in 2013, 
Chinese companies acquired €5.25 billion worth of contracts for work in the 
EU; while the business turnover of completed works reached €4.01 billion. 
China has concluded 13 FTAs, but in none of them has public procurement 
been incorporated. Market access for public procurement is not found in 
any other bilateral, regional or multilateral agreement signed by China.  
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Although access to EU procurement markets is relatively unproblematic, 
Chinese businesses complain that the EU public procurement market 
suffers from persistent fragmentation, which brings about unpredictability, 
increased business costs and risks. Still, EU companies in China are not 
granted the reciprocal treatment that they understandably wish to enjoy. 
They face ‘buy-China’ policies in China and are confronted with ‘offset’ 
requirements such as local content and technology transfer. These are 
exactly the areas where China has been trying to make improvements in its 
GPA offers, but it seems that the concessions are not sufficient. 
China joining 
the GPA, but 
not yet 
Looking at the six GPA offers that China submitted, the concessions made 
were extensive in three aspects, i.e. i) widened coverage of procuring 
entities and ii) of the relevant goods, services and works, as well as iii) 
lowered thresholds. Additionally, China went for a 3-year, instead of 5-year 
grace period to implement the GPA upon accession. Moreover, in China’s 
6th offer, activities in the fields of drinking water, electricity, energy, 
transportation, telecommunications and postal services have been offered, 
in late 2014, for procurement coverage, which is symbolic since these 
sectors are typically SOE-dominated. One has to read this offer with the 
knowledge that SOEs have not been offered as covered entities in China’s 
GPA offers to date. Addressing the SOE question in earnest is a crucial 
offensive interest of the EU. What EU businesses insist on is that China 
offers more entities at more administrative levels and in more provincial 
territories with even more lowered thresholds. All these demands are in 
addition to the EU’s insistence on establishing a more transparent and non-
discriminatory institutional framework.  
Public 
procurement 
laws for 
budget 
control, but 
the ‘public 
market’ is also 
a big trade 
issue  
It is too little realised in the EU that the public procurement regime in the 
EU and in China have different purposes. The EU enforces transparent, fair 
and competitive public procurement across the EU’s single market in order 
to generate (equal) business opportunities, drive economic growth and 
create jobs, but of course also to ensure that tax money is spent 
efficiently. In the old planned economy, where all property was collectively 
owned and given the overwhelming influence of the state in the past, 
regulating the use of public funds appeared redundant. Therefore, before 
the 1980s, there were no public procurement laws/regulations. Still today, 
public procurement is not seen as a component of trade, but rather as a 
device for budgetary control and discipline, and therefore a means to 
eliminate corruption and to use public funds more effectively. Negotiating 
the country’s GPA accession has served as an internal drive for China’s 
institutional reform of its public procurement system. The country has 
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made much progress in regulating its public procurement market, now 
governed by various laws and implementing regulations, completed with a 
centralised website to publish information pertaining to tenders at central 
and local government levels.  
A mechanism of checks and balances has been installed, complete with a 
public-private-partnership model of cooperation in procurement of services 
and works. The country is now working to tackle accounting irregularities in 
the area of public procurement, as is seen from the Implementing Rules of 
the Government Procurement Law. One can appreciate these internal 
developments as one of many pillars of domestic reform. Still, China cannot 
continue to ignore that its public purchases and works represent a giant 
market that, in WTO circles, is not expected to be closed completely. And 
the suggestion of a FTA with the EU must imply the genuine preparedness 
to regard public procurement as a major trade issue as well. A FTA with 
China would be on a GPA-plus basis, if the EU has its way. Therefore, it is 
indispensable for China to join the GPA first, as a stepping stone to 
negotiate public procurement in an EU-China FTA. 
Successful IPR 
cooperation, 
yielding sound 
(Chinese) IPR 
laws  
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) are important to the EU’s economic 
growth. It is estimated that IPR-intensive sectors account for around 39% of 
EU GDP (worth some €4.7 trillion annually) and, taking indirect jobs into 
account, up to 35% of all jobs. China, although having achieved remarkable 
progress in IPR legislation in the three decades since the early 1980s, is still 
confronted with serious challenges of weaker IPR protection and 
enforcement, which adversely affects the country’s ambition of becoming 
an innovative economy. EU businesses in China complain about 
unpredictable administrative enforcement, the patent linkage practice, 
uncertain admissibility of supplementary data for pharmaceutical product 
patent applications, weak enforcement on theft of trade secrets and 
copyright ownership. Chinese authorities have actively engaged European 
businesses via public consultations and suggestions to improve its IPR 
legislation. However, the principal problem is implementation and 
enforcement. Chinese businesses in Europe have no complaints against the 
EU’s IPR protection regime. Chinese enterprises, such as Huawei 
Technologies and ZTE Corporation, for example, are top patent applicants 
under the EPO (European Patent Office) filing system.  
FTA can follow 
a TRIPS-plus 
approach, but 
what about 
IPR chapters are found in all of China’s recent FTAs, while the depth and 
breadth of protection measures are on the increase in recent years. In 
2015, the IPR chapters in the China-Korea and China-Australia FTAs provide 
in great detail the degree and scope of IPR protection, taking a ‘TRIPS plus’ 
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enforcement? approach. The EU’s IPR chapter in its FTAs is consistent in its position, which 
is to “complement and specify” the rights and obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement, but with a much wider protection scope encompassing 
basically all international IPR treaties. The presumption is that the EU and 
China should be able to conclude an IPR chapter in an FTA because China’s 
IPR policy/law is ambitious in providing protection that is in the country’s 
best interest in transforming its economy into one driven by innovation. 
The only problem, but a major one on the Chinese side, is implementation 
(delays, inconsistency and enforcement). Counterfeiting has consistently 
turned out to be a problem when goods arrive at EU borders: Chinese 
goods (to be) imported into the EU seem to be champions in counterfeiting 
(some two-thirds of all detected cases).  
Constructive 
approach to 
GIs 
The EU, as the originator of geographical indicator (GI) protection, has 
taken the lead worldwide in identifying and protecting their GIs. China, as a 
latecomer to GI protection, has a range of local products corresponding to 
the concept of GIs, but only a few of them are already known or protected 
globally. At the end of 2012, 10 Chinese food names received protected 
status in the EU as GIs, as a result of the EU-China Geographical Indications 
“10 plus 10” pilot project. Since then, there has been no application for the 
protection of extra Chinese GIs. GI protection in China is handicapped by 
fragmented registration and protection systems, which are often embroiled 
in disputes among different interest groups of businesses.  
EU-China 
bilateral GIs 
with great 
opportunities 
China ranks in the EU’s top five of GI exports (agricultural products, 
foodstuffs, wines and spirits).The EU is negotiating a bilateral agreement 
with China on the protection of GIs, aimed at providing protection in China 
of a first list of EU GIs with 100 names for agricultural products, including 
dairy and meat products. China is now the world’s fourth-largest importer 
of food, and the food and grocery retail market is set to grow by 15% 
annually. Additionally, as Chinese domestic consumers have deep concerns 
over food safety and the quality and origin of ingredients, EU firms are 
present with excellent opportunities to make huge commercial gains, if 
only they can penetrate the market (see tariffs, TRQs and SPS) and if the EU 
and China can agree to execute effective measures to protect its GI 
products. 
China’s FTA 
approach on 
GIs so far 
Among the 13 FTAs that China has concluded so far, bilateral GI protection 
appears as a component only in the FTAs with Peru, New Zealand, Australia 
and Switzerland. More often than not, however, the provisions look ’best-
endeavour’ style, without substantive commitment. The EU and China are 
presently negotiating a ‘comprehensive’ agreement on GIs, which 
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undoubtedly goes further. Besides strengthening cooperation in the field of 
GI protection and supervision and combating counterfeiting, it should pave 
the way for more European GI-protected goods to penetrate the Chinese 
market, and vice versa on a reciprocal basis. Once completed, this would 
render a FTA easier to negotiate as well.  
The CAI and 
EU-China 
investment 
treat 
The EU-China negotiations on a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment 
(CAI) started in September 2012. The idea is to first negotiate a CAI and 
then to consider the exploration of a FTA, for the EU under reform 
conditions. In January 2016, the two Parties announced there would be a 
wide scope of the CAI negotiations, which should improve market access 
opportunities for their investors and guarantee that they will not 
discriminate against their respective companies, as well as to provide for a 
high and balanced level of protection for investors and their investments. 
Key challenges of the (mainly Chinese) regulatory environment, relating to 
transparency, licensing and authorisation procedures, are also on the 
negotiation table.  
Why the CAI? The two primary objectives of a CAI are to achieve market access for the EU 
and for Chinese investors (to each other’s market) as well as modern 
investment protection. The far-reaching restrictions for foreign investors to 
enter and/or do business in many Chinese services and goods markets form 
a powerful motivation to negotiate a CAI. Data reveal that China has the 
most restrictive FDI regime among 58 countries, including all OECD and G20 
countries, and covering 22 sectors, such as agriculture, mining & quarrying 
(including oil extraction), manufacturing, oil refinery & chemicals, retail and 
transport. Thus, for China to create a level playing field for foreign 
companies already in China or for potential entrants is a very tall order. A 
second EU motivation is to overcome the fragmentation of investment 
protection for European firms due to national BITs with China, some of 
which are also hopelessly outdated and were concluded in the mid-1980s.  
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 Figure ES7. FDI restrictiveness index, 2014 
 
Data source: OECD Database (2016). 
Deep 
asymmetry in 
FDI market 
access 
Whereas EU companies face serious access problems in China, Chinese 
companies have relatively easy access to the European market, although 
complaints do exist, especially in relation to the movement of natural 
persons (mode 4, GATS). Investment obstacles in China are of two types. 
The first type consists of the overall Chinese investment strategy, based not 
so much on principles of free markets (with an exception here or there), 
but rather on categorising FDI in four classes: prohibited, restricted, 
allowed and encouraged. This regime is adapted over time so that it 
amounts to an industrial strategy or what are called ‘structural policies’ 
fitting the five-year plans of China. Therefore, access issues are found in the 
first three classes in various ways. The second type refers to ‘post-
establishment’ when EU (and other foreign) investors experience an 
uneven playing field for doing business, i.e. a myriad of policy restrictions 
and forms of discrimination.  
Can the CAI 
bridge the 
expectation 
gap (from 
today’s FTAs)? 
China is keen to further open up and also wishes to solicit ‘external 
pressure’ to push forward reforms, but it seems to be of two minds. 
Comparing the investment chapter under respective FTAs concluded by 
China and the EU, for China, substantive provisions on market access are 
left for further negotiations post-FTA. Moreover, what China has agreed to 
offer in terms of market access (pre- and post-establishment) typically 
reduces the EU’s stance by half. For example, the ‘pre-establishment’ phase 
of investment is not covered under national treatment, while what is 
covered are “expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or 
other disposition of investments in its territory”. “Performance 
requirements” comply with the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
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Measures (TRIMs) which are only applicable to trade in goods. In contrast, 
the EU wants cross-border “trade in services” as well as least-restrictive 
local services provision in most services markets to be included as a priority 
in the FTA.  
Linking the CAI 
to the FTA? 
The EU is determined to see a good outcome from the CAI negotiations, 
which, in turn, serves as a prior condition for beginning to explore a FTA. As 
for China, it should be expected to pursue its ‘opening up’ based on its own 
agenda. This agenda is full of pro-market reforms in very general terms but 
with, so far, very little to show in actual practice for business. Therefore, 
when pressing ahead with its CAI demands, the EU ought to ask itself what 
effective leverage it has. Will integrating CAI in a FTA not be a more 
sensible and effective option, or, would that further postpone the effective 
arrival of improved investment market access by a few more years? 
State-owned 
enterprises: 
The biggest 
legacy 
problem 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a special but very important subject in 
EU-China trade and investment. A FTA cannot be negotiated without 
addressing in earnest this major legacy problem in China. SOEs, far from 
being treated in China in a non-preferential way and solely under 
commercial considerations (Art. XVII, GATT), are still strongholds of the old 
Chinese planning and economic system, despite several significant reforms 
in the last three decades. SOEs, which wield enormous market power in a 
series of large-scale industries and a range of services markets, are 
protected by a battery of restrictions (or outright bans). Their CEOs have 
received special blessings from the Party, they enjoy privileges in access to 
finance in a number of complex ways and have recently become 
frontrunners in China’s FDI strategies abroad. But their record in 
productivity growth record over time is poor: private firms’ productivity in 
China grows twice as fast, despite all the facilitation that SOEs enjoy.  
SOEs, new to 
China’s FTAs 
Economically and politically, SOEs are as much a liability as a formidable 
force. Three SOEs from China rank in the top-ten of the Fortune-500. Many 
SOEs are giant firms. In some sectors, however, they have created and 
maintained unbelievable excess capacities (in aluminium, ceramics and, 
above all, steel; in steel, with suggested loss coverage of many billions, 
possibly as high as €30 billion a year, if no open markets are found). If China 
wants to introduce effective and profound reforms, it cannot avoid the SOE 
issue. Whether for ideological reasons, or plain lobbying and vested 
interests, the SOEs are not formally part of the 2013 reform roadmaps, as 
announced so far.  
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SOEs are also a liability in trade and investment relations. The China-Korea 
FTA does not incorporate a SOE chapter, although the intense Korea-China 
economic intercourse is profoundly influenced by the highly distortive and 
restrictive business environment. The EU and e.g. TPP (with a proper SOE 
chapter) are adamant that the SOE question is seriously settled once and 
for all, for the good of China (a kind of pressure it often says it welcomes) 
and for undistorted market-driven economic relations with WTO partners.  
SOEs, a serious 
liability 
Domestically, European businesses in China are discriminated against – 
there simply is nothing like a level-playing field vis-à-vis Chinese SOEs, while 
Chinese businesses in the EU enjoy national treatment, with access to 
judicial review if necessary. So, EU businesses in China express frustration 
over the lack of market access as well as the multitude of restrictions they 
face and long for reciprocity. Internationally, Chinese SOEs are the 
frontrunners of the country’s global investment, helped by guaranteed 
access to the government coffers [including frequently provincial and local 
ones] which seem bottomless. Their success in FDI may sooner or later 
backfire and begin to undermine the benefits from international trade and 
investment based on non-discrimination and respect for market principles.  
Figure ES8. Share of SOEs among the top 10 firms in 16 selected countries 
(%) 
 
Note: Only countries with shares above 10% are shown. 
Source: P. Kowalski et al. (2013), “State-owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and 
Policy Implications”, OECD Trade Policy Paper No. 147, OECD, Paris. 
SOEs and 
Chinese 
reforms 
Following the Third Plenum in 2013, China has pledged to reform its SOEs, 
reducing the subsidies they have enjoyed and diluting state holdings. But it 
remains to be seen how China will implement all these measures 
11% 13% 15% 16%
17%
23%
37%
48% 50%
59%
67% 68% 69%
81%
88%
96%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 25 
 
effectively, within the set timeframe up to 2020. SOEs impede China’s 
implementation of an effective competition policy, too, since they do not 
seem to be subject to competition policy, following Art. 7 of the Anti-
Monopoly Law (AML) of 2008. In the absence of specific implementing 
rules, this defeats the purpose of competition policy.  
EU-China 
cooperation 
on anti-trust is 
fruitful 
Otherwise, China is making rapid progress with competition policy. The EU 
and China have worked together in this field for many years and it is now 
beginning to show, in particular with respect to merger control. AML covers 
monopolistic operations having anti-competitive effects on the Chinese 
market (that is, operations within China as well as activities outside China, 
but also affecting the domestic market). EU competition law serves as the 
main reference for the AML on restrictive business practices, abuse of 
dominant position (cf. Arts.101, 102, TFEU) and the EU merger Regulation. 
But deeper 
commitments 
and subsidies 
disciplines are 
desirable 
EU businesses complain that China’s competition policy (AML, in particular, 
with respect to mergers) principally targets foreign businesses. But after a 
careful reality check, this allegation appears to hold little truth. Other 
complaints focus on implementation practice (especially the merger & 
acquisition transaction review), procedural rules, transparency and 
enforcement discrepancies in different localities with regard to price-
related investigations due to local interest and protectionism. So far, 
China’s competition chapters in its FTAs feature provisions on cooperation 
that are principles-based, but the EU prefers to negotiate commitments. It 
favours detailed provisions, not just soft-law approaches to substance, for 
example, on ‘specific subsidies’ which are permissible depending on proper 
justification, whereas blanket and unlimited subsidies should be prohibited. 
Such commitments would have a very significant effect on China’s SOEs. 
 
An EU-China FTA: Its economic impact and adjustment issues 
The study also provides simulation estimates of the economic impact of a stylised EU-China 
FTA. The economic impact is calculated with the help of a complex CGE model, the technical 
format of which is ‘state-of-the-art’, and with the newest GTAP 2011 world database, 
probably the best available anywhere. The economic impact is provided with respect to the 
effect on GDP of the EU and China, and of all the EU member states, as well as the effects on 
industrial and services sectors’ output and bilateral trade. In addition, labour issues are 
studied. Wage increases are calculated for workers at three skill levels. Given the nature of 
the model (which does not allow the direct measurement of temporary unemployment, 
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however, which might result from heavier competition in such a FTA), these wage increases 
occur for a given employment, assuming the immediate adjustment by all workers. Of 
course, these assumptions are unrealistic, which is why a separate section is devoted to this 
labour adjustment issue for workers in a few sectors where output is likely to shrink due to 
the FTA. However, in most sectors of goods and services, the simulation shows positive 
effects, also implying more jobs overall. 
How the 
economic 
impacts were 
empirically 
analysed? 
The stylised FTA (used in the model) has two variants: a ‘modest’ one with 
full removal of bilateral tariffs and 25% reduction in of the cost of 
regulatory barriers in goods and the same in services; and an ‘ambitious’ 
one, stylised with full bilateral tariff removal and 50% reduction in the costs 
of regulatory barriers on goods markets and also 50% reduction in the costs 
of regulatory barriers in services markets. Since, on the whole, the costs of 
regulatory barriers in goods and services markets are far higher than 
average tariffs, one should expect this ‘deep and comprehensive’ FTA, 
which addresses TBT and SPS issues as well as access to services markets, 
to generate greater economic effects than a tariff-only (‘shallow’) FTA. The 
term employed in the study and which is common in the literature is NTMs, 
non-tariff measures, which mostly boil down to regulatory barriers. 
Whereas empirical economic analysis of tariff removal has been well 
known for a longer period of time, the estimates of NTM costs – that is, the 
costs of regulatory barriers of tremendous complexity – is much more 
difficult. Since the simulation has used the newest estimates of the costs of 
NTMs, one has to accept that these measures are nevertheless quite 
problematic and employed only because there is no better alternative. The 
relevant model chapters 18 and 19 therefore use the term ‘actionable’ 
NTMs, that is, the part of simple average NTM costs that can be reduced 
via the FTA. Although the costs of NTMs differ significantly between China 
and the EU (simple average of 36.7% for goods and 43.5% in services for 
China against 22.8% and 20.9% for the EU), the ‘actionable’ NTM 
reductions are also distinct: some 12.9% cost reduction of market access 
for the EU and some 22.3% for China. Such percentages are much higher 
than the average tariffs of the EU (less than 4%) and of China (8%). This is 
the fundamental argument why a ‘deep’ FTA is so crucial. China has 
substantially higher relative NTM cost levels for motor vehicles and 
services, while the EU has relatively higher NTM cost levels in low-wage 
sectors like textiles, clothing and footwear, as well as in paper and metals.  
FTA’s positive 
impact on GDP 
The EU-China FTA is simulated to affect GDP positively: it will be (by 2030) 
1.16% higher in China and 0.43% higher in the EU under the modest FTA, 
but 1.87% higher in China and 0.76% higher in the EU under the ambitious 
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FTA. Because EU income is higher overall, the outcomes in money terms 
are more balanced: $62.5 (now €55.8) billion for China and $54.3 (now 
€48.5) billion for the EU in the modest case; $99.7 (now €89.1) billion for 
China and $93.2 (now €83.3) billion for the EU in the ambitious case.  
Why the 
results are an 
underestimate 
These results are an underestimate of the full economic effects for two sets 
of reasons. One set has to do with the intrinsic limitations of these models, 
despite their crucial general equilibrium characteristics (which incorporate 
all secondary effects to all markets and further responses as well, both 
domestically and in third countries). Several aspects are simply not 
included in such models but are bound to be affected by an ambitious FTA, 
such as: i) investment effects and their repercussions; ii) the trade-FDI 
nexus via value chains or intra-industry trade (in other words, with easier 
and freer FDI in China, EU-China trade in e.g. components) might be 
complementary; similar effects are likely for business services, too; iii) 
various dynamic effects (including innovation, new business models and 
IPR questions); and iv) the non-regulatory improvement of market 
functioning in China (e.g. if SOEs would be disciplined and no longer so 
super-dominant; also, improvement of transparency and governance, the 
lack of which is a major complaint of European business in China). Public 
procurement is also not ‘in’ in a satisfactory way, and this alone is a 
significant potential market in China, even when a small fraction would be 
eligible. Another set of reasons is more technical, mainly the problematic 
nature of the estimates of the costs of NTMs, in spite of efforts to improve 
this work. In particular, the cost levels of NTMs in services are suspected to 
be on the low side – one can observe that the opening up of services seems 
to contribute relatively little to the GDP effects and to increases in bilateral 
trade.  
GDP effects for 
member states 
Effects on GDP have also been simulated for all EU member states. The 
range of GDP changes goes from 0.47% for Portugal to 1.97% for Slovakia, 
in the ambitious FTA, while in the modest FTA, this range stretches from 
0.27% (Portugal) to 1.34% (Slovakia again). All EU member states gain 
somewhat in both scenarios. 
Powerful trade 
effects 
EU bilateral exports to China increase strongly, by between 79.2% (modest) 
and 110.64% (ambitious), while there is a tiny drop in exports to the rest of 
the world. Overall EU exports go up by between 2.2% and 3.2%, 
respectively. China’s exports to the EU increase by between 39.2% 
(modest) and 56.9% (ambitious), with a larger increase in total exports in 
value than for the EU. In addition, in China’s case, there is a slight increase 
in exports to the rest of the world. Hence, the trade effects of the FTA are 
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quite powerful, with more than a doubling of EU exports and a 60% 
increase in the already very large Chinese exports (of goods mainly) to the 
EU.  
Figure ES9. FTA effects on EU output, exports and imports (changes by 
sectors, ambitious scenario)  
 
 
Note: Trade is with the world.  
Real wages up 
for workers, 
three skill 
levels 
The effects on real wages are as follows: China’s real wage gains (in %) are 
smaller than overall GDP gains, while EU gains are somewhat higher. This 
reflects the respective patterns of trade. The EU imports much more 
consumer goods than vice versa – indeed, a large portion of EU imports of 
goods are ‘mass consumer goods’ which (can) directly raise real disposable 
income of EU consumers via a reduction in the cost of living insofar as such 
imports from China are cheaper than local substitutes. One also observes a 
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wide range of effects in EU member states, ranging from 1.66% for real 
wages in Slovakia to 0.24% for real wages in Greece, under the ambitious 
scenario. According to skill-levels variations, the greatest real wage gains in 
the EU in percent terms are for low-skilled workers, with an EU average of 
1.13% in the ambitious FTA scenario. That figure hides a great deal of 
variation, however, with Belgian and German low-skilled workers enjoying 
a 2% increase [2.01% for Belgium and 1.90% for Germany], and rather 
small gains in some lower-income EU countries [Portugal (0.14%), Greece 
(0.30%), Romania (0.41%) and Bulgaria (0.43%)].  
Adjustment for 
workers, in the 
model used 
The CGE estimation does not confirm the conjecture that (some) EU low-
skilled workers might suffer income losses from a FTA with China, as in all 
EU countries the workers see real wages increase in both scenarios. This 
probably means that the EU, in the recent past, has already adjusted quite 
far to the strongest comparative advantages of China. The FTA is not likely 
to lead to a drastic new downward adjustment in sectors with relatively 
many low-skilled workers, although a few shrinking sectors will be 
observed. It can also be interpreted as a result of second-order effects (in 
general equilibrium), for instance, that the overall rise in economic activity 
– due to the FTA – also benefits the sectors under some competitive threat. 
Finally, one has to realise that, in the model, and of course not so fast and 
not so smoothly in actual practice, workers adjust via immediate re-
allocation between sectors. This model-approach has the effect that, on 
the one hand, workers in marginally contracting sectors can minimise a 
wage decline via the re-allocation of some of them, and, on the other hand, 
the mobile workers can join in the expansion of the sectors enjoying 
increasing demand.  
Adjustment for 
workers, in the 
real world 
Of course, policy-makers and workers alike need to understand how the 
CGE simulations with respect to labour can be best interpreted for the 
reality of EU workers involved: that is, the actual practice of adjusting 
(over, say, the period) until 2030. Trading with a middle-income emerging 
economy like China can, in actual practice (rather than in the CGE model) 
of adjustment in European labour markets, bring about labour 
displacement that may cause temporary unemployment. If and insofar as 
this would happen, the overall benefits for the EU economy would not be 
enjoyed for at least the workers (and at least for a period) losing their jobs.  
Policy-makers and stakeholders should first consider whether and to what 
extent this might happen, and, second, take effective measures to ensure 
that temporary ‘losers’ are compensated and are given new opportunities. 
Labour displacement would occur when workers, leaving a sector having 
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lost comparative advantage vis-á-vis China, cannot immediately be 
absorbed into another sector with rising demand (contrary to the model’s 
assumptions). If one were to pay attention only to those sectors where the 
simulation suggests a contraction in the EU (in China, sectoral contractions 
can be seen to be even larger), it is likely that selected job losses would 
occur. Of course, overall, far more additional jobs are created, but these 
might be different jobs in different sectors and/or be located in different 
regions or countries. 
Between 
minimum and 
maximum 
labour 
displacement  
Since the CGE model is based on ‘given’ employment, no simulation of 
induced, temporary unemployment can be generated: all initial workers 
retain a job, but perhaps a different job in a different sector at a different 
wage. However, a proxy of the other extreme, namely, all workers are 
mobile “in the model” between sectors, can be roughly calculated. This 
approach is very extreme, as it suggests that not a single one of these 
‘mobile’ workers would be absorbed immediately in another sector. But 
such an extreme scenario never happens in actual labour market practice, 
and it also disregards several other key issues. So, in assessing adjustment 
issues to a EU-China deep FTA at this stage, one is found in between no 
induced unemployment – as the great flexibility of workers and their wages 
in the CGE model generates perfect and immediate adjustment – and a 
theoretical maximum ‘labour displacement’, if no adjustment whatsoever 
would take place, at least not immediately. The study shows that labour 
displacement in this extreme sense will be strongest for low-skilled workers 
in the EU (some 2% of the EU labour force and a little more for China). The 
member states that would be more affected are Malta, Slovakia, Germany, 
Finland, Hungary and Italy. Unfortunately, there is no rigorous analytical 
way to determine in between these two extremes, how large or small the 
job losses caused by the FTA would be. 
Why workers’ 
adjustment is 
manageable, 
even if painful 
It is undeniable that jobs are lost every day in labour markets, but the study 
cites four critical considerations that can go far in mitigating highly 
pessimistic expectations. First, CGE models ignore (they are ‘static’) several 
options that are available to workers to deal with bad news. In actual 
practice, workers do anticipate, especially in vulnerable sectors, 
competitive threats and may (and do) seek to work elsewhere; they may 
seek private upskilling or even re-training; they move to other regions 
(even if, in the EU, such mobility is not very high, it is not irrelevant); they 
retire and if adjustment takes years, this does reduce pressures. Second, 
companies have options, too, and often exercise them. Only some 
companies in vulnerable sectors are relocating towards lower-wage 
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countries (even inside the EU) or exit from the market. Companies also 
seek to upgrade their product portfolio, thereby reducing their 
vulnerability vis-à-vis China; they may widen their portfolio as well; they 
may invest in innovative products or variations; or change their business 
model e.g. with a combination of different ‘tasks’ in global value chains. 
Third, the design of the final FTA may (and usually does) anticipate the 
adjustment problems by explicitly using ‘time’ as a factor. In the case of 
vulnerable sectors with relatively more low-skilled workers, the tariff 
reductions are typically back-loaded, i.e. they are known when the FTA 
treaty is concluded, but become actually relevant only after a number of 
years (say, after 5 or 7 years of the 10 years assumed throughout this 
study). This back-loading facilitates the adjustment, so that labour 
displacement need not, or to a much lesser extent, lead to job losses, 
without immediate prospects. Fourth, ‘time’ also plays a crucial role for 
another, perhaps even more important reason. China is still growing more 
rapidly than the EU and this will continue for the entire period until, say, 
2030. In those 13 years or so, Chinese wages will rise fast and comparative 
advantages precisely in low-skilled-intensive sectors will become less 
pronounced or fade away. Moreover, the famous ‘unlimited supply of 
unskilled labour’ in China (coming in from the western or central 
countryside) has dried up and is actually shrinking, whilst rapid growth in 
services (with a range of skill levels) will compete with labour demand for 
low-skilled industrial sectors. None of this can be incorporated in the CGE 
model, even when some anticipation of income levels in 2030 has been 
applied. Taken together, these four considerations significantly brighten 
the otherwise sombre outlook for low-skilled workers. 
Member 
states (helped 
by the EU) 
should commit 
to active 
labour market 
policies 
What labour displacement remains, due to the FTA, even when the periods 
of temporary unemployment are not known in advance, should be properly 
addressed by explicit and clear policy action. Some of the cushioning is 
automatic, given the welfare state. But ‘active labour market policies’ are 
required, whether in the form of (effective) re-training, upskilling, job 
search support, etc. But it should also be noted that there are limits to 
what can and should be ‘attributed’ to the EU-China FTA. Job losses occur 
all the time and for many reasons (whether IT or automation, bad 
management, shifts in demand to other products or services, new business 
models, etc.) and one has to be careful not to single out one individual FTA 
as the source of job losses. And the gains in jobs (far greater due to the FTA 
than the losses) do help as well. 
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Overall policy implications 
A FTA between China and the EU is worthwhile for a host of reasons. The economic potential 
in bilateral trade is shown to be large (more than a doubling of what are already very large 
trade flows both ways), and this does not include expected powerful investment effects 
(which, unfortunately, are resistant to modelling, so no hard estimates) and their 
repercussions for bilateral trade in goods and services. It would also be positive for GDP and 
jobs. Strategically, the FTA should be significant, because it can only succeed when China 
implements the reforms it has announced and complements them with additional ones such 
as on SOEs and the opening of public procurement. In this sense, the FTA is even more 
beneficial for China than for the EU (the model cannot incorporate these aspects). It goes to 
confirm that a deep and comprehensive FTA is a perfect ‘fit’ for China at its current stage of 
development, expressing the ‘new logic’ given its announced reforms, whilst the EU can 
finally pursue the ‘logical sequel’ in its trade policy vis-á-vis dynamic East Asia. 
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Introduction 
Though fascinating as an idea, until only two years ago it seemed far-fetched to pursue 
liberalised trade and investment between China and the EU in the form of a modern, deep 
and comprehensive free trade area.1 This idea was catapulted to the near-future agenda 
between the EU and China when President Xi Jinping, in the spring of 2014, openly called on 
the EU to jointly explore it. Since then, the EU has slowly become accustomed to what in 
Brussels is still regarded as a very ambitious thought. EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia 
Malmström (2016) has clearly stated that a free trade area with China would be subject to 
two major conditions, but in principle, these conditions are in line with avowed Chinese 
trade, investment and domestic reform policies.  
The authors, at the request of the EU Foreign Trade Association, have attempted to map the 
many elements of a possible free trade agreement (FTA) between China and the EU and 
made every effort to understand the main implications of such an initiative. The economic 
impact of a possible FTA is also analysed. There is no true precedent for this work.2 
Part I provides a rationale for an EU-China FTA and attempts to embed the idea in the recent 
trade strategies of the partners, trade and investment trends, and global value chains 
(GVCs), which often end in China.  
Part II is about the substance and the ‘how’ of such an initiative, based on the notion of a 
‘deep and comprehensive’ FTA. It comprises an in-depth empirical analysis of tariffs in 
industrial and agro-food trade, tries to position trade remedies in such a deep cooperation, 
and discusses in some detail the technical barriers to trade and the sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS, for food & feed plus plant health). It also analyses public 
procurement on both sides, as well as intellectual property rights (including geographical 
indications), state-owned enterprises and related competition policies (all bones of 
contention). Part II ends with two chapters that are bound to be part of any FTA strategy 
with China: the current investment negotiations and the problem of socio-economic 
adjustment. 
                                                   
1 However far-fetched, one might wish to compare this with an early contribution by Fukasaku & 
Pelkmans (1995) on ‘open continentalism’ between East Asia and the EU.  
2 In 2008, a sustainability impact assessment was undertaken for the efforts at the time to negotiate 
a partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) between China and the EU. This study does entail a 
considerable amount of economic analysis, for the simple reason that the agenda for the PCA was, 
unusually, full of economic and trade cooperation. Nevertheless, the subject matter and the 
substantive analysis can only very partially be compared with the present work. The PCA was never 
attained. See Van der Geest et al. (2016). 
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Part III employs a cutting-edge, CGE-model approach to calculate the economic impact of a 
stylised EU-China FTA. Results are provided for both a modest and a more ambitious FTA. 
The chapters deal with the effects on GDP and on trade – also by member state and sector – 
and a proxy for the temporary unemployment of workers moving between sectors in both 
economies. In addition, the analysis has been refined by distinguishing three skill levels of 
workers. 
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Part I. The Global and Bilateral Context 
1. Why an EU-China free trade area? 
1.1 The context for a free trade area study 
The idea of a free trade area with China has hardly been studied in earnest so far, either in 
China or in the EU. Since late 2012, the EU has been negotiating a bilateral investment treaty 
(BIT, under the more encompassing label of a comprehensive agreement on investment, 
CAI) at the EU level, integrating, updating and extending the 26 BITs China already has with 
EU member states. Eight rounds of negotiation have been completed (the last one in late 
November 2015) and it is unknown when these negotiations will be finished (see chapter 
15). Nine years ago, the EU and China engaged in negotiations on a partnership and 
cooperation agreement (PCA), meant to cover – besides the usual technical and political 
cooperation in such PCAs – forms of economic cooperation (see Box 1.1).  
Box 1.1 EU-China: From a trade deal through the PCA talks to a free trade area? 
China and the European Economic Community (EEC) established diplomatic relations in 1975. 
Ever since, the economic relationship has been the core of the bilateral relationship, especially 
with a growing series of agreements on economic cooperation. These include the Trade 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and China in 1978, the EU-China Trade 
and Cooperation Agreement of 1985, and the EU-China Strategic Partnerships in 2004.3 In 2007, 
negotiations on the EU-China Partnership and Cooperation Agreement were launched, based on 
two pillars: political cooperation (e.g. on democracy, human rights and governance), and trade 
and investment liberalisation, mainly in the form of trade and investment facilitation. However, 
during the PCA negotiations divergent expectations between the two sides made progress 
difficult, despite China’s accession to the WTO and its follow-up, and despite similar political 
exchanges in the far broader framework of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM). The EU favoured 
ambitious provisions to facilitate trade and investment, e.g. on intellectual property, public 
procurement and rules for the establishment of EU businesses, while China had a much lower 
level of ambition and preferred an agreement built on broad cooperation and dialogue 
principles. In the end, the PCA negotiations were discontinued although a quarter of 22 chapters 
had been finalised on the trade and investment side and another quarter close to finalisation.4  
                                                   
3 See Snyder (2010), pp. 7-45. A precise chronology of official EU-China relations can be found on the 
website of the European External Action Service, “EU-China Relations: Chronology” 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/chronology_2014_en.pdf). 
4 See European Commission, “Trade Relations with China”, Memo, DG Trade, Brussels, July 2010. 
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At the 15th EU-China summit held on 20 September 2012, China and the EU agreed to launch 
negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement. Negotiations started in January 2014, and the 
second round of talks took place on 24 March 2014, before President Xi’s visit to Brussels. During 
his visit on 31 March 2014, President Xi made a plea for negotiations on an EU-China free trade 
agreement (FTA) and proposed a joint ‘feasibility study’. The EU-China summit joint statement 
issued on 29 June 2015 declared that, once the conditions were right, concluding a 
comprehensive EU-China investment agreement would lead towards a deep and comprehensive 
FTA as a longer-term perspective. 
The PCA negotiations failed. Because the European Commission has favoured the route of ad 
hoc but broad economic and technical cooperation, especially after the stranded PCA 
discussions and given the current negotiations on an investment treaty, there has apparently 
been little or no interest in analysing the idea of a free trade area.5 The EU is also interested 
in the plurilateral route, i.e. persuading China to join several plurilateral WTO agreements 
under negotiation. These include the Information Technology Agreement 2 (ITA 2, an 
upgrade and modernisation of the information and communications technology (ICT) goods 
agreement that eliminates tariffs on ICT goods by a critical mass of WTO countries trading in 
these goods; China is a member of the ITA 1, and ITA 2 was formally concluded in Nairobi in 
December 2015). In addition is the green goods agreement6 and the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TiSA), which is attempting to move significantly beyond the disappointing set of 
commitments on trade in services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS); China is not yet ‘in’). Also, since 2007, China has made a series of offers following its 
promise when acceding to the WTO in 2001, to become a member of another existing 
plurilateral, the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), but so far these offers have 
been regarded as insufficient in order to admit China to the GPA (see also chapter 12).  
It is certainly justified to study a possible FTA with China in terms of alternative policy 
options and/or how an FTA could be best combined with the other two valuable routes, 
namely, building on the extensive cooperation already existing with China, and the prospects 
for China going more and more plurilateral. In this context, the questions asked are whether 
and to what extent an FTA with China would add value to one or the other approach or to 
                                                   
5 For the PCA negotiations, however, which were meant to be ‘ambitious’ (at least for the EU side), a 
massive study was undertaken in the form of a trade sustainability impact assessment by a group of 
36 analysts led by Willem van der Geest. This study attempted to conduct impact analysis based on a 
CGE model for some elements and a partial equilibrium (sector approach) model for five sectors, 
besides extensive qualitative analysis of sustainability aspects. The premise of the report, which is in 
itself very informative, is a somewhat artificial one, namely that the PCA would generate so much 
and effective bilateral trade facilitation that the ‘liberalisation effects’ can usefully be simulated. In 
this way, the distinction between a possible FTA and this assessment of effective and widespread 
facilitation, also in regulatory domains, begins to be blurred. In this special sense, one might argue 
that the Van der Geest et al. (2008) study is a forerunner of some elements of our study.  
6 Officially called the Environmental Goods Agreement, it is under negotiation; China is ‘in’.  
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both. Clearly, the more shallow the possible FTA with China, the less room there would be to 
generate much value added beyond the other two routes. The obverse is equally interesting: 
the deeper and more comprehensive the FTA, the greater the possibilities that at least some 
elements of the cooperative route and specific segments of the plurilaterals can be better 
dealt with in the FTA framework. Therefore, once one delves into the substance of a possible 
FTA, in particular a comprehensive and deep FTA (as the EU has strongly favoured for all its 
FTAs, since 2006), the context has to be broadened to cooperative activities in a wide sense 
and in the plurilateral and possibly even multilateral arena.  
1.2 Is there a case for an EU-China FTA? 
It is striking that neither China’s President Xi nor Prime Minister Li Keqiang have advanced a 
rationale for their suggestion to launch a feasibility study for such an FTA. Of course, this 
does not mean that such a rationale does not exist, or that it cannot be constructed by 
reasoning and on the basis of informal discussions in China and the EU. But it does mean 
that there are no clear quotations available about the rationale from the Chinese or EU 
authorities. In China, one generally sees the suggestion from the Chinese leadership to 
engage in a feasibility study about an EU-China FTA as an implicit invitation to the EU 
political leadership to signal some basic political will and interest in taking the next step, no 
matter how cautiously. In other words, the official reaction of the EU that the EU-China CAI 
negotiations must be completed first is well understood in China, but owing to the fact that 
at first, no more was said about the eventual willingness to engage even in a feasibility 
study, suspicions arose about the EU’s preparedness for or interest in a bilateral FTA. The 
June 2015 EU-China summit declaration attempted, in very modest ways, to mitigate this 
sense of suspicion. Commissioner Malmström (2016) inched further in accommodating the 
FTA option, albeit under two conditions (see chapter 5). Whatever the several specific 
rationales of an FTA between China and the EU (as discussed below), the basic logic is 
compelling from the EU side. Ever since 2006 (the Global Europe strategy), the EU has 
actively pursued FTAs with ‘dynamic’ East Asian economies. An FTA with Korea has been 
functioning for years, and two FTAs (with Singapore and Vietnam) are under ratification. 
Negotiations with Japan, Thailand and Malaysia are ongoing, whereas the Philippines and 
the EU have decided to start negotiations in May 2016. The ‘scoping’ discussions with 
Indonesia, interrupted a few years ago, might well be continued. These ten years of EU FTA 
activism in East Asia prompt the query: Where is China in this list? China is by far the biggest 
East Asian economy and was (and still is probably) very dynamic indeed. China is a logical 
sequel to the EU’s trade strategy in East Asia. 
Let us therefore turn to the broad set of possible rationales for such an FTA. We discuss five 
such rationales. 
The first argument – of great importance economically – is that the potential for intensifying 
EU-China trade and investment relations is still enormous, despite the impressive growth in 
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bilateral economic ties the two economies have already experienced. This argument cannot 
be surprising. It is typically advanced for every FTA to be negotiated. But our study shows in 
considerable detail that this potential is large relative to what has already been 
accomplished in EU-China economic relations as well as absolutely large given the size of the 
two economies. Also the rigorous economic simulation based on the CGE-GTAP model 
approach in part III of this study – which, given the model’s limitations, can only simulate 
part of what a deep FTA would comprise – provides respectable ammunition for this 
argument. Knowing that CGE simulation only covers part of a ‘deep and comprehensive’ FTA, 
it has to be complemented by a qualitative assessment of the potential based on other 
elements of the FTA. Of course, China is a special case, not only because of the size of its 
economy and population, but also because of the expected rapid reforms and structural 
changes in the next one and a half to two decades. Therefore, plain extrapolation is not 
appropriate. Indeed, the qualitative economic arguments for great potential have to 
incorporate the expected shifts in comparative advantage and the new competitive edges of 
China in the near future, but equally well the combination of domestic reforms and related 
greater openness of the Chinese economy, precisely to accommodate and stimulate the 
activities (especially, but not only services) enabled by these liberalisations. One should also 
expect a significant and structural shift towards relatively greater domestic consumption. In 
the present study, the implications of these points are elaborated in several ways. 
Second, an equally unavoidable argument in favour of an FTA with China is found in the 
domino or ‘me-too’ character7 of today’s evolution in the landscape of FTAs in Asia, if not 
the entire world economy. This argument is about bilateral FTAs. Both China and the EU 
have been quite active in concluding FTAs, and in some cases with the same economies. In 
the absence of new engagements at the multilateral level (certainly not after Nairobi), and 
dependent on the success of (and full Chinese involvement in) the four plurilaterals 
mentioned, the logic of not concluding an FTA with China as a very important trade and 
investment partner of the EU (and indeed, the EU for China) becomes ever harder to defend, 
when the two continue an active pursuit of new FTAs with one another’s partner countries. 
Thus, the EU has an FTA with South Korea, and now so has China; the EU negotiates with 
Japan, and so does China. The EU now negotiates an FTA with Australia and New Zealand, 
and China already has better access through an FTA. The EU negotiates with several 
                                                   
7 The domino theory (see e.g. Baldwin, 1993) essentially holds that FTAs concluded by partner 
economies A and B generate a strong incentive to eliminate the trade diversion or margin of 
discrimination for excluded country Y by also concluding an FTA with one or more of the partners. 
This simple idea has proved to be a powerful explanation of the FTA waves witnessed since the late 
1990s. The ‘me-too’ idea (see Pelkmans & Brenton, 1999) is similar, but here the emphasis is on 
relatively small partner economies desiring an FTA with a giant partner, as small partners often have 
a high share of exports with that one giant economy, and cannot afford to experience discrimination. 
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 39 
 
countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),8 but China already has a 
China–ASEAN FTA framework and several country-based FTAs with ASEAN members. The 
domino/me-too incentives to conclude FTAs need not be too dangerous to the world 
economy – though they are second-best to effective multilateralism – as long as the FTAs are 
strictly in conformity with the WTO and build on its foundation and take the form of many 
specialised agreements in so-called ‘WTO-plus’ approaches of higher ambition.  
Third, a more recent and additional argument for an EU-China FTA is found in the rise of 
‘mega-regionals’. Nowadays, FTAs are no longer only bilateral but also ‘regional’ or even 
wider or more important (mega-regionals). Of course, the EU has been a forerunner with a 
network of FTAs in Europe itself (some are linked with a prospect of EU membership, 
whereas this is not the case for other such FTAs in the framework of the Neighbourhood 
Policy) and with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Perhaps the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, in force since 1994) may be seen as a mega-regional. The 
European approach was more or less mimicked by ASEAN after it had implemented the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area, by concluding a string of (shallow) FTAs with East Asian countries, 
Australia, New Zealand and India. This is an outcome of the ASEAN plus Six,9 itself a direct 
consequence of the strong trade and investment dependence of ASEAN, rendering it vital for 
ASEAN to secure and deepen market access for export purposes, including the activities of 
global value chains. The FTAs of the ASEAN plus Six are a testimony of how powerful the 
domino and me-too incentives are, because ASEAN itself is not a customs union, let alone a 
higher form of economic integration with common institutions and powers, but a free trade 
area without a common trade policy! Therefore, a cumbersome and fully intergovernmental 
approach to negotiating these FTAs had to be accepted, with a follow-up on a(n) (ASEAN) 
country-by-(Six)-country basis. Late 2012, the ASEAN-plus-Six approach was taken to a 
higher level as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The ASEAN plus 
Six used ASEAN as the ‘hub’ with FTA ‘spokes’ vis-à-vis the Six other economies. But these Six 
are also concluding bilateral FTAs with each other, as noted above. The RCEP is an attempt 
to create coherence and avoid incompatibilities (e.g. due to origin rules) between the 
various East Asian (plus India) FTAs, if not accomplish the further move of a shallow but 
more or less tariff-free East Asian FTA in goods. Given that the EU has prioritised an East Asia 
FTA strategy since 2006, the RCEP is of obvious importance for the EU as it incentivises even 
more the completion of its East Asia strategy of better market access.  
                                                   
8 An FTA has been concluded with Singapore; an FTA has been signalled with Vietnam; negotiations 
are underway with Malaysia, Thailand and at the same time, also the Philippines; scoping discussions 
for an FTA with Indonesia (based on a preparatory joint study by the High Level Group in 2011) have 
stopped but not been abandoned.  
9 The Six are China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India.  
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Another ‘Pacific’ initiative, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, a kind of leader-
driven OECD, Pacific-style)10 emerged and began in earnest in the early 1990s. APEC has 
stimulated voluntary tariff liberalisation under so-called ‘open regionalism’ and various 
forms of improved market access, including, e.g. selected mutual recognition agreements 
(MRAs, on the results of conformity assessments) to reduce technical barriers as well as 
basic investment agreement principles. Yet APEC not only includes countries with vastly 
different levels of development, but also has to accommodate members having rather 
diverse preferences about the speed, ambition and depth of Pacific trade and investment 
liberalisation. The voluntarism and slow speed of liberalisation in the APEC region eventually 
led to the formation of a subgroup of 12 ‘able and willing’ APEC members, eager to go 
forward and deeper.11 This led to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, concluded 
in October 2015. The TPP is deeper and more comprehensive than the RCEP is expected to 
be, which would give it a kind of leadership in Asia, if not worldwide, were it not for the fact 
that China is not in it (neither are some other important and swiftly rising economies such as 
Indonesia and the Philippines).12  
This has led some commentators to suggest that China is ‘isolated’ or ‘contained’ by US 
leadership in the TPP. Before rushing to conclusions, it should be considered that (a) all TPP 
countries trade very actively with China and most also have investments there, (b) China has 
concluded FTAs with some TPP countries and may conclude more, and (c) as an APEC 
member, China has the right to join the TPP at any time, subject to agreement by the 12 
signatories, even though it has spread messages that the TPP is in some respects too 
ambitious at this stage. At the 2014 annual conference of APEC leaders, held in China, China 
obtained acceptance by APEC for a feasibility study on an APEC-wide FTA, connecting the 
RCEP and the TPP. Still, given the highly dynamic nature of the global FTA scene and taking 
into consideration that China is continuing to grow quite fast while engaged in a domestic 
reform process, which should eventually help to facilitate further opening up, the TPP is 
surely generating incentives for China to seek deeper engagements in trade and investment 
with its principal trading/investment partners. And if that is made more difficult by not being 
able to join the TPP at the moment, it logically turns to its biggest trading partner of all, the 
EU! This logic is further strengthened by three other FTAs, at least one of which is another 
                                                   
10 APEC has twenty-one member countries, including the three NAFTA countries, Peru and Chile, as 
well as Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei, China, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, Papua 
New Guinea and seven of the ten ASEAN countries (Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia are not members). 
See www.apec.org for further details.  
11 The countries involved are the three NAFTA countries, Chile and Peru along with Japan, Australia 
and New Zealand, and four (of the ten) ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and Singapore). 
Note that South Korea, China and (of ASEAN), e.g. Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, are not 
involved. 
12 That South Korea is not in has more to do with the fact that the country has already concluded 
FTAs with the leading TPP countries, and some of these FTAs (e.g. KORUS) are advanced FTAs.  
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mega-regional: the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA),13 the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)14 and the EU–Japan negotiations. 
These involve four economies that used to be the joint leaders of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), formerly known as the Quad countries. Their economic 
prominence and strong traditional adherence to the GATT and WTO obviously makes Beijing 
wonder how and how much it would be affected, and what strategies can be employed to 
offset or at least mitigate the negative fall-out from such important FTAs or mega-regionals. 
An FTA with the EU would at least secure and presumably improve market access and also 
tie in the EU more firmly as a partner of China in the East Asia region. It would offset to some 
degree the trade diversion effects of the TPP. And an EU-China FTA would serve China to 
experiment and move up the ladder of ambition for its FTAs, as China knows that the EU 
would only be interested in an ambitious and comprehensive FTA, nothing less. In short, 
mega-regionals have created powerful incentives for China, and to a lesser degree for the 
EU, to seek an FTA with its most important trade and investment partner.  
Fourth, China has engaged in continual reform for decades, but in 2013, it decided on 
courageous new plans for structural and deep reforms of the economy on the route to what 
it calls a ‘socialist market economy’. The reforms are mainly motivated by the present 
development model of China running out of steam. The reliance on heavy industry (with 
overcapacity in a range of sectors), large-scale assembly operations with low-skilled labour 
input (in turn relying on a cheap, seemingly endless inflow of such labour from the 
countryside, which is now drying up),15 relatively little innovation, a neglect of services 
domestically as well as in global value chains, the prominence and protection of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) have together led to significantly lower productivity growth than for 
private firms, along with a neglect of sustainable development. Given this incapacity to 
deliver further impetus to Chinese growth, higher and rapidly rising wages and the urgent 
attention to a healthier environment for citizens and workers, China will have to generate 
higher value added in global value chains and domestically. This is bound to be linked, 
sooner or later and in various ways, with the opening up to and competitive stimulus from 
foreign entrants in local markets and for example, cross-border trade in services. It will imply 
more effective discipline and fewer privileges for SOEs (in turn, creating a more market-
driven environment in China, possibly leading to higher productivity of SOEs) and a greater 
reliance on legal certainty for market players in many respects.  
                                                   
13 CETA refers to the EU–Canada FTA, subject to ratification. 
14 The US–EU FTA, under the heading of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, is under 
negotiation. In economic terms, TTIP is the largest of all FTAs concluded or under negotiation, with 
the TPP coming close as also being a genuine ‘mega-regional’.  
15 Every year, this inflow shrinks by around 3 million workers.  
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The 2013 Reform Decision by the Communist Party’s Third Plenum16 is an impressive 
document with principles and reform outlines that would seem to promise a major leap 
towards a better functioning and more open market economy. The question is now whether 
China can actually bring off the effective implementation of this vision and accept the 
numerous and at times painful implications. There is a great ‘thirst’ in China for outside 
pressures to encourage and push this reform process, both market competitive ones as well 
as governmental ones through discipline, opening up and policy cooperation. And FTAs, not 
to say ‘deep’ FTAs with trusted partners, seem to China to be an almost ideal form of 
organising or generating such reform pressures, through partnerships. The EU is regarded by 
China as such a partner, possibly, and the EU, in turn, is only too keen to stimulate China to 
pursue these reforms (especially now that they come from within China and have been 
decided by its own leadership).  
Fifth, there may well be strategic and geopolitical reasons for China, and perhaps for the EU, 
too, to seek broad, deep and lasting bilateral commitments and partnerships, and an FTA is 
one of the strongest, if not the most committing, form. China has undoubtedly been 
concerned by the combination of the TPP and TTIP, and not merely for economic reasons. 
APEC has failed to prevent these developments. One might surmise that China may well 
regard these new mega-regionals, in which it is not – so far – accepted, as geopolitical 
manifestations of possible or future alliances that might eventually induce an undesirable 
degree of isolation, or at least a lack of ‘friends’. It has sought deeper cooperation with the 
BRICs (Brazil, Russia and India besides itself, plus South Africa), intensified its relations with 
Africa, cautiously welcomed better cooperation with Russia directly and initiated major 
initiatives (e.g. in infrastructure and its financing) for Central Asia (such as the new Silk Road 
and One-Belt visions, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB, with many EU 
countries contributing, too)) and Eastern Europe – in the China-plus-16 talks. But in none of 
these are the leading economies involved, or not more than very marginally. China has also 
engaged in FTAs with its direct neighbours South Korea and Japan (still under negotiation), 
after many years of joint preparation of ‘feasibility’ studies, despite (or some suggest, 
precisely because of) the frictions about tiny uninhabited islands between the three. One 
might argue that the EU is an ideal geopolitical partner for China, as the EU is by definition a 
‘civil’ union, serves as its largest trading partner and a leading investment partner (and 
perhaps soon with a BIT in the form of the CAI), while the absence of military or political 
influence in the Pacific pre-empts grave political frictions in its immediate hinterland. 
Whether and to what extent the EU would share this view, is debatable. In any event, for the 
EU an FTA is not primarily a political tool but there is no denying that a deep and 
comprehensive FTA with China is bound to have lasting diplomatic and other implications.  
                                                   
16 See “The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in brief”, at 
China.org.cn (www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/16/content_30620736.htm). 
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These five rationales for an FTA with China add up to a formidable set of reasons justifying 
an exploratory study. The present study mainly focuses on the ‘how’ of the FTA (part II), 
after discussing some contextual aspects, and the simulated economic impacts (part III). The 
study does not go into the rationales in great detail, except where indispensable for a better 
understanding of such an FTA itself.  
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2. China and the EU in a rapidly changing world economy 
Before delving deep into the substance of a possible FTA between China and the EU, it is 
crucial to appreciate the global economic context in which China and the EU operate, the 
trade strategies they have followed and the relation between modern trade policy and the 
empirical relevance of global value chains for European and Chinese business. Each one of 
these subjects deserves a book-length manuscript. For present purposes, however, that 
would not be necessary. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 only provide the very basics of these aspects, 
enough to contextualise the EU-China FTA, as a background for analysing the possible 
substance of an FTA and the empirical simulation of its economic impact, insofar as such 
modelling can help us. 
Chapter 2 deals with three aspects of the global economic context in which such an FTA 
would have to be understood. Section 2.1 provides some empirical reflections on the 
relative importance (weight) of China and the EU in future world trade. Section 2.2 discusses 
the relevance of domestic reforms in the EU and in China for the performance of the 
economy (‘competitiveness’) and hence, for the prospects of opening up successfully in the 
case of China. It is critical that Chinese reforms are implemented effectively and with a 
minimum speed for an ambitious and comprehensive FTA with the EU to be possible and 
successful. Nevertheless, such reforms are of course primarily in the Chinese public interest, 
as indeed reflected in the notable Third Plenum Decisions in 2013. Section 2.3 gives a 
summary account of China and the EU’s trade strategies, as a basis to understand the 
realistic options for both trade and investment partners, including a rich and deep FTA with 
each other. 
2.1 Chinese weight as an EU trade partner: Anticipate 2030  
Before FTAs have an effective impact on market players, a lot of time will pass. Beginning 
with ‘scoping’ before negotiations, the negotiations themselves (easily lasting three to five 
years), the legal scrubbing and ratification process and the entry into force may well add up 
to a decade or more. Even then, sensitive sectors or other issues may only gradually be 
liberalised. Therefore, the relevant period for an EU-China FTA, if initiated soon, would be 
the years up to 2030. In this forward-looking perspective, China is likely to become even 
more important in world trade. Compared with 2012, Figure 2.1 shows the weight of non-EU 
trade partners in world trade as expected by 2030. We do not notice any particular shifts 
except in the cases of China and the US. While in the top pie chart (2012) the US is the most 
important trade partner together with China, the expectation for 2030 puts the latter in first 
place (16%), while the US share is expected to be reduced by two percentage points (to 12%) 
(Figure 2.2). In other words, by 2030 China will clearly be the EU’s largest trading partner. 
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Figure 2.1 The global economy in 2012 
 
Figure 2.2 The global economy in 2030: Trends and strategies for Europe 
 
Source: Gros and Alcidi (2013). 
It has also often been suggested that the EU should focus more on the BRICs and that this 
ought to be reflected in EU trade policy. Yet, among the BRICs, China’s trade is in a class of 
its own (see Table 2.1). Russia is a good second but its imports from the EU are entirely 
driven by consumption (that is, no intermediates); hence, the growth ‘multiplier’ calculated 
in 2012 (already lower than for China) is very unlikely to be realised or even to get close. 
Brazil and India import far less than the other two BRICs and trade now seems to stagnate. 
Also on this count, a focus on China, even in the form of an FTA, appears sensible.  
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Table 2.1 Major potential FTA partners, TTIP versus the BRICs 
Country 
EU trade by partner, 2012 (€ billion) 
(imports from the EU in parenthesis) GDP growth to 2030, x-fold* MFN tariffs** 
US 498 (292) 1.35 2.1 
BRICs 924 (346) 3.75 n.a. 
China 434 (144) 4.5 8.2*** 
Russia 337 (123) 3.29 9.5 
Brazil 77 (40) 1.7 10.2 
India 76 (39) 3.73 7.2 
* Based on current trade volume (European Commission, DG Trade) and with growth forecasts of the MaGE 
model. 
** MFN = Most favoured nation. MFN applied 2010 based on the trade-weighted average. Higher tariffs 
indicate a larger potential for reduction. Sources: IMF, WTO and MaGE estimations. 
*** MFN on industrial goods. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Gros and Alcidi (2013). 
 
2.2 Competitiveness and reforms in the EU and China17 
Reform at home means different things to China and the EU, as their predicaments radically 
differ. The EU is mainly interested in engaging in structural reforms to limit the over-
indebtedness and fiscal unsustainability of EU member states, render labour markets more 
flexible (without losing social basics, so typical for Europe) and make services markets more 
efficient (helped by a further intra-EU opening up of the single services market). Adding to 
these are its interests in reducing the role of government where no obvious case can be 
found (hence, some privatisations in Greece, for example) and pursuing upskilling and 
intrusive education policies in EU countries that are far below the EU average in high-skilled 
and medium-skilled intensive output.  
In China, the reform process means something far more radical as the starting point is so 
different. China has had almost 35 years of high growth based on gradually allowing in new 
private firms, while leaving the SOEs more or less untouched, until the country began to 
prepare for WTO membership. In the late 1990s, SOEs began to be disciplined by drastic 
measures, such as the end of the SOE-based social security, sickness insurance and basic 
education for their workers, and massive lay-offs.18 When entering the WTO (in 2001), the 
                                                   
17 Principal sources: (i) Chi Fulin et al. (2015), (ii) OECD (2015) and (iii) the European Chamber of 
Commerce in China (2015) (p. 430).  
18 The numbers are unheard of, a consequence of the transition towards a more market-based 
economy. Suggestions are that some 40 million SOE workers lost their jobs and often had to move 
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economy opened up considerably in goods markets though barely in services. Recently, 
China’s model – of heavily investing in large-scale industries (in particular by SOEs, barely 
constrained by financing issues) and massively relying on cheap labour coming in from the 
central and Western countryside (with few rights, and without full, urban hukou privileges as 
for local citizens in Eastern cities) to many free export zones or elsewhere, with phenomenal 
growth in trade and output – has been rapidly running out of steam. 
Thus, China became the world’s factory where the GVCs (global value chains) often ended 
for purposes of final assembly, and this worked well for a while. Once the labour inflow 
reduced (due to ageing and local development) and wages started to rise structurally, the 
severe limits of this system became apparent. Now China is saddled with enormous 
overcapacity in many sectors and says it wants to cut seriously; however, mixed signals are 
heard and observed. In October 2013, the State Council issued guidelines on reducing excess 
capacity in steel, cement, aluminium, flat glass and shipbuilding, but when the authors were 
in Beijing in December 2015, Mr Li once again promised to cut overcapacity. It is critical for 
China to render this promise credible, but it is also relevant for the EU as most of these are 
typically sectors where (anti-)dumping can be expected and has occurred. For most of the 
overcapacity SOEs are involved and many workers will have to be laid off, not to speak of 
writing off capital and equipment. This would seem to be the principal reason why 
overcapacity is not reduced as quickly as possible. The massive lay-offs of the late 1990s 
cannot be repeated. Still, there are two reasons why the overcapacity issue might, socially, 
not be as dramatic in the medium run as one might think. First, there are good possibilities 
for workers to move into the fast-growing services sectors, in some cases with retraining and 
up-skilling. Second, there may well be possibilities for labour to be reallocated to other 
manufacturing sectors, because during the last few years, the intra-China west–east labour 
flows have been steadily shrinking at the rate of some 3 million workers per year. 
Compared with the last decades, China wants to boost services and middle-class spending. 
Rather than pure assembly, it wants to move up the value chains to higher value added in 
the products that it exports. This creates a direct link with boosting services, as higher value 
added is usually connected with high-quality services. In turn, that almost certainly requires 
better performing services markets, less restrictive service regulations and opening up to 
world competitors in domestic services markets. Central and local governments have 
announced that labour from the countryside will also receive hukou privileges and allow 
farmers to become citizens of cities with all the (health, social and educational) rights. 
Reforms aim at transforming the SOEs more convincingly into normal enterprises without 
special access and privileges in financing, but the Third Plenum also underscored that SOEs 
are vital to China’s economic development and will have to be protected! Foreign and local 
                                                                                                                                                               
elsewhere. The size of China renders 40 million a smaller share than in most countries; nevertheless, 
the mere scale of this imposed adjustment has been enormous. See also chapter 14. 
48 │ PART I. THE GLOBAL AND BILATERAL CONTEXT 
 
observers applauded the Third Plenum intentions but often concur in that factual reform 
activities are scattered and irregular, not yet making a genuine reform path towards the 
avowed socialist market economy.19 
The question is whether an FTA with China can fruitfully interact with the domestic reforms. 
In what areas are the Chinese reforms going to liberalise (e.g. services?) or discipline SOEs, 
and will this make the FTA easier to negotiate and also ‘deeper’ in terms of commitments? 
Conversely, can such an FTA boost the internal reform process and induce commitments to 
effectively implement these reforms, as Chinese authorities suggest? The FTA could, in their 
view, work as a credible form of external pressure while coming from a cooperative partner 
in an agreed WTO-based bilateral setting. 
2.3 Comparing China and the EU’s trade strategies: Multilateral, plurilateral and 
bilateral  
The EU and China’s trade strategies have a number of aspects in common. Both are WTO 
members. Both have concluded a series of FTAs. Both have also joined international 
organisations, which are underpinning a lot of the indispensable regulatory cooperation or 
convergence, characterising modern trade policies. One can think of, e.g. the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC, 
for global technical standards) or (for the purposes of SPS regulatory cooperation) the Codex 
Alimentarius and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) as well as others. Both 
have actively supported interregional efforts, based on notions of a further opening of 
markets worldwide, such as (for the EU) the OECD and (for China) APEC. China and the EU 
member states (and since the Lisbon Treaty, also the EU as such) have been very active in 
concluding investment protection treaties (BITs), which show increasing signs of 
convergence. For China as a middle-income country emerging only recently from the status 
of a developing country, this is undoubtedly a remarkable record. After all, the EU and many 
member states are founding members of the GATT, have always felt a global responsibility 
to assume leadership, with the ‘willing and able’, to strengthen the world trade system and 
have been developed countries for a long time. This might also explain why China has some 
difficulties with joining the WTO plurilaterals, seeking to write WTO-plus rules in a range of 
sensitive areas. Catching up to commitments that go beyond those of the Uruguay Round is 
quite demanding for many non-OECD countries, including China. Nevertheless, China is also 
moving in these areas. More generally, the flurry of FTAs China has concluded, the stimulus 
from APEC and the transformation of its economic interests after decades of rapid economic 
                                                   
19 See for example, the Annual Position Paper 2015/2016 of the European Chamber of Commerce in 
China (2015); see also the 2014 American Business in China White Paper by the AmCham China 
(2014); and also the US China investment climate statement for 2015 by the US Department of State 
(2015).  
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development amount to powerful signals that China today and in the future is a very 
different and more ambitious partner than in the recent past. These considerations underlie 
the robust argument why it makes sense to pursue an ambitious and ‘deep’ partnership 
between the EU and China.  
China established credibility with its joining the WTO in 2001, implementing significant 
reforms and opening up, especially in goods markets. In becoming a WTO member, it also 
accepted a ‘built-in’ agenda of further reforms linked to trade initiatives (e.g. on government 
procurement). For ten more years there was annual WTO reporting on the follow-up of a 
range of issues connected to WTO membership, keeping China on the promised route. Still, 
China has not fully lived up to its responsibilities (as the EU and others see it). As the biggest 
trader in the world (only the EU as a whole is larger), one should expect a degree of 
leadership in undertaking initiatives in the Doha Round or actively supporting a brokerage 
role in order to improve the multilateral trade environment. Instead, a passive attitude was 
observed in Doha and, in particular, China did little to persuade difficult BRICs, such as India 
and Brazil, to make reasonable concessions or avoid free-riding. 
To the disappointment of the EU, this has led to a stalemate in the WTO, with the modest 
exception of trade facilitation (admittedly important for many APEC countries, including 
China). The way to move on has proven to be a renewed emphasis on plurilaterals, i.e. the 
GPA on public procurement (will China join, as promised? So far, six packages have not led to 
a breakthrough – see chapter 12); the ITA 2 (on new ICT goods tariff-free, with China finally 
yielding after a deal with the US in 2014 and joining in 2015); the option of a WTO 
plurilateral on environmental goods (China is not yet in, but might try) and TiSA, the 
plurilateral on freer trade in services, with a hybrid list (negative and positive), but so far, 
little initiative from China to join, other than through trivial offers. 
One might say that last hurdle is not surprising if one realises the many restrictions China 
maintains in services and related investment. Nonetheless, a lack of commitment in services 
is puzzling in the light of its own clear reform strategy (from the very top) to liberalise 
services both domestically and towards foreign business. The obvious explanation is 
resistance from SOEs, preponderant in several services markets, and with enormous political 
and lobbying power. 
It is at least somewhat more probable that bilateral strategies are regarded by China as a 
safer mode to open up, in terms of partnerships (which China prefers) and with selective and 
gradual schedules. As shown in Table 2.2, China has been very active in concluding or 
negotiating FTAs, usually with East Asian or South Asian countries, as well as a few other 
ones (recently including Switzerland, Norway and Iceland as European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries). 
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Table 2.2 China’s FTA activism: Concluded and negotiated FTAs 
China’s free trade agreements China–ASEAN FTA 
 China–Pakistan FTA 
 China–Chile FTA 
 China–New Zealand FTA 
 China–Singapore FTA 
 China–Peru FTA 
 Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic and Partnership 
Agreement 
 Mainland and Macau Closer Economic and Partnership Agreement 
 China–Costa Rica FTA 
 China–Iceland FTA 
 China–Switzerland FTA 
 China–Korea FTA 
 China–Australia FTA 
FTAs under negotiation China–Gulf Cooperation Council FTA 
 China–Norway FTA 
 China–Japan- Korea FTA 
 RCEP 
 China–ASEAN FTA upgrade negotiations 
 China–Sri Lanka FTA 
 China–Maldives FTA 
Preferential trade agreement Asia–Pacific Trade Agreement 
Note: China also maintains a special agreement with Chinese Taipei, which has led to rapid and deep 
liberalisation, but its formal FTA status is in doubt. 
Source: Authors. 
Among the deals in force, however, only the FTAs with Korea and Australia are ‘less shallow’ 
(but not so deep) while all the other ones mainly seek tariff-free goods trade. As one 
observes from a few cases in Table 2.2, China goes for upgrading (deepening) existing FTAs 
over time, albeit cautiously. In particular, the FTA with Korea and possibly soon the trilateral 
with Korea and Japan are interesting, as they are quintessential for China’s trade interests. 
The staged FTA between China and Australia can also be read as a prudent exercise in 
upgrading. These FTAs or negotiations can be studied as templates or illustrations of what 
China might be willing to concede (or indeed ask when conceding) and may be useful for the 
EU. 
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The EU’s trade strategy since 200620 has been clear: it is keen to tap into East Asia essentially 
for reasons of the growth-enhancing effects of connecting with dynamic markets. FTAs have 
been concluded with South Korea (in force), Singapore and Vietnam (ratification pending for 
both); negotiations are underway with Japan, Thailand, Malaysia and (very recently) the 
Philippines. In this respect, also the recent EU decisions to negotiate FTAs with New Zealand 
and Australia are crucial given the entry into force of the TPP, as those two countries already 
have an FTA with China. This strategy has been highlighted once again, and this time with 
more clarity and specificity, in the European Commission’s recent “Trade for all” 
Communication (2015).21 The latter speaks of a “strategic engagement” in Asia and the 
Pacific and clarifies the current trade policy predicament with China. It argues (rightly) that 
the ongoing CAI22 negotiations will support China’s reforms as well as the mutual investment 
strategies, e.g. One Belt, One Road. It continues: “China has suggested further deepening the 
relationship through an FTA, but the EU will only be ready to engage in such a process once 
the right conditions are met, as expressed in the EU-China 2020 strategic agenda for 
cooperation.” And “[t]hose conditions are also related to the successful implementation of a 
range of domestic economic reforms in China, since the purpose of an FTA would necessarily 
be to establish a level playing field”. 
Finally, China’s thinking about the TPP and the political/geostrategic meaning of FTAs in 
some cases has to be developed (e.g. Song & Wen, 2012).23 The Chinese leadership does not 
hide a certain interest in joining the transpacific deal even if it realises that the level of 
ambition put forward by the agreement is somewhat too high for the current situation. It 
has also been argued that the interest in joining the TPP as well as the Chinese president’s 
call for an EU-China FTA belong to a broader strategy that seeks to avoid the Chinese 
economy being isolated, even more so now that the TTIP is also quite advanced (although far 
from being concluded). The EU takes the Chinese request seriously, as affirmed by 
Commissioner Malmström (2016) during a recent speech, but at the same time the 
Commission expects that two main prerequisites will be met before starting any future 
negotiations. First, the ongoing negotiations on bilateral investments must be successfully 
concluded; second, and most importantly, China must significantly reform its internal system 
by letting markets drive the outcomes of reform while reducing the role of the state. The 
reason why the promised reforms are a fundamental step before starting FTA talks is the 
high degree of ambition of EU FTAs. The scope and depth of an FTA with China in terms of 
                                                   
20 See European Commission, “Global Europe, competing in the world: A contribution to the EU’s 
Growth and Jobs Strategy’’, Brussels, 2006; see also European Commission, “Trade, Growth and 
World Affairs: Trade Policy as a core component of the EU’s 2020 Strategy”, COM(2010) 612, 
Brussels, 2010. 
21 See European Commission, “Trade for All: Towards a more responsible trade and Investment 
Policy”, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015. 
22 For more on the CAI (a broader BIT with China), see chapter 15.  
23 See also Peterson Institute for International Economics (2016).  
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hard and enforceable commitments are only possible and credible when, in China, profound 
and wide-ranging reforms are effectively implemented. This will have far-reaching effects on 
China’s own government and governance, as many indications in this study point to, and 
imply sweeping removal of bans, restrictions, and costly and pointless ‘competition’ 
between far too many overlapping public agencies/ministries, at central and provincial/local 
levels. In the process, the SOE problem with all its special dimensions, including the direct 
line to the Party in China, will have to be tackled convincingly. Altogether, markets and the 
business environment will surely change significantly. Early in this process, reforming and 
curtailing the supply in selected industries and thereby reducing the massive overcapacity 
are steps needed, as Commissioner Malmström noted, first of all for the Chinese economy 
and by implication for its commercial partners.  
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3. Bilateral economic relations: Trade and investments  
In recent decades, the economic relations between the EU and China have changed beyond 
recognition. The present chapter focuses on trends and the composition of bilateral trade 
and investment. China was the second biggest trading partner in goods for the EU in 2014 
and the EU the biggest trade partner in goods for China (European Commission, 2016). For 
services, in 2014 China (with $8 billion) was the second largest for EU exports (modes 1 and 
2) after the US (OECD, 2016). In terms of the stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
Chinese stocks in the EU are the highest of Chinese bilateral stocks anywhere. In 2014, China 
became the largest FDI recipient by reaching $129 billion, surpassing the US: the role of the 
EU as an investor is increasing while the roles of Japan and the US are declining (UNCTAD, 
2015). If one also realises the profound interlinkages between European and Chinese 
business in GVCs, the flows of royalties and the near-explosion of Chinese tourism in Europe, 
the EU-China economic relationship is large, manifold and probably worth being developed 
as well as embedded in better structures. 
Figure 3.1 reports the total trade flows (imports plus exports in goods) between the EU and 
China and the trade balance. Flows have steadily increased since 1995 with two setbacks in 
2009 and in 2012–13. During the same period, the EU experienced an increasing deficit. 
Since 2009, the deficit in goods trade has more or less stabilised. It should be realised that 
Figure 3.1 depicts the conventional deficit in goods trade. This is a gross figure, with 
considerable double-counting with respect to imported intermediates (into China, and then 
exported when incorporated into the final export good). It is later shown that the deficit in 
goods trade, when double-counting is removed (also indirectly through other inputs, e.g. 
services) is substantially lower (though still large).  
Figure 3.1 Total EU-28 trade in goods with China ($ billion) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2015). 
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In Figure 3.2, we can see the evolution of the sectoral composition of the trade flows. There 
is a clear predominance of machinery and transport equipment followed by (other) 
manufactured goods and articles, which together account for 80% of trade flows. Among the 
remaining sectors, it is worth mentioning chemicals. 
Figure 3.2 Total trade for sectors, EU-China 
 
 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the trade growth of each sector over time. On the export side, only 
machinery shows a sustained growth rate, rising from $12 billion in 1995 to $126 billion in 
2014. The other sectors, notably chemicals, also show a stable, positive growth rate but less 
high than that of machinery and transport equipment. In contrast, imports from China have 
grown across sectors in a more balanced way, especially in sectors like (other) manufactured 
goods and articles, showing the strong import activities of the EU in those sectors. 
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Figure 3.3 EU-28 goods exports to China, by sector 
 
Figure 3.4 EU-28 goods imports from China, by sector 
 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 provide measures of ‘relative trade dependence’ between the EU and 
China, expressed as shares of overall EU exports or imports. Figure 3.5 shows an increase of 
the Chinese share of EU goods exports from less than 1% in 1995 to more than 3.5% in 2014, 
a strong growth but from a low base. China, meanwhile, strongly relies on the EU as a target 
market for its goods exports, with an average share of its overall goods exports of 15%. 
However, the diagram shows a drop between 2012 and 2014 of three percentage points. 
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Figure 3.5 EU and China: Bilateral trade dependence in goods exports 
Note: The ratios have defined the EU (Chinese) goods exports to China (EU) as a share of total goods exports by 
the EU (China). 
Trade dependence on the import side shows a completely different trend. China was good 
for almost 8% of EU goods imports in 2014, up from 1.5% in 1995. Chinese goods imports 
from the EU as a share of total Chinese goods imports slowly decreased, from 16% in 1995 to 
almost 12.5% in 2014, presumably owing to the strong rise of intermediate goods imports by 
China from East Asia.  
Figure 3.6 EU and China: Bilateral trade dependence in goods imports 
Note: The ratios have defined the EU (Chinese) imports from China (EU) with respect to total goods imports by 
the EU (China). 
In cross-border services (modes 1 and 2 of the GATS), trade flows are far smaller than in 
goods. The flows have increased over time and the EU has shown a growing surplus, from 
around $4 billion in 2010 to $12 billion in 2014 (Figure 3.7). There are two prevalent sectors 
in EU China trade in services: transport and business services (Figure 3.8).  
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Figure 3.7 Imports from and exports to China of services and the EU trade balance 
(on the right axis) 
 
Source: OECD Statistics (2015). 
Figure 3.8 EU-China trade in services, by sector 
 
The EU trade balance with China is negative but the trade volumes have continually 
increased except for the years 2012 and 2013. The rise of the trade deficit, as explained in 
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interdependence, it is worth mentioning that China strongly relies on the EU as a destination 
market, while the EU depends on China mainly for mass consumer goods and imports of 
intermediates.  
Figure 3.9 represents the stocks of EU FDI flows towards China in 2013. In particular, we 
notice a positive balance of more than €100 billion due to inward flows equal to slightly 
more than €20 billion. For a sectoral analysis of FDI, refer to chapter 16.  
Figure 3.9 EU FDI stocks towards China (€ billion), 2013 
 
Source: European Commission (2016). 
In Figure 3.10, the trend in stocks of FDI (both inward and outward) is depicted from the 
Chinese perspective for a longer period. Bilateral stocks have both strongly increased over 
time; however, the gap between European FDI towards China and Chinese FDI towards the 
EU remains quite high. The EU is the largest exporter of FDI to the Chinese economy, with 
almost $80 billion in 2014. In the same year, Chinese FDI flowing to the EU was slightly above 
$30 billion. In terms of share, Chinese inward FDI has been relatively stable although a 
greater engagement in the global value chain would have suggested an opposite result. 
Indeed, as reported by the UNCTAD (2013), a positive correlation between engagement in 
GVCs and changes in inward stocks of FDI would be expected.  
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Figure 3.10 Chinese inward and outward FDI stocks from/to the EU ($ million) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2016). 
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4. Global value chains: Significance for the EU and China  
Compared with several decades ago, trade in goods and services is nowadays much more 
sophisticated. Rather than trading only finished products, manufacturing firms often engage 
only in segments of the value chain, targeting specific products and hence preferring in-
depth specialisation. Similarly, in services, new interlinkages with goods have emerged, 
implying that exports of goods in fact incorporate a rising share of services input. 
Developments in ICT and reductions of travel and freight transport costs allow less vertically 
integrated firms to take advantage of the highly differentiated comparative advantages and 
specialisations worldwide.  
This phenomenon is also relevant for trade relations between the EU and China, where the 
latter is often considered an ‘assembly’ factory, engaged in low-skilled activities and very 
competitive in the lower parts of the value chain. The EU, by contrast, is seen ever more as a 
service economy specialised in high technology and medium and high-skilled intensive goods 
and services, withdrawing from low-skilled intensive goods output or labour-intensive goods 
more generally.  
The degree of internationalisation between the two economies is not yet as deep as one 
could imagine; indeed, the process seems to have just started, being only 8% of global 
output dependent on imported intermediates and the remaining 82% sourced domestically 
(European Commission, 2014), suggesting that the process is at its initial stage. 
Understanding the functioning of GVCs remains crucial to analysing the future trade 
relations between the two economies. In order to do so, it is convenient to refer to a recent 
study released by the European Commission.24 The final product can be divided into three 
components according to the value added generated by a single economy: the direct 
domestic value added, which includes the direct remuneration of the domestic factors 
engaged in the production, domestic intermediates that incorporate the value of the 
intermediate product bought from a domestic firm and finally, the imported intermediates 
that represent those purchased from foreign companies. 
World trade statistics are normally based on customs forms and invoices of goods passing 
frontiers. The trade flows so reported look only at goods classified on such forms and do not 
take into account which intermediate part of that good is first imported from another 
country. In practical terms, this means that a final good imported by the EU from China can 
be assembled there, while it contains major imported inputs from outside. Therefore, the 
                                                   
24 See European Commission, “China–EU global value chains: Who creates value, how and where? 
Growing linkages and opportunities”, Brussels, 2014 (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/ 
january/tradoc_152123.pdfhttp://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/january/tradoc_152123.pdf) 
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ordinary trade statistics do not express the value added in China but merely the face value of 
the invoice price. Thus, in statistical terms, traditional gross trade statistics imply double-
counting problems, which are especially serious with respect to an assembly economy like 
China’s. The double-counting has an interesting implication for the trade deficit with China: 
once an imported input is deducted (a complicated exercise for many thousands of types of 
goods and services), the EU trade deficit with China is lower, and in some sectors much 
lower.  
Thanks to recent (WTO & OECD) statistics collected in terms of value added, it is possible to 
understand the position of each country in the global value chain and compare the trade 
deficits according to the two methodologies.  
Figure 4.1 shows the difference between the trade balance calculated with gross traditional 
statistics, and the balance of trade in value added: what the picture clearly shows is that, in 
terms of value added, the deficit is systematically smaller than the traditional trade balance. 
However, the value-added approach does not invert the sign of the balance, but merely 
amends it a bit. 
Figure 4.1 EU China trade balance (gross flows and value added) 
 
Source: Trade in Value Added (TiVA) Statistics, OECD Database (2015). 
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Moreover, given recent statistical work by the European Commission,25 one can have a clear 
understanding of how many jobs are supported by trade activities with China. This is of 
course true for EU jobs connected to EU exports, but it is even possible for Chinese jobs 
dependent on EU exports, as well as EU jobs connected to EU imports from China. Figure 4.2 
represents the value added (linked directly with employment) created in Europe by each 
member state’s exports to China, while Figure 4.3 shows the number of jobs created in each 
EU member state thanks to the goods and services exported to China.  
Figure 4.2 EU value added in the exports of each member state by trading partner (€ billion), 
2011 
 
Source: DG trade/Joint Research Centre Trade and Jobs (2015). 
Figure 4.3 Number of EU jobs supported by member states’ exports to China, 2011 
 
Source: DG trade/Joint Research Centre Trade and Jobs (2015). 
                                                   
25 Conducted with the EU’s Joint Research Centre. 
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What it is surprising is that China, in spite of what we often believe, is relying less on 
imported intermediates, going against the common view that it is just an ‘assembly’ centre. 
Indeed, this seems partially true. While it is still specialised in low value-added activities, like 
pure assembly, it is relying more and more on domestic inputs and integrating different 
stages of the chain more than the past (Table 4.1). This coincides with the current Chinese 
strategy aiming at increasing the value added of this production and moving up in the value 
chain towards more sophisticated production. 
Table 4.1 Decomposition of total output by direct input (%) 
    Domestic Imported 
    Direct value added  Intermediates  Intermediates 
World 1995 53 41 6 
  2009 50 42 8 
EU 1995 53 39 8 (of which 5% is intra-EU) 
  2009 51 38 10 (of which 6% is intra-EU) 
China 1995 39 56 5 
  2009 33 59 8 
Source: European Commission (2013). 
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5. What would an EU-China FTA look like? 
Part II of this study deals with the ‘how’ of a possible EU-China FTA. Basic design issues are 
discussed in this chapter, whereas substantive questions are addressed in chapters 6–14, 
complemented by chapter 15 on the CAI (on investment). The CAI could also be imagined as 
being integrated into the FTA. 
When looking at the two prospective FTA partners’ bilateral and regional trade policies over 
the last 10 to 15 years or so, the contrast in their FTA strategies is clear: China so far has 
preferred shallow FTAs (and with very different types of partners, even including the 
Maldives) and the EU has followed an outspoken strategy of concluding ‘deep and 
comprehensive’ FTAs, with explicit preferences for East Asia, for instance.  
This contrast in the design of FTAs as favoured by the two parties is a crucial issue that – in 
the event of the two parties beginning a ‘scoping’ exercise of what may be expected to be 
negotiable – has to be resolved first. In this short chapter, two aspects are addressed: (i) 
what a ‘deep’ versus a ‘shallow’ FTA is; and (ii) the broad economic considerations that play 
a leading role in opting for one or the other.  
A comprehensive FTA is characterised by a broad scope of policy areas beyond pure tariff 
issues, areas recognised as trade-relevant (e.g. in the WTO or elsewhere like the OECD or 
APEC), whereas a shallow FTA focuses on tariffs, other duties (e.g. anti-dumping duties), 
tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) (often employed for agro-goods) and some customs questions. The 
policy areas beyond tariffs in a comprehensive FTA typically include a range of regulatory 
domains and this must mean that they are largely ‘domestic’ rather than purely ‘border’ 
questions. Including them in an FTA with hard obligations, rather than for mere 
‘cooperation’ or ‘best endeavours’, is regarded as more intrusive, and hence, often more 
sensitive. However, one should not overplay this argument or political sentiment, because 
even the WTO has a number of agreements on these regulatory domains, such as services 
(GATS), trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), intellectual property rights (IPRs), SPS 
and technical barriers to trade (TBTs). Moreover, plurilateral WTO agreements (signed by 
those ‘willing and able’ but open for new members under WTO rules) complement the list in 
areas such as public procurement, or deepen the above-mentioned WTO agreement by 
further-reaching commitments (e.g. services in TiSA). A ‘deep’ FTA is characterised by the 
depth of commitments and enforceable obligations. When an FTA is ‘deep and 
comprehensive’, it refers therefore to hard, enforceable obligations of a WTO-plus (or ‘WTO-
plus-plus’) nature in both regulatory and traditional areas of trade policy, and presumably 
with the common institutional structures (joint bodies or a hierarchy of committees) to 
monitor progress, address complaints, elaborate on technical issues or even deepen 
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commitments further over time (a so-called ‘living agreement’). Clearly, all this is rather 
different from the original idea of a free trade area. An early example of a deep and 
comprehensive FTA is NAFTA (in force since 1994), which covers many domains. Meanwhile, 
the ambition has shifted upwards a good deal more, as demonstrated by CETA (probably the 
most ambitious FTA outside the EEA, which is unique and irrelevant26 for ‘normal’ trade 
policy), TTIP (so far as one can tell at the moment) and TPP. Therefore, to accept a deep and 
comprehensive FTA as the starting point of negotiations is no longer nearly as ‘ambitious’ as 
it was (say) two decades ago. But that is easily concluded for the EU. It is far more 
challenging for China, given its tradition of rather shallow and less comprehensive FTAs.  
What matters nowadays is less what chapters or policy domains are included in an FTA but 
rather how deep the bilateral or regional commitments are in these areas. In other words, 
general calls to ‘cooperate’ or for ‘best endeavours’ in trying to enhance commitments in 
such regulatory policy domains often do not go beyond the WTO level of trade policy or 
might as well be pledged in (say) the OECD or APEC (as indeed this is done routinely). In 
terms of the ‘depth’ of commitments in an FTA, these best endeavour clauses, for example, 
should not count as adding value for market access or fostering trade and investment, until 
or unless they lead to hard commitments later on. Thus, in recent FTAs concluded by China 
(e.g. with Korea), endeavour clauses can be found with respect to several regulatory areas 
that China regards as a basis for future cooperation (‘gradually’). But also on the EU side, it is 
clear that the Union’s insistence on depth may not always be heeded by partners. The most 
advanced FTA outside Europe is CETA, yet its TBT chapter27 is not nearly as committing as 
one would expect – this is due to Canada’s profound market integration with the US (and 
Mexico) where for example, technical standardisation and reference to standards in 
technical regulation are conducted in very different ways from the EU.  
Concretely, a rule of thumb for a deep and comprehensive FTA is the fulfilment of two 
requirements: a broad scope, and within the regulatory areas, a significant degree of 
commitment. The broad scope implies that, beyond tariffs (and related anti-dumping and 
TRQs), the following areas should be in: TBTs, SPS barriers and food/feed safety issues 
leading to obstacles, market access in services, public procurement, IPRs and geographical 
indications and investment (both access and protection), and competition policy (including 
state trading, which – in the case of China – implies the role of SOEs in markets). For 
investment, one might opt for a stand-alone investment protection agreement (as the CAI 
might be – see chapter 16) and make it more ambitious by including market access. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of market access through investment is an obvious overlap with 
                                                   
26 As the EEA is all about being a member of the EU internal market (except for agriculture and 
fisheries) without being a member of the EU. For extensive analysis, see Pelkmans & Boehler (2013). 
27 In contrast to the part on conformity assessment in the protocol of chapter 27 of the CETA, which 
is setting a new global benchmark.  
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what a deep FTA is expected to be. Therefore, sequencing first a CAI and subsequently an 
FTA is determined not by design logic, but by the building of trust, the capacity of a country 
to assume deep obligations (which have considerable domestic consequences) at the 
present stage and problems of adjustment and resistance to reform. The depth of 
commitments in these areas is a very complicated question and is dealt with in the 
remainder of the study. 
The economic considerations favouring a deep FTA have not had much analytical attention 
in economics until recently. In CGE simulations (such as in our part III) and in econometric 
tests, there are suggestions that deeper FTAs generate greater (positive) economic effects 
than shallow FTAs. What makes countries hesitate (and China is no exception) is that the 
depth of commitments is feared to be inconsistent with the level of development, and hence 
the comparative advantages at the present stage. Such FTAs would be ‘unbalanced’ and 
mainly favour highly developed economies (such as the EU). Correct or not, this argument 
has to be regarded from two sides: given the EU’s high level of development, it is obvious 
that a pure tariff agreement is also biased. Indeed, insofar as the comparative advantages of 
a developed economy are found in high-tech or high-skilled intensive goods and in services, 
tariffs may be a trivial market access barrier compared with TBTs (resulting from differences 
in regulation or conformity assessment) or SPS barriers or other regulatory barriers (e.g. in 
the case of services). This is also true for public procurement in sophisticated products or for 
instance, transport systems or complex infrastructure. A mere focus on tariffs would likely 
bias the prospective FTA in the other direction, failing largely or completely to address costly 
market access barriers for goods and services exported by developed countries. Moreover, if 
the emerging economies do not want to risk getting stuck in the ‘middle-income trap’ (and 
China is plainly doing everything to avoid that), they will have to upgrade goods and services 
nationally and in global exchange, often linked to investment too, and this strongly suggests 
forms of FTAs that are broad in scope and deep in commitments. Only such deep and 
comprehensive FTAs will induce the competitive exposure and opportunities required to 
produce and compete at the world level and raise productivity in the process, badly needed 
to underpin sustained high growth. It should thus be possible to find a compromise between 
the EU and China, in particular with a view to the medium and longer run. The recent 
conclusion of a fairly deep EU FTA with Vietnam points in the same direction.  
There are also more rigorous economic arguments to do so. In an ambitious recent 
contribution by Dür, Baccini & Elsig (2014), a more precise and insightful identification of the 
‘depth’ of FTAs has been developed.28 The authors employ different econometric 
                                                   
28 Within the scope of ten ‘behind-the-border’ policy domains, a total of over 100 items have been 
coded in order to measure the depth of commitments in these areas. This has been done for a large 
sample of no fewer than 587 FTAs (and other agreements like customs unions), which tends to 
improve statistical robustness. 
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specifications in order to answer the question of whether FTAs actually do increase trade. 
They find – in more robust results than before – that deep FTAs increase trade considerably 
more than shallow ones. This is important because in previous empirical work FTAs were 
(usually) not distinguished as to their design features. This has led to doubts about the 
effectiveness of generating economic gains through FTAs. Yet, these doubts are a 
consequence of the large number of shallow FTAs in the samples used for the early empirical 
work. As noted, in CGE empirics, addressing the non-tariff elements in FTAs does lead to 
simulated economic gains that are one to two times higher than gains from tariff removal 
only. But the problem with CGE empirics is that one needs reliable ad valorem equivalent 
(AVEs) (for tariffs) of the trading costs of behind-the-border measures. This is not only very 
difficult to accomplish but also cannot29 be differentiated as to the specific measures that 
together determine the depth of FTAs. In other words, AVEs represent trading costs of a 
range of possible barriers that are not separately identified. The work from Dür, Baccini & 
Elsig (2014) shows decisively that deep FTAs matter much more and are worth doing for 
greater economic gains.  
  
                                                   
29 Or at best, selectively in some specific types of measures – see Pelkmans, Lejour, Schrefler, Mustilli 
& Timini (2014) for the European Parliament and (for TBTs only) Berden & Francois (2015).  
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6. Market access in industrial goods: An analysis of tariffs 
Tariffs in EU-China trade are still of some importance, more so in agro-food than in industrial 
goods, but even the latter are selectively of significance. Of course, the traditional core of 
any FTA remains the removal of tariffs. The present chapter deals extensively with tariffs on 
industrial goods. Chapter 8 addresses tariff and TRQs in bilateral agro-food trade. In 2014, 
bilateral trade in industrial goods was 30 times that in agro-goods, but the latter has been 
rapidly increasing whereas the former exchange has recently been lacklustre, yet still at a 
high level. Section 6.1 analyses bilateral industrial trade and its sectoral composition. Mutual 
trade dependence at the sectoral level is studied as well. This is followed by a short section 
on tariff profiles (6.2) at the 2-digit level of sectors, for both economies. Since many tariffs 
are not so high or even low or zero, the hard kernel of the tariff negotiations in an FTA are 
the tariff peaks. Section 6.3 provides an analysis of tariff peaks at the 2-, 6- and 8-digit levels, 
as appropriate. The patterns of peak tariffs in China and in the EU are quite different and the 
totals of peaks are far higher for China. Note that, unless specified, we use applied tariffs 
(not the bound, most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs where these differ from applied, which is 
often the case for China, but not for the EU). In the actual negotiations, bound MFN tariffs 
matter of course, but the sensitivity of bilateral tariff removal is largely determined by the 
applied level.  
6.1 Analysing bilateral trade and its sectoral composition 
In chapter 3, it was noted how large bilateral (industrial) goods trade has become. China is a 
major supplier of fast-moving consumer goods in the EU and also exports many components 
or intermediate goods that are crucial for EU exports or competitive output in the internal 
market. The EU predominantly exports medium and high-tech goods or high-skilled intensive 
goods to China, which could be sophisticated intermediates for later assembly at the end of 
a GVC. Figure 6.1 shows the rapid growth in import and export values of EU-China trade 
from 2002 to 2014. It also shows a rising deficit in the goods trade balance until 2009 and 
some fluctuations ever since around a stable average. There is no denying that the EU trade 
deficit in goods is large – it is even larger than EU goods exports to China, albeit that 
difference has narrowed significantly over time. The decreasing amount of European imports 
in the last three years has reduced the trade balance to around $230 billion. Nonetheless, 
while 2014 imports registered a $40 billion increase, EU exports to China increased by only 
$20 billion in 2014.  
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Figure 6.1 EU trade balance with China in industry 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). 
Besides the gigantic difference in value traded between agricultural and industrial goods 
($21 billion against $640 billion of total two-way trade in 2014), another interesting 
difference with respect to agricultural trade is the higher sector concentration in EU-China 
trade (Table 6.1). Whereas sectoral shares of the most traded agricultural products range 
from 10.7% (fish) to 5.0% (wool) (see chapter 8, Table 8.1), the first two most traded 
industrial product groups, namely, machinery (various)30 with 22.34% and electrical 
machinery with 20.94%, have much higher shares and the difference with the third amounts 
to at least 12 percentage points (vehicles other than railway, etc., mainly cars, at 8.18%). 
However, as the footnote shows, this is largely due to the amalgamation of product groups 
in a somewhat artificial HS 2-digit category (its label of ‘nuclear reactors’ does not cover the 
meaning for EU-China trade at all). The EU’s top three export-to-China groups make up 56% 
of all EU industrial goods exports to China: various machinery and automotive, each some 
22.5%, followed by electrical machinery with another 11%. Two-way trade within the same 
HS 2-digit group, that is, intra-industry trade, at least at the 2-digit level, varies but is no 
longer always low (as one might expect in the case of developing countries): EU imports 
from China are highly concentrated with nearly half in electrical machinery and various 
machinery, which are also leading export product groups. In summary, while the first two 
product groups in bilateral trade are driven by both export to and import from China, four 
out of the other six most traded products are mostly determined by imports from China.  
                                                   
30 HS 84 is an amalgam of electronic equipment (and parts), appliances for industrial use, air coolers, 
piston engines, printing machinery, machining centres for working metal, etc., under the 2-digit label 
of ‘nuclear reactors’, which is seriously misleading. In fact, a frequently used label is ‘various 
machinery’ which is employed in the text.  
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Table 6.1 Most traded products in industry, 2014 
Total trade EU exports to China EU imports from China 
HS code and name Share (%) HS code and name Share (%) HS code and name Share (%) 
84, Nuclear 
reactors, etc. 22.34 
84, Nuclear 
reactors, etc. 22.51 
85 Electrical 
machinery, etc. 25.42 
85, Electrical 
machinery, etc. 20.94 
87, Vehicles other 
than railway, etc. 22.44 
84, Nuclear 
reactors, etc. 22.26 
87, Vehicles other 
than railway, etc. 8.18 
85, Electrical 
machinery, etc. 11.13 
62, Articles of 
apparel & clothing, 
not knitted 
5.68 
62, Articles of 
apparel & clothing, 
not knitted 
4.06 90, Optical, photo, etc. 6.05 
61, Articles of 
apparel & clothing, 
knitted 
4.99 
90, Optical, photo, 
etc. 3.60 
88, Aircraft, 
spacecraft and 
parts  
5.20 94, Furniture, bedding, etc. 4.46 
61, Articles of 
apparel & clothing, 
knitted 
3.50 30, Pharmaceutical prod. 3.93 95, Toys, etc. 4.06 
94, Furniture, 
bedding, etc. 3.29 
39, Plastics and 
articles thereof 3.23 
64, Footwear, 
gaiters and the like 3.29 
95, Toys, etc. 2.83 
71, 
Natural/cultured 
pearls, precious 
stone 
3.01 39, Plastics and articles thereof 2.54 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS. 
A closer look at intra-industry trade (IIT) may be insightful. A traditional indicator of two-way 
trade within sectors, which is what IIT really is, is the Grubel-Lloyd IIT index.31 Such IIT may 
well express sectoral interdependence, for example, trade of components (more) in one 
direction and trade in final goods (more) in the other direction. This might be a result of 
GVCs but it might be due to European FDI in China as well, trading with subsidiaries in the 
EU. IIT might also be driven by differentiation of the preferences of customers or consumers. 
IIT tends to render the adjustment to the ‘opening-up’ of a sector to external competition 
less costly and quicker than for inter-industry trade (as the adjustment can often occur 
                                                   
31 More specifically, it is ; . 
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within different segments of the same sector, so that skills and even familiarity with 
technology may remain worthwhile). This property of adjustment, not least in the case of 
China, should be helpful, especially for workers and for companies with a not-too-narrow 
specialisation. However, the Gruber-Lloyd index has to be employed at several levels of 
product (dis)aggregation, in order to understand well the detailed product specialisation. 
The Gruber-Lloyd index shown in Figure 6.2 gives a broad idea of the level of sectoral 
complementarity between the exports of the two economies. The 0.63 value registered for 
various machinery, the first product group in bilateral trade, is a direct consequence of the 
fact that it is placed first in European exports and second in European imports. Thus, it is 
clear that both economies nowadays have a comprehensive knowledge of the sector, partly 
of course through FDI, showing that China is beginning to develop in higher-skilled sectors 
with medium technology. This is the kind of refined specialisation that is bound to 
characterise more and more EU-China industrial goods trade in the future. It goes beyond 
the purpose of this FTA study to conduct further analysis at the 6-digit level for the various 
sectors in the list of leading traded products. Looking at the other two main export product 
groups of the two economies, they remain close to a Gruber-Lloyd value of 0.3, which 
indicates largely inter- (not intra-)industry trade. In other words, the EU has a strong 
comparative advantage in automotive and China has it for large segments of electrical 
machinery, etc. Even lower Gruber-Lloyd indices can be observed for other product groups, 
such as clothing and toys, pointing to pure inter-industry trade – in other words, the EU has 
lost its comparative advantages in such sectors. The exception is optical, photo, etc., which 
has a Gruber-Lloyd index even higher than 0.9. In fact, although the latter has been excluded 
in Table 6.1, it is still among the ten most imported Chinese products by the EU with a share 
of 2.48% in 2014.  
Figure 6.2 Gruber-Lloyd index for the most traded products in industry, 2014 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS; 2-digit sector level. 
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Figure 6.3 reports the change in Chinese revealed comparative advantages (RCAs) with 
respect to the world in 2010 and 2014. A country has an RCA for a specific good when the 
index is above 1.32 Hence, the exercise shows the sectors in which China is gaining 
importance in the international trade scenario and thus the direction in which the Chinese 
economy is moving. While China’s largest advantages in hides/skins, textiles/clothing and 
footwear slightly decreased over the period while remaining considerably above the unit 
threshold, China has progressively been diminishing its disadvantages. For instance, China 
managed to obtain an RCA in both metals and stone/glass already in 2014, whereas for 
plastics/rubbers China still suffers from a slight disadvantage compared with the world as 
the index reports a value of 0.9 in 2014 after an improvement of 0.2 over the four years 
analysed.  
Figure 6.3 RCA index for China in 2010 and 2014 
 
Note: HS 2-digit categories: 25-26 minerals; 27-27 fuels; 28-38 chemicals; 39-40 plastics/rubbers; 41-43 
hides/skins; 44-49 wood; 50-63 textiles/clothing; 64-67 footwear; 68-71 stone/glass; 72-83 metals; 84-85 
machinery/electrical; 86-89 transport; 90-99 miscellaneous. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS. 
Another important element for the analysis is the ‘dependence’ of Chinese exports on the 
European market. Figure 6.4 reports both the shares of products in total Chinese exports 
(blue columns) and the amounts of these exports directed to the EU (orange columns). Thus, 
13% of the top Chinese exports of electrical machinery and equipment go to the EU, as well 
                                                   
32 Revealed comparative advantage is measured by the RCA index = ; where i 
is the country index, n is the set of countries, j is the commodity index, and t is the set of 
commodities.  
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as 20% or more of each of the next four products in descending order. Therefore, one can 
identify two main reasons why textile tariffs might be important in tariff negotiations. First, 
articles of apparel & clothing, knitted or not knitted (respectively fourth and fifth among 
Chinese exports to the world) are the Chinese exports with the highest dependence on the 
European market; second, the simple average of the MFN applied tariff of the European 
textiles is the highest among all, with an average duty of 7.2%.  
Figure 6.4 Top ten Chinese exports to the world (shares in total exports and shares directed 
to the EU), 2014  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS. 
On the European side (Figure 6.5), the products with the highest shares of Chinese exports 
are vehicles other than railway (mainly automotive) and aircraft, etc., both belonging to the 
transportation sector. Tariffs on miscellaneous products can also be of interest, first because 
optical, etc. is significant in bilateral trade, and second because furniture, bedding, etc., is 
the third Chinese export in terms of exports to the world and for its share of exports to the 
EU.  
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Figure 6.5 Top ten European exports to the world (shares in total exports and shares directed 
to China), 2014 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS. 
 
6.2 Industrial tariff profiles of the EU and China 
Simple averages of MFN applied tariffs in industrial goods are lower than those for 
agricultural goods (see chapter 8, Figure 8.2) and this is true for both economies. As shown 
in Figure 6.6, China has an overall simple average of MFN applied duties in the industrial 
sector of 8% (at the HS 2-digit level in 2014), more than double the EU average. 
Machinery/electrical, chemicals and transportation have tariff averages of around 7–8%. In 
2014, 33.6% (47.7%) of European (Chinese) exports to China (the EU) were in electrical 
machinery and equipment and in various machinery (which together constitute the 
machinery/electrical category in Figure 6.6) counting for roughly €220 billion bilaterally 
traded.  
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Figure 6.6 EU and China, simple MFN applied averages in industry, 2014 
Note: HS 2-digit codes: Mineral prod. 25, 26, 27; chemicals & allied ind. 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38; 
plastic/rubbers 39, 40; articles of leather 42; wood & wood prod. 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49; textiles 50, 53, 54, 55, 
56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63; footwear/headgear 64, 65, 66, 67; stone/glass 68, 69, 70, 71; metals 72, 73, 74, 
75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83; machinery/electrical 84, 85; transportation 86, 87, 88, 89; miscellaneous 90, 91, 
92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS. 
What is striking in Figure 6.6 is that, for every sector specified in the figure, Chinese average 
tariffs are higher than those of the EU. For some sectors, the discrepancies are large, say, 
half or more: mineral products, leather articles, footwear, stone/glass, metals, 
machinery/electrical, transportation and miscellaneous. Some of these sectoral tariff 
barriers would seem to be less interesting for EU exporters (minerals, footwear and 
stone/glass), but in other sectors tariff removal would be most welcome for EU business. For 
Chinese industrial exporters, EU average tariffs are hardly a serious barrier, with the possible 
exceptions of textiles/clothing, leather (though much less high than China’s) and 
plastics/rubbers.  
6.3 Where China and the EU differ: Tariff peaks 
In East Asia, it is not unusual for tariff peaks to be numerous but highly concentrated in a 
few subsectors, and with a ‘laser approach’ of using 8 (or sometimes even 10) digits. A tariff 
peak is defined by the WTO as an applied duty of higher than 15%. China has far more (8-
digit) tariff peaks for industrial goods (more than 1,400) than the EU (45), but not in many 
sectors. As Figure 6.7 shows, there are 6 HS 2-digit sectors having more than 50 8-digit tariff 
peaks. Towering above all others are clothing knitted and not knitted with (respectively) no 
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fewer than 382 8-digit peaks and 550 such peaks. This is a plainly protectionist approach to 
defend Chinese industry against emerging, low-skilled, comparative advantage countries like 
Bangladesh, India, Vietnam and Cambodia, but not of much importance for the EU, except in 
a few luxury clothing items where EU exporters might still be competitive. Therefore, nearly 
1,000 peaks of the 1,400-plus are largely irrelevant for the EU in an FTA, and also China 
should not be sensitive in a bilateral with the EU;33 the EU’s offensive interest is to remove 
the tariffs for the competitive luxury items in clothing. Note that the EU has slightly higher 
tariffs for clothing but never as high as 15%. The other four sectors with more than 50 peaks 
are various machinery with 66 peaks, electrical machinery with 92 peaks, automotive with 
171 peaks and a remainder category ‘miscellaneous’. In Figure 6.8 the EU 8-digit tariff peaks 
are shown to appear in only two sectors: footwear (with 26) and automotive (19). None of 
these peaks is higher than 25%.  
Figure 6.7 Chinese peaks (MFN applied duty > 15%, 8-digit lines) in industry classified at the 
HS 2-digit level, 2014 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS. 
                                                   
33 Of course, such peaks remaining vis-à-vis third countries, while becoming zero in the FTA, would 
inevitably cause some trade diversion in the margin. 
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Figure 6.8 European Peaks (MFN applied duty > 15%, 8-digit lines) in Industry classified at HS 
2-digit level, 2014  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS. 
Figure 6.9 reports the distribution of Chinese peaks (at the 6-digit level, not 8 digits like in 
Figure 6.7) among duty ranges. The lowest duty range groups 57.2% of all industrial peaks, 
but 55.0% of these belong to apparel & clothing, either knitted or not knitted. As the latter 
products are of limited importance in the European exports basket, their complete bilateral 
liberalisation should not be too difficult. Nevertheless, some specific lines concerning high 
quality products might be taken into consideration by EU negotiators. For example, high 
quality suits are of interest for European businesses that want to ensure a promising position 
in the top segment of a market probably growing hand in hand with Chinese GDP per capita. 
Looking at various machinery and at electrical machinery and equipment, both in the top 
three of the most exported products worldwide by the EU and China, they include 6-digit 
lines with duty averages mostly above or equal to 20% (66.66% for various machinery and 
73.08% for electrical machinery and equipment). For cars (vehicles other than railway) none 
of the 6-digit lines fall in the lowest duty range and some 6-digit peaks falling in the highest 
duty range are defined in Figure 6.9. For example, for Chinese imports of motorcycles (HS 
8711), four 6-digit lines are subjected to prohibitive tariffs of 45%, one of 40% and another 
one of 30%.  
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Figure 6.9 Distribution of Chinese peaks by products and duty ranges, industry, 2014 
 
Note: The upper bound value of each range is excluded. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS. 
Figure 6.9 shows that Chinese peaks are often far higher than 15% or so. Of the highest 
ranges of the five levels distinguished, the highest are all 6-digit tariffs above 45% 
(prohibitive; 4 lines) and those between 35% and 45% (usually prohibitive; 14 lines). Yet, 
even at (only) the 6-digit level, no fewer than 258 tariff peaks are found, ranging between 
15% and 20%, 129 6-digit peaks between 20% and 25%, and another 46 6-digit lines between 
25% and 35%, which can easily be prohibitive, certainly when even light TBTs would be 
relevant as well.  
The following inferences from the present chapter are the most important:  
1. Industrial goods trade with China is largely inter-industry trade – that is, the comparative 
advantage sectors of the EU and China differ. 
2. But for two sectors, intra-industry trade is considerable (electrical machinery) or even 
high (optical, photo, etc.). 
3. Given rapidly rising wages and the upskilling of the Chinese labour force, plus strong 
inflows of FDI, China is bound to gradually augment the shares of more sophisticated 
goods or generate more value added in the tasks in GVCs that China can assume. This 
leads to more intra-industry trade, fitting grosso modo the aims of the Chinese leaders in 
their new growth model.  
4. For the EU, this means that adjustment to the new specialisation patterns China 
develops should be less costly socially and economically than the former adjustment to 
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relatively labour-intensive (indeed, low-skilled intensive and low-tech) goods, the 
production of which was almost entirely reallocated during the period of the mid-1980s 
to the early 2000s. 
5. Chinese (applied) industrial tariffs are on average about double (8%) the EU tariff 
average. But this says little because Chinese tariff protection is sharply divided between 
peaks tariffs, at an extremely fine (8-digit) level of specialisation, and all other industrial 
tariffs. 
6. While the EU maintains a few (45) peak tariffs in footwear and in vehicles (cars and 
motorbikes), China has more than 1,400 peak tariffs at the 8-digit level, although nearly 
1,000 of them are only in clothing (knitted and not knitted), which is of little interest to 
EU exporters having lost comparative advantage. In some other sectors such as 
machinery, electrical machinery and automotive (all strong EU export sectors), however, 
there are still quite a few peaks and the frequency of higher peaks (beyond, say, 20%) is 
such that the EU will undoubtedly see it as an offensive interest to obtain full, bilateral 
tariff removal in these sectors, which would enable EU companies to exploit the full 
potential of their current comparative advantage.  
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7. Market access in goods: Trade defence remedies 
7.1 Relevance of trade defence for an FTA 
To correct for harmful price distortions of specific imported goods, EU companies can 
consider recourse to trade defence instruments (TDIs), such as anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy measures. They can request that the EU target specific countries, companies (and 
products) when such distortive practices with respect to EU imports cause them injury. The 
impact of such highly targeted remedies on the total goods flows between the country (here, 
the EU) that starts the investigation and the one under investigation, is negligible, as by 
definition anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures hit a highly specific group of companies 
in a (group of) specific country(-ies) to preserve an undistorted competitive environment in a 
specific product category.34 
The question is now whether an FTA (here, between the EU and China) is likely or even 
expected to alter the application of trade defence instruments by both parties. The short 
answer is usually not. In many FTAs, the subject is not even touched upon. It would of course 
be possible to include it. One might imagine that the parties commit not to apply anti-
dumping unilaterally (following WTO rules, of course) and commit first to go for consultation 
or perhaps act only after the search for an agreed solution. Ideally, one might also suggest 
that dumping, as a distortion of competition, is dealt with under competition law and policy, 
but this would require an exceptionally close cooperation between the FTA partners. Such 
degrees of cooperation in competition policy are hardly found anywhere when FTAs are 
concluded. Probably, the most extreme form of rejecting anti-dumping in a preferential 
agreement is Art. 91, EEC, now long deleted from the Treaty, which explicitly allowed 
reverse dumping (back to the EU member state where the goods came from) in the 
transition period of the EEC customs union. One would not normally expect even a ‘deep 
and comprehensive’ FTA with China to change the application of trade defence instruments. 
But why then discuss TDIs in this study? 
The only logic that explains it is a political one, not a functional one. Even though the total 
amount of trade in goods affected by TDIs (usually, anti-dumping, AD) is very small, the 
sensitivity on both sides is far greater. China finds – as our several interviews in Beijing, 
                                                   
34 According to the European Commission’s “Evaluation of the European Union’s Trade Defence 
Instruments” (Brussels, 2012), the impact on bilateral flows hit by dumping (or the anti-dumping 
procedure) is not large but the effect on the specific product category can be noticeable as it 
temporary reduces ‘dumped’ imports. Moreover, TDIs can affect entry decisions of the firms and 
alter the probability of exit from the market since they ensure a provisional protection against unfair 
competitors. As noticed in past studies, the effectiveness of TDIs is not only motivated by the 
possibility of restoring competitiveness, but also in terms of threat. If TDIs are used in a credible and 
thorough way, the commercial counterpart will have a higher incentive to abide by trade rules. 
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discussions in Europe with Chinese business and other sources make abundantly clear – that 
the EU targets Chinese exports to the EU frequently and this creates anxiety and uncertainty 
among exporters. Indeed, while China was targeted (through initiations) on average 28% 
between 1995 and 2014 – which is higher than any other trading partner – China’s share 
went up shortly after its accession to the WTO and reached no less than 47% (but here, of 
AD measures in force) in 2014.35 China is therefore right. If all cases properly reflect dumping 
in the sense of selling in the EU at prices lower than the market-driven costs at home, 
however, there would still be no problem. But China is not a ‘market economy’ and that is at 
the root of the EU anxiety, especially in a few specific sectors. The authors have decided that 
a short treatment of this problem is justified by the anxieties on both sides, which threaten 
to affect negatively the climate in which a possible FTA would have to be negotiated. In 
other words, there is no direct connection between an FTA and TDIs, but future negotiations 
on an FTA – as the Chinese leadership suggested – would only be feasible in an atmosphere 
of a minimum level of mutual trust supported by political will on both sides.  
7.2 Recent bilateral application of trade defence 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 on protection against dumped imports, in compliance 
with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, allows the EU to set an ad valorem duty to balance 
dumping, once there is sufficient evidence that a dumped price has been applied causing 
injury to some specific EU companies.36 There are several elements to be proved, such as the 
link between the dumping and the injury, and the fact that the potential anti-dumping 
measure would not be against the interest of the Union (for example, also considering those 
using the imports as inputs). The same principles apply to the Council Regulation (EC) No. 
597/2009 on protection against subsidised imports by imposing a countervailing duty.  
The setting of the anti-dumping duty follows the lesser duty rule, according to which the EU 
duty applied to the importers does not correspond to the dumping margin (defined as the 
difference between the ‘normal value’ of the good imported and the export prices applied) 
but to the injury margin suffered by the company that is usually lower. The injury margin is 
usually chosen to set the anti-dumping duty, so the methodology behind its calculation is 
crucial to offset the injury caused by dumped imports. The investigation period usually lasts 
15 months. Nine months after the start of the investigation provisional measures can be 
imposed. This is followed by definitive duties collected at the end of the period, with the 
implementing regulation confirming or eventually modifying the conditions set in the 
                                                   
35 See Yalcin et al. (2016) available here . It is true, however, that the US and India had even more AD 
measures in force in 2014, and with higher (US) or much higher (India) AD duties.  
36 Dumping itself is held to exist between countries A and B, once exports of good x from (say) B to A 
are priced lower in the A market than in B’s home market. 
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provisional act. Definitive measures can be in force for five years, after which the measure 
has to be reviewed and possibly prolonged but never automatically. 
Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1 show EU TD investigations by major industrial sector over the period 
2005–10. It identifies a typical sectoral pattern in anti-dumping cases: the dominance of 
products from large-scale homogeneous goods sectors, such as (bulk) chemicals, steel and 
other metal products and plastics. Dumping by firms may stem from many reasons, including 
normal commercial conduct (e.g. to penetrate a new market with temporarily low prices) 
but also an exercise of market power by trying the squeeze out competitors through 
predatory pricing, or disparate, aggressive selling tactics in the case of overcapacity at home 
in order to survive in the short run or avoid immediate adjustment.  
Table 7.1 refers to investigations initiated by China by sector by mid-2015. 
Figure 7.1 EU Trade defence investigations by major industrial sector, 2005–10 
 
Source: European Commission (2010). 
Table 7.1 Ongoing investigations against China by product group (mid-2015) 
Product Proceeding Measures 
Acesulfame Potassium (ACE-K) Anti-dumping Measures in force (prov.) 
Aluminium foil (certain) Anti-dumping Measures in force 
Aluminium foil (certain)(CAF) Anti-dumping No measure 
Aspartame Anti-dumping No measure 
Ceramic foam filters Anti-dumping No measure 
Citric acid Anti-dumping Measures in force 
Cold-rolled flat steel products (certain) Anti-dumping No measure 
Grain-oriented flat-rolled products of electrical 
steel (GOES) 
Anti-dumping Measures in force (prov.) 
Molybdenum wires (certain) Anti-dumping Measures in force 
Rebars (high fatigue performance steel concrete Anti-dumping No measure 
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reinforcement) 
Seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or steel (certain) Anti-dumping Measures in force 
Sodium cyclamate Anti-dumping No measure 
Solar panels Anti-dumping Measures in force 
Solar panels Anti-subsidy Measures in force 
Tartaric acid Anti-dumping No measure 
Wire rod Anti-dumping Measures in force (1) 
Source: European Commission (2015). 
Table 7.2 shows the procedures initiated by China against other countries: one observes that 
out of 114 cases, 15 are against the European Union and half of them are against products of 
chemicals, while the remaining half are spread over plastics, metals, paper and machinery.  
Table 7.2 Procedures initiated by China by product and by country 
(in force as at 31 December 2013)  
 
Notes on products: a) Products of the chemical and allied industries; b) resins, plastics and articles thereof; 
rubber and articles and thereof; c) base metals and articles thereof; d) paper, paperboard and articles thereof; 
e) machinery and electrical equipment; f) live animals and animal products; and g) prepared foodstuffs.  
Source: WTO (2014). 
 
7.3 Market economy status for China: Law, economics or a political compromise? 
In anti-dumping procedures the possibility is foreseen to calculate the duties without taking 
into account pricing conditions in the country under investigation when this country is not 
considered a ‘market economy’ by other WTO importing members. The logic of this 
provision is that, in a non-market economy, the market-driven price mechanism does not 
function properly (or not at all), so that domestic prices in such an economy cannot be 
trusted to reflect average or marginal costs. Since the basis of an anti-dumping investigation 
is precisely the domestic costs (or price, for practical reasons) asked by local companies, the 
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lack of reliable (market) prices in that economy requires another solution. The possibility of 
considering it a ‘non-market economy’ implies that the reference price, needed to compute 
the duty, must be found in an ‘analogue’ country where the price mechanism is guaranteed 
to work normally. In practical terms, the consequence of the non-market economy status is 
that the dumping margins applied tend to be larger and hence the duties that companies 
which dump good x, will pay, are higher. How much higher is not, a priori, clear. Often EU 
producers that fear being hit, especially now that China is experiencing huge overcapacities 
in, e.g. steel, simple ceramics, selected bulk chemicals and aluminium, leading them to 
suspect ‘distress dumping’ on a very large scale, compare EU AD duties with US AD duties, 
which are indeed much higher on average. These companies/sectors argue that the EU 
should neither routinely apply the lesser duty rule, nor terminate the non-market status of 
China as long as these huge overcapacities do not lead to bankruptcies and market exit.  
Art. 15 in the China WTO accession protocol includes the possibility of considering the 
country still a ‘non-market economy’ given the large subsidisation policy in place, as well as 
widespread price controls and state guarantees for SOEs. Subsidies (including very easy 
finance of new investment, e.g. in the capacity of SOEs, by state-owned banks, themselves 
therefore SOEs) and state guarantees in China have been broadly supported by Five Year 
plans established by the Party. This largely unchecked process in some sectors worked one 
or two decades ago as exports kept on growing rapidly but it has assumed absurd 
proportions over the last seven years. In the present low-growth climate (for China, at least) 
the true dimensions of Chinese overcapacity in some industrial sectors have become much 
more clear. A frank admission in the China Daily of 4 December 2015, quoting a speech by 
Mr Li on how the reduce overcapacities, was revealing: overcapacity in steel had reached 
around 400 million tons, half of the Chinese capacity and twice the entire steelmaking 
capacity of the country that is the second most important producer of steel worldwide! 
Overcapacities of this size cannot possibly be maintained beyond half a year or so without 
bankruptcies or applying drastic capacity cuts. The incentives or mere survival pressures to 
export these products abroad at marginal or below-marginal cost prices (often considered 
dumped for non-subsidised industries) are extremely powerful and undermine a market-
based competitive trade environment. They may also cause import-competing industries in 
the EU to cut capacity (and lay off workers) that may well be potentially competitive under 
market-driven circumstances.  
In the EU and US, there is an animated debate on whether the Art. 15 provisions of granting 
the market economy status (MES) to China, or not, by the end of 2016 automatically expires. 
The idea is that, by December 2016 and solely for purposes of AD duty calculations, WTO 
members should recognise China as a market economy in anti-dumping investigations (not 
in general terms!). Ideally, this should have been automatically applied by the WTO at the 
time of China’s accession in 2001, but many WTO economies refused to do so as Chinese 
industry (in particular, SOEs) is often supported in various ways and so able to set artificially 
low prices in the international context. By granting China MES, domestic Chinese prices 
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 85 
 
would become the guide. For those feeling threatened by exports in sectors with huge 
overcapacity, this de facto lowering of AD duties is regarded as less effective for their 
protection (trade defence). The duties under MES applied on dumped imports are likely to 
be lower compared with when the ‘analogue’ country is chosen as the ‘like’ economy for 
price comparison, but of course without supported industry and with tight constraints in 
case of some overcapacity. 
The EU and US debates on the market economy status tend to mix up the broader notion of 
whether China is already a market economy in general – the theme here is how far reforms 
have come and what is there to be done still – with the highly specific and technical question 
of whether or not WTO procedures on China’s accession impose the granting of that status 
by December 2016 for the purpose of anti-dumping calculations. China does not have any 
doubt, as it is convinced that there is an automatic recognition of MES, regardless of the 
different legal interpretations discussed. The recognition, according to the Chinese 
authorities, is automatic and not conditional on compliance with the five criteria imposed by 
EU law (as discussed further below) on what a market economy is. Below we summarise the 
thrust of the legal and economic debate.  
7.3.1 Is it about law? 
The legal discussion is mainly focused on two paragraphs of Art. 15, specifically Art. 15(a)(ii) 
and (d). It is worth recalling that, at the time of accession, many WTO members preferred to 
apply a non-market economy status to China exactly as had occurred for other former 
communist countries, assuming that the legacy of the planned economy was likely to 
generate an unfair market and trade environment for some products for years to come. The 
assumption need not apply by definition but it forces the country under investigation to 
show that a specific sector reflects market economy conditions, and if that is shown 
empirically, the amount of the duty can be based on domestic prices. Moreover, there was 
probably hope in 2001 that a sustained Chinese reform process – which did occur before 
WTO accession – would be continued and hence, this provision could have been subject to a 
revision after a number of years.  
According to Art. 15(a), WTO members cannot use domestic Chinese prices to set anti-
dumping duties by applying the methodology envisaged for countries considered non-
market economies unless (ii) “the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that 
market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to 
manufacture, production and sale of that product”. Paragraph (d) states that the market 
economy status must be granted once China meets the criteria set by the WTO importing 
country. For the EU, five criteria are found in the basic Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1225/2009. However, the paragraph continues and may confuse the reader by stating that  
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[i]n any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the 
date of accession. In addition, should China establish, pursuant to the national law of 
the importing WTO Member, that market economy conditions prevail in a particular 
industry or sector, the non-market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no 
longer apply to that industry or sector. 
The last paragraph seems to be intentionally contradictory and leaves room for 
interpretation.  
7.3.2 Is it about economics? 
Although the issue should in principle concern anti-dumping practices that, in the final 
analysis, hit only a very small percentage of bilateral trade flows and few specific products, a 
debate on how the state intervenes in the Chinese economy and its market functioning 
seems hard to avoid. There are many signs that China still deeply intervenes in many ways in 
market functioning, through direct subsidies, state guarantees, other ‘protection’ of SOEs 
(often operating in the sectors most hit by AD duties historically), a lack of access to public 
procurement, etc. This is not to deny the immense progress the country has made in the last 
decade in moving towards a market-based economy, even if less ambitious than perhaps 
expected by WTO members. 
Defining what is a market economy and what is not in a broader sense is not an easy task. 
The EU has set five criteria recognised in the basic anti-dumping regulation that must be 
respected to grant the status also according to Art. 15. The basic EU regulation defines a 
market economy in anti-dumping procedures according to these five criteria: 
1. low degree of government influence over the allocation of resources and decisions of 
enterprises, whether directly or indirectly (e.g. public bodies), for example, through the 
use of state-fixed prices, or discrimination in the tax, trade or currency regimes;  
2. absence of state-induced distortions in the operation of enterprises linked to 
privatisation and absence of use of non-market trading or compensation systems (such 
as barter trade); 
3. existence and implementation of a transparent and non-discriminatory company law 
that ensures adequate corporate governance (application of international accounting 
standards, protection of shareholders, public availability of accurate company 
information);  
4. existence and implementation of a coherent, effective and transparent set of laws that 
ensure the respect of property rights and the operation of a functioning bankruptcy 
regime; and 
5. existence of a genuine financial sector that operates independently from the state and 
which, in law and practice, is subject to sufficient guarantee provisions and adequate 
supervision. 
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 87 
 
The only official and relatively recent source that applies these criteria goes back to 2008, 
when the European Commission37 released a working document stating that only criterion 2 
was actually met. The other four ones, although considerable progress had been achieved, 
had not been met, so granting the status was not justified. 
Since this assessment, there have only been a few studies (e.g. Taube & in der Heiden, 2015; 
and also Scott & Jiang, 2015)38 and all supported by industrial groups that fear being hurt by 
the granting of the status. The studies assess whether those criteria are nowadays met and 
what economic impacts a potential granting of MES would have on the EU economy in terms 
of job losses and overall production. In order to address both questions, many assumptions 
must be made about the linkage of the change in the pricing methodology in each anti-
dumping case in relation to the ability, in the margin, of a firm to keep or not (some of) its 
employees. Not only can the adopted methodology be debated rather critically, but also the 
studies do not consider the potential benefits/costs to other economic actors besides the 
producers (e.g. what are the consequences for importers, for instance?). Indeed, the 
possibility of granting China MES could reduce the effectiveness of trade defence 
instruments but how much is difficult to say. The methodological difficulties are the same 
that apply to the identification of the general impact on trade flows of the application of 
TDIs. What has been learned in past assessments of TDI regulations is that confidentiality of 
actual import flows from companies affected by investigations and definition of 
counterfactual flows, which would be needed to measure the effect of the non-application 
of the duty, could render the exercise very imprecise. 
7.3.3 …and if it were mainly about geopolitics? 
Between a possibly contradictory legal statement and a lack of economic understanding on 
whether the status must be granted, a political compromise might be found that also takes 
into consideration the current investment negotiations between the EU and China. Many 
argue that not granting MES could undermine the current CAI39 negotiations and future 
trade cooperation – including perhaps an FTA – with China, which is already and could 
increasingly become an important destination market for European goods, services and 
investments. Moreover, by granting the status of a market economy, there is a chance of 
                                                   
37 See European Commission, “Progress by the Republic of China towards graduation to market 
economy status in trade defence investigation”, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2008) 
2503 final, 19.09.2008 (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/june/tradoc_143599.pdf). 
38 See Taube & in der Heiden (2015) at http://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 
5537b2fbe4b0e49a1e30c01c/t/558ba747e4b004a9529395ae/1435215687902/MES+China+Study_Ta
ube_Full+Version-25June15_F.pdf; see also Scott & Jiang (2015) at http://static1.squarespace.com/ 
static/5537b2fbe4b0e49a1e30c01c/t/55fc0373e4b09a69209aa9c2/1443621109236/Unilateral+grant
+of+Market+Economy+Status+to+China+would+put+millions+of+EU+jobs+at+risk.pdf 
39 Concerning the CAI, see chapter 15. 
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stimulating China to adopt a more straightforward reform process in order to avoid being 
isolated in both the transpacific and Eurasian continental areas. Finally, the decision should 
also consider the position of the US, always in favour of a more restrictive use of trade 
defence remedies, and whether this decision might compromise EU relations with both. 
Still, a workable solution need not be black or white: granting MES will in any case require a 
change in the basic EU regulation, since China may not meet the five criteria and whether it 
does nowadays can only be based on a common agreement of the 28 EU member states. 
Without a clear legal interpretation, the debate between winners and losers will not easily 
lead to a compromise.  
Recently, a paper published by the European Parliament (Barone, 2015) identifies four 
possible solutions. Two of them propose a mixed outcome allowing for adjustment costs to 
be imposed by the EU and the suspension of the much-criticised ‘analogue country’ 
approach.  
The European Parliament paper outlines the following solutions: (i) China does not acquire 
the market economy status because the automaticity does not apply. This implies that the 
status quo does not change. (ii) China does not change its status unless it meets the five 
criteria, but a different methodology in the price-setting can be applied that does not involve 
the analogue country practice. (iii) China acquires MES, hence, the reference prices in anti-
dumping procedures will be those used in China. This solution will also require an 
amendment of the basic regulation agreed by all member states. Finally, (iv) China acquires 
MES but the EU maintains the possibility to apply cost adjustments in specific cases where 
the state can be shown to have intervened in the price-setting. 
While options (ii) and (iv) seem to have a similar outcome, option (ii) does not require a 
change in the basic regulation while option (iv) (and (iii)) does. The possibility to grant MES 
by maintaining a reservation of applying some cost adjustments (although accepting the 
normal value as it is considered in China) will not alter the current treatment for some 
products. 
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8. Market access in agriculture: Tariffs and tariff-rate quotas 
This chapter deals with agriculture, where both tariffs and TRQs matter. After a short 
analysis of trade flows in this sector (8.1), tariff profiles at various levels of disaggregation 
are presented (8.2), tariff peaks are studied at the 2-digit sector level as well as at the 6- and 
8-digit tariff line level (8.3) and TRQs are dealt with in the main text and in Annex I. TRQs 
(and their enlargement) can be a difficult negotiation issue but in the case of China, this is 
less likely; the EU side of TRQs is far more complicated, however.  
Table 8.1 Weighted MFN applied tariff rate at the HS 2-digit level (%) 
 Overall Agro-food Industry 
China 9.30 12.27 8.02 
EU 4.76 6.90 3.83 
Note: Agriculture includes products 1-24, 35, 43, 51 and 52. 
Source: Data from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). 
Looking at the averages of weighted40 MFN applied tariff rates (Error! Reference source not 
found.), agriculture is a protected sector for both economies. Besides the concerns related 
to food quality, which are present in every country, China has long pursued a strict policy of 
food self-sufficiency that allows the government to decide on prices and quantities in order 
to protect both citizens and farmers from price fluctuations or shortages. What matters for 
agriculture is a verification of whether and in what agro-products the Chinese tariff 
protection and TRQs are actually hitting potential export products from the EU. It is 
interesting to foresee which of the two parties will play defence and which offense. One 
question is whether China is willing to drop its strict policy of food self-sufficiency and to 
expose its farmers more to international competition. Still, the ongoing structural change in 
Chinese society towards higher quality goods rather than quantity (due mainly to the 
evolution of the Chinese diet) could be a focal point of the negotiations. Indeed, the EU 
seems eager to have access to the Chinese food market, exporting the quality and safety 
standards sought by China, as it is already doing selectively (e.g. some fruit exports now 
banned by Russia have found their way into China, such as pears). 
8.1 Bilateral agro-food trade and its composition  
The overall increase in living standards of the Chinese population, led by a successful middle 
class, will modify the Chinese demand for all kinds of goods in general, but food is likely to 
be the first affected. Possible evidence of this ongoing trend towards high(er) quality food in 
                                                   
40 Weights are the corresponding trade values. Note that, as before, tariffs are MFN applied tariffs, 
not the bound tariffs (if different).  
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Chinese demand can be found in the positive trade balance that the EU enjoyed in 2013 for 
the first time since 2002 (Figure 8.1). European exports grew steadily until 2009, when the 
pace dramatically increased, pushing the total value of European agrarian goods to $11 
billion in 2014 from the $4 billion in 2009. Meanwhile, the European imports from China 
have not reduced, besides the drop in 2009 owing to the start of the European crisis, with 
$10.2 billion in 2014.  
Figure 8.1 EU trade balance with China in agro-food 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS. 
This path points to an emerging complementarity between the two economies, where China 
has finally obtained a sufficient level of income per capita to purchase high-quality products. 
Thus, the EU may seize the opportunity to become a significant player in the future Chinese 
agro-economy, and EU agro-products have all the right features to make it possible. What 
needs to be taken into account, however, is competitive supply from Australia and New 
Zealand (both having FTAs with China). Table 8.2 reports the shares of the eight most traded 
agricultural products, in descending order of importance, aggregated at the 2-digit level. The 
only product present in both exports to China and imports from China is fish, which leads in 
total trade (10.7%) and in imports from China (17.4%). Of the remaining most traded 
products, European exports dominate, with beverages (8.4%) and preparation of cereal 
(7.1%) at the top for total bilateral trade.  
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Table 8.2 Most traded products in agro-food, 2014 
Total trade EU exports to China EU imports from China 
HS code and 
name 
Share (%) HS code and 
name 
Share (%) HS code and 
name 
Share (%) 
03, Fish 10.7 22, Beverages 15.7 03, Fish 17.4 
22, Beverages 8.4 02, Meat 12.1 05, Prod. of 
animal origin 
8.0 
19, Prep. of 
cereal 
7.1 19, Prep. of 
cereal 
11.9 07, Edible 
veg. 
7.4 
02, Meat 6.5 41, Raw hides 
and skins 
10.3 51, Wool 6.8 
04, Dairy 
products 
5.8 04, Dairy 
products 
9.5 20, Prep. of 
veg. 
6.4 
41, Raw hides 
and skins 
5.8 43, Fur skins 6.6 12, Oil seeds 6.3 
05, Prod. of 
animal origin 
5.3 03, Fish 4.6 52, Cotton 6.3 
51, Wool 5.0 35, Albuminoidal 
subst. 
4.3 09, Coffee, 
tea 
6.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS. 
 
8.2 Tariff and TRQ barriers in bilateral agro-food trade 
Tariffs in agriculture are higher than in industry for the above-mentioned reasons related to 
food security and protection of domestic farmers. Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 8.2, the 
European simple duty averages are mostly concentrated around the relatively low threshold 
of 5%, except for dairy products (8.1%) and processed agricultural products (PAPs) (14.0%), 
where the EU has a strong comparative advantage, and for sugar and confectionery (11.4%) 
and beverages & tobacco (23.15%), which have always been highly protected products 
worldwide. China levies rather high applied MFN rates on all its agricultural goods, thereby 
keeping its primary sector rather closed.  
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Figure 8.2 EU and China simple applied tariff averages in agro-food, 2014 
 
Note: HS 2-digit codes: Animal products 01, 02, 03, 05; animal derivatives 35, 41, 43, 51; dairy products 4; PAP 
16, 19, 20, 21; fruit, veg., plants 06, 07, 08, 13, 14; coffee, tea 9; cereals and milling 10, 11; oilseeds, fats & oils 
12, 15; sugars and confectionery 17; beverages & tobacco 22, 24; cotton 52; other 18, 23. 
 
8.2.1 Agro-food in China’s FTAs 
China has shown an increasing willingness in recent FTAs to gradually open up its agricultural 
sector. Starting with the FTA with Chile (2005), although agricultural products were still 
subjected to high initial tariffs (equal to or higher than 20%) and long phase-out periods (ten 
years), and thus made the FTA less ambitious with respect to agriculture, the eventual tariff 
removals turned out to have a great impact on two-way agro-food trade between the 
economies. In fact, though agro-food products count for a small part in total bilateral trade 
(5.1% in 2014), they registered an average annual growth rate of 21.6% between 2006 ($366 
million) and 2014 ($1.755 million), outperforming industrial goods, which grew on average 
by 16.8% per year.41 
In the FTA with New Zealand (2008), China has been more inclined to lower agricultural 
tariffs, but maize, sugar, forestry, wool and cotton were excluded, as for Chile. Moreover, 
China also introduced a country-specific TRQ on Indonesian(!) imports of wool equal to 
25,450 tonnes (of which 450 tonnes are of wool tops), which grew annually by 5% for five 
                                                   
41 Total trade increased from $9.6 billion in 2006 to $33.9 billion in 2014. Calculations refer to the 
sum of Chile’s imports from China and exports to China. Products are disaggregated at the HS 2-digit 
level and are sourced from WITS.  
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years.42 The trade relationship between the FTA partners strengthened over the years after 
the agreement and the two-way trade exploded, registering a 252% increase from 2009 to 
2014.43 As a result of the more ambitious tariff cuts in agriculture compared with the Chilean 
FTA, the share of agro-food in total trade escalated from 25.9% to 40.9% in the same five-
year period. As happened with Chile, agricultural goods enjoyed the largest growth, at 31.8% 
on annual average.  
8.2.2 Agro-food in the EU’s FTAs 
Mexico (2000) has the first FTA signed by the EU with a non-European OECD country,44 in 
which many agro-goods had to follow long phase-out schedules. In fact, while only 43.1% of 
agro-food imports from Mexico enjoyed a zero EU tariff in the year the FTA went into force, 
another 33% of them were spread over four, eight, nine and ten45 years of phase-out 
schedules (fish and fish products, and vegetables), and in some cases, they were also 
subjected to TRQs (e.g. bird’s eggs and flowers) or the entry price system (seasonal fruit). 
The high level of diversification of the tariff liberalisation measures adopted by the EU 
together with their slow implementation have made the EU–Mexico FTA a low-ambition 
agreement that has not led to substantial gains in agricultural trade. Bilateral trade of agro-
food did not show any growth from 2001 to 2014, at 5.52% in 2001 and 5.10% in 2014. 
Similarly, both European imports and exports with Mexico have lost importance as a share of 
total agro-trade, implying that the bilateral market opening for agricultural products was not 
deep enough. 
In the FTA with Chile (2003), the EU went further with tariff cuts as compared with the 
Mexican example, with 90% of agricultural tariffs on zero-duty in the year after the treaty 
went into force. The remaining products were subjected to long phase-out schedules (either 
seven or ten years), including PAPs of vegetables, fruits and meat as well as meat and fish. In 
contrast with the TRQs agreed with Mexico, in the FTA with Chile all the TRQs (except fish) 
set a duty-free regime from the date the agreement entered into force. Moreover, some of 
the quotas increased over the years by predetermined annual rates of either 5% or 10%. In 
the first six years, the greater liberalisation, compared with the FTA with Mexico, led to an 
increase of ten percentage points in the share of agro-food imports in total EU imports from 
Chile (from 22.9% in 2004 to 32.6% in 2009).  
                                                   
42 See Peterson Institute for International Economics (2016), p. 161. 
43 Total trade has increased from $6.1 billion in 2009 to $15.5 billion in 2014. Calculations refer to the 
sum of New Zealand’s imports from China and exports to China. Products are disaggregated at the HS 
2-digit level and sourced from WITS.  
44 Other than South Africa (2000). 
45 For the ten-year specific case, the tariff rate remains unchanged for the first three years and a 
phasing-out schedule for seven years afterward. See Copenhagen Economics (2011).  
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The finalised negotiations on CETA, concluded in August 2014, have brought exceptional 
results in tariff cuts for the overall economy as well as for fisheries and agriculture. The tariff 
cuts agreed upon by the EU are undoubtedly comprehensive, with 98.7% of all European 
tariff lines to be eliminated.46 Considering agriculture, only 6.2% of agro-food tariffs will not 
be fully eliminated after seven years. Among these excluded lines, some are products 
subjected to the entry price system (e.g. tomatoes, oranges, apples and grape juice); some 
have been totally excluded from negotiations (chicken and turkey meat, and eggs); and for 
others, the TRQs have been set to guarantee duty-free imports for limited quantities (Table 
8.3).  
Table 8.3 EU TRQs in CETA negotiations 
Product Agreed CETA quota (tonnes) Duty-free on existing quota (WTO) 
Beef 45,838 + 3,000 (bison) 11,500 (Hilton beef) 
Pork 75,000 4,625 
Sweet corn 8,000(1) – 
Common wheat 60,147(2) 38,853(2) 
(1) It will apply upon entry into force of CETA.  
(2) It will expire once the tariff on common wheat is fully phased out. 
Source: “CETA–Summary of the final negotiating results”, European Commission (2015). 
While for Hilton beef, bison and common wheat the duty-free amounts will be available 
immediately after CETA enters into force, a phase-in period of five years has been decided 
for beef, pork and sweet corn. These TRQs ensure Canada almost ‘unique’ duty-free access 
(within the quota, of course) to the protected European agrarian market.  
8.3 Tariffs peaks in agro-food 
As shown by past FTAs concluded by both EU and China, it is possible to identify sensitive 
products for both sides. Dependent on the competitiveness of the other party in such goods, 
this should enable the reader to assess options for an FTA between China and the EU. For 
agro-goods with relatively low tariffs and no TRQs, liberalisation should be easier but the 
question is whether the gains in trade or welfare would be large. It is therefore much more 
important to focus on sensitive products. Moreover, in the specific case of China, an increase 
in competition due to the entrance of international firms into the market would lead to an 
overall improvement of choice. Growing international competition generates a so-called 
‘market selection effect’: pushing inefficient and uncompetitive domestic firms out of the 
market as well as firms mistrusted for quality that is too low. Its short-run effect is always 
                                                   
46 See the European Commission (2015) article, “CETA – Summary of the final negotiating results” 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/december/tradoc_152982.pdf). 
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painful, but in the longer run, remarkable gains for the entire Chinese economic system 
could be generated. In other words, it would make the complicated task that President Xi 
and the country would be undertaking easier, i.e. transforming the entire economy into a 
real market-driven economy. Yet, there will be opposition to this process. That is why phase-
out schedules, aimed at conciliating all the different interests, are of extreme importance in 
order to smoothly go through the adjustment process and successfully overcome the initial 
opposition. The focus will first be on sensitive products insofar as they are characterised by 
tariff peaks and then by TRQs. 
Figures 8.3 and 8.4 report the distribution of 8-digit product tariff peaks among agro-food 
products for the HS 2-digit level sectors for China and the EU respectively.47 The reader 
should be aware that the scale of both axes between the two figures differs, with the 
European vertical one extending to 500 whereas the Chinese one stops at 120, and the 
horizontal one being far more inclusive on the Chinese side (i.e. more product sectors). In 
fact, while the Chinese primary sector is protected in almost all the products (89.7%), the 
European one reports only ten products characterised by peaks with a marked discrepancy 
between the top three and the others. Indeed, the most impacted European product, 
prepared fruit & vegetables, reports a number of peaks three times higher than fish, the 
second product in descending order, and even more than four times higher than the most 
tariff-protected Chinese product, which is also prepared fruit & vegetables. Furthermore, all 
the first three European products register a higher number of peaks than the first Chinese 
product. In a nutshell, while the EU has adopted a very protectionist policy for a few selected 
products, China tends to protect its entire agricultural sector, reflecting its historical 
approach of food self-sufficiency and the need to safeguard a farming class far poorer and 
presumably more under-resourced than EU farmers.  
Combining the distribution of peaks in both economies with the distribution of the most 
traded agro-food products in 2014 (see Table 8.2 above), one might begin to suggest what 
the priorities would be for the two sides. The European negotiators may focus on PAPs, 
particularly of meat and fish, and meat products for two reasons: first, to improve the 
already notable access to the Chinese market of meat (not-processed meat is already second 
in agro-food exports to China, with a share of 12.1% in 2014) towards new high-quality 
products, and second, because European countries have a strong comparative advantage in 
PAPs worldwide. The Chinese prepared meat, fish category (HS 16) reported 30 peaks in 
2014, which was a high number but is still only a third of the number for prepared fruit & 
vegetables (HS 20). Thus, PAPs of meat and fish would probably be those of interest for the 
EU among the four PAP categories (HS 16, 19, 20 and 21) used in Figure 8.2. The second 
                                                   
47 Calculations refer to the data on the number of peaks reported by WITS, which report the 8-digit 
lines of a 2-digit category with a duty above 15%. In Figure 8.3, the EU is the partner and China is the 
reporter, the opposite of Figure 8.4. 
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reason, and probably the more important, is the ongoing shift of the Chinese diet towards 
more meat, given the steady increase in income and the worsening condition of historical 
agricultural lands caused by climate change. China, for its part, will certainly demand lower 
EU protection for fish, which is the top traded product in bilateral agricultural trade and the 
leading EU import product from China, despite 144 EU tariff peaks at the 8-digit level.  
Figure 8.3 Chinese peaks (MFN applied duty > 15%, 8-digit lines) in agro-food classified at the 
HS 2-digit level, 2014  
 
Note: Agriculture includes products in the HS 2-digit classification from 1 to 24, 35, 43, 51 and 52.  
Source: WITS. 
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Figure 8.4 European peaks (MFN applied duty > 15%, 8-digit lines) in agro-food classified at 
the HS 2-digit level, 2014  
 
Note: Agriculture includes products in the HS 2-digit classification from 1 to 24, 35, 43, 51 and 52. 
Source: WITS.  
Investigating at the 6-digit level, Table 8.4 shows that China imposes duties above 15% on 
13.89% of all its products, a share seven times higher than the European equivalent. 
However, if one considers agriculture alone, this high ratio in terms of share shrinks to only 
twice as high, and is reflected in the value traded under peak rates: almost the same 
between the two sides, with China importing goods from the EU for $1,183.6 million and the 
EU registering $919.8 million of imports from China.  
Table 8.4 China and the EU’s peaks (>15%) at the HS 6-digit level, 2014 
 China EU 
 No. of lines 
with simple 
applied MFN 
avg >15% 
Sector 
relevance 
(%) 
Import 
value 
($ million) 
No. of lines 
with simple 
applied MFN 
avg >15% 
Sector 
relevance 
(%) 
Import 
value 
($ million) 
Agro-
food 
171 23.88 1,183.6 80 10.06 919.8 
Industry 455 12.00 29,604.0 14 0.35 7,017.4 
Total 626 13.89(1) 30,787.7 94 1.97(2) 7,937.2 
(1) China reports a total of 4,507 6-digit lines of which 716 are agricultural and 3,791 are industrial.  
(2) EU reports a total of 4,761 6-digit lines of which 798 are agricultural and 3,963 are industrial. 
Notes: Agriculture includes HS 2-digit products 1-24, 35, 41, 43, 51 and 52.  
Source: WITS. 
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Another consideration is the distribution of the 6-digit lines, identified in Table 8.4, over the 
duty rate spectrum. Whereas 60% of all EU 6-digit lines are in the range of between 15% and 
20%, for the Chinese the figure is only 17% in the lowest interval, and a more important 
share of 35.88% is in the considerably higher range of 25–35% (Table 8.5).  
Table 8.5 Distribution of peaks (6-digit level) among duty ranges in agro-food (%), 2014  
 15-20 20-25 25-35 ≥35 
EU 60.00 28.75 7.50 3.75 
CHINA 17.06 41.18 35.8 5.88 
Note: The upper bound value of each range is excluded.  
Source: Authors. 
Hence, the question is whether a negotiation can successfully tear down these high duties, 
and thus shrink the numbers in the two main ranges for Chinese duties (i.e. 20–25% and 25–
35%). Furthermore, the sectors that would interest European negotiators the most, such as 
PAPs, meat and beverages, are characterised by Chinese duty averages higher than 25% 
(Figure 8.5).  
Figure 8.5 Distribution of Chinese peaks (6-digit level) by product and duty range, agro-food, 
2014 
 
Note: The upper bound value of each range is excluded. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS. 
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A complete elimination of these tariffs from the Chinese side seems improbable, certainly 
not within a short period. A reasonable way out could be the concession of a special quota 
for the EU (as has been the case for wool in the FTA with Indonesia) with a preferential duty 
and based on annual increases over a number of years. For its part, China would likely ask 
the EU to remove tariffs on fish, which are already below the threshold of 20% (Figure 8.6), 
perhaps with a long phase-out schedule.  
Figure 8.6 Distribution of European peaks (6-digit level) by product and duty range, agro-
food, 2014 
 
Note: The upper bound value of each range is excluded. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using WITS. 
A final matter of concern is the product lines at the 6-digit level that register simple averages 
slightly below or equal to 15%, and that in this way do not fall into the category of peaks. 
Once again, China outperforms the EU with 63 lines against only 9 European, with an MFN 
applied duty rate included in the range of between 14.5% and 15%. Interestingly, the greater 
part of these Chinese lines is in PAPs, and they are spread among meat, fish, vegetables, 
fruits and cereals.48 On the other side, 7 out of 9 European lines concern fish, which is the 
most imported European good from China (see Table 8.2 above). 
                                                   
48 Specifically, they are 27 lines (2014): 9 lines in HS 16 prep. meat, fish; 7 lines in HS 19 prep. cereal; 
7 lines in HS 20 prepared fruit & vegetables; and 4 lines in HS 21 prep. food (other).  
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8.4 Tough barriers: Tariff rate quotas 
Another point to be addressed is the liberalisation of TRQs, that is, their removal or at least a 
significant enlargement of duty-free volumes. In fact, the relevance of TRQs in the present 
FTA discussion depends on whether the protected goods are potential export products for 
the other party. In the case of EU-China, this is not often applicable. Figure 8.7 plots tariff 
lines at the 8-digit level subjected to TRQs grouped in their respective 2-digit categories. 
First, the number of EU TRQs is much higher than those of China: 269 against 47. Second, 
comparing the product groups at the 2-digit level in which these lines fall, the two 
economies share only three categories: cereals, milling products and sugars. Thus, the two 
structures of TRQs do not hinder each other, and above all, they do not involve the main 
exported products of the counterpart of the FTA. Indeed, the Chinese quotas would not 
seem to be a priority item of discussion for European negotiators as the EU is hardly a major 
producer, let alone an exporter of rice or cereals and certainly not of wool and cotton. The 
case of sugar is more complex, but to call the EU a major would-be exporter is surely wrong, 
and moreover, more competitive suppliers might already enjoy good market access to China. 
The EU might have to concede preferential TRQs for Chinese imports, probably on 
vegetables (HS 07), which were the third most imported product by the EU from China in 
2014 with a share of 7.4%. This because neither fish (HS 03) nor products of animal origins 
(HS 05), the first and second EU imports from China, are subjected to European TRQs.  
Figure 8.7 Distribution of 8-digit lines subjected to TRQs  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WT/TPR/S/300 China and the Tariff Analysis Online (TAO) facility of the 
WTO.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
EU CHINA
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 101 
 
Whereas the Chinese out-of-quota tariffs are all ad valorem (Table 8.6), the European 
scheme is far more complicated, as it either reports ad valorem tariffs, or specific tariffs 
(€ per ton or hl) or a combination of both (see Annex I, European TRQs). 
Furthermore, European lines at the 8-digit levels are often grouped in the same TRQ 
specification, creating overlapping in-quota quantities between products’ aggregation at the 
4-digit level.49 This happens also in the Chinese TRQs for wheat, corn and rice, in which 
categories HS 10 and 11 share quantities, but the more homogenous definition of duty and 
quantity among the 8-digit lines makes Chinese TRQs easier to understand than the 
European ones. Finally, some European out-of-quota duties are seasonal, meaning that the 
specific tariff may change depending on the time of year (e.g. high-quality oranges in HS 
0805). 
Nevertheless, TRQs are not always binding, that is, the quota filling rates of some sensitive 
products in the EU’s TRQ list for 2011 and 2012 are not always close to 100%.50 The wide 
spectrum of filling rates might be encouraging for negotiations as possible concessions to 
China can focus on products with high filling rates and enough weight in the Chinese export 
basket. For instance, among the lines concerning rice imports, only husked (brown) rice and 
broken rice do not totally fill the quota, so the EU might set a preferential quota for the 
import of rice from China. In summary, negotiation on TRQs will probably mainly focus on 
concessions from the EU side, both because Chinese TRQs only marginally affect EU exports, 
and because the quantity limitations set by the EU are not always completely used, so 
negotiations can focus on those few specific lines with high filling rates that are of interest 
for Chinese exports.  
 
                                                   
49 For example, the “High quality meat of bovine animals, fresh, chilled or frozen” TRQ groups 
together fresh and frozen meat, but they are in HS 0201 and 0202 respectively. Hence, the assigned 
in-quota quantity of 37,000 tonnes has to be split between the two consecutive categories. 
50 Derived from WTO documents G/AG/N/EU/12, 13 December 2012 and G/AG/N/EU/16, 14 
November 2013. 
Looking at edible vegetables (HS 07), most of the products (i.e. potatoes, tomatoes, carrots and 
turnips and sweet peppers) reached the threshold of in-quota imports, whereas dried onions 
registered filling rates of 56.75% and 56% for 2011 and 2012 respectively, and sweet potatoes (other 
than for human consumption) only reached 12.42% (2011) and 11.22% (2012). Notably, imports of 
manioc are basically always duty free due to the huge amount allowed in-quota. Within fruits (HS 
08), while sweet oranges and apricots register filling rates equal to (nearly) zero, European imports of 
cherries filled around 20% of the quota restriction. Finally, a filling rate that strongly fluctuated 
between the two years has been that of lemons, decreasing from 94.59% in 2011 to 40.34% in 2012.  
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Table 8.6 Chinese TRQs 
Products Number of lines 
Out-of-
quota 
rates (%) 
In-quota 
rates (%) 
Tariff quota 
quantity 
(tonnes) 
In-quota 
imports 
(2011) 
In-quota 
imports 
(2012) 
 Wheat  7   9,636,000 1,258,00 3,701,000 
 Wheat and meslin 4 65 1    
 Wheat or meslin flour 1 65 6    
 Groats and meal of wheat 1 65 9    
 Pellets of wheat 1 65 10    
 Corn 5   7,200,000 1,754,000 5,208,000 
 Maize seed 1 20 1    
 Maize other than seed 1 65 1    
 Maize flour 1 40 9    
 Groats and meal of corn 1 65 9    
 Pellets of corn 1 65 10    
 Rice 14   5,320,000 598,000 2,369,000 
 Rice 10 65 1    
 Rice flour 2 40 9    
 Meal of rice 2 10 9    
 Sugar 7 50 15 1,945,000 1,945,000 1,945,000 
 Fertilizers 3 50 4* … … … 
 Wool 9   287,000 287,000 287,000 
 Wool, not carded or 
combed 6 38 1    
 Wool, carded or combed 3 38 3    
 Cotton 2 40 1 894,000 894,000 894,000 
* Interim duty applied at 1%. 
(...) Not available.  
Source: WT/TPR/S/300 China 
In the EU-China agro-food trade, there are many opportunities to expand trade and hence 
consumer choice.  
a) China is gradually reducing its strict self-sufficiency policy, as shown by recent import 
growth and significant concessions in recent FTAs. Also EU agro-food exports to China 
have been rising rapidly ever since 2009 and enjoy a positive trade balance. 
b) The EU has – overall – lower tariffs and far fewer tariff peaks in agro-food than China. 
China’s tariff peaks are also higher than the EU’s, on average. 
c) In TRQs, however, it is the other way around: China has relatively few and simple, 
transparent TRQs, often in sectors in which the EU is not an exporter. The EU has many 
TRQs and the in-quota rates and the beyond-quota rates are complicated, with some 
being seasonal as well (the entry price system). Only in cereals, milling products and 
sugars do both economies employ TRQs. 
d) Rapid income growth, especially in the growing middle class, is helping to slowly alter the 
Chinese diet towards more meat and a search for higher quality and safe agro-food 
products. This enlarges the potential for the EU, as its farmers and producers are widely 
known for quality and a credible food safety system.  
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9. Technical barriers to trade 
9.1 Mapping bilateral TBTs and their scope 
Technical barriers to trade are consistently identified by business as a major, if not the 
major, obstacle to cross-border trade. As a group, they are an important non-tariff measure 
(NTM), besides other regulatory barriers, such as differences in and controls of SPS measures 
on food, feed and plant health (see chapter 10) and disparate requirements in services trade 
and investment. TBTs consist of three types: differences in technical standards, differences 
in technical regulations and differences in or non-recognition of conformity assessment 
(through certification, inspection, pre-market type approval, etc.) and its accreditation. 
Technical standards are voluntary by definition, as the WTO TBT Agreement and its annex 
prescribe, following a century-plus old tradition of standardisation. Nevertheless, differences 
in (voluntary) standards can cause barriers for several reasons, such as reference in 
insurance contracts, incompatibility or interoperability questions, adaptation of 
intermediate products in global value chains, or a later reference of a local standard (say, 
deviating from an ISO or IEC one) in a national law. Technical regulations and (most of) 
conformity assessment are about mandatory requirements, which can be costly if different 
between trading countries. Since there are many WTO partners, if all were to make up their 
own technical mandatory requirements in every technical detail, it is likely that they would 
all differ somewhat or sometimes very much, and the costs of goods trade would become 
very high. A fundamental principle, which follows from ‘better regulation’, is for countries to 
define first their health, safety, environmental and consumer protection objectives, as a 
form of reducing risks to levels acceptable to society, if the marginal costs are not too high. 
Given these objectives, the technical instruments to pursue these objectives can be left to 
standardisation bodies, as long as the objectives are assured. Increasingly, such standards 
can be internationalised, not only in the EU/EEA but even at world levels, that is, world 
standards from IEC/ISO wherever possible, or from recognised world consortia in, say, ICT 
goods and services.  
The justified reason to regulate (the market failure of risks that are too high for, e.g. safety) 
is in line with the WTO TBT Agreement, whereas the technical requirements will be sufficient 
to support these objectives (in most cases) and certification can then confirm that these 
standards have actually been used in products or components, and thus the latter are safe. 
The third track, that is, conformity assessment, is also more and more internationalised 
through (ISO) accreditation standards, private high-standard networks for accreditation (e.g. 
International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) and the IECEE-CB)51 and its 
recognition and mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) such as in APEC, between the US as 
                                                   
51 IECEE-CB refers to the System of Conformity Assessment Schemes for Electrotechnical Equipment 
and Components. 
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well as Canada and the EU and some other instances.52 While the EU is a frontrunner in this 
area (also due to its own history of building up its single market), China is only beginning the 
process of internationalisation of its systems and hence the lowering of TBTs through this 
‘global’ route. However, the EU is – given its own internal history of the single market – well 
placed to support China in this transition and stimulate the country to reduce bilateral TBTs 
as quickly as possible, while internationalising its system, principles, standards, accreditation 
and certification. 
There are no systematic empirical studies on TBTs as an access barrier to the Chinese market 
or, for that matter, to the EU market. There is quite some work on TBTs as a barrier to the 
EU market (mainly from work by the US and Japan, but again largely complaints-based). The 
WTO Trade Policy Reviews – for large traders like the EU and China, every two years – 
provide useful information but the relevant sections in these reports do not easily add up to 
a systematic survey. These difficulties about TBTs are inherent to the subject area, which is 
intrinsically resistant to attempts to measure the costs over many tens of thousands of 
goods and services. The selective information is nonetheless quite rich and is presumably 
useful for trade negotiators. Of course, the WTO has long established a notification system 
under its TBT committee and this has generated a dataset about TBTs, in the simple sense of 
(here, Chinese or EU) measures notified. One should realise that TBTs are inevitable in a 
world economy where all countries conduct risk regulation, that is, regulation to reduce risks 
in health, safety, environment, financial markets (prudential and financial stability) and 
consumer protection, all market failures that justify regulation in principle. This means that 
equating TBTs with any measure notified to the WTO TBT committee might be formally 
correct, but is not productive or useful as such. What matters is first whether the WTO TBT 
principles have been adhered to, when regulating, and second, whether the ‘trading costs’ of 
such a TBT for market access are the lowest possible, without affecting the (national) 
objectives of lowering specific risks. Although China has only begun notifying since (late) 
2001, whereas many WTO members have done this since 1995, it is remarkable that in early 
2016, China had by far the highest number of TBT measures of all Asian countries: 1,118.53 
The next two are Japan (728) and Korea (691). What makes the Chinese number even more 
impressive is the fact that TBTs (resulting from new regulation) are, to some extent, a 
product of the level of development, because people tend to become more risk averse when 
becoming richer. Well, China is surely not the richest country in Asia and has a lower income 
per capita than for example, Japan and Korea, yet it has notified far more. This record might 
suggest that TBTs may well be a significant issue in ordinary trade relations and a crucial 
element in an FTA. Moreover, the ‘specific trade concerns’ with respect to such Chinese TBTs 
the EU has raised in the WTO are as high as 40 (on 19 notified measures), higher than those 
raised by WTO partners, including the US. The EU, on the other hand, notifying since 1995 
                                                   
52 See Correia de Brito, Kauffmann & Pelkmans (2016) for an extensive survey of MRAs.  
53 There are, however, persistent complaints that China has failed to notify all relevant measures.  
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and highly developed, has 917 TBT notifications, some 200 fewer than China. However, EU 
member states have also notified of such measures (presumably, where national 
competences remain) but it is anything but clear what the status is of many of such 
measures.54 China has filed 26 specific trade concerns about EU TBT notifications, related to 
16 measures.  
Section 9.2 complements the empirical analysis in economic studies and CGE simulations, 
like that in part III of this study, by the nitty-gritty reality of TBTs for numerous goods or 
services in markets every day. Nowadays, economic studies on trade barriers typically 
employ AVEs (ad valorem equivalents) for the costs of TBTs that exporters incur on top of 
the (CIF-inclusive) invoice presented to importers in the destination market. AVEs are not 
directly measured but estimated with the help of various econometric methods. Estimating 
AVEs with some degree of reliability is so difficult that, until (say) a decade ago, trade 
economists simply did not invest in such attempts. Indeed, it is perhaps as much an art as a 
mature and fully developed economic technique (Bergsten, Hufbauer & Miner, 2014) and 
the data requirements are most demanding, often simply beyond what is possible to obtain 
(e.g. Berden & Francois, 2015). AVEs have been employed in part III and it is therefore 
worthwhile to inform the reader about the meaning and robustness of these TBT cost 
measures. This is done in Box 19.1 in chapter 19. Section 9.2, instead, attempts to review the 
collected evidence at the micro level on TBTs in goods, for both China and the EU. We use 
several sources for this review.55 Section 9.3 deals with the intended transformation of the 
Chinese system of technical regulation, standards and conformity assessment. This reform is 
a typical product of the profound transition the Chinese economy is undergoing, to leave 
behind the legacies of the planned economy and support in market-driven ways the 
competitiveness of its enterprises, innovation and market openness in a stimulating and not 
throttling or over-controlled and rigid fashion. It is also crucial for Chinese exports with 
greater value added in value chains and outside them. For the EU, this huge reform process, 
an overhaul really, offers many possibilities to reduce TBTs and greatly facilitates the present 
and future openness of the Chinese market. It is therefore relevant for a possible FTA and for 
constructive, intensified cooperation. A first summary of this reform with a tentative 
assessment is provided. Section 9.4 provides a few inferences, including some remarks on 
the contrast between the TBT chapters in the recent China–Korea FTA and the EU–Vietnam 
FTA as a signal for ‘reading’ the preparedness of China to upgrade FTAs in this respect.  
                                                   
54 Thus, one suspects that many older EU country notifications might well have become irrelevant 
with newer EU-wide regulation or referred standards, but it is impossible to know how much. 
Moreover, notification practices by EU countries would seem to differ enormously: whereas a 
number of EU countries have notified fewer than 50, France (228) and notably the Netherlands 
(615!) have been very active.  
55 Sources include WTO information contained in the two-yearly TPRs on China and on the EU, 
information in Commission documents on EU-China trade, and the 2015 Annual Position report from 
the European Chamber of Commerce in China. 
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9.2 TBTs between China and the EU: Empirical evidence at sector and product 
levels 
Section 9.2.1 introduces the Chinese regulatory standards and conformance system, which is 
different from that of the EU. Without elaborating too many details, it is crucial to realise 
that China is emerging from a state-run planning system with strong top-down properties, 
and – initially – with a high degree of isolation. Two decades ago, Chinese exports of goods 
were largely still produced in the many export-processing zones, without much of a link with 
domestic standards or rules; these goods were produced on the basis of standards of the 
multinationals or value chains involved or the regulations of the target markets (or both). At 
first, the domestic regulatory system was not deeply affected by it. With greater openness 
and in the run-up to WTO membership, this started to change, but the regulatory and 
standards system did not immediately follow Chinese integration into the world economy. 
The sketch of the system until today, in section 9.2.1, is later followed in section 9.2.3 by a 
discussion of the belated but massive reform – initiated in 2015 – towards a more market-
driven and unified system. Following the description of today’s system and a brief 
comparison with the EU, section 9.2.2 sums up the qualitative evidence on TBTs between 
the two economies.  
9.2.1 Contrasting China’s risk regulation system with that of the EU 
The most important contrast between the EU risk regulation system and that of China is the 
overwhelming role of the state in many manifestations. It begins with the terminology. In 
the tradition of the ISO/IEC and the annex to the WTO TBT Agreement, a standard is by 
definition voluntary and is, as a rule, agreed by market players, albeit after open and public 
inquiry or consultation.56 The fundamental idea behind it is that market adoption is a matter 
of whether markets, including consumers, actually prefer the standard or not. Many 
standards help the market to function better and hence such standards are quickly 
embraced by companies and consumers. But there is no need or duty; the market will 
decide. Numerous standards are not promulgated for aspects of risk regulation but for 
technical aspects of market efficiency, technical terminology, removing redundancy, assuring 
interoperability, compatibility, (defined) quality or best-practice testing of performance. 
Some 20,000 of the 25,000 European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and European 
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC) standards have nothing to do 
with regulation and governments are not involved at all. And markets determine whether an 
agreed standard is actually ‘adopted’ in practice. Standard bodies are private (often non-
profit) organisations, supported and largely financed by business. In the EU, of the more 
                                                   
56 Moreover, it is well understood that standardisation is subject to anti-trust discipline (in the EU, 
there is an exemption under conditions and a memorandum of understanding with standard bodies; 
now also Regulation (EU) No. 1085/2012).  
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than €1 billion direct costs of writing standards by CEN, CENELEC and European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), around 95% comes from industry. When risk 
regulation (that is, a mandatory requirement) is at stake, a balance is sought between, on 
the one hand, the public interest of overcoming market failures like (too high risks for) safety 
(etc.) through the state-regulated objectives and procedures for conformity assessment as 
well as supervision, and on the other hand, the technical formulation of these requirements 
in (referred) standards by the private standard bodies.57 Only when risks are seen as very 
high does the prescriptive nature of EU regulation increase. The great advantage of such a 
market-driven system is its flexibility and far greater capacity to exploit the technical and 
market knowledge of suppliers and industrial users in thousands of specific product markets, 
than when the public administration would have to lead and decide technical details.  
The Chinese system may move in that direction, but at the moment58 this is not yet the case. 
Box 9.1 below explains Chinese terminology inherited from the days of planning. A myriad of 
state organs are involved in setting technical regulations, including many ministries and a 
host of special state bodies led by AQSIQ.59 The hierarchy reduces standards emanating from 
technical manuals of enterprises to a residual status, exactly the opposite of what happens 
in the EU. In 2001, the Standardisation Administration of China (SAC) was established to 
exercise unified administration over the standardisation work in the country. Meanwhile, 
China has drastically improved its international networking, now being a member of IEC, ISO, 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Codex Alimentarius. There are 
confusing signals about how internationalised its ‘standards’ really are. The WTO (2012, p. 
48) reports that, of the 21,400 Chinese national standards, some 46% had been adopted 
from international standards or advanced foreign standards.60 Yet that is not what, for 
instance, European business in China conveys: they say that the actual adoption of IEC/ISO 
standards in China is still very limited. One explanation for this discrepancy is that, besides 
national standards, there are some 90,000 ministry (often industry or sector) standards, and 
an unknown number of local standards (Xu, 2015). Another possible explanation may be 
found in the considerable fragmentation of the system (with duplications, inconsistencies, 
                                                   
57 The crucial difference between the US and the EU here is that US regulators pick what they regard 
as the most appropriate standard and incorporate it into the regulation (thereby, no longer being 
voluntary) whereas in the EU, the referred standard remains voluntary and the option exists to 
request conformity assessment (from a notified body) on the basis of a different technical solution 
satisfying the EU regulatory objective. In actual practice, business often relies on the referred 
standard. 
58 Derived from WTO (2012), pp. 45–49 and the underlying WTO doc. G/TBT/2/Add.65 of 29 January 
2002.  
59 AQSIQ refers to the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of 
the People's Republic of China. 
60 The latter probably refers to standards from a dozen prominent US standards bodies (ASTM, 
ASME, IEEE, UL, etc.), which have been adopted by markets in many countries. In 2015, the 
mandatory and voluntary national standards had grown to 31,000.  
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etc.) caused by the fact that far too many ministries and other state-related players write 
standards. If standard A is based on international standards, but one of the 63 ministries(!) 
involved imposes another one with deviations, the practical effect of internationalisation 
may vanish. What is unthinkable in the EU is that the large majority of technical committees 
is found within ministries.  
Box 9.1 Standards and risk regulation in China: Why terminology matters 
China and the EU do not differ fundamentally on risk regulation in terms of objectives for 
environmental, worker and consumer risk reduction. Because the EU is more developed, its risk 
objectives are often more demanding, but that is also changing for China as it is catching up. Still, 
when it comes to technical requirements, there are stark differences. The term ‘standards’ is 
employed routinely, also formally, although such ‘standards’ are not standards as understood in 
ISO/IEC and the annex to the WTO TBT Agreement, which prescribe the global terminology and 
practices. Chinese standards can be, and often are, ‘mandatory’, although in ISO terms that is an 
oxymoron: it is either a standard and hence voluntary (and may or may not be factually used by 
markets), or it is a technical regulation, and thus mandatory. The latter may, but need not, refer to 
existing standards as one satisfactory solution for adhering to the requirements of a (say, safety or 
health or environmental) regulation. This is not merely a matter of labels. Chinese ‘standards’ can be 
mandatory or voluntary (indicated by adding ‘T’ to the code), but both are usually written by 
ministries (and their technical committees) or other state organs, albeit increasingly with public 
consultation.  
Moreover, the current Chinese system is confusing and costly (hence, the overhaul as discussed in 
section 9.2.3). There are many types and names: national standards, ministry or industry standards, 
trade standards, regional or local standards, enterprise standards and national certified reference 
material (in specific cases). Except for enterprise standards, all of these are frequently mandatory – 
leading to conflicting standards or undue overlap or inconsistencies, and in any event, complexity 
that is not necessary. That the state is over-present can be illustrated by the obligation of ‘enterprise 
standards’ to be registered! In the world economy, the technical manual of an enterprise is normally 
a closely guarded secret for that company, the basis for its acquired place in the market. Trade 
standards are typically developed when there is no national standard (yet) and become null and void 
once a similar national standard has been promulgated. Independent (non-state) market-driven 
standardisation bodies like the CEN, CENELEC and ETSI or their national members, or the hundreds of 
US bodies, do not exist in China.  
China is closer to global practices in conformity assessment and accreditation. There is no 
comparable problem of terminology. It would be crucial for CNAS61 (and indeed foreign as well as 
local business in China) to fully recognise global (strict) ISO accreditation standards as practised by 
members of, for example the ILAC worldwide. If done, it would also imply greater certainty as well as 
cost reduction for European business in China. This would also render the APEC-type MRAs in 
electrical goods and telecoms equipment, for example, more valuable.  
                                                   
61 CNAS refers to the China National Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment. 
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The system is gradually improving but in 2014 it was realised that gradual reform is 
insufficiently effective and beginning to seriously hinder Chinese attempts to capture the 
higher value added segments of value chains and to move towards more sophisticated 
exports or safer/healthier/greener products for China itself. Section 9.2.3 sets out the 
overhaul of the system that was initiated in 2015.  
The CNCA (China National Certification and Accreditation Commission) under AQSIQ is 
responsible for compulsory product certification in China, with the help of a Compulsory 
Certificates Certification Catalogue. The Catalogue lists 22 groups and 163 categories of 
products.62 The China Quality Certification Centre has 11 branches and over 200 designated 
laboratories, in China and abroad. CNAS takes care of accreditation (since 2006) and has 
accredited 4,400 laboratories and 244 inspection bodies. These relatively recent moves boil 
down to a far more flexible modernisation. The question is whether and to what extent EU 
conformity assessment bodies can be fully involved in this system, based on ISO 
accreditation standards and the highly respected ILAC network of world class bodies 
involved. The EU sector complains that what China calls the testing, inspection and 
certification (TIC) sector (see chapter 11) has remained relatively closed.  
9.2.2  Empirical evidence on TBTs between China and the EU 
As far as we know, there is a discrepancy between empirical information about TBTs caused 
by China for European business and TBTs caused by the EU for Chinese exporters or EU 
importers. Systematic evidence on the latter does not seem to be available.  
9.2.2.1 Chinese TBTs as encountered by European business 
Table 9.1 summarises in a somewhat crude fashion the sectoral data provided in the 2015 
Annual Position paper of the European Chamber of Commerce with respect to TBTs. 
Table 9.1 TBTs as identified by European business in China 
Sector/activity Barrier description Comment, advice to China 
Automotive Lack of coordination in auto regulation & 
red tape; 
Measures are often not technology-neutral; 
Restrictions or prohibitions of imports of car 
components and used cars; 
Enforcement of strict safety test/road tests, 
helping consumers and levelling the playing 
Advice: Set up a single 
automotive agency for China. 
Act in pro-innovative and not 
prescriptive ways. 
Liberalise these imports; do not 
force EU component suppliers 
to form joint ventures (JVs). 
                                                   
62 These vary from a range of electrical and electronic goods, to power motors, electric tools, 
telecoms equipment, audio-video equipment, IT technology, safety glass, medical devices, and e.g. 
toys.  
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field; 
The independent ‘aftermarket’ is highly 
restricted and access is difficult, e.g. due to 
4S shops (monopoly); original parts suppliers 
face difficulties and severe IPR issues. 
Enforce anti-trust and IPRs (see 
chapter 13), liberalise imports 
(here, not so much tariffs); note 
that counterfeiting is 
widespread (and unsafe!). 
Cosmetics Numerous detailed issues cause TBTs and/or 
result from a lack of ‘national treatment’ or 
a lack of good governance; 
Notification in China is not identical in the 
country; 
China has not yet adopted ISO 24443 for test 
standards/reports. 
Advice: Introduce urgently a 
risk-based classification system, 
advise and focus on high-risk 
cosmetics, not on over-
controlling low-risk ones. 
Energy markets There are market access barriers in power & 
gas grids (monopolised) and components, 
too; unequal data availability (e.g. for shale 
gas) and lack of clarity about whether 
foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) can 
participate. 
There is a large list of issues for EU investors 
in China, but some are linked to TBTs in 
trade (e.g. clean coal standards, imports of 
National-V standard fuel supplies and fair 
competition in the supply chain for energy 
equipment). 
Opening up is a ‘domestic’ pro-
competition issue, an SOE 
question, and a trade (in goods 
and services) and FDI issue. 
Health care  Market access problems and a lack of 
standards on in-vitro diagnostic products; 
Problems in procurement at a provincial 
level, especially high-value medical devices; 
Lack of ‘equal treatment’ for JVs and wholly 
owned FDI; no recognition of medical 
devices made in China as ‘domestic’(!). 
Advice 1: Harmonise document 
requirements for clinical 
evaluations with internationally 
accepted ones. 
Advice 2: China to participate 
in/join the International 
Medical Device Regulators 
Forum (IMDRF), and their test 
run of regulated product 
submission (RPS).  
Advice 3: Base efficiency/quality 
criteria on the US FDA system; 
establish a good supply practice 
& efficient supervision system, 
in cooperation with the EU. 
Advice 4: Encourage an EU-
China health IT expert round-
table. 
Metals/steel and 
mining 
Address in earnest the enormous (and very 
costly loss coverage of) overcapacity in steel; 
this huge overcapacity ‘overhang’ causes in 
turn many other ‘ugly things’, such as 
below-marginal-costs pricing in China and in 
the world, distortions (e.g. discriminatory 
Not addressing this massive 
‘overhang’ for so long now 
causes a huge drain on the 
Chinese economy (for steel 
alone, it may be some €50–70 
billion a year) and cannot but 
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VAT refunds), explicit subsidies, state 
guarantees (only for SOEs), tax breaks 
(SOEs), the postponing of measures (e.g. 
anti-pollution) and letting (efficient) private 
steel firms in China go broke while 
protecting SOEs. 
lead to anti-dumping measures 
all over the world, plus all the 
distortions, some of which are 
TBTs.  
Advice 1: Eliminate loopholes 
(like adding chrome) and 
equalise VAT refunds.  
Advice 2: Reduce import tariffs 
and TBTs for steel to expose the 
market to competition (e.g. 
quality steel). 
Advice 3: Encourage fair 
competition in metals & mining, 
equalise compliance between 
SOEs and private (also foreign) 
firms, give access to metal 
exchanges, remove guarantees, 
develop standards for recycling 
and open up to the foreign 
advanced technologies of FIEs. 
(Petro)Chemical Detailed implementation of the Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) in China in a fair & 
consistent process is still a problem; there 
are a mix of local investor and trade 
problems. 
China has a local variant of 
REACH but with some 
disproportionate data 
requirements.  
Advice: Adopt the (UN) CLP 
classification; utilise the Global 
Harmonised System (GHS) and 
Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) 
standards for laboratories & 
testing. 
Pharmaceuticals Market access for medicines can be very 
problematic  
Access is also made more 
difficult by the way the 
domestic system functions, 
alongside serious IPR questions. 
Rail  Market access is very difficult due to public 
procurement issues – the Chinese market is 
practically closed. 
Advice 1: Open up rail 
standardisation to FIEs. 
Advice 2: Ensure better IPR 
protection in rail technology. 
Renewable 
energy 
No transparency in the bidding system; 
On solar, the technical conformance system 
is not up to the proper fulfilment of the task 
in independent ways, making access costly 
or too difficult. 
Advice: Establish third-party 
inspection; for high-quality 
components, set up an 
acceptance, verification and 
monitoring scheme; establish a 
fine-tuned feed-in tariff support 
scheme for solar PV application. 
Smart grids There is no national treatment; there is 
discrimination of foreign suppliers by 
restricting them from using the required 
Advice 1: Link/facilitate 
domestic/international 
standardisation work. 
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encryption technologies. 
There is no level playing field for new 
market actors’ access to power systems 
infrastructure. 
Advice 2: Establish a regular 
Sino–EU smart-grid platform. 
Source: Authors based on European Chamber of Commerce in China (2015). 
 
9.2.2.2 EU TBTs for China’s exporters and EU importers 
No systematic information on or analysis of EU TBTs that hinder China in its exports to the 
EU seems to be publicly available. As a second-best, one can summarise the information 
published by the WTO in its Trade Policy Reviews on the EU, and in particular where China is 
explicitly involved. A good deal of this information in Trade Policy Reviews on the EU TBTs63 
consists of summaries of the EU regime of technical regulations and conformity assessment, 
and the link with European and world technical standards. Essentially, the relevant TBT 
information consists of so-called ‘specific trade concerns’ raised by other WTO partners. In 
2013, and apart from a more general concern that SMEs might find the compliance burden 
of the EU TBT regime so heavy that they consider it an ’unnecessary obstacle’ to trade, a list 
of such specific trade concerns is provided by the WTO (pp. 59-60). Of the 22 items listed, 
China is a complainant in 12 of them, followed at a distance by 7 for the US. The 12 items 
include two old ones (one from 1999 on hazardous substances in electronic equipment and 
one on REACH from 2005). The others touch upon toys, accreditation and market 
surveillance (a systemic issue, now in Regulation (EC) No. 765/2008), herbal medicinal 
products, eco-design for air conditioners, falsified medicines, new cosmetics regulation (e.g. 
an animal testing ban), allergenic limits in children’s products, limits for soluble cadmium in 
toys, measuring/testing the seasonal performance of air conditioners and 
prohibited/restricted substances in cosmetic products. In the 2015 WTO Trade Policy Review 
on the EU, no such detailed list is available (p. 55). The newer list contains seven old items, 
at least three of which (still) involve China (herbal medicinal products, eco-design for air 
conditioners and falsified medicines). Seven new ones were added. As noted at the outset, 
this information as such does not tell the reader that much and is not, by definition, linked to 
the economic definition of a TBT: differences in technical regulations, standards or 
conformity assessment, and their costs for exporters to obtain market access. The ‘specific 
trade concerns’ in the WTO are more a mechanism triggering consultations among WTO 
partners in the WTO TBT committee, with a view to trying to resolve the matter to the 
extent possible.  
Risky products are also subject, in the EU, to market surveillance and outside border controls 
by the authorities of the member states, in order to protect consumers, and for the last few 
                                                   
63 See WTO (2013), TBT chapter 3.1.8, pp. 57-63; see also WTO (2015), TBT chapter 3.1.8, pp. 50-55. 
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years, also professionals and workers. Authorities will take (too) risky or non-compliant 
products out of the market and report to an EU-wide rapid alert system called RAPEX for 
dangerous non-food products.64 In this notification system, China’s record is not good and 
this has remained a serious problem for many years. In 2014, China was the source of many 
RAPEX notifications about products from outside the Union: in total 1,462 notifications, as 
compared with 66 (for the next non-EU country with notifications, namely, Turkey) and the 
US with 60. For professional products in 2014, China also was the focus of an exceptional 
number of notifications: 37, as against 25 for all other countries together, mainly concerning 
microbiological and environmental risks. Over the period 2007–14 inclusive, and for 
consumer products, China (including Hong Kong) alone had consistently more than half of all 
notifications (including also the intra-EU ones), with 64% in 2013 and 2014. This situation 
was (and is) the reason for cooperation programmes between the EU and China and regular 
follow-ups with China on specific items. 
9.3 Transforming China’s technical regulation, standards and conformity 
assessment 
TBTs with China cannot be understood without appreciating China’s transition from a 
planned to a much more market-driven (yet ‘socialist’) economy. In the present section, the 
transition is explained with respect to the triplet of TBT forms: technical regulation, 
standards and conformity assessment. By definition, this transition is a medium to long-run 
process. At the same time, this transition itself is part of the overall transition of China from 
a planned to a market-driven economy.  
First, a few remarks on transition with Chinese characteristics. A similarity with the post-
1989 process in Eastern Europe is that such countries face a stark choice. On the one hand, 
one could completely do away with the institutions, mind-sets and vested interests of the 
former regime and system (yet, without a revolution or bloodshed), including the Party in its 
present power role. On the other hand, one could initiate a long-run reform process ‘from 
within’, and explicitly with those having been in power, indeed a monopoly of power, under 
the ancien regime, with the intention of mellowing the mind-sets towards market 
functioning and reducing the role of the state to that of a regulator and supervisor. It has 
been analytically shown, and convincingly so, that the former transition (i.e. with a break 
with the past, including its power structures) requires an exceptionally stable security and 
regulatory environment (the so-called ‘anchor’)65 and far-reaching consensus in political 
circles about the sense of direction, even if very painful at first. This observation has often 
                                                   
64 For food and feed products and for plants, it is called RASFF – see chapter 10. The source of RAPEX 
statistics is the RAPEX annual statistics for 2014, see www.ec.euroapeu/consumers_safety/ 
safety_products/rapex/reports/docs/rapex_report_2014finalweb_en.pdf. 
65 See for example, Fischer (1998) and Campos & Coricelli (2002), pp. 793-836. 
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been contrasted with two transition alternatives, one is China two to three decades ago, the 
other being those Eastern European and Central Asian countries not having an anchor and 
sense of direction – an anchor typically offered by the EU and its market-driven model. The 
Eastern European/Central Asian approach has in common that it either failed in transition 
(Ukraine, for instance) or power structures re-emerged in another form (or both) and 
transition was imposed with some blend of market and commands, but in any event, the EU 
was not regarded as an option. Few of the latter countries enjoyed success, although the 
resource-rich ones of course did better.  
The China transition is different. There, the idea has always been that the power structures 
would remain and that reform had to be gradual, based on trial and error. What Mikhail 
Gorbachev initiated in the Soviet Union, was strongly resisted as manifestly imprudent or 
too risky for China. So, private initiative was allowed more and more without ever letting the 
old state sectors collapse (e.g. SOEs). In welfare terms, one can theoretically prove that such 
an approach is initially welfare-improving and Pareto-optimal (Roland, 2000). Another huge 
difference with the case of China, is its super-export-oriented growth model (exactly at the 
right time and hardly ‘inside’ the economy but in separate free zones), which was massively 
successful. By contrast, transition in Europe, even for those countries now having become 
EU countries, was at first extremely negative in terms of income and jobs adjustment. 
‘Gradualism in reform WITH mighty success’ never seemed to work in Europe (think what 
Romania went through during the 1990s).  
However, the last few years and during the coming years, the Chinese growth model might 
still shine but far less overall, and not at all in some sectors and regions. China begins to face 
a similar problem as some other former communist countries did a while ago. Can centralist, 
all-powerful systems and vested interests, also backed up by a secretive Party system 
without any rivalry, transform themselves so as to engineer a successful transition towards a 
market-driven economy, which is fundamentally not top-down? One finds numerous 
examples and indications of how difficult that is. Mind-sets and thinking are heavily biased 
by a long legacy of communism with top-down instructions, with a strong dose of 
management-by-speech (from leaders), a conviction (real or not, but practised) that the 
Party is beneficial for the people (although its input, through-put and output processes are 
never tested by the people and are largely invisible). There is also a hidden sentiment that 
markets are inevitable for growth, but at the end of the day, not ideal (just tolerated). 
Striking is the role (or non-role) of ‘information’, notably data, openness in information, 
policy papers with analysis and clarification, statistics – all of which are either not produced 
(clearly with a reason) or produced but kept away from society and the public domain, or are 
only selectively given out (which could be a lack of national treatment) or simply follow 
internationally accepted procedures (e.g. WTO and IMF). This entire transition process is 
further complicated by a(n) (un)healthy dose of nationalism, which has an extremely long 
tradition in China. The Chinese are negotiators and assume positions in this light. Finally, the 
country is incredibly large and this adds its own layer of problems as well.  
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All of these aspects are recognisable in many facets of today’s China, and just as well in the 
transformation of the technical regulation, standards and TIC or conformity assessment 
regimes.  
Once one enters the TIC and standards world in China, familiar aspects compatible with WTO 
and ISO/IEC are encountered but also the extreme rigidity of the old infamous GOST 
standards (of the Soviets) and the power-fights of (too many) ministries that act by 
regulatory command. Nevertheless, the 2013 Third Plenum Party Decision on reforms is 
impressive in its firm stance on deep reforms in many areas in a market-oriented direction. 
The European Chamber of Commerce’s (2015) report attempts to verify all the specific 
wording of the Decision in terms of follow-up as well as actually introduced reforms. It 
expresses doubts, not dissimilar to those referred to above. Also, Commissioner Malmström 
(2016) alluded to the so far disappointing reform record. Overhauling systems and 
institutions is exceptionally difficult, harder still when emerging from communism, and China 
is no exception.  
In technical regulation and standards, a triple-staged reform was proposed in 2014–15 by 
the SAC, backed up by the State Council (China’s central government). If we are to take 
literally the words in these reform proposals, the Chinese reform is going to be wide-ranging 
and impressive. It is bound to affect existing TBTs in many ways directly, while probably 
affecting the way ISO/IEC will work in the future as well. Therefore, it is bound to be a crucial 
subject for an eventual FTA with China – a combination of WTO (TBT Agreement) 
compatibility with deep cooperation with the EU (and hence, indirectly, IEC/ISO), besides 
openness and transparency about Chinese standards activities, with ample and active 
consultation. In addition are free access to (far) better data and information, not as a favour 
but routine and automatic, and with foreseen investment in information generation, which 
is done without any other purpose in mind, and for society without any tactical or strategic 
considerations. The latter words are not found in official documents, to be sure. It is the 
benchmark that the EU would tend to suggest.  
The reform of ‘standardisation’ in China is led by the Standardisation Administration of 
China. In an official slide presentation by SAC (March 2015), hence by its own frank 
admission, the basic rationale of the reform is that the current standards system and 
standardisation management are not suitable. That is, not fit for purpose. SAC explains that 
this is so for four reasons. First, China’s standards are inadequate, aged and lagging behind. 
Second, they are duplicative and overlapping. Third, the system is not ‘reasonable’ and not 
in accordance with the ‘needs of the socialist market economy’. Fourth, coordination and 
promotion are inadequate. There are six operational objectives, which can be understood, 
with perhaps some queries here or there; they are derived from the overall objective of the 
reform, which is unfortunately rather dialectic, if not fuzzy. The overall objective is to 
“establish the new type of standards system for synergetic development of the government-
oriented standards with the market-driven standards, improve and complete the unified and 
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effective standardisation management system co-governed by [the] government and 
market”.  
Below are the six operational objectives:  
1. Ensure an efficient and authoritative planning and coordination mechanism for 
standardisation.  
2. Integrate and streamline mandatory standards (see Box 9.1 on terminology) (from local, 
sectoral and national, all into national).  
3. Optimise and improve the voluntary standards. (Here, the explanation is puzzling, but 
part of the puzzle is presumably terminology: voluntary standards should all become 
‘national’ while an upgrade to ‘pubic benefits’ standards within the responsibility of the 
government is announced, and gradually the number and scale of existing voluntary 
standards should be reduced. Note that a voluntary standard is more problematic in 
China, as ‘voluntary’ is not automatically the property of a standard (although it should 
be) and the government or judges do not fully appreciate the idea of (voluntary) 
standards – otherwise, the ‘reduction’ makes no sense).  
4. Develop ‘group standards’ – which is an interesting modernisation because what is 
referred to are ‘technology alliance standards’, or consortia standards (in IT, typically), 
and in China sometimes called ‘ organisational’ standards.  
5. Relax control over and invigorate enterprise standards (this is a typical transition 
measure; phase out registration (!) of enterprise standards and establish self-declaration 
of such standards as the basis for the Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity (SDoCs). Note 
that, in market economies, company standards are not normally self-declared to the 
public unless there is a reason (e.g. compatibility), but at the same time, there is a 
tradition, greatly encouraged by the EU’s new approach, of making use of SDoCs for the 
purpose of conformity assessment). 
6. Improve the international standards activity of China (by mutual recognition and by more 
experts and chairs in ISO/IEC). The Action Plan has several stages from 2015 to 2019 
inclusive, led by a ‘joint session’ including AQSIQ and SAC as well as 39 ministries. The 
reform incorporates a massive clean-up of the overly complex and confusing system of 
standardisation and of the overall body of standards.  
In TIC matters, such as certification, it is usually clear where to go, the problem is rather 
what are the exact laws (mandatory standards) to which adherence is needed. Besides this 
occasionally costly uncertainty, there is often no technical correspondence, let alone full 
similarity, between European standards (serving EU regulations) or technical specifications in 
EU laws (like in the old approach) or for that matter IEC/ISO standards and Chinese 
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 117 
 
requirements. Yet, there seems to be no detailed study on the frequency or costs of these 
disparities in standards or technical regulations between the EU and China. But it is precisely 
these disparities that are called ‘technical barriers to trade’ and their costs can be high 
indeed. As the new reform of ‘standards’ in China frankly acknowledges, a good deal of 
existing TBTs stem from a range of legacy problems from the old systems that require large-
scale measures and institutional reform. In this respect, certification has taken on more 
modern forms. For product certification, the China Compulsory Certification (CCC), some 
typical examples include the Special Equipment Licensing Office (SELO, for boiler pressure 
regulation), the certificate for nuclear safety equipment and the Network Access Licence 
(NAL), in total 175 products by the end of 2012, with third-party certification of a prototype 
test and company inspection, followed by (annual) supervision. Whereas management & 
process certification (like that for occupational health and safety (OHS) or risk management) 
is voluntary, energy efficiency certification is mandatory (supporting labelling, although 
based on self-declaration in 33 cases). So too is environmental certification (based on ISO 
14000; think also of laws somewhat comparable to EU approaches such as the restriction of 
hazardous substances (ROHS) and waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE)). China 
now has 60 effective standards on mandatory energy efficiency (i.e. regulations), rising to 
100 by late 2017.66 Other ministry-level regulations referring to standards include the State 
Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) for medical devices, the ministry of health (MoH) sign 
for food safety and the entry approval for MIIT’s telecoms equipment network (presumably 
based on APEC’s MRA in this area).67 China is also introducing low-carbon certificates for 
energy-intensive activities, such as Portland cement, flat glass, aluminium alloys and certain 
engines.  
Although China is an ISO and IEC member, has become more active recently and intends to 
become a strong contributor at the global level, it seems that the actual adoption of IEC/ISO 
standards in markets is still very low. This is a major indicator that technical barriers to trade 
are likely to be high and frequent, especially because the overlap between IEC standards and 
European (CENELEC) ones is around 72%(!) and even with ISO and CEN standards the overlap 
is 31%, in both cases pertaining to thousands of standards. There is no agreement between 
SAC and IEC/ISO comparable to the Vienna & Dresden Agreements that the EU’s standards 
developing organisations have concluded and which could swiftly increase Chinese adoption 
as well as enhance the overlap between global standards and the Chinese ones. Xu (2015) 
notes that the consistency between Chinese and international standards in the consumer 
products sector has now reached 95% (but elsewhere she says it is generally low, that is, on 
non-consumer issues). Through the reform China strives to become a large, if not the largest 
                                                   
66 These include, e.g. office equipment, household appliances, lighting products and commercial and 
industrial equipment. 
67 For details of APEC’s MRAs, see Correia de Brito, Kaufmann & Pelkmans (2016). 
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world standards ‘power’ by 2020: the language conveys the idea that a chair in IEC/ISO can 
exercise power, rather than being a top expert (on merit), a facilitator or a mediator. 
China itself has suffered from the legacies of this standard non-system and is trying to 
correct it now with much effort. One major goal is a unified (internal) market in China – 
perhaps surprising for newcomers to China – which should also be beneficial for EU firms, 
whether already in China or exporting to China. SAC also speaks of standards as a ‘hard 
constraint’ for quality. The new standards system would be ‘simplified’ and merely have 
national regulations (mandatory standards), voluntary standards (not only from 
‘organisations’ but also from the government) and enterprise standards (which used to be 
controlled and registered). Terms like ‘recommendatory standards’ are employed – gradually 
to be developed and eventually moving towards ‘public interest’ standards. But the authors 
have been unable to trace any definition or meaning of what ‘public interest standards’ 
might be. The term is a curious one, as in a proper system, all standards when properly 
adopted in an open fashion, are in the public interest. 
It is early days for this reform. It is worth quoting two experts in an attempt to appreciate 
the meaning of the reform. Xu (2015) notes the transition problem in all this (how much 
government still?) and the idea that enterprises can have their own standards without 
registering them is still alien to many government officials. Ministries are still not sufficiently 
bound to coordinate so as to no longer act on their own, and in certification, ministries can 
still refer to any standard. The coordination with so many ministries might be a nightmare if 
not based on strong principles as in the EU, principles that are enforced in the EU (also by 
judicial review) and from which one cannot deviate. Yet another question is whether EU 
firms can participate better and more frequently in local standardisation, as this has been a 
problem, depending on the sector. Ms Xu is also warning that the consortia/alliance/group 
standards might cause new TBTs when not closely aligned with global consortia in such 
areas.  
Ziegler (2015) (an expert on Chinese standards) trusts that greater emphasis on coherence 
and integrity of the system will support the European ISO/IEC model of standardisation 
(whereas Xu fears some Americanisation). Ziegler also holds that “China is fostering its 
unique system of compulsory public interest standards playing a major role in the absence of 
technical regulations”. With China’s leadership, he agrees that the discrepancy between 
China being the world’s no. 1 trader and the poor state of its standards and regulatory 
system has to be resolved urgently. In Ziegler’s view, compulsory standards are a product of 
co-regulation, i.e. they are not technical regulations but standards made by the market (yet 
in an organised setting), which are then made compulsory. In the EU, the EU legislator sets 
the objectives based on market failures and then lets co-regulation work itself out. Is that so 
different? Ziegler is outspoken about the risk of modern protectionism: China, with 
government-sponsored domestic standards, might well create an insular market (indigenous 
technology). The Chinese have seen acceptance of some standards at IEC/ISO level already 
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and they network more and more (e.g. with DIN). But where are the Chinese companies at 
the global standardisation level (except for Huawei)? Even in South East Asia, recognition of 
Chinese standards is low, according to Ziegler. There is somewhat more emphasis on TBTs 
and standards in recent China trade agreements, but so far, little outcome. China is shaping 
up, though: ASEAN plus Six (or RCEP) and the Silk Road Economic Belt do pay attention to 
TBTs, respectively, and to standards (see also section 9.4). Of course the AIIB area and the 
Central Asia Belt are free of US domination, but are the Central Asian countries ready to 
make a difference? Is the Belt a new China orbit? 
9.4 Some inferences about lowering TBTs in an EU-China FTA 
The most important inference about Chinese TBTs is that Chinese exports, inward FDI and to 
some extent imports have grown extremely rapidly and thereby far outpaced the domestic 
capacity to govern risk regulation and all its technical implications. There is a powerful legacy 
to still hold on (often on a highly fragmented basis between many ministries and agencies at 
the central level, as well as provincial and local governments) to numerous direct controls 
and ‘authority’. However, the technical aspects of risk regulation is an archetypical area 
where the state should carefully define its proper role (e.g. setting risk objectives for health 
and safety) and organise technical support in a range of different ways, but principally 
through clear governance, without pretending that the state masters all and everything 
technically. This is neither necessary nor desirable. The overwhelming influence of the ‘state’ 
in issues that are closely related to TBTs (standards, technical regulation and conformity 
assessment) has generated a labyrinth full of inefficiencies, contradiction and delays that 
have now been openly criticised by the Chinese government itself, notably when announcing 
its drastic overhaul in 2015 by the SAC. It is in the interest of the EU to actively cooperate 
with China so as to support a speedy improvement of the system and its results, in an FTA or 
without it. The probable advantage of an FTA in this case is that the EU might be more 
directly involved during the overhaul in China, so that the new system is and remains open, 
harmonious with international standards and their application and interaction with ISO/IEC. 
It might also help to facilitate transparency in a more systemic way in this area. One should 
not forget that, until now, China has not had private, independent standardisation bodies 
that could, in the WTO TBT tradition, be expected to provide transparency on a permanent 
basis. Committees within ministries, resulting from a legacy of communism, are not easily 
going to deliver levels of transparency in line with what is customary internationally.  
In fact, although China does have enormous technical capacities, which are quickly 
increasing too, there is a great need for capacity ‘shaping’ (much more than capacity 
building) in a (so far) highly inefficient domestic institutional environment (with vested 
interests as well). The EU and ISO/IEC ought to be directly involved to help this shaping, in 
both a constructive way through technical cooperation and as a guardian to link more and 
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more with IEC/ISO, for example by creating an agreement similar to that which the EU has 
made through the Vienna & Dresden Agreements68 and in other ways.  
How prudent China is in TBT affairs can be gauged from the TBT chapter in the China–Korea 
FTA.69 It is all about mutual understanding and strengthening cooperation, while in 
repetitive ways re-affirming the TBT Agreement. There is a legal basis to undertake several 
more advanced initiatives (e.g. equivalence) but nowhere any firm commitments. The 
transparency article (6.7) is diplomatic but mainly rests on endeavours. There is stronger 
encouragement of ‘cooperation’, even joint efforts, and this is exactly what the EU in a 
possible FTA should also encourage. This cooperation includes many aspects but again 
without hard commitments (e.g. ‘may use’ accreditation and shall encourage national 
certification bodies to be a member of the IECEE-CB scheme). Details on closer cooperation 
(called ‘implementation’ in Art. 6.10) on conformity assessment, which might refer to an 
MRA, are postponed (“agree to make their best efforts to negotiate…at their earliest 
convenience”). One can even understand this Chinese prudence, given the need to engage in 
massive domestic reforms of risk regulation and its technical support in the years ahead. 
Although the EU–Vietnam FTA text on technical barriers to trade is less stringent than for 
example, the EU–Korea FTA, given the level of development of Vietnam, and it also 
emphasises cooperation for good reasons, the text goes much further and is more precise 
and detailed than the TBT chapter in the China–Korea FTA.  
  
                                                   
68 When a new standard or family of standards has to be written, the Vienna & Dresden Agreements 
instruct the EU (usually, for certain regulatory objectives that are widely agreed, but this is no 
condition; it also happens for standards without a link to regulation), to attempt to write the ISO/IEC 
standard at the same time (and on the EU side, with the same experts) so that a single EU/ISO/IEC 
standard will result. This approach is a resounding success and generates increasing harmonisation 
between EU standards and world ones.  
69 See chapter 6, on the China FTA Network website (http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enkorea.shtml). 
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10. Reducing SPS barriers in an EU-China FTA 
The rules, controls and inspections on food safety and on animal and plant health – SPS 
measures – tend to be relatively costly owing to the great sensitivities about public health 
and in many cases the need to minimise the risks of products causing disease and its 
contagion. The WTO SPS Agreement has set basic principles on what can and cannot be done 
in the SPS area. It is somewhat similar to the TBT Agreement when it comes to disguised 
barriers to trade, non-discrimination and proportionality, but insists on scientific evidence in 
a proper risk analysis prior to taking (justified) measures. As China and the EU are WTO 
members and hence adhere to the SPS Agreement, they are therefore on par, in principle. 
Both China and the EU (and the member states) are members of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (for maximum tolerance levels, e.g. in water, food and other such standards), 
the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC). Nonetheless, there are costly SPS barriers between China and the EU. An 
SPS barrier is not the same as justified, yet costly measures that are inevitable for public and 
animal health. In this context, a barrier is creating additional costs for market access beyond 
what is necessary and justified for consumer and other safety, or in extreme cases, a barrier 
might refer to a ban, temporary or for an undetermined period, for which the justification is 
not given, not based on science or spurious. A free trade area between China and the EU 
should be able to greatly reduce or (ideally) eliminate the extra costs of the two SPS regimes 
for imports beyond measures that are justified and inevitable. Section 10.1 discusses at 
some length the main Chinese SPS barriers maintained on exports of EU agro-food into 
China, which are partly product-specific but for the most part systemic. Section 10.2 
discusses the problems as perceived or experienced by third countries when trying to export 
food, feed, plants or live animals to the EU, with a special emphasis on China where possible. 
Section 10.3 proposes some guidelines for solutions in the framework of a future FTA.  
10.1 Market access barriers of the Chinese SPS regime 
10.1.1 WTO and US assessment of Chinese SPS measures 
The WTO70 is unusually critical of the Chinese food safety (etc.) system in that (i) a “myriad 
of laws and implementing regulations and rules continue to regulate China’s SPS regime; 
some of these laws are outdated and repetitive” (WTO, 2014, p. 76), and (ii) the system is 
fragmented, given that many regulatory authorities belong to different agencies. The latter 
is a challenge for proper enforcement, with an “overlap of functions and thus an avoidance 
of responsibility and lack of accountability”. China uses the Catalogue of Entry-Exit 
Commodities Inspected and Quarantined by Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine Organs 
with no fewer than 2,032 tariff lines at the HS 8-digit level. Some of these tariff lines are not 
                                                   
70 See WTO (2012), pp. 49 ff.; see also WTO (2014), pp. 76 ff.  
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about food, feed, animal health or plants, but include veterinary drugs and cosmetics, 
among others. The system appears rather strict, involving a good deal of red tape. “Some 
80% of the goods subject to automatic licensing are also subject to inspection and 
quarantine and some 35% of goods subject to non-automatic licensing were also subject to 
inspection and quarantine.” Moreover, there are two additional aspects to be taken into 
account. First, there is another catalogue on Import Commodities subject to safety and 
quality permits, stipulating general standards for goods in case such goods are highly 
sensitive in terms of safety, sanitation and environmental protection. Second, foreign 
enterprises that manufacture, import, process and store food need to be registered before 
their related food imports are imported into China. The question is whether this regime is 
stricter, i.e. more costly, than other regimes of WTO members, or more costly than 
necessary, creating extra barriers. The WTO is suggestive that this is so but does not go so 
far as literally stating it. China is an outlier in Asia and also compared with the EU when it 
comes to SPS notifications. Thus, since 2001 China has notified SPS measures 1,020 times, 
compared (in Asia) with New Zealand with 523 notifications, Korea with 516 and Japan with 
427. The EU’s notifications amounted to 558, with Albania coming second in Europe with 
184; there is little notification by EU member states, as SPS regulations are very largely 
harmonised in the EU. China being an outlier might stem from the overcrowding of 
regulatory authorities and the two catalogues, but caution is needed before drawing such 
conclusions.71 Notifications may be broad or narrow and repeated updates can also lead to 
distinct notification practices. In other words, it is not obvious that China is more restrictive 
in SPS merely because it has a high score in notifications to the WTO SPS committee.  
What is striking in a number of cases on China in the US Trade Representative’s (2014)72 
report on SPS is how long it takes before SPS irritants or bans are resolved by China, implying 
medium to long-term damage to (in this case, US) exports. For instance, there is the issue 
concerning ractopamine, for which the maximum residue levels are now under the Codex 
Alimentarius, yet the matter still has not been resolved bilaterally. Other outstanding issues 
are the BSE-related ban on (here, US) live cattle, beef and beef products applied since 2003, 
the zero-tolerance level of salmonella in poultry for the last decade or so (even though zero 
levels are unachievable technically, likewise for Chinese chicken) and a long-standing dispute 
on types of apples since 1995(!) affected by alleged pest-related concerns and bans on 
avocados since 2005, as well as table-stock potatoes (since 2000). In all these cases, there 
are undue delays and forms of foot-dragging, which in WTO terms, are disguised forms of 
protectionism.  
                                                   
71 For example, the US has notified as many as 2,769 items, followed (in the Americas) by Brazil with 
1,058 and Canada with 946. 
72 See the report on SPS from the US Trade Representative (2014) 
(http://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/FINAL-2014-SPS-Report-Compiled_o.pdf). 
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10.1.2 EU concerns about Chinese SPS barriers 
10.1.2.1 General concerns 
The EU is delighted about the development of trade in agro-food with China, with an 
average annual rate of export growth of no less than 23.9% over the period 2005–15.73 
There is a firm conviction in EU agro-business and policy circles that China needs high-quality 
and safe agro-food products, that consumers are keen to obtain them and have the 
purchasing power by now to buy such imported products. There is still a lingering mistrust in 
Chinese agro-food produce among Chinese consumers after several food scandals in the 
country, in spite of major reforms in the SPS system and inspections that the Chinese 
government has since introduced. At the same time, the EU has serious complaints about 
the Chinese SPS regime as to how it works in actual practice. The overall view may be 
summarised as follows: SPS measures are often far too costly and overly restrictive or create 
considerable uncertainty, which blocks or significantly reduces actual as compared with 
potential EU agro-food exports. So far, the EU authorities take the benign view that bilateral 
consultations and a good deal of patience, rather than WTO litigation, is the proper way to 
attempt to resolve these disputes, in addition to extensive cooperation programmes with 
China (for the latter, see Box 10.1). An FTA between China and the EU could be seen as a 
further deepening and more committing form of working together to drastically lower the 
(unnecessary) costs of these SPS measures.  
Box 10.1 EU-China technical cooperation on agro-food and SPS 
Regular consultations between the EU and China on trade irritants in agro-food are complemented 
by technical cooperation of a fairly wide scope. Basically, the EU-China Trade Project aims at capacity 
building for high-quality SPS management in all main areas and especially for technical issues, testing 
and risk analysis. The project has four pillars: food safety, plant health, animal health and 
biotechnology (plus some work on GIs). In food safety, it is about modernising food safety strategy, 
including risk analysis, traceability and food safety standards. It has elaborated 28 technical activities, 
and so far, held 12 technical workshops. In plant health, it is about pesticide residues, organic agro-
producers and agro-product processing technology, which have been the subject of 6 technical 
workshops/seminars and 7 other activities on EU technical plant-health regulations to date. On 
animal health, it is about welfare and disease prevention, with a focus on BSE and enhancing 
reference laboratory capacity, with 22 technical activities and another 3 workshops thus far. In 
biotechnology, the project seeks to support EU-China standards harmonisation, with a view to 
helping to ensure the safety and legality of Chinese products entering the EU. This is a new pillar with 
only two activities having taken place, including one on technical assistance to support the inspection 
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).74  
                                                   
73 In addition is the average of annual growth of agro-food imports from China, at a lower but 
respectable rate of 7% for the same period. 
74 For details, see the EU-China Agriculture & Food Safety website (www.euchinaagri.org/). 
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Not unlike the WTO, EU complaints about China’s SPS regime are largely systemic. In other 
words, although specific products or EU member states may be hit, the root cause, more 
often than not, is a set of shortcomings in the domestic regime as such, including the 
following top three:  
1. lack of respect for international standards, and indeed for those of the international 
organisations of which China is a member. Note that the SPS Agreement is clear about 
the acceptance of international standards, adopted after great care about risk 
assessment – if one deviates or refuses acceptance, this has to be justified, based on a 
risk assessment and based on science, showing empirical evidence of doubt. China does 
not have a habit of doing so;75 
2. very lengthy, complex and non-transparent application procedures that are 
unnecessarily costly and generate uncertainty for potential exporters. Most potential EU 
exporters of agro-food are experienced in penetrating many markets outside the EU and 
are not infrequently bewildered by the problems and sheer costs of market access; and 
3. ‘embedded discrimination’ in the approach of the Chinese authorities in several ways. 
The principal problem the EU has with China’s SPS regime is that China does not 
recognise the (far-reaching, if not almost complete) harmonisation at the EU level of SPS 
measures, but instead deals with member states and on a case-by-case basis for every 
product. The upshot is that similar or identical SPS problems are often addressed in 
different ways and with distinct results, and that waiting time is extended unnecessarily. 
There are indications, consistent with the WTO assessment, that far too many 
agencies/ministries are involved in China, not to speak of (inconsistent) actual border 
controls (between different ports) once a consignment arrives. The multitude of agencies 
causes confusion for EU exporters, as their messages or instructions tend to overlap only 
partly, while their internal communication leaves much to be desired. Probably, for the same 
reason, applications are not always answered or take a long time to be ‘heard’. Recently, 
when queried about the problems of the Chinese SPS regime, a senior APEC-based trade 
diplomat noted drily that, “we have learned to live even with this system”. That seems to 
sum up the EU attitude as well: even though the costs of market access for agro-food 
exports to China are far too high (and this works its way through to higher import prices for 
Chinese consumers), it is nevertheless still worth exporting because demand in China is 
strong and increasing. And in fairness, one ought to add that once the high first-imports 
hurdle has been overcome, it becomes somewhat easier to maintain a regular flow of 
exports in given products.  
                                                   
75 For years, this has been a prominent complaint of the European Chamber of Commerce in China in 
its Annual Position paper, and was again in 2015. 
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10.1.2.2 Specific EU concerns 
Since SPS measures can be extremely detailed and since their scope is vast,76 only the major 
specific concerns are listed in Table 10.1. Although specific, some of these are nonetheless 
rooted in systemic questions as discussed above. The table lists seven specific concerns. 
Early in February 2016, the EU Market Access database listed eight issues, with a good deal 
of overlap with Table 10.1; three of these eight are persistent trade irritants as they date 
back to 2005 and 2006.  
Table 10.1 Specific EU SPS concerns about market access to China 
 Issue EU complaint EU position 
1 Approval of meat 
establishments 
The application process for the 
approval of meat establishments for 
export to China is burdensome and 
can take several years; the 
procedure is not clear (not 
predictable, transparent and there 
is no end-date); it requires prior on-
site inspection; it is not limited to 
what is ‘reasonable and necessary’. 
The Codex Alimentarius 
standards lay down that such 
audits should focus on the 
performance of the local 
authority, as a prior step to 
allowing exports (if all Chinese 
requirements are fulfilled), and 
not on-site audits as a rule; for 
every new product, a new 
procedure has to be started all 
over again; in all of this, China 
violates Annex C on 
inspection/approvals of WTO 
SPS commitments; there is also 
the issue of approaches to 
each EU member state. 
2 Dairy: Non-alignment 
with international 
standards 
Chinese standards for cheese ignore 
international standards, especially 
on the levels of yeast and mould, 
cheese definitions, the methods 
used, the list of raw materials and 
permitted ingredients; there is no 
risk assessment to justify this; (see 
also the case study on cheese by the 
European Chamber of Commerce in 
China (2015, pp. 138–9). 
Cheese is an important and 
traditional export product of 
the EU: for about a third of EU 
countries this is a significant 
export item; de facto this 
implies a ban on certain 
cheeses with great traditions; 
China seems to have promised 
to review these standards but 
without a date. 
3 Phthalates in alcoholic 
beverages 
A sudden, unjustified import 
restriction was introduced in 2013, 
requiring very low levels of 
phthalates, not underpinned by a 
risk assessment at first, and with no 
This inconsistency and 
confusion would seem to be 
typical of the Chinese SPS 
system; early in 2016, the 
restriction had not been 
                                                   
76 It might be remembered that, in the EC 1992 programme for the internal market, when EU-wide 
SPS was introduced, no fewer than 160 directives were included in the White Paper of 1985, later 
followed by additional legislation and countless comitology decisions.  
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withdrawal once the risk 
assessment (in 2014) showed that 
higher levels were safe. 
relaxed or withdrawn, despite 
the Chinese risk assessment of 
2014.  
4 Micro-biological 
standard on listeria 
For meat and dairy, zero tolerance 
of listeria is maintained by China; 
China does not accept the 
alternative approach in line with a 
2007 standard from the Codex, 
which provides an equally high level 
of safety. 
This barrier is overly restrictive 
as the Codex standard shows; 
it affects important potential 
meat and (raw milk) cheese 
exports, so it is significant for 
EU producers. 
5 BSE-related ban on 
(b)ovine and its 
products since 2000 
Until 2014, China never allowed 
these imports despite BSE long 
having been overcome in Europe; 
the first new country applications 
date back to 2005; no risk analysis 
has ever been published by China; 
since 2014, a slow recognition of 
the problem has begun, with 
selected EU member states. 
The EU finds that China 
unjustifiably discriminates 
between EU and non-EU WTO 
partners (allowed to export 
(b)ovine products) and 
between EU member states 
(having almost all the same OIE 
(negligible) risk status): 
Hungary can now export beef 
and Romania live cattle, while 
for the Netherlands and Ireland 
the ban has been lifted but the 
renewed process of market 
access had not been completed 
by early 2016; other EU 
countries are not yet allowed 
to export. 
6 Non-recognition of EU 
‘regionalisation’ for 
cases of African swine 
fever and avian 
influenza (bird flu) 
China does not recognise 
‘regionalisation’ when outbreaks of 
contagious diseases among animals 
occur, despite Art. 6 of the SPS 
Agreement and the OIE standards 
for regionalisation; regionalisation 
determines, under strict conditions, 
disease-free zones from which trade 
can safely take place – hence, pork 
and chicken exports from zones 
without any disease are affected; 
these bans are disproportionate 
(namely country-wide, not region-
based); also, timeframes are 
disproportionate (for avian 
influenza in poultry, three months 
after a stamping-out policy is the 
norm); so far, China has not 
provided its risk assessments for 
non-recognition of the stringent 
regionalisation policies strictly 
implemented in EU member states 
whenever an outbreak occurs for 
China violates various critical 
aspects of the carefully 
constructed international SPS 
regime in cases of such 
outbreaks, and is additionally 
excessively slow to proceed on 
lifting the bans, besides lacking 
transparency and 
predictability, which is all very 
costly. 
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diseases like African swine fever and 
avian influenza. 
7 Chinese import ban 
imposed on (b)ovine 
genetic material due to 
the Schmallenberg 
virus (in 2012) 
The OIE says that the virus is not an 
emerging disease, and does not 
meet the criteria for setting an 
international standard (and thus not 
a trade condition); China has not 
provided a risk analysis and refuses 
even to trade semen from 
(negatively) tested animals; 
technical cooperation on the 
Schmallenberg virus with China is 
now ongoing, at China’s request. 
The EU suggests that the 
problem has arisen, in part, 
because China suffers from a 
lack of capacity building, which 
the EU is supporting.  
Source: Authors. 
The problems listed can hopefully be resolved over time, but if the systemic issues are not 
addressed by China itself, new such problems are bound to occur. Insofar as Chinese 
consumers and customers (e.g. supermarkets) continue to demand imported food from the 
EU, if not more of it, the transformation and improvement of the Chinese SPS system in 
terms of its actual implementation would facilitate such imports (and therefore, increase 
Chinese consumer welfare) and lower its prices appreciably (further increase that welfare).  
The costs of these problems to EU exporters and China-based importers are considerable. As 
an example, it is advised to read the user-friendly guideline from the EU SME centre in 
Beijing about “Exporting meat to China”77 showing the complexity of applications, approvals 
and protocols. There is also a proxy calculation of the costs of clearance upon arrival in a 
harbour (with the example of Qingdao), with 16 fees and other cost items (such as the 
import tariffs (see chapter 8), import agent fees and empty container charges), as well as the 
delays (in days) when going through all the steps necessary.  
10.2 Concerns from China and WTO partners about EU SPS barriers 
Although the EU is a leader in SPS matters, this does not mean that there are no trade 
irritants or actual or perceived barriers for WTO partners, including China. This is clear from 
the eight ‘specific trade concerns’ listed in the WTO’s Trade Policy Review on the EU (2013, 
p. 64), with two from China78 and the ten new specific trade concerns in the Trade Policy 
Review for 2015 (WTO, 2015, p. 59, footnote 119).79 The EU SPS regime is stable, with the 
                                                   
77 See the website of the EU SME Centre (www.eusmecentre.org.en), version of November 2013. 
78 These relate to the regulation on polyamide and melamine plastic kitchenware, and the limits of 
aluminium in flour products. 
79 Among these are the French ban on Bisphenol A, some highly specific SPS cases, the EU proposal 
for categorisation of certain compounds as endocrine disruptors, and the EU’s renewal of GMO 
approvals. 
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exception of new (2013) proposals for the simplification of SPS issues in the value chain, 
including a further convergence with international standards. The only two perpetual 
concerns in SPS are the day-to-day application of the EU’s rapid alert system RASFF and the 
EU’s GMO regime. The second one defies the normal application of the precautionary 
principle and can therefore only be regarded as a societal choice for a very strict regime. 
Since the SPS Agreement is based on scientific risk assessment and the related justification 
of restrictions, the EU’s GMO regime is globally regarded as fully inconsistent with what the 
EU, in other areas of SPS, firmly defends and practises.80 When the precautionary principle is 
invoked, there have to be explicit risk reasons and at least some partial scientific evidence of 
concerns about threats to human and animal health or irreversibility, leading one to take 
measures in the period until more research might bring greater certainty. But there are no 
health risks and there is no scientific evidence about health threats from GMOs. After 
decades of massive and painstaking research all over the world, and after at least two 
decades of living with GMO-based food and feed in many countries in all continents, GMOs 
have yet to be identified scientifically as risky; so far, no risks have been identified at all.81 
This blatant inconsistency irritates many WTO partners, even though formally WTO countries 
can of course exercise their sovereign right to set higher or distinct food safety objectives. 
The EU has, however, no case based on scientific risk assessment. Nevertheless, the 
idiosyncratic EU approach creates a series of complications in trade, also with China.82 
The first issue, RASFF, is a minor one. It is more about the risk that food and feed products, 
when rejected at the EU borders in one place, might also be rejected – in a chain reaction to 
the automatic alert system notification – at many other border posts in the EU, or that 
rejection patterns differ among EU member states. Some WTO partners have raised 
concerns and asked questions about the transparency of the RASFF and potential restrictions 
of trade. This might be owing to a lack of coordination of the member state border posts. For 
this purpose, ten new standard operating rules published in December 201483 will fully 
harmonise the application. 
RASFF has been, and still is, important for China’s exports to the EU. China is, at the same 
time, a regular problem case when it comes to food/feed risks notified to RASFF by EU 
member states, and a country involving considerable follow-up in order to prevent 
                                                   
80 This is quite apart from the enormous economic and social advantages of GMOs for hundreds of 
millions of farmers in developing countries, especially in areas where diseases spread easily or (say) 
too little water can ruin a harvest.  
81 See European Academies, Science Advisory Council (2013) (www.easac.eu/fileadmin/Reports/ 
Planting_the_Future/EASAC_Planting_the_Future_LAY_SUMMARY.pdf). 
82 Thus, in the RASFF’s top-ten notifications, e.g. in 2010, cereals imported from China contained 
illegal GMOs. 
83 See “RASFF – Food and Feed Safety Alerts” on the European Commission website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/rasff). 
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repetition. China is traditionally the country with the highest number of notifications in 
RASFF. Still, from the 2011 peak of 562 notifications, the trend has been steadily downward: 
536 in 2012, 433 in 2013 and 413 in 2014 (still the highest). In the annual top-ten of 
countries of origin of RASFF notifications of risky products, the country remains (too) 
prominent: three out of ten countries in 2011, no fewer than six out of ten in 2012, three in 
2013 and four in 2014. In 2014, of 421 relevant cases, 77 were followed up with China, in the 
hope of increasing awareness.  
10.3 Lowering SPS barriers in an EU-China FTA 
SPS is typically an area where there will always be a need for a mix of cooperation and for 
exercising the national right to regulate and indeed protect consumers, as well as livestock 
and plant health. In the case of China, however, there are some systemic questions that 
should be expected to become less of a problem over time, but nowadays are severely 
hindering, at times even blocking, trade in food, feed and plant products. The costs of much 
wanted agro-food imports into China are unnecessarily pushed up to high levels. 
China faces the great challenge of reforming and streamlining its domestic system. This is 
easily said from the outside but requires forceful institutional reform and greater 
transparency, both still somewhat sensitive in China. The present study on the FTA is not the 
right place to discuss this and it is less than clear that recommendations on such a reform 
should come from ‘outside’. Still, all trading partners and the WTO have insisted on this for 
years. One aspect in particular, so typical for a system that emerges out of communism, 
keeps irritating European business in China: the fact that ‘voluntary’ standards are still 
enforced (by some judges and administrators) as if they are regulations with a mandatory 
nature. 
In addition, China has been catapulted into middle-income status in a short period of time 
and is still growing fairly rapidly. But it would seem that the capacity, both technical and 
institutional, to properly address the issues and guarantees of ‘safe’ food and feed, is much 
behind what would be desirable and indeed what is more and more expected domestically 
and internationally. The EU has developed a programme of intense agro-food technical 
cooperation (see Box 10.1 above) and more of the same is necessary for years to come. 
Nevertheless, it would be useful if this cooperation were more explicitly linked to the 
facilitation of market access and to greater transparency. Food supervision in China is under 
reform and both the depth and speed of this reform could well be improved. It should be 
noted that the EU still waits for a resolution of three substantial complaints with very long 
delays. The experience would seem to suggest that an EU-China FTA should agree on a 
maximum waiting time for substantive answers and on cooperative ways of solving the 
problem, with greater mutual obligations in procedures as well as transparency, so as to pre-
empt these situations. 
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But it is not just about the government, it is also about the agro-food value chains in China. 
There is a lack of awareness, even after some food scandals, in value chains about the 
responsibilities of all private players. Value chains in food and feed do require shared 
responsibilities, perhaps with a liability system as well, and inspection cannot possibly solve 
all problems. In addition, it would be a good idea if China were set up an alert system like the 
EU’s RASFF or a similar alternative, with full openness and consistent follow-ups.  
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11. Market access in services: China and the EU 
11.1 Introduction 
Cross-border trade in services with China, other than personal travel and (to some extent) 
air and maritime freight transport, is heavily restricted. When EU companies attempt to go 
for FDI in China in order to provide services, they find that many services markets are 
blocked or restricted for foreign FDI. For Chinese companies coming to the EU, FDI is 
basically free and cross-border services are easier, albeit that (for reciprocity reasons) some 
of the liberal access regimes are not applied. In GATS, the only initiative to widen and 
deepen services commitments is the plurilateral TiSA (currently negotiated in Geneva), for 
which China has shown interest but has not yet made significant offers enabling the country 
to join. For these reasons, there is the expectation that an EU-China FTA might greatly 
facilitate market access in services on a bilateral basis. 
General principles of market access in services are determined by the GATS, for both the EU 
and China. The specifics per sector or subsector (some 160 in total) are set out in the GATS 
(opening) commitments, schedules annexed to GATS. For China, the GATS commitments 
date from 2001, when the country became a WTO member; for the EU, they are from 1995, 
except for telecoms and financial services (late 1990s). The actually applied market access 
may, at times, be better but this does not take the form of a legal GATS commitment (not 
bound). Broadly speaking, an FTA between China and the EU can be beneficial because it is 
an opportunity to widen and deepen the commitments under GATS in a bilateral fashion. 
There is plenty of room to do this, as the EU has already done bilaterally in several FTAs 
recently concluded. Recent FTAs that China has concluded have hardly or not yet seized this 
opportunity. For access to China’s services markets, this opportunity is significant, as services 
markets are often (partially) exempted in GATS commitments, closed or subject to heavy 
requirements of many kinds. Moreover, there are some prominent examples of formal 
openness of the Chinese services markets, but oligopolies of SOEs have the effect of 
preventing actual entry beyond trivial and highly specialised services (e.g. services provided 
only to EU firms in China); it is not clear whether anti-trust is effectively applied.84 
Services markets can be penetrated through four modes of supply as the GATS specifies: 
cross-border trade in services (mode 1),85 investment (as FDI, also called (local) 
                                                   
84 Thus, Bergsten, Hufbauer & Miner (2014, p. 320) insist that, if a US–China FTA were ever 
negotiated, the article against abuse of monopoly position (see Table 11.3, further) should be 
extended to oligopolies (of SOEs) with equivalent conduct.  
85 Mode 2 is also cross-border trade but initiated by the consumer (e.g. a tourist) or customer moving 
to the supplier. In actual practice, only mode 1 matters for FTAs and negotiators. Moreover, 
passenger travel is usually mode 2 but the sticking issue may well be visas, which fall outside trade 
policy (and hence outside an FTA).  
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‘establishment’ or ‘commercial presence’ – mode 3) and temporary cross-border services 
(mode 4, also called ‘temporary movement of natural persons’, either technical or other 
service staff for a contracted short-term assignment, or intra-corporate staff for 
multinationals or actual or potential investors). In particular, mode 3 (local establishment 
through FDI) is – in many services sectors – the only effective route to penetrate the market 
and supply services requiring close relationships with clients (for trust and service quality). 
This creates an additional complication because the local FDI regime will affect this entry 
route for the services business. Thus, if service market X is relatively free but FDI in sector X 
is restricted or banned, foreign service provision will be effectively impossible or at best 
trivial. Similarly, if a service market X is restricted (e.g. by highly conditional licensing) but FDI 
is not restricted as such, the upshot would be more or less the same: no effective access. 
Therefore, although market access in services is an FTA issue, it cannot be fully separated 
from investment negotiations, certainly not for services. Chapter 16 on the CAI currently 
negotiated between China and the EU addresses this aspect of market access, too. 
Sometimes, services and investment in FTAs are taken together – in other words, the CAI 
becomes part of the FTA – as is the case in CETA.86 In the case of an EU-China FTA, however, 
it is unlikely that a CAI at the EU level would be ‘incorporated’ in the trade bilateral. The 
current sequence, namely the completion of the CAI first, will probably determine the FDI 
access and the FTA may have to be built on that. For Chinese access to the EU, the FDI issue 
is a minor one, as the EU FDI regime is very open indeed. Chinese enterprises have little 
difficulty in establishing themselves in the EU in almost all sectors and recently, they 
increasingly do so. Section 11.2 sets out recent attempts to quantify access barriers to 
services markets, here bilaterally between the EU and China. Section 11.3 discusses, 
respectively, access to the Chinese services markets in various modes based on a summary 
of 5 aspects for 13 services sectors in a lengthy Table 11.1, followed by a similar qualitative 
summary about access to the EU services markets for Chinese firms based on WTO reports 
(in Table 11.2). Section 11.4 speculates on the potential value added of an FTA, also in light 
of the results of the China–Korea FTA and the EU’s recently concluded FTA with Vietnam.  
11.2 Measuring the extent of market access in services: China and the EU 
It is extremely difficult to assess the degree of restrictiveness of market access, in the various 
services modes, without lengthy qualitative analysis of regulatory and other measures and 
their application. Recently, the OECD and the World Bank constructed (distinct) methods to 
‘measure’ such degrees, in attempts to inform the debate and comparisons among GATS 
partners. There are two quantitative tools to ‘measure’ degrees of ‘restrictiveness’ of market 
regulation in services, one on the services market regulation as a whole, the other 
specifically estimating the costs of access for a foreign provider in terms of a tariff equivalent 
                                                   
86 For a detailed analysis, see Mustilli, Pelkmans & Woolcock (2015), forthcoming (as a European 
Parliament publication). 
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(i.e. a percentage on top of the price of supply). A Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) 
captures the extent to which trade or FDI related to services are hampered by regulatory 
restrictions. Thus, the estimation of such indexes entails the rather complex duty of ‘giving a 
number’ to a set of qualitative information that reflects the overall barriers constraining 
services activities between countries. The AVE of the costs of market access for a foreign 
services supplier is similar to the costs of TBTs. In part III of this study, the empirical 
estimates of AVEs are employed in order to arrive at estimates of the economic impact of 
the FTA. The great difficulty in services is, first, that investment and services supply are 
blended in a single number, and second, that regulation in services (which may or may not 
be justified in principle by market failures) is often linked not merely with the service itself 
but also with regulating or supervising the provider (or both). In addition, the prices (hence, 
the costs) of services are far more difficult to measure properly than goods prices, with or 
without TBTs. The question is whether STRIs and AVEs can improve the economic evaluation 
of openness in services and also can help us appreciate the costs of the regulatory barriers in 
services between China and the EU. Ideally, this may perhaps support choices in FTA 
negotiations. 
Two STRI indices have been developed by the OECD87 and the World Bank,88 respectively. 
Both are briefly reported in order to grasp degrees of restrictiveness, even though their 
different methodologies make it impossible to compare the numbers exactly.89 
Figures 11.1 and 11.2 juxtapose the two indexes for an EU-17 selection90 and China. In both 
cases, the EU-17 index reports the simple averages for the entire EU-17 of the single country 
values. Regarding sector aggregation, while the World Bank provides already aggregated 
                                                   
87 See the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index on the OECD website (OECD STRI). 
88 See the World Bank’s Services Trade Restrictions Database on the World Bank website (WB STRI). 
89 The OECD index applies a binary approach (90%), that is, yes/no answers to many aspects, grouped 
into five categories of restrictions. The index from the World Bank is based on a simple average of 
degrees of restrictions by country and by sector. But it is the weighting system that represents the 
main difference between the two indexes. In fact, the World Bank index relies on an additive method 
that identifies five degrees of restrictiveness by means of a score from 0 to 100 with intervals of 25. 
By contrast, the OECD index uses experts’ judgments to formulate a weighting scheme that gives a 
threshold for the binary measure. The five categories of restrictions for the OECD are restrictions in 
foreign ownership and other entry conditions, restrictions on the movement of people, other 
discriminatory measures/standards, barriers to competition, administrative issues and regulatory 
transparency. The World Bank’s five degrees are basically open, minor restrictions (25), major 
restrictions (50), virtually closed (75) and closed (100).  
90 The chosen countries are the only ones in the EU for which both databases have data. The 17 
countries are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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categories, for the OECD index different sub-categories have been merged.91 A higher index 
number means greater restrictiveness.  
The two figures show that China’s restrictiveness for services markets is (much) higher than 
EU averages (as expected) – and this difference is more pronounced in the OECD version. In 
two major sectors, however, the two methods come up with significant divergences: in 
telecommunications and transportation. For telecoms, the World Bank’s STRI for the EU is so 
low that it falls under completely opened (defined by the World Bank scale system), whereas 
telecoms is only slightly below the EU STRI average in the OECD method but exceeds retail 
and is almost as restrictive as financial. In transportation, the two types of STRI indexes even 
conflict: under the OECD method, the EU STRI is less than half that of China’s, whereas under 
the World Bank method, the EU’s restrictiveness is not only higher than under the OECD 
method, but the Chinese STRI is so low that it is found to be clearly less restrictive than the 
EU’s. This shows that one has to be very careful with these measures and complement them 
with substantive, qualitative information and assessment, as the present chapter does.  
Figure 11.1 OECD STRI index for the EU-17 and for China, 2015 
 
                                                   
91 These are financial (commercial banking and insurance), telecommunications (telecoms), retail 
(distribution), transportation (air transport, maritime transport, road freight transport, rail freight 
transport and courier services) and professional (accounting and legal). 
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Figure 11.2 World Bank STRI index for the EU-17 and China 
 
11.3 Sectoral services market access: China and the EU 
11.3.1 Introduction to the regulatory logic of the survey 
As a general introduction, what is critical in market access for services in China is a 
combination of factors: 
1. restrictions on or the banning of FDI (mode 3) in sectors or economic activities. This is 
done in the Foreign Investment Catalogue published regularly.92 Four categories are 
employed by the Catalogue: encouraged, unrestricted, restricted and banned; 
2. de jure or de facto lack of ‘national treatment’ when EU FIEs are (trying to get into or 
survive) in the market; and 
3. the (super)dominance of SOEs in many industrial and services markets. This dominance is 
not only a matter of huge market shares as a legacy of the past, but also bolstered by a 
battery of distortions, all to the sole benefit of these state enterprises. These distortions 
include credit privileges, information privileges, privileges in prior ‘consultation’ or in 
some forms of standardisation, subsidies (including sometimes loss coverage) and the 
failure of anti-trust authorities to tackle anti-competitive structures and conduct. 
                                                   
92 For the Chinese version, see the website of China’s Ministry of Commerce 
(www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/f/201503/20150300911747.shtml). 
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Item 1 is complicated by the following core issues: 
a. de jure national treatment, resulting from GATS commitments or reforms; 
b. in many services sectors, national treatment that is GATS-committed by China for some 
modes, but in mode 3 (FDI in services) it is often done so incompletely. This implies that 
many forms and degrees of discrimination – here, of EU FIEs – in the markets in China 
where these EU companies operate, can persist. Thus, even if item 1 above is gradually 
relaxed, in the sense that the Catalogue had fewer markets or activities ‘banned’ or 
‘restricted’ for non-Chinese enterprises, this would not guarantee at all that investment 
and services supply could be (profitably) rolled out in parts or all of China – there may be 
all kinds of restrictions in the operation of the firm or its provision of services in the 
market or geographical parts of it; and 
c. the issue that, as the Covington & Burling (2015) report sets out in detail, a stricter form 
of national treatment as a discipline for China is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
achieving a level playing field, e.g. for EU service providers in China. 
That is also why there are no fewer than five routes to ‘better market access’ for services in 
the case of China. One could be a unilateral improvement or extension of GATS 
commitments by China, as China has done a few times in other areas (including tariffs). Such 
a unilateral move – without reciprocity of any kind by a GATS partner – is conceivable as an 
element of a domestic reform programme. It is an open invitation for (more) foreign 
competition and this may well fit reforms, e.g. a greater attractiveness of services through 
price, quality, innovation through new business models, variety, or all four. The advantage of 
a stronger GATS commitment is that it is a powerful sign of commitment, because policy 
reversals in this respect are costly economically and politically. A second option is to 
(further) open up FDI in various markets where FDI is now restricted or banned, through the 
Catalogue. This has happened now and then over the last few years. A third route is a clear 
and systematic programme of reducing the violations of national treatment, which prevent 
or severely hinder EU FIEs (and other FDI) in entering or profitably operating in various 
markets in China. Because this can take many forms, it should be based on a logic rooted in 
economic efficiency and a spirit of openness while giving more space to private enterprise, 
whether Chinese or foreign. In turn, this should fit, if not promote, the reforms announced in 
the Decision of the Third Plenum of the Party. But it ought to be predictable in order to be 
credible and to be sustained even in the face of opposition by vested interests or very short-
term regional/local criticism. A fourth route is to commit in WTO plurilaterals to opening up 
sectors or to the greater adherence to national treatment (e.g. to plurilateral partners or all 
WTO partners). The two prominent examples are TiSA (for services) and the GPA (for 
government procurement, which applies to goods and services). As noted, in both 
plurilaterals, China is involved but not yet firmly in or legally committed. There is no doubt 
that Chinese participation in both fits in with its announced domestic reform programme; 
yet apparently, the domestic political economy is still too sensitive or the speed would be 
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too high. The fifth route is FTAs with important trading partners, such as the EU. The CAI 
could ensure the opening up in the Catalogue and both the CAI and the FTA – in some 
sequence or combination – could enhance and clarify which restrictions of national 
treatment would still be allowed and which restrictions would be forbidden, in such a 
bilateral.  
In addition, market access can be improved by means of policies ensuring ‘better market 
functioning’ in China, in particular, undistorted competition. Undistorted competition may 
be thought to be neutral with regard to which companies may be disadvantaged, but that is 
rarely the case in China. In the EU, market competition is typically distorted (if and when it 
happens, which is not all that common because of its market institutions) by anti-
competitive conduct or structure, or by distortive state interventions that have been largely 
pre-empted or forbidden through the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) and its case law. In China, that is not the case. China is an economy ‘in transition’ 
from a planned economy to (what it calls) a ‘socialist market economy’.  
To appreciate what happens in China, it is good to remember the experience of the former 
communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe in the period from 1989 to around 
2003–04. In order to make markets work, not only is private enterprise allowed to come into 
markets, but also SOEs have to be subjected to full market discipline and so-called ‘hard 
budget constraints’. These two conditions mean, in effect, that the ownership by the state 
does not give such companies any advantage whatsoever. Indeed, once the EU managed to 
effectively impose these conditions on those former communist countries that could 
become EU members, a sharp contrast emerged between that group and the former 
communist countries that had to reform ‘on their own’. The first group quickly realised a 
sound economic catch-up process and attracted large and steady FDI inflows, helping these 
countries to upgrade while also rapidly improving their services performance. The other 
group fell behind in many respects, as it is intrinsically difficult to overcome resistance to 
such profound transition processes with radical shifts in market share, competitive exposure 
and innovation, not to speak of shedding of workers and writing off capital. It is therefore 
not surprising that China suggests that WTO and FTA discipline may well help its domestic 
commitment to reforms. However, the principal lesson from the transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe is precisely that such external discipline has to be ‘hard’ and credible (even 
when painful) and consistent. This requires a kind of ‘constitutional regime’ of a market 
economy as the EU brought to the Eastern European countries. The latter countries were 
eager and willing to accept the initial hardship because they knew that, besides being 
inevitable anyway, it would be followed by economic growth and beneficial EU membership. 
In other words, China should not expect that a selective and slow relaxation of a highly 
conditional acceptance of FDI and of a largely restricted application of national treatment is 
going to have effects similar to the switch to a genuine market economy, as the new EU 
members typically experienced in the run-up to EU membership. Thus, there are many 
markets where SOEs have a powerful position in the market, jointly, bolstered by distortions 
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that help them alone, while anti-trust is not sufficiently applied or applied mainly to foreign 
entrants whether for horizontal or vertical agreements, monopolistic or joint dominance, 
anti-competitive mergers or M&A. Also, in network industries such as gas, electricity, rail, 
telecoms and postal, the combination of regulation, supervision and anti-trust is not 
necessarily facilitating entry or effective competitive rivalry by EU entrants, if possible at all.  
It is useful to realise that SOEs, in a number of goods sectors, experience or have built up 
enormous overcapacities (see also chapter 14). Addressing these overcapacities has been 
announced by the Chinese leadership more than once in the last few years but adjustment is 
likely to be painful both sectorially and regionally. Chinese economists argue, with some 
validity in the medium run, that the pool of workers from the huge countryside (without 
hukou) is not only drying up but is actually shrinking by some 3 million workers per year, and 
furthermore, that the domestic services sector is already growing very rapidly, allowing 
quick absorption of the shed labour, so that adjustment is likely to be feasible without too 
many problems. But there might still be resistance out of fear of ‘transition’, out of fear of 
new skills, out of fear of displacement to other regions, etc., not to speak of the leadership 
of SOEs (the CEO always being a high-ranking Party official), which would naturally insist on 
sustained privileges. The relevance for services is that the overall reform may well be 
discredited if, besides the painful adjustment from massive overcapacity in goods sectors, 
services sectors were to open up too fast or too widely, causing significant adjustment there 
as well. Moreover, Chinese institutions and control organisms are in the process of retreat 
and abolition of many tasks and processes, but again, this is a somewhat unnatural process 
when coming out of a planned economy. Much of what is happening and not happening in 
and with these institutions is shrouded in mystery, or a lack of transparency. What is normal 
and abundantly available in (say) OECD countries, namely, policy documents and extensive 
consultation about and with such institutions, complemented by academic, legal, journalistic 
and political scrutiny, is largely lacking in China. The culture of the planned and autocratic 
economy being that ‘information’ is scarce and regarded as a tool of power or influence – a 
fortiori for the institutions of the state itself – is still very much alive in China. Of course, 
there are many ways to make up for this scarcity, such as think-tank reports and ‘soft 
information’ through interviews. But this is an imperfect substitute for an open societal 
debate based on a well-explained strategy, in turn built on a deliberate choice between 
options and an open attitude towards a participative debate, with elected politicians being 
transparent and accountable for what they do (or do not). One may note that this is China’s 
choice – which goes without saying, of course – but it surely comes with the drawback that 
the reform process is hard to ‘read’ and even harder to foresee in its actual implementation. 
It is also difficult to ‘correct’ the process from outside, which is one reason why a 
partnership in a deep and comprehensive FTA might be of mutual advantage to both China 
and the EU.  
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11.3.2 Access to and national treatment in Chinese services markets – A survey  
In reading the large Table 11.1 below, it should be realised that it mainly focuses on mode 3 
(FDI) and hardly on mode 1 (cross-border services between the EU and China, which have 
frequently remained ‘unbound’ in GATS commitments, although in some selected services 
such as transport, travel and a few other ones, cross-border trade has developed). Likewise, 
there is less attention given to mode 4 (cross-border movement of natural persons for 
temporary services, such as professionals and intra-corporate transferees). Furthermore, 
horizontal issues such as IPRs and public procurement, which may matter for services of 
course, are not dealt with here (see chapters 12 and 13). There are other issues of direct 
interest to (here) EU service providers in China that are not or only occasionally dealt with, 
such as transparency and the rule of law aspects, and broader (non-discriminatory) 
overregulation of sectors, which are sometimes discussed in column 5 of Table 11.1 under 
the notion of ‘reforms’, as they tend to be a legacy of the planned economy. This also leads 
to suggestions for (more) EU-China cooperation that go beyond access and national 
treatment questions. 
Table 11.1 reflects the formal GATS commitments of China from 2001, supplemented by the 
numerous details of the application of these commitments or of the discretion left, drawn 
from the very extensive reporting of the European Chamber of Commerce in China and from 
the last two detailed Trade Policy Reviews by the WTO (2012 and 2014). 
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Table 11.1 Sectoral access to and national treatment in China’s services markets – A survey 
Sector GATS 
commitments 
Market access 
(FDI, unless otherwise 
indicated) 
National treatment 
(Discrimination of the EU 
and foreign firms) 
SOEs & anti-trust Other aspects or comments 
1. Aviation Outside GATS, 
except repairs;93  
Mode 3 access, with severe 
restrictions (e.g. JVs in repair 
or some other secondary air 
services only; Mode 1 is 
outside GATS, no Air Services 
Agreement (ASA) at the EU-
level bilateral yet, only 
member states; recent China 
ASAs are more liberal; there 
is considerable EU-China 
cross-border trade; the 
domestic market is closed. 
 SOEs dominate 
but private 
domestic entry is 
now active. 
There is a great need to 
enhance technical and 
regulatory cooperation. 
2. Construction 
services 
JVs with wholly 
foreign ownership 
are allowed; 
JVs with EU owners can only 
operate in four rather limited 
market segments; EU service 
providers do not receive full 
recognition; despite all this, 
FDI in construction is 
substantial. 
Capital requirements for 
JVs in construction differ 
from domestic firms; 
there is restricted access 
to projects for FIEs in 
construction; the types of 
contracts create subtle 
barriers; there is unequal 
participation in standards 
development between 
Chinese and foreign firms; 
foreign investors in real 
M&A for local 
companies 
through FDI is 
suboptimal. 
There is a proposal for a joint 
research centre on 
integrated urban planning 
solutions with Chinese 
characteristics; in addition 
are reform requests, possibly 
through 
cooperation/dialogues; note 
that the Chinese construction 
market becomes more and 
more competitive and is the 
largest in the world – 56 of 
                                                   
93 China allows this but as JVs, with an economic needs test and only for international services. 
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estate face major hurdles; 
considerable barriers exist 
in licensing, registration 
and qualification regimes. 
the top 300 construction 
firms in the world are 
Chinese. 
3. Distribution 
services 
Commission 
agents and 
wholesale 
activities 
(excluding salt & 
tobacco): mode 1 
unbound; mode 3 
as JVs with foreign 
majority 
ownership; retail 
mode 3 is less and 
less restricted by a 
time schedule, 
though some 
restrictions are 
permanent, such 
as JVs only and no 
more than four of 
them; there are 
some restrictions 
for chain stores 
with more than 30 
outlets. 
See the GATS commitment 
column. 
Online retailing (a sector 
with explosive growth) is 
in the restricted category 
of the Investment 
Catalogue; the required 
ICP licence falls under 
telecoms administration 
measures; franchising, on 
the other hand, was 
removed from the 
restrictive category in 
2011. 
 Retail generates 9% of the 
Chinese economy; foreign 
investors are very active as 
both wholesale/agents and in 
retail; of the 4,266 foreign 
invested firms (in late 2010), 
70% were wholly foreign-
owned; crucial are the 360 
department stores and 160 
large supermarkets, including 
those owned by EU firms, 
with altogether a million 
workers; online retail remains 
difficult for foreign entrants, 
with a joint market share of 
the two leading incumbents 
(Taobao.com and 
360buy.com) of 46% of the 
market (2011), while 
Amazon.cn reached 2.3%. 
4. Environmental 
services 
Extensive 
commitments on 
access (mode 3) in 
segments such as 
sewage services, 
Since the 2011 version of the 
Foreign Investment 
Catalogue, FDI in 
environmental services has 
been ‘encouraged’ by the 
Though mode 3 in most 
environmental services is 
relatively liberal, ASEAN 
and other FTA partners of 
China have obtained the 
 The sector is growing very 
rapidly; the Chinese 
government is massively 
investing in equipment, 
infrastructure and services, 
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solid waste 
disposal services, 
cleaning services 
of exhaust gases, 
noise abatement 
services, nature & 
landscape 
protection 
services, sanitation 
services and 
others; JVs are 
compulsory but 
with foreign 
majority 
ownership. 
government, except in some 
categories (e.g. heat supply 
and water drainage networks 
in cities); also note that the 
GATS commitments (second 
column) neither includes 
environmental quality 
monitoring nor pollution 
source inspection, which was 
still the case in 2012 (latest 
information). 
option of fully foreign-
owned enterprises. 
and designing regimes that 
should attract foreign 
investors and service 
providers (reasons include 
diversification of the types of 
operators, advance 
marketisation and import of 
state-of-the-art 
technologies); for sewage and 
solid waste, infrastructure 
projects can be in the form of 
build-operate-transfer. 
5. ICT services 
 
Note: In 2001, ICT 
services and 
telecoms clearly 
separated, unlike 
today, with many 
new services and 
new technology; in 
2001 these were 
called ‘computer 
and related 
services’; of the 
four main services 
then listed, two 
have no limitations 
on market access 
or on national 
treatment 
(installation of 
Localisation requirements 
exist for (personal) data 
processing (acting as a cost-
barrier to EU ICT firms and 
EU banks). 
China mandates 
indigenous technology 
without global 
harmonisation; some 
technology committees in 
ICT standardisation do not 
allow FIEs despite SAC 
regulations; ‘technology-
neutral’ is violated; cloud 
computing is not really 
open; licensing for 
services using encryption 
technology is de facto 
prohibiting foreign-owned 
business in China and 
deters FDI; there are 
discriminatory 
procurement restrictions 
Independent non-
state laboratories 
are not allowed to 
conduct testing & 
certification; there 
are not yet clear 
open accreditation 
(rules) for 
independent 
laboratories. 
Certification in ICT (may) 
deviate from international 
norms; even ‘source code’ 
may be required, which is 
highly intrusive; several of 
these issues are linked to 
WTO TBT issues and (lack of) 
TBT notifications; ICT R&D 
cooperation between the EU 
and China needs to be 
strengthened.  
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 143 
 
computer 
hardware and data 
processing) and 
one still has mode 
3 restrictions (only 
JVs but with 
foreign majority 
ownership for 
software services; 
after a period, 
wholly owned 
subsidiaries are 
allowed in 
maintenance and 
repair services). 
of the Multi-Level 
Protection Scheme 
(MPLS); MPLS rules are far 
too broad, throttling 
competition; all 1,200 
services products having 
obtained licensing by the 
Office of the State 
Commercial Cryptography 
Administration (OSCCA) 
are solely developed by 
Chinese companies; all 
687 companies having a 
sales licence are Chinese; 
national (non-
harmonised) algorithms 
can be applied, pushing 
out EU firms (e.g. mobile 
payments). 
6. Logistics 
(including express 
delivery) 
In 2001, logistics 
was not 
recognised as a 
sector in GATS 
commitments. 
In 2015, logistics was an 
‘encouraged’ FDI sector in 
China (with fast growth); 
China correctly defines 
logistics as integrated 
services (in various modes) 
of transport, warehousing, 
freight forwarding and IT. 
Operation permits for 
express delivery are 
excessively costly, due to 
repetitive approvals, city 
after city; in some cases, 
domestic investors in 
express delivery receive 
preferential treatment. 
One SOE (China 
Material Storage 
and 
Transportation 
Co.) is the market 
leader but 
competition is 
strong and growth 
is rapid; among 
the top 50, 18 
were SOEs in 2009 
and 6 were foreign 
invested; the 
market share of 
A degree of overregulation of 
express delivery persists due 
to security concerns; other 
technical and VAT issues 
hinder ‘trade facilitation’; in 
addition is legal uncertainty. 
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the 6,400 foreign 
logistical firms at 
the end of 2011 
was 22%; 
Schenker was the 
Olympics official 
logistical 
company; the Big 
Four in express 
delivery have a 
major presence in 
China. 
7. Maritime 
transport 
There is a basic 
commitment only 
for international 
freight and 
passenger 
transport (mode 
1); mode 3: JVs 
allowed a 
maximum of 49% 
foreign ownership 
and the Chinese 
side appoints the 
board chair and 
general manager; 
on crews (cf. mode 
4), there is no 
commitment; 
national treatment 
applies except in 
mode 4; nine 
ancillary services 
Less than 49% of foreign-
owned firms are allowed in 
maritime, but the Chinese 
flag on ships is compulsory; 
inland shipping is forbidden 
for foreign firms. 
‘International relay’ 
(international cargo 
between Chinese ports) is 
only for wholly Chinese-
owned vessels 
(inefficient); it is relaxed 
in new free trade zones 
(FTZ) but only if the ship 
ultimately is Chinese-
owned (seen as a new 
disadvantage). 
Monopolistic port 
groups disallow 
free terminal 
choice and may 
abuse their power. 
High surcharges are 
surrounded by rule of law 
issues. 
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at ports are made 
available. 
8. Professional 
services 
8a) Legal services: 
Chinese law 
practice is 
excluded; there 
are considerable 
restrictions for the 
limited remaining 
scope, e.g. 
international 
clients; 
8b) Accounting 
and auditing: for 
mode 3 either JVs 
or wholly owned 
but solely for CPAs 
licensed by the 
Chinese 
government; in an 
additional 
commitment, JVs 
can also have non-
CPAs among their 
staff; 
8c) Architects/ 
engineers: mode 3 
is no longer 
restricted, albeit 
that architects and 
engineers ought to 
be registered as 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mode 4 is quite flexible (but 
always as ‘consultants’).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreigners with CPA 
licences are accorded 
national treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual architects are 
treated as ‘consultants’ 
and cannot become 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A mutual recognition 
agreement for architects 
could be beneficial, as shown 
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such in their home 
country; 
8d) 
Medical/dental: 
JVs as 
hospitals/clinics 
with majority 
foreign ownership, 
but in line with 
China’s needs, and 
with a majority of 
doctors/staff being 
Chinese.  
Chinese-registered 
architects – they have no 
access to the Chinese 
examination to become 
one.  
by MRA agreements with 
Macao, Taipei and Hong 
Kong. 
9. Quality & safety 
services (referred 
to as TICs in China) 
In 2001, these 
were still in a 
rather limited form 
as ‘technical 
testing and 
analysis services’ 
(i.e. no 
certification) and 
for scientific 
analysis serving 
offshore oilfields; 
wholly owned 
technical testing 
firms are 
permitted (after a 
period), if also 
engaged in this 
business in their 
home country; for 
The 2015 Foreign Investment 
Catalogue removed TIC from 
the ‘restricted’ category; 
however, licensing and 
certification qualifications – 
so far – are only for Chinese 
firms; it is extremely hard to 
become and ‘auditor’ or 
‘inspector’; see chapter 16 
on the BIT/CAI. 
There are severe limits to 
market opening to foreign 
TIC providers and of 
‘recommended 
laboratories’ as one of 
several administrative 
measures (adhering, so-
called, to ‘national 
treatment’) to prevent or 
severely limit market 
opening to (foreign) TIC 
providers; frantic new 
regulation of the TIC 
market is occurring 
without real reform; this 
is leading to EU-China 
trade conflicts; heavy and 
superfluous 
administrative controls – 
SOEs are 
(super)dominant, 
based on heavy 
controls by AQSIQ; 
certificates are not 
always trusted in 
China (causing 
doubts about 
whether the many 
controls really 
serve safety). 
The reform of the TIC of 
February 2014 is not (yet) 
forthcoming; there is fear of 
public control being replaced 
by private monopolies; 
(possibly) EU-China 
cooperation could make the 
‘market’ work rather than 
excessive administrative 
controls (while still having 
safety scandals); reforms in 
TIC also seem to lack a legal 
basis.  
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offshore oilfields, 
this is only in 
cooperation with 
Chinese partners. 
an apparent legacy of the 
planned economy – 
disadvantage the market-
based world class EU TIC 
industry with world TIC 
standards. 
10. Telecoms (now 
eComms including 
digital services) 
 
In 2001, these 
were still based 
mainly on fixed 
and mobile (+ fax), 
though packet-
switched services 
were covered; 
mode 3 in basic 
telecoms with only 
49% JVs; ‘value 
added’ services, 
such as email, 
voice mail, EDI and 
online data 
processing, idem, 
albeit that JVs can 
now be 50% 
foreign-owned. 
ICT FDI access, including R&D 
units, are well developed; 
seven out of eight value-
added services are open in 
the Shanghai zone (not yet in 
China); e-commerce is fully 
open, but there are 
localisation requirements for 
(personal) data processing 
(acting as a cost barrier to EU 
ICT firms and EU banks); 34 
JVs on basic telecoms with 
between 20% and 50% 
foreign ownership have 
obtained licences, with 
considerable restrictions. 
There is no equal 
treatment for foreign 
service providers; the 5G 
group are not open to 
wholly foreign-owned 
firms or FIEs; licensing 
remains problematic (e.g. 
basic telecoms mode 3 is 
only 49% foreign-owned); 
security-related rules 
discriminate against 
foreign IT products; 
licensing for services 
using encryption 
technology is de facto 
prohibiting foreign-owned 
business in China and 
deters FDI; there are 
discriminatory 
procurement restrictions 
of the MPLS; MPLS rules 
are far too broad, 
throttling competition; all 
1,200 services products 
having obtained OSCCA 
licensing are solely 
developed by Chinese 
Telecoms (basic, 
fixed and mobile) 
are super 
dominated by an 
SOE oligopoly, de 
facto a monopoly 
with 98% or 99% 
market share; the 
SOEs have been 
partially 
privatised, with 
today’s state-
ownership ratios 
of some 63–74%, 
the remainder 
being usually 
foreign-owned 
through holdings 
on the Hong Kong 
stock exchange; 
the upshot is that 
the market is 
nearly closed for 
effective entry; 
the mobile virtual 
network operator 
(MVNO) (a cost-
Better dialogue is taking 
place on security-related 
issues; internet speed is still a 
major issue (due to 
infrastructure shortages as 
well as filters & controls of 
internet traffic); internet 
speed has negative effects on 
FIE business and business 
models as well as on R&D by 
EU firms in China.  
 
Note that the 2013 friction 
between China and the EU on 
telecoms was about telecoms 
equipment (hence, goods and 
not services), e.g. on export 
credits to Huawei and ZTE 
and on discrimination in 
public procurement bidding 
for large telecoms 
infrastructure projects in 
China (see the chapters on 
public-private partnership 
and competition). 
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companies; all 687 
companies having a sales 
licence are Chinese; 
national (non-
harmonised) algorithms 
can be applied, pushing 
out EU firms (e.g. mobile 
payments). 
effective solution 
to increase 
competition) is still 
not fully open to 
foreign firms. 
11. Banking & 
securities 
Mode 1 is 
extended only to 
non-core financial 
services (like data 
processing, 
portfolio research, 
etc.) and foreign 
currency business 
upon local FDI; 
criteria for 
authorisation is 
solely prudential 
(no ‘needs’ test) 
and JVs are 
preferred (see 
access).  
Foreign banks are subject to 
rigid market access 
restrictions (ownership and 
business scope); there is a 
single foreign owner 
maximum of 20%, which is 
25% for all foreign; foreign 
ownership in JVs for 
securities is now 49%, but 
the business scope is 
restricted to underwriting 
and distributing securities 
(and not all shares can be 
traded); multiple, 
simultaneous branch 
expansion is not allowed. 
Bonds underwriting de 
facto discriminates 
against foreign firms; 
foreign banks face 
difficulties in funding 
genuine trade-related 
finance (due to foreign 
debt quotas and 
guarantees); access to 
China’s Foreign Exchange 
Interbank market is de 
facto restricted; there is 
access to Chinese stock 
exchanges as special 
members.  
Although there are 
1,000 foreign 
banks in China (as 
of end 2014), with 
563 branches in 69 
cities, the very low 
market share of 
these many banks 
together has 
steadily decreased 
from 2.16% (2008) 
to 1.62% (2014); 
Chinese (SOE) 
banks do not (have 
to) fear effective 
competition from 
foreign entrants. 
Obtaining new bank licences 
is very cumbersome, but exit 
is harder still; these exit 
barriers are a huge deterrent; 
total lack of reciprocity has 
powerful economic effects in 
that Chinese banks grow 
rapidly in China and in the 
EU, whereas EU banks in 
China cannot. 
However, the huge stock of 
non-performing loans has 
been reduced drastically; 
China follows Basel III for 
prudential regulation; a draft 
deposit insurance scheme is 
underway.  
12. Consumer & 
non-bank finance 
(e.g. motor 
vehicles)  
Mode 1 is 
restricted; FDI is 
‘free’. 
No restrictions and reform is 
ongoing; online entry is easy 
and pro-competitive. 
Very high financial 
thresholds exclude de 
facto even top-quality 
non-bank financial 
institutions; direct 
financing or guarantees 
from their foreign 
SOEs still 
dominate but 
entry (e.g. online) 
is pro-competitive. 
Lack of regulation of this 
peer-to-peer market and the 
underdeveloped credit risk 
system in China has to be 
tackled urgently; it is critical 
for supporting consumption, 
which in turn is key to China’s 
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shareholders are not 
possible. 
re-balancing. 
13. Insurance Mode 1 only 
covers the 
insurance of 
international 
activities (e.g. 
transport); foreign 
non-life insurers 
are no longer 
restricted and 
have full business 
scope; also, re-
insurance is free; 
for life insurers, 
JVs with 50%; FDI 
in brokerage of 
large commercial 
risks can be wholly 
foreign-owned. 
Foreign ownership of health 
insurance is 50%; property 
insurance 100%; foreign 
insurers are banned from 
operating pension funds. 
Re-insurance is formally 
open, but in fact subject 
to an arduous and long 
approval process; a de 
facto brake exists on 
branching by foreign 
insurers; bank/insurance 
combinations are 
restricted, implying that 
domestic banks will elect 
to cooperate only with 
domestic insurers (key for 
distribution & branching); 
online insurance sales 
cannot go out-of-province 
(which disadvantages EU 
players with few 
branches). 
The market share 
of foreign insurers 
is ‘limited’, but 
higher than for 
banks (4.5% 2014; 
for life, 5.8%) and 
growth is much 
faster than for 
banks (no less 
than 23% in 2014); 
the top five 
insurers (all 
Chinese) have a 
market share of 
70% (life) and 75% 
(non-life). 
Many reforms are underway 
or announced; the pension 
system is in its infancy; EU-
China cooperation might be 
helpful; there are CAI/BIT 
matters for this sector (see 
chapter 16). 
14. Private equity, 
securities & 
strategic M&A 
Mode 1, foreign 
securities 
institutions may 
directly engage in 
B share business; 
mode 3, 
representative 
offices of foreign 
securities 
institutions may 
become special 
members of all 
The main concern is that the 
new draft of the Foreign 
Investment Law (FIL) is 
whether it allows more and 
secure FDI access; the 
‘national security review’ is 
excessively broad, extending 
to non-risk sectors (agro, 
transport, etc.) and with very 
vague clauses – and seriously 
risks being abused for 
protectionist purposes; the 
FIL claims to realise 
‘national treatment’ (if 
not on the negative list, 
introduced in FIL); but (a) 
foreign exchange control 
is still in the way; (b) 
variable interest entities 
(esp. in ICT) are subjected 
to serious uncertainty; (c) 
indirect transactions are 
now classified as FDI; (d) 
the threshold for 
 Deep reform of SOE sectors, 
to withdraw from ‘non-
strategic’ sectors, is hardly or 
not happening (still, in e.g. 
hospitals, real estate, retail), 
and SOEs continue to benefit 
from subsidies (through 
cheap finance) and 
favouritism; despite favours, 
their productivity is only 
about half of private firms in 
China; moreover, SOE 
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Chinese stock 
exchanges; JVs 
with 49% for the 
domestic 
securities 
investment fund 
management 
business; for 
underwriting A 
shares and 
underwriting and 
trading B and H 
shares as well as 
corporate and 
government debt, 
or launching of 
funds, JVs are 
required with a 
maximum of 33% 
foreign ownership; 
the criteria for 
authorisation are 
solely prudential, 
e.g. no economic 
needs test or 
quotas; no 
limitations exist on 
national treatment 
in modes 1 and 3. 
(new) Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor option 
introduces greater access 
possibilities and the high 
thresholds for entry have 
been lowered significantly. 
approvals are a denial of 
national treatment for 
FDI; (e) the approval 
process applies many, and 
at times vague, criteria; (f) 
there is no appeal; (g) 
other regulations (than 
FIL) have to be reviewed, 
so that national 
treatment works; the 
equity transfer involving 
SOEs is very heavy for 
FIEs; there are still many 
restrictions for FIEs 
seeking to enter the 
Chinese capital market. 
dominance reduces market 
functioning. 
Sources: Based on 2001 GATS commitments by China published by the WTO, the European Chamber of Commerce in China (2015) and the WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews on 
China for 2012 and 2014, respectively. 
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11.3.3 On Chinese access to the EU services markets 
Although the STRI indexes and the AVEs for (access to) the EU services market are much 
lower than those for access to the Chinese services markets, there are some exceptions and 
one or two ‘oddities’, and it is not a priori clear what is behind them. It will not be possible 
to fully resolve each and every puzzle behind the STRIs and AVEs. Moreover, the Chinese 
complaints are overwhelmingly about goods, with only rare remarks on some services.  
What follows below is a summary of what the WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews on the EU write 
on access to the EU services market in 2015 and in 2013. It concerns the following sectors: 
financial services, environmental services, air transport, maritime transport,94 telecoms 
services, audio-visual services and distribution services (retail, wholesale and 
car/motorcycle repair). A general point in financial markets is worth stressing beforehand: 
the actual regulatory requirements after the deep and comprehensive financial market 
reforms between 2010 and 2014 have had two effects. One is a significant harmonisation 
effect (as many member states’ exceptions or deviations are now ruled out) and the other is 
a greater stringency effect, that is, it is now less easy to enter and operate in the EU when 
the home regime is not at the international standard level as well. 
Table 11.2 Third-country (China’s) access to EU services markets – A sketch 
Sector GATS commitment Actual access policy Comments 
1. Maritime 
services 
This is ‘somewhat 
limited’ (the EU 
withdrew a liberal 
offer in 1995–96 due 
to lack of reciprocity 
by many WTO 
partners). 
The applied regime 
(largely governed by 
member states!) is ‘very 
liberal’; an EU-China 
maritime bilateral has 
been in force since 2008.  
Cabotage is reserved for EU 
flagships (a widespread 
practice in the WTO). 
2. Air 
transport 
GATS does not deal 
with ASAs (air services 
agreements on landing 
rights and seven 
freedoms); only three 
secondary services are 
under the GATS air 
transport annex, i.e. 
maintenance & repair, 
ticket selling, 
computer reservation 
The actual access of 
airlines depends on 
bilateral ASAs (verify 
ASAs with China); outside 
GATS, the EU regime on 
FDI in air transport 
services is liberal, except 
on airlines (given an EU 
ownership clause – again, 
common practice with 
WTO partners). 
Hence, there is some scope 
for FTA-improved access in 
all secondary services; for 
airlines (new?), an EU-level 
ASA is critical. 
                                                   
94 Rail and road transport are not included, being irrelevant as they are today for EU-China trade. 
Perhaps the One Belt, One Road project and the AIIB might change that in (say) ten years from now, 
but at best only marginally given the huge maritime volumes of trade. Pipeline services have also 
been left out. 
152 │ PART II. DESIGN AND SUBSTANCE FOR AN EU-CHINA FTA 
 
systems; four more 
are offered by the EU 
under Doha, i.e. 
ground handling, 
airport management, 
storage & 
warehousing and 
freight agency 
services. 
3. 
Environmental 
services 
All environmental 
services are covered 
by GATS commitments 
(waste water 
treatment, solid & 
hazardous waste 
management, air & 
noise pollution 
abatement, nature & 
landscape protection); 
also mode 3 is 
covered. 
In FTAs with the EU, 
access is slightly more 
open (e.g. selected 
member states allow 
more FDI). 
Large and growing, this is a 
promising sector for the EU, 
with a turnover of some 
€300 billion. 
4. Telecoms 
services 
A very detailed survey 
of new rules by the 
EU; the EU adheres to 
the WTO telecoms 
reference paper of 
1997. 
There is an extensive EU 
rules-based regime, but 
national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) and 
network characteristics 
still fragment the single 
market considerably; this 
reduces economic access 
possibilities. 
Member states still have 
some discretion, e.g. 
through NRAs but also 
through state-ownership 
(although sharply reduced 
since the late 1990s); for 
example, the dominance of 
Deutsche Telekom has been 
retained, e.g. in the local 
loop and broadband, and 
despite the advice of the 
German Monopoly 
Commission to sell off, the 
government still holds direct 
and indirect stakes (through 
a state-owned bank). 
5. Audio-visual 
services  
Broadcasting is an 
exception; there are 
no EU GATS 
commitments. 
De facto actual 
access/openness is 
considerable, with high 
market shares for non-EU 
firms (read the US – on 
films, video and TV 
programmes); there are 
some EU and member 
state aids to broadcasting 
and EU production of 
contents (some €3 billion 
of all member states plus 
the EU). 
Due to convergence in 
digital services, the 
restrictive broadcasting 
rules have less effect than in 
the past and alternative 
consumption of audio-video 
services have increased 
rapidly, without any 
boundaries. 
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6. Retail, 
wholesale, car 
repairs 
GATS commitments 
are very substantial 
and cover all types of 
distribution and all 
products (except 
tobacco, firearms and 
medicines), except 
‘procedures’ for 
establishment. 
The EU Services Directive 
(2006/123) has had a 
positive effect erga 
omnes; WTO scores on 
services trade (out of 
100) are high: 72 for 
GATS commitments and 
88 for the best FTAs; local 
and national restrictions 
(environment + location) 
can be problematic, but 
are not discriminating for 
non-EU entrants. 
This is a very large sector 
(with turnover some 11.2% 
of EU GNP); inwards and 
outwards FATS are huge 
(respectively €1,156 and 
€881 billion in 2011) (FATS 
refers to foreign affiliates’ 
trade in services, i.e. local 
services supply of 
subsidiaries). 
7. Financial 
services 
GATS commitments by 
the EU are derived 
from the 1997 WTO 
Understanding on 
Commitments in 
Financial Services; 
basically, these are 
quite open (provided 
that regulations are 
adhered to or 
‘equivalence’ of the 
home regime is 
recognised by the EU) 
but there are 
numerous smaller or 
highly specific 
reservations by EU 
member states. 
Actual openness is 
reflected, for example, in 
1,022 foreign controlled 
(non-EU/EEA) subsidiaries 
and branches (in 2011) in 
banking; there were 45 
branches of third (non-
EU/EEA) countries in 
insurance in 2011.  
Foreign-owned 
subsidiaries can benefit 
from a ‘European 
passport’ covering the 
entire internal market (all 
financial services sectors). 
For mode 1 (cross-border 
services), third countries’ 
suppliers can benefit from 
‘equivalence’ of their home 
regulatory regimes; if 
equivalent, they can 
continue their activities, also 
after the 2010–14 reforms; 
(early 2013) examples 
include: 
 IFRS accounting 
principles; four 
countries including 
China; 
 anti-money laundering, 
13 countries, including 
China; 
 credit rating agencies; 
four recognised 
countries and another 
six for ESMA advice, 
including China; and 
 statutory audits; there 
are three separate 
aspects of equivalence 
here and in all three, 
China has ‘equivalence’ 
recognised by the EU. 
 
Notes: For GATS commitments, see Table 11.1.  
Sources: Authors, and WTO (2013) and (2015). 
154 │ PART II. DESIGN AND SUBSTANCE FOR AN EU-CHINA FTA 
 
11.4 Potential value added of an EU-China FTA, based on prior experiences 
After the detailed attempt to understand market access and local restrictions for the 
services modes, especially in China, is it possible to provide some guidance on the substance 
of a possible EU-China FTA? Although Table 11.2 (Chinese access to the EU services market) 
is also relevant, the following discussion focuses on the degrees of ambition for China. 
These ambitions are not known, as no such policy documents are available to the 
knowledge of the authors; moreover, China has been opening up cautiously and is engaged 
in reform processes, so the ambition to open up and commit in an FTA is likely to increase 
over time, at least somewhat.  
With the help of Table 11.3, the scope and nature of possible commitments is gauged. Table 
11.3 reports on two FTAs that may well be indicative for the scope and nature of possible 
commitments by China on bilateral services trade. The FTA recently concluded between the 
EU and Vietnam is widely held to be a benchmark for what is possible between the EU and 
developing countries. China is already more developed than Vietnam, but is in several 
respects certainly characterised by large-scale development needs. The country sees itself 
still as a development country, albeit a middle-income one. The FTA between the EU and 
Vietnam should therefore be a feasible benchmark for an FTA between the EU and China in 
services. The recently concluded FTA between China and Korea is probably the ‘deepest’ 
FTA concluded so far by China and can be regarded as expressing the current ambitions of 
China in services. These new ambitions go beyond what China has thus far been willing to 
liberalise in FTAs.  
Table 11.3 Services modes in recent FTAs relevant for an EU-China FTA 
Aspects EU–Vietnam China–Korea Comments 
Combined with 
investment? 
Yes, there is a lengthy 
chapter on services, FDI, 
investor–state dispute 
settlement (ISDS), mode 4 
and e-commerce. 
No, these are separate 
chapters, but Art. 12.8 (of 
the investment chapter) 
confirms and specifies the 
linkages with investment for 
services in general and for 
financial services “to the 
extent that they relate to a 
covered investment”. 
On China–Korea, 
there is no explicit 
linkage for 
telecoms (chapter 
10) (presumably 
because FDI is 
assumed). 
Sectoral 
(sub)chapters 
(See also the 
Schedule of 
Specific 
Commitments) 
 Computer services 
 Postal services 
 Telecoms 
 Financial services 
 Maritime 
(international) 
 e-commerce 
 Financial services 
 Telecoms services 
 e-commerce 
 
Liberalisation 
technique 
Positive listing; there is a 
schedule of specific 
commitments. 
Positive listing; there is a 
schedule of specific 
commitments (and later 
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additional ones, to be 
negotiated). 
Cross-border 
services: 
Market access 
Market access by 
prohibiting three types of 
limitations (the number of 
suppliers, total value of 
service transactions and 
the number of service 
operations). 
Market access by prohibiting 
six types of limitations (see 
the three from EU–Vietnam, 
plus the number of natural 
persons involved (and no 
economic needs test), 
specific types of legal entity 
or JVs, a maximum % limit of 
a foreign shareholding). 
China–Korea is 
considerably more 
liberal than EU–
Vietnam. 
Cross-border 
services: 
National 
treatment 
There is a standard national 
treatment clause for ‘like’ 
services and suppliers. 
Idem as for EU–Vietnam Hence, possible 
differences be-
tween the FTAs are 
found in the 
schedules of speci-
fic commitments 
and the conditions 
for each service 
sector granted 
national treatment. 
Cross-border 
services: Most 
favoured 
nation 
treatment 
There is MFN treatment in 
‘like’ situations. 
No MFN  
Domestic 
regulatory 
commitments 
There are largely standard 
clauses (e.g. on licensing) 
on impartiality, speed, 
reasonableness, etc., for 
modes 1, 3 and 4; it 
encourages MRAs for 
professional qualifications. 
Note that there is a 
separate chapter (18) on 
transparency. 
There are largely standard 
clauses on impartiality, 
speed, reasonableness, etc. 
for modes 1, 3 and 4; 
separate articles on 
transparency (Art. 8.8) and 
‘recognition’ (including an 
‘agreement’, Art. 8.9). 
 
Competitive 
safeguards 
These are in the telecoms 
section V of chapter 8. Note 
that the FTA has a chapter 
(10) on SOEs that is far 
more general. 
There is a “monopoly and 
exclusive service suppliers” 
clause (Art. 8.12); no abuse 
of its monopoly position 
(outside the scope of 
monopoly rights); remedies 
are weak: the other Party is 
to “provide specific 
information”, or, 
“consultations” in case of 
subsidies; there is also an 
Art. 8.15 on restrictive 
business practices. Note that 
the China–Korea FTA has no 
chapter on SOEs. 
It would seem that 
the overall setting 
of pre-empting or 
correcting anti-
competitive 
conduct is rather 
‘soft’ in the China–
Korea FTA and 
somewhat stronger 
for EU–Vietnam. 
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Note: Schedules of specific commitments are not included or assessed in this table. 
Source: Authors. 
Table 11.3 shows that – if these two FTAs are any guide – an EU-China FTA could 
considerably improve market access and (‘national’) treatment of services and suppliers 
from the EU in China. Table 11.1 demonstrates that there are serious restrictions (including 
anti-competitive oligopolies) in sector markets like telecoms and financial services. Both of 
these are addressed in the EU–Vietnam and the China–Korea agreements. The latter’s 
Annex 8-A-2 (Schedule of Specific Commitments) for China shows limited degrees of market 
access, e.g. in telecoms and financial services.95 Still, as the first item in Table 11.3 shows, 
Korea and China have agreed to postpone investment negotiations on market access to 
2017 and cross-border services are not subject to MFN. On horizontal issues like 
transparency and competition policy, the China–Korea FTA is distinctly weak. Perhaps this 
may not be surprising as it signals the clear defensive interest of today’s China. An even 
greater sensitivity, so it would appear, is the lack of an SOE chapter in the China–Korea FTA. 
Such a chapter with effective and binding guarantees would undoubtedly be an offensive 
interest of the EU. Dependent on Chinese reforms, this might turn into a major issue, or not. 
One might suggest that the SOE chapter in the EU–Vietnam FTA is a modest benchmark. In 
an EU-China FTA, such a text for SOEs might be accepted as a first step in a ‘living 
agreement’. In this respect, the China–Korea FTA has an Annex 22-A entitled “Guidelines for 
subsequent negotiations”, aiming at achieving high-level liberalisation for trade in services 
and investment, based on a ‘negative list’ approach! According to Art. 4 of this annex, the 
structure would become a copy of CETA96 in this respect. But even with a negative list 
approach, liberalisation critically depends on the negative list itself. Whether and when 
China, given its reform process, will be ready to accept an SOE chapter with meaningful 
discipline, too, in a possible FTA is not clear at the moment. In short, China will travel the 
FTA path step by step and the China–Korea FTA is the latest example of that.  
  
                                                   
95 For more extensive assessment, see Schott, Jung & Cimino (2015). 
96 See chapters 10, 11 and 35 (the annexes) of CETA. 
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12. Public procurement 
The EU and China have very divergent regimes for public procurement. The EU adheres to 
the plurilateral WTO GPA. China implemented a public procurement regime only after its 
WTO accession. It has submitted so far six offers since December 2007,97 in accordance with 
its WTO Accession Protocol, in order to become a GPA member.98 So far, these offers have 
not been accepted as sufficient for the purpose. The negotiations are still ongoing. 
Essentially, China is closed to foreign competitors bidding for public procurement contracts, 
except in cases of shortages of technology or otherwise. Chinese companies have a much 
easier time in the EU and do obtain contracts in the public procurement market. China has 
concluded 13 FTAs99 but in none of them has public procurement been incorporated. 
Market access for public procurement is not found in any other bilateral, regional or 
multilateral agreement signed by China. Europeans ought to realise that China is keen to 
implement a public procurement system as a means to eliminate corruption and to use 
public funds more effectively, but the concept, in its view, is less related to market access. 
Therefore, for China public procurement is perhaps first of all an issue of domestic economic 
reform.100 Nonetheless, the idea of negotiating an FTA between the EU and China would be 
next to impossible if China would continue to leave out public procurement in its FTA 
negotiations. The EU is only interested in ‘deep and comprehensive FTAs’ and public 
procurement is a key element of such FTAs. Should China join the GPA in the next one or 
two years, the FTA issue would be whether and to what extent the parties can reach 
agreement on the GPA-plus elements. In addition, there are likely to be issues of proper 
implementation. For these reasons, the present chapter will mainly deal with the Chinese 
regime of public procurement and market access, and much less with that of the EU.  
In the context of EU-China trade relations, public procurement is a sensitive area because of 
the huge potential of business opportunities present in the Chinese market. The official 
Chinese interpretation of the public procurement market in China covers only 2.7% of GDP 
                                                   
97 The six Appendix 1 offers were submitted by China in December 2007, July 2010, November 2011, 
November 2012, December 2013 and December 2014, respectively. 
98 The GPA is negotiated at two levels, i.e. plurilateral and bilateral. For the former, the question is 
for all current GPA Parties and China to reach an agreement as to the entities and types of 
procurement that China will offer to comply with the GPA provisions. For the latter, in the context of 
EU-China trade relations, it aims to improve market access for the supply of goods, services and 
works from EU to China and, at the same time, to establish a transparent, accountable and efficient 
acquisition process to ensure an environment of ‘value-for-money’ for Chinese 
consumers/taxpayers. In an FTA, one would expect the formal extension of the open and 
competitive regime of the EU to Chinese firms, also when bidding from China itself.  
99 Available from the China FTA Network website (http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/) (in Chinese). 
100 See Annex II for a detailed analysis on China’s public procurement regime. 
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in 2014101 (RMB 1,731 billion, or €240 billion) while typically this is likely to be in the range 
of 15–26% in any other economy. In the EU, public procurement accounts for 16%102 and 
the European Chamber of Commerce in China quotes sources holding that all public 
procurement including that of SOEs and military amounts to some 35%! The sensitivity of 
the subject is also caused by the lack of reciprocal treatment: whereas EU business faces 
major obstacles and buy-China policies in China, Chinese companies enjoy a relatively open 
EU market as far as public procurement is concerned.  
It is noted that, although negotiating a GPA accession would be another milestone in China’s 
march from a planned to a market-oriented open economy, China has its own, somewhat 
idiosyncratic perception towards public procurement. Given the overwhelming influence of 
the state in the past and to a degree still today, public procurement to Chinese law-makers 
is not seen as a component of trade, but a device for budgetary control and discipline. From 
the outside, this is less than obvious because it was the country’s WTO accession that 
prompted China to promulgate its first Public Procurement Law in 2003. Budgetary control 
is the reason why public procurement is under the reins of the Ministry of Finance, and 
fiscal funds will trigger the application of procurement rules. Secondly, unlike the objective 
of the GPA, which is to ensure openness, fairness (e.g. non-discrimination) and 
transparency, the purpose of imposing public procurement rules for China is to standardise 
government procurement practices, and improve the efficiency of government procurement 
funds, safeguarding national and public interests, protecting the legitimate rights and 
interests of the parties in government procurement and promoting clean government.103 It 
is evident that the EU and Chinese approaches have completely points of departure: China 
has a strong tendency, so far, to isolate public procurement from competition from abroad 
(whether FDI in China or bidding from outside) and yet desires to adhere to the GPA, while 
European companies are often frustrated because of severely restricted access to 
procurement markets, knowing that Chinese companies do not encounter anywhere near 
such restrictive environments in the EU.  
12.1 China’s offers to accede to the WTO GPA 
12.1.1 Trends of the six GPA offers: Widened coverages and lowered thresholds 
China submitted its sixth and the latest offer in December 2014. The improvements, or 
concessions, made by the six offers were extensive and in three aspects, i.e. widened 
                                                   
101 A Brief Summary of National Government Procurement in 2014, Ministry of Finance, 30 July 2015. 
Available at http://gks.mof.gov.cn/redianzhuanti/zhengfucaigouguanli/201507/ 
t20150730_1387257.html.  
102 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/public-procurement/. 
103 Art.1, Government Procurement Law. 
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coverage of procuring entities and goods, services and works, as well as lowered 
thresholds.104 Additionally, China, in the last two offers, requests a three-year, instead of 
five-year, grace period to implement the GPA upon accession. Moreover, in China’s sixth 
offer, activities in the fields of drinking water, electricity, energy, transportation, 
telecommunications and postal services are now offered for procurement coverage, which 
is a new development.105  
For covered entities, from the first to the sixth offer, the coverage offered is widened from 
just 50 to 63 central government entities.106 As to covered sub-central government entities, 
the number has increased from 14 offices, special organisations and organisations directly 
under the four municipalities and 15 provinces, to altogether 458, although with 
qualifications.107 Since China’s second offer, a third category was added to covered 
procurement entities, called “other entities”, to be subject to GPA rules. Entities such as the 
Xinhua News Agency and the Chinese Academy of Social Science are under this category. In 
China’s sixth offer, the threshold for procurement of goods for “other entities” is 600,000 
SDRs for the first and second year after GPA implementation (and 400,000 SDRs from the 
third year onwards), lowered from 900,000 SDRs, which was proposed in the second offer.  
The list of covered procurement items has also been expanded considerably over the last six 
offers (see Annex II for details). In its first offer, China only offered those, for example, office 
consumables, classified in the Catalogue of Items Subject to Government Procurement 
contained in the Circular of Treasury as covered procurement items which were indeed 
                                                   
104 Also, compared to its initial offer when China requested a 15-year grace period for implementing 
the GPA after accession, the country in its fourth offer decided to reduce the grace period to 5 years 
and insisted to maintain its right to negotiate for transitional arrangements with regard to relevant 
obligations.  
105 Under the General Notes of China’s fifth GPA offer submitted on 6 January 2014, Art.1(iii) states 
that the offer shall not cover procurement activities taking place in the field of drinking water, 
electricity, energy, transportation, telecommunications or postal services. This provision was 
scrapped in China’s sixth GPA offer submitted on 23 December 2014 (derived from the Accession of 
the People’s Republic of China to the Agreement on Government Procurement, Communication 
from the People’s Republic of China, Fourth and Fifth Revised Offers (Restricted)).  
106 Such central government entities include ministries and commissions under the State Council, 
special organisation directly under the State Council (i.e. SASAC), organisation directly under the 
State Council, offices (e.g. Research Office of the State Council), public institutions directly under the 
State Council and administrations and bureaus under the ministries and commissions (e.g. National 
Bureau of Energy).  
107 For example, the procurement of construction services conducted by all the sub-central 
government entities using special funds of the central government are to be exempted from the 
Agreement. Also, China proposed that the GPA become applicable to the Group A sub-central 
government entities (i.e. four municipalities and seven provinces) after the Agreement takes effect 
for China, and to the Group B entities (nine provinces) three years after the Agreement takes effect 
for China.    
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narrow and limited, without meeting the GPA parties’ expectations. Since China’s second 
offer, the covered procurement goods are based on the United Nations Central Product 
Classification, subject to paragraph 1, Art. III of the GPA concerning security and general 
exceptions.  
The procurement items covered are considerably extended as well. In its latest offer, China 
for example proposed to subject all goods procured by the covered entities to the GPA 
rules. As to services, the WTO Services Sectoral Classification List shall apply; and as to 
construction works the Division 51 of the United Nations Central Product Classification are 
offered, which is more than the scope set down by China’s Government Procurement 
Law.108  
As to lowered thresholds, while thresholds are divided into those applicable to central and 
to sub-central governmental entities, thresholds were reduced from 500,000 SDRs (the 
December 2007 offer) to 200,000 SDRs for the first year and second year of implementation, 
then 130,000 SDRs from the third year onwards (the December 2014 offer) for goods as far 
as central government entities are concerned. 
12.1.2 European Companies’ Grievance concerning limitations and departures 
Despite the above-mentioned extensive concessions China has made in its first six GPA 
accession offers, the limitations were still seen as heavy and some of them were against 
certain principles in the GPA, such as non-discrimination and no-offsets. Foreign companies’ 
grievances derive mainly from these objections. The general sentiment among the EU 
businesses in China is that the coverage should go even wider, while the thresholds should 
be lower.  
A general problem is that national treatment is not guaranteed since deviation may take 
place when an ‘important’ national policy would be impaired by a specific procurement 
(paragraph 4 of the General Note, sixth offer). This is not in conformity with the GPA spirit.  
Secondly, for development purposes, domestic content, offset procurement or transfer of 
technology may be required in procurement (paragraph 5 of the General Note, sixth 
offer).109 Although without any doubt the said requirements are departures from the GPA’s 
                                                   
108 Note that in China’s first offer, only construction of buildings, offices and residential buildings 
were offered as covered works.  
109 Technology transfer is not a new requirement, but it has existed since China implemented its 
opening-up policy in the late 1970s. At the time, China launched its campaign of “Four 
Modernisations”, i.e. of science and technology, agriculture, industry and national defence, because 
the country was in serious need of foreign technology and investment in order to spearhead the 
economic reform. Alstom started its technology transfer to China in 1985, when China Railway 
ordered 150 “8K” dual-compartment electric locomotives.  
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‘no-offset’ principle, depending on the extent of the requirement included in each 
procurement contract, their adverse impact on foreign companies is arguable, especially 
concerning the requirement of ‘domestic content’. Coined as the ‘global factory’, many 
global competitive companies have set up their joint ventures in China long ago.110 Since the 
Chinese government never provided any definition of ‘domestic content’, such requirement 
may simply imply supplying products manufactured at a joint-venture based in China which 
possesses competitive advanced technology and good value for money. For example, 
concerning the procurement contract for coaches for Shanghai Metro Line 3, the effect of 
‘localisation’ – one of the key tendering requirements – was indeed limited since Alstom 
won the tender. The competitive process was challenged only by Siemens111 at the time, 
which had already set up a factory in Nanjing prior to the opening of the tender. Note that 
Alstom has a presence in more than 20 entities in China with around 7,500 employees, and 
started technology transfer to China in 1985.  
Thirdly, until now China’s Appendix 1 Offer did not include SOEs112 as covered entities, as is 
the case under its domestic procurement law. The question of SOEs’ coverage is of great 
concern to European companies, as well as to the EU as one of China’s major GPA 
negotiating parties.  
The grievance against Chinese SOEs being excluded from procurement coverage is that SOEs 
may nowadays appear as an enterprise or a holding company113 after having experienced 
decades of reform through decentralisation, reorganisation, corporatisation and 
privatisation, but in reality still function as a governmental institution or commission, etc., 
with privileged access to public funds and government influence. If this is correct, SOEs 
                                                   
110 For example, in 1984, Alcatel-Lucent established Shanghai Bell Telephone Equipment 
Manufacturing Co. Ltd., which was the first foreign invested joint venture in China’s history. To date, 
Alcatel-Lucent has established 12 joint ventures in China. 
111 Nonetheless, Siemens’ failure to obtain the coach contract was unlikely to be related to 
‘localisation’. Before the tendering, a catastrophic derailing accident took place in Germany involving 
a Siemens train. In the meanwhile, politics might have played its role. Siemens obtained both coach 
contracts for Shanghai Metro Lines 1 & 2 while Alstom’s chances were thwarted as the French 
government sold arms to Taiwan at each occasion in the run-up to the contract bidding. Still, Alstom 
stood a higher chance of winning the procurement contract of Line 3 in view of the train accident 
and cleared political course.  
112 In China, SOEs consist of those wholly owned by the state (SOEs) and those in which the state has 
controlling shares (SCEs). The latter refer to enterprises in which the state, or another SOE, holds 
more than 50% of the equity; or, if the share of the equity is less than 50%, the State or another SOE 
has controlling influence on its management and operation. For the purpose of this article, SOEs 
mean SOEs and SCEs. 
113 For example, at the end of September 2011, 1,047 SOEs were listed on the stock exchange in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, accounting for 44.7% of companies listed. See WTO Trade Policy Review, 
Report by the Secretariat, China, WT/TPR/S/264/Rev.1, 20 July 2012, para 222.  
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should be offered as covered entities and fall within the remit of China’s GPA Appendix 1 
Offer.  
However, identifying a reformed SOE as a governmental body is to ask whether it functions 
as a public body or whether it uses public funds. For the former, what matters is whether 
the SOE in question possesses, exercises, or is vested with, governmental authority, for 
which the WTO Appellate Body adopted a case-by-case approach.114 As to the “public 
funds” test,115 what matters is that the SOE enjoys privileged access to public funds for 
procuring goods and services on behalf of the government.116 If yes, the SOE in question is a 
government body and should be subject to procurement rules. As far as the GPA is 
concerned, entities at all levels of government hierarchy (including enterprises owned or 
influenced by government117) may be considered as having privileged access to public funds 
and therefore are required to procure in accordance with the GPA rules. In China, however, 
public funds could include, or exclude, a few sources of funds, as mentioned in the 
beginning. Since the meaning of ‘public funds’ is different under the GPA and in China’s 
practice, it is perhaps to be expected that the GPA and China’s views do not match with 
respect to SOEs’ role in public procurement. Besides, after having gone through constant 
reforms in the past three decades in China, many SOEs are no longer considered as SOEs but 
ordinary market players. The question is whether this is correct since independent studies 
show that SOEs still enjoy preferential policies, coupled with exclusive access to public 
funds. This might explain why China and its trading partners have such diverging views 
towards SOEs, and why China so far did not concede SOEs covered entities in its Appendix 1 
Offer. As the Implementing Rules of the Government Procurement Law provides a new 
                                                   
114 The WTO Appellate Body adopted a case-by-case approach “by conducting a proper evaluation of 
the core features of the entity concerned, and its relationship with government in the narrow 
sense”, since “the precise contours and characteristics of a public body are bound to differ from 
entity to entity…”. See United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China (DS379), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS379/AB/R, 11 March 2011, para 
317.  
115 The OECD defines government procurement as the purchase of goods and services by the 
government for consumption and investment, but not for resale (“The Size of Government 
Procurement Markets”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 1, No. 4). It therefore correlates 
government procurement to “public funds”. By the same token, under China’s Government 
Procurement Law, fiscal funds trigger the application of public procurement.  
116 Kong Q., “Chinese Law and Practice on Government Procurement in the Context of China’s WTO 
Accession”, (2002) 11 Public Procurement Law Review 201. 
117 Entities “owned or influenced by government” refer to SOEs or those undertakings that the state 
controls through a shareholding. In practice, undertakings that are run on a commercial basis are 
excluded. Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) provides that discipline 
on “state trading enterprises” required to run on commercial considerations does not “apply to 
imports of products for immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use”.  
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meaning to ‘fiscal funds’ and their application, it is yet to be seen how this development will 
affect SOEs’ role in China’s public procurement market.  
There is equally the question of coverage with regard to affiliates of government 
undertakings,118 which carry out commercial activities but enjoy privileged access to public 
funds at the same time. Usually, such affiliates are created by certain government 
undertakings in order to manage a specific sector of activities. In general, government 
undertakings refer to those functions in administrative capacity and are maintained by 
public budgetary or extra-budgetary funds. From the perspective of the GPA, it’s not straight 
forward if they should be classified as SOEs and thus subject to government procurement 
rules.119 The Korea Government Procurement case confirmed that the element of “being 
legally unified” is the key to determine if a government undertaking affiliate should be 
subject to government procurement rules, not the ingredient of “government control”. This 
being the case, many of China’s government undertaking affiliates will neither be 
considered as SOEs, nor subject to procurement rules, since it is a common practice in China 
that, for state infrastructure investment, each new civil project sets up its own enterprise 
with a separate legal personality. Note, however, that affiliates of government undertakings 
in China conduct a huge amount of procurement contracts, especially in terms of public 
works, each year.120 On top of that, although China’s Government Procurement Law 
arguably excludes SOEs from its scope,121 procurement of works of state enterprises is de 
facto covered by the Bidding and Tendering Law – the national law applies to all tendering 
activities of works, public or private, conducted within the territory of China. As 
                                                   
118 In general, government undertakings refer to those functions in administrative capacity and are 
maintained by public budgetary or extra-budgetary funds. From the perspective of the GPA, it’s not 
straight forward if they should be classified as SOEs and thus subject to government procurement 
rules. Such government undertakings include social organisations, for example trade union, women's 
federation, the Communist youth league, etc. as well as political parties, such as the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and eight “democratic parties” under the leadership of the CCP and, public 
institutions.  
119 See Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS163/R, adopted 
on 19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VIII, 3541.  
120 It was reported that from 2000 to 2005, in the western region alone the Chinese government 
invested more than €100 billion in some 70 projects. A further €16.3 billion was spent in 12 projects 
in constructing railways, highways, hydraulic power stations, airports, etc. in 2006. The information 
was announced by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) some-time ago, 
at www.sdpc.gov.cn/xwfb/t20060630_75020.htm. However, the weblink is no longer workable. 
More updated information is not available.  
121 Art. 2 of China’s Government Procurement Law defines government procurement as those 
purchases made by state organs, institutions and social organisations at all levels by using fiscal 
funds and from the Central Procurement Catalogue or of which those value exceeds the respective 
procurement thresholds prescribed by the Catalogue for goods, words and services. As fiscal funds is 
the trigger for applying the procurement law, if an SOE can manage not to use fiscal funds while 
conducting public procurement activities then the law won’t apply.  
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procurement activities conducted by SOEs are not regulated with precision in China, this 
could be the reason that the country inserted in each of its Appendix 1 Offers that 
“procurement with the aim of supporting small and medium-sized enterprises and 
promoting development in minority and poverty-stricken areas”122 will not be subject to 
procurement rules.123 This offset, nonetheless, suggests a departure from China’s national 
procurement law provision.  
12.2 Barriers to EU Public Procurement as seen by Chinese investors in Europe  
Although the EU public procurement regime exemplifies the principles enshrined in the 
GPA, such as competition, transparency, removed institutional barriers to trade and 
harmonisation thanks to the governing public procurement Directives, persistent 
fragmentation is also observed by some Chinese investors in Europe who complain about 
unpredictability, increased business costs and risks. Having said that, there is no doubt that 
the EU procurement market is one of the most open in the world. Indeed, some Chinese 
companies are big winners of procurement contracts in Europe. For example, building on its 
past procurement success in providing e-powered full-sized buses in the Netherlands, in 
June 2015, China’s BYD Company Ltd. obtained the procurement contract from the 
Amsterdam Schiphol Airport to supply a fleet of 35 pure electric buses, which will be used to 
transport passengers between aircrafts and terminals.124  
As mentioned earlier, some barriers are due to member states’ competences in setting up 
procedures, awarding criteria and evaluation policies in their respective national 
procurement legislation. Procurement procedures imposed by member states are seen by 
Chinese investors as cumbersome and unpredictable, since different member states may 
impose different rules despite harmonisation at the Union level. In any case, national 
                                                   
122 Paragraph 1.4, General Notes. China’s 4th GPA accession Appendix 1 Offer, November 2012. 
123 Art. 3 of China’s Bidding and Tendering Law requires that procurement of works, including 
procurement of relevant services (land inspection, design) and procurement of important equipment 
and materials used in such projects, must go through a tendering procedure if the construction 
project is as follows: 
[i] concerning public interests or public security such as large infrastructure, public utility 
and etc.; or [ii] fully or partially financed by state-owned or state-borrowed fund; or [iii] 
financed by loans or aid from international organizations or foreign governments. The 
detailed scope and scale of such works shall be decided by the relevant departments of the 
State Council. For works fall outside of the scope, relevant laws or regulations issued by the 
State Council shall apply.  
For detailed discussions on procurement activities conducted by state enterprises in China, see P. 
Wang, “Regulating Procurement of State Enterprises in China – current status and future policy 
considerations”, policy paper delivered under the Asia Link Project (2007-2010) funded by the 
European Commission.  
124 Available at www.bydeurope.com/news/news.php?action=readnews&page=1&nid=209. 
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officials are criticised for being overly prudent in that, instead of focusing on obtaining 
‘value for money’, in order to be ‘safe’, public procurement often deteriorates into ‘ticking 
of items” on a long list of bureaucratic requirements.125  
So far, the EU has concluded 11 free trade agreements with third countries (ACP as a group) 
and some of them are GPA parties, such as Korea and Singapore; while others are not, such 
as Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, South Africa and the ACP countries.126  
The models of bilateral cooperation on public procurement undertaken between the EU and 
its FTA partners are different, even vis-à-vis Korea and Singapore, although all three parties 
are GPA members.127 Between the EU and Korea, cooperation on public procurement and 
expanding on each party’s public procurement market are based on the WTO GPA, except 
for build-operate-transfer contracts and public works concessions, which are subject to 
specific terms agreed in the FTA.128 The chapter on public procurement in the EU-Singapore 
FTA is extensive, however, in the form of a stand-alone agreement on public procurement, 
with details on covered entities and activities from both sides, complete with thresholds as 
well as general notes and derogations on the EU’s side concerning exceptions to the 
coverage.  
12.3 Possible directions for EU-China negotiations on public procurement 
The directions of EU-China negotiations on public procurement under a FTA could either 
follow the GPA or an augmented GPA+ approach. But as the EU advocates deep and 
comprehensive FTAs, it is almost certain that the EU will favour a GPA+ approach. In 
practice, to borrow its language used on IPR cooperation under FTAs, the EU will endeavour 
to “complement and specify” GPA rules when negotiating with China on public 
procurement.  
                                                   
125 Pelkmans J. & Correia de Brito A., Enforcement in the EU Single Market, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, p.79. 
126 Available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150129.pdf. 
127 As to EU’s FTA partners which are not GPA parties, cooperation on public procurement in each 
FTA is different, ranging from technical cooperation and assistance to full adoption of the EU rules. 
For example, the public procurement provisions contained in the EU-Chile Association Agreement 
concerns cooperation and providing technical assistance on issues connected with public 
procurement, paying special attention to the municipal level (Art.33, EU-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement). However, to the EU’s eastern neighbours, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, each 
agreed to adopt EU’s acquis on public procurement within a certain timeframe, together with 
institutional reform in order to establish an effective public procurement system (Chapter 8, EU-
Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. Art.268.2, EU-Moldova Association Agreement. 
Art.141.2, EU-Georgia Association Agreement). 
128 Art.9.2.2, the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement. 
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Access to China’s public procurement market has been a thorny issue in EU-China bilateral 
trade relations. Although both sides have complaints against each other, Chinese businesses 
generally agree that the public procurement market in the EU is open and transparent, 
while EU business is much more frustrated by the limited access to the market in China, the 
lack of reciprocal treatment and all the monopolies that SOEs enjoy. The EU as well as its 
member states have urged China to offer more covered entities at more administrative 
levels and in wider provincial territories with lower thresholds, in addition to a more 
transparent and non-discriminatory institutional framework. The question of SOEs’ coverage 
is yet another controversial area. 
Reflecting on China’s six GPA offers submitted so far, China has made considerable 
concessions in terms of coverage as well as thresholds, as mentioned previously. As the EU 
already offers third countries open access to its public procurement market, and some 
Chinese businesses have won big contracts, it could be that the EU would aim for the same 
degree of openness from the Chinese side – based on the principle of reciprocity, together 
with a reviewing and monitoring mechanism for best implementation.  
Additionally, EU-China cooperation on public procurement does not seem possible without 
both sides’ reaching an agreement on SOEs’ coverage. With the on-going SOEs reforms that 
China has been undertaking in the last three decades with a view that SOEs would operate 
on commercial terms, without privileged access to government policies and funds, China 
needs to convince the EU. This would mean passing the test of public body, or of public 
funds, of exempting those SOEs (if private and commercial) from the remit of public 
procurement coverage, or possibly falling within the remit.  
On the Chinese side, it is observed that negotiations of the country’s GPA accession have so 
far served as a drive for China’s institutional reform on its public procurement system. The 
benefits accrued from this exercise are that China’s public procurement system is now 
safeguarded by legal instruments, with the aims of eliminating corruption while efficiently 
using public funds. China is now working to tackle accounting irregularities in the area of 
public procurement, as is seen from the Implementing Rules of the Government 
Procurement Law. China’s procurement procedures are normalised and have become more 
transparent. A mechanism of checks and balances has been installed, complete with a 
public–private partnership model of cooperation in procurement of services and works. 
Cooperation between the EU and China on public procurement could be one way to further 
China’s institutional reform in this regard, for example concerning better regulations, 
especially with regard to those offsets, and regulatory monitoring as to how best to 
maintain discipline at the local governmental levels while enjoying the liberty of 
decentralisation at the same time. The EU faces the same challenges, too, since its 
decentralised procedures, requirements and substance cause undesirable regulatory 
heterogeneity among the member states resulting in barriers or distortions, prompting 
Chinese businesses’ complaints against a fragmented public procurement market in the EU. 
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13. Intellectual property rights and geographical indications  
13.1 Introduction 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) are important to the EU’s economic growth. It is 
estimated that IPR-intensive sectors account for around 39% of EU GDP (worth some €4.7 
trillion annually) and, taking indirect jobs into account, up to 35% of all jobs.129 China, 
although having achieved remarkable progress in IPR legislation over the last three decades, 
is still confronted with the challenges of weaker IPR protection and enforcement, which 
adversely affects the country’s ambition of becoming an innovative economy.  
China is on the EU’s “list of priority countries” for IPR infringement. IPR infringement 
remains a serious problem for EU businesses in China. For example, 64% of all fake goods 
seized at European borders in 2012 came from China.130 Issues hampering bilateral trade 
include administrative enforcement, patent linkage, admissibility of supplementary data for 
pharmaceutical product patent applications,131 enforcement on trade secret theft and 
ownership of copyrights. It is noted that the Chinese authorities do engage European 
businesses for public consultations and to improve on its IPR legislation. However, the 
problem is delayed or inconsistent implementation, which engenders new concerns.132  
Chinese businesses in Europe have no complaints against the EU’s IPR protection regime. 
Chinese enterprises, such as Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corporation, are top patent 
applicants under the EPO (European Patent Office) filing system.  
                                                   
129 Intellectual property rights intensive industries: contribution to economic performance and 
employment in the European Union, Industry-Level Analysis Report, Joint project between the 
European Patent Office and the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market, Munich and 
Alicante, 2013. 
130 Note, however, this figure was 9% less compared to 2011, during which, according to EU customs 
statistics, 73% of goods suspected of infringing IPR came from China. On the other hand, in 2012, 
four out of every five European businesses operating in China rated Beijing’s enforcement of IPR 
laws and regulations as inadequate. Fact Sheet: Facts and figures on EU-China trade, March 2014. 
131 Post-data admissibility is a big problem facing by the EU and US pharmaceutical companies 
because they have a huge stake in China. In December 2013, China’s State Intellectual Property 
Office clarified that the submission of post-filing experimental data is permissible in very limited 
instances, when, for example, being used to confirm that the technical solution has the use or effect 
asserted in the specification of a patent application (such as to prove the facts or statements in the 
original specification are correct). Nonetheless, submission of post-filing experimental data will not 
rectify a disclosure that is insufficient at the time of filing. Since then, the US pharmaceutical 
industry reports progress as a result of this policy change. However, implementation of the 
commitment has been inconsistent, resulting in patent invalidations.  
132 For details, see European Business in China Position Paper, 2015-2016. The US businesses are 
confronted with the same problems of implementation. See US government 2015 Special 301 
Report, pp. 42-43. 
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13.2 EU-China IP Dialogue 
Although China is constantly on the “priority watch list” of the US Special 301 Report, too, 
the EU appears to be less aggressive than the US in criticising China for its weak IPR 
protection and enforcement.133 The EU communicates its concerns through the various EU-
China trade dialogue mechanisms and trade assistance programmes, such as the EU-China 
High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, IP Key and the China IPR SME Helpdesk. Since 
2004, the annual EU-China IP Dialogue has been held alternatively in Brussels and Beijing. 
Under the framework of the Dialogue, Chinese and EU IPR policy-makers, practitioners and 
academics exchange ideas on best practices, update each other on the development of 
legislation, or “solve concrete problems faced by EU companies”. Since 2005, in order to 
bring more focused technical discussions to the Dialogue, the EU-China IP working group 
was also established and joined by industry and other rights holders.  
On the other hand, the EU and China are close partners in global IPR protection. For 
example, both parties are members of the IP5 project, an initiative involving the world’s five 
biggest IP offices in order to improve the efficiency of the examination process as far as 
multi-patent applications are concerned. The EPO and some of its national members have 
provided technical assistance to China’s IPR development ever since the early 1980s.134  
                                                   
133 For example, as early as 1979, when China launched its economic reform, the Agreement on 
Trade Relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China was 
concluded, in which Art. VI dealt with IPR protection, concerning patent, trademarks, copyrights and 
unfair competition. At the time, as IPR legislation did not exist in China at all, both countries agreed 
to recognise the importance of IPR protection and pledged to provide IPR protection on a reciprocal 
basis based on laws and international practice. In the same year, the China-US Agreement on 
Cooperation in Science and Technology was also concluded, in which it was envisaged that 
“treatment of IPR” may be a covered subject while implementing the agreement. These two 
agreements may have prompted China to accelerate its process of IPR legislation, as the Sino-US 
Trade Negotiation and Memorandum of Understanding (1992) resulted in China’s first patent law 
amendment taking place in 1992, which made significant changes to China’s patent legislation, such 
as wider scope of patentable subject matters and longer period for patent protection. In 2007, the 
US brought China to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body for the violation of certain international IPR 
enforcement measures. See China – Measures affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights (DS362). 
134 At the time, China sent many scholars to countries such as Germany to study and conduct 
research in order to fill the IP knowledge gap. For example, thanks to the Project of Promotion of the 
Patent System of the People’s Republic of China, an inter-governmental agreement signed between 
China and Germany in 1983, Germany assisted China in the training of examination personnel and in 
the construction of a patent documentation database. See Ganea (2005), p. 4. 
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13.3 China’s IPR legislation and enforcement 
The landscape of IPR protection in the EU is straightforward; after all, the whole concept of 
IPR was born in Europe: patents have been systematically granted in Venice since 1450 and 
the Statute of Monopolies, the world’s first patent statute, was enacted in England in 1624. 
13.3.1 The turn-around of IPR in China 
As for China, it has achieved remarkable progress in IPR legislation for over four decades,135 
after a series of IPR and related laws were first enacted after the Cultural Revolution, in the 
late 1970s.136 Ever since the country acceded to international IPR treaties, such as the Paris 
Convention in 1983 and the TRIPS Agreement in 2001, protection measures provided by 
China’s IPR legislation have been compatible with the minimum standards set down by the 
international treaties China has signed. China’s IPR laws are updated regularly to reflect 
changing domestic needs, comply with international obligations and implement government 
IP policies. Within the broader framework of China’s WTO accession commitment, China has 
complied in a painstaking manner.137  
These achievements in IPR legislation should not be underestimated solely because China is 
ruled by Communist ideology under which all property, whether real or intellectual, is by 
default collectively owned. Spearheading technological modernisation may be rapidly 
achieved through importing foreign advanced technologies, but in this case IPR protection is 
a prerequisite. In order to manoeuvre between the two opposing concepts of collective and 
                                                   
135 A powerful example is patent rights protection. Patent law was renewed in 1984. China has in 
recent years registered the world’s highest patent application numbers. Some of China’s home 
grown companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, are champions of the patent application system under 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty. European patent applications filed by Chinese entities increased 
about tenfold between 2001 and 2010. 
136 For example, Criminal Law was enacted in 1979, Trademark Law in 1982, Patent Law in 1984, 
Copyright Law in 1990. 
137 One recent example is that, in order to bring transparency to its judiciary, in October 2014, 
China’s People’s Procuratorate established the website of Case Information Disclosure of the 
People’s Procuratorate of the P.R. China (www.ajxxgk.jcy.gov.cn/html/index.html). It covers case 
information of 31 provinces and municipalities, as well as military camps in the Xinjiang autonomous 
area. Information with regard to procedural stages of cases, case defence documents, major cases, 
submitted case documents, appeals as well as final case decisions, etc., is posted on the website. 
This may be considered as a great leap forward in the history of China’s legal history. Burdened with 
thousands years of feudalism when the society was divided into those who ruled and those who 
were ruled and strictly confined, case information was a privilege and disclosing case information to 
citizens was considered unnecessary, if not unthinkable. Therefore, disclosing case information is 
more than just instilling transparency in China’s judicial system but also about relinquishing privilege. 
This perhaps can explain why – although having been a member of an international trading 
community for more than a decade – it took China another decade to establish a case-reporting 
system.  
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private property ownership, China declared it would follow a socialist commodity economic 
development model (which in more recent years has become a ‘socialist market economic 
development model’). Thanks to this successful transformation of ideology, protection of 
private property rights became possible in China’s legislation. Articles 94-97 of the General 
Principles of Civil Law (1986) provide that copyrights, trademarks, discoveries, inventions 
and other achievements in scientific and technological research are protected.  
Note that constitutional protection of IPR was only provided in 2004 – 22 years after the 
Trademark Law, China’s first IP law, was enacted in 1982.138 And China promulgated its first 
(general) Property Law only in November 2013, which was no less than 30 years after the 
IPR regime came into effect in the country.  
The background concerning property ownership is critical to understanding the (lack of) 
appreciation of IPR and its weaker enforcement in China, especially when the IPR regime 
was just reinstalled. Although the Chinese legislature consistently attempts to reinforce the 
country’s IPR enforcement system through, for example, each amendment and various IPR 
enforcement campaigns, weaker enforcement continues to negate China’s achievements in 
IPR protection.  
IPR enforcement in China is undertaken by an administrative-judicial dual-track system. The 
origins of China’s persistent weaker IPR enforcement are reflected in both limbs of the 
enforcement mechanism, namely weaker administrative enforcement and less efficient 
case-handling capacity under judicial enforcement. The root cause goes back to collective 
property ownership, and the result is that Chinese society’s awareness of IPR infringement, 
i.e. a violation of a private right, is poor and grievance against infringement is left without 
adequate redress.  
Administrative and judicial enforcement are of equal importance. Having administrative 
enforcement in place is a historical (due to the legacy of the Cultural Revolution) as well as 
cultural choice since Chinese society values harmony, while litigation will only be the very 
last resort. Therefore, although administrative enforcement bears weaknesses, such as the 
lack of legal certainties, it nonetheless shares equal responsibility with judicial enforcement. 
The statistics also reveal this: in 2014, administrative law enforcement agency investigated 
178,000 cases while judicial organs concluded 18,020 cases.139  
Due to its intrinsic disadvantage, administrative enforcement is often blamed for being too 
weak to deter future infringers. For example, it is only equipped to award limited remedies, 
                                                   
138 On the occasion of the fourth amendment of the Constitution when citizens’ rights to private 
property was acknowledged and confirmed inviolable. Art.13, Constitution of the People’s Republic 
of China (14 March 2004). 
139 Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China, 2014, SIPO, p. 10. 
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while a mediation agreement is often left unenforced. This renders administrative 
enforcement uncertain at the expense of IP right holders.  
13.3.2 Administrative enforcement: culturally rooted but less effective 
Apart from being a cultural tradition, administrative enforcement was promoted as a 
substitute for judicial enforcement because China’s judicial system was not at all functioning 
for adjudication when it was reinstated after the Cultural Revolution.140 The administrative 
enforcement mechanism continues its function these days with increased judicial powers as 
the Chinese legislature attempts to bring legal certainty as well as authority to the 
enforcement effort.141 But one should not overlook that personnel dedicated to 
administrative enforcement remain legally competent. This being the case, no matter how 
powerful IPR enforcement measures may improve, the effectiveness of implementation 
may very well be compromised via the administrative route. 
Although the administrative enforcement mechanism has meanwhile been empowered with 
more judicial capacity, one remaining flaw of the mechanism is that a mediation agreement 
does not include compensation for infringement. Administrative enforcement authorities 
are only entitled to issue administrative fines, confiscate illicit income and request the 
infringement act to be ceased. An enforcement measure without the power to impose 
infringement compensation delivers justice only by half. Infringers are unlikely to be 
deterred. This feature of “fine without compensation” persists, for example, in the Draft 
Patent Law 2015, although the new amendment is more precise with the amount of fines 
that the Patent Administration Authority may issue in relation to patent passing off, 
compared to the measures contained in previous versions of the patent law.142  
Since 2005, China has been the world’s most litigious country on IP cases. Because the 
country’s administrative enforcement mechanism carries the same importance – and is as 
                                                   
140 During the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976, higher education was completely abolished in 
China, and so was the legal profession. Therefore, especially in the first 20 years after the Cultural 
Revolution, most of the limited number of legal professionals were in fact retired army officers who 
took up judicial posts or became lawyers after some initial legal training which was undoubtedly 
inadequate. As China’s judicial system was less competent, the administration enforcement 
mechanism was developed to bridge the gap but such a quick fix was not incapable of solving all 
problems. 
141 For example, by virtue of Art. 61 of the Draft Patent Law 2015, the Patent Administration 
Department shall have the authority to mediate in the amount of compensation for the damage 
caused to the patent right holder. Later, if any party refuses to execute the mediation agreement, 
the other party may institute legal proceedings for compulsory execution.  
142 In relation to patent passing off, in addition to civil liability, if the illegal turnover exceeds RMB 
50,000, a fine of one to five times the illegal turnover may be imposed. If there is no illegal turnover 
or the illegal turnover does not exceed RMB 50,000, a fine of not more than RMB 250,000 may be 
imposed. Art. 66, Draft Patent Law 2015. 
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frequently used – as its judicial enforcement counterpart, the former mechanism is simply 
not powerful enough to deter future infringers. It is unjust that there are many grieved 
patent right holders who do receive compensation.  
13.3.3 The problems of judicial enforcement  
Criticisms of the judicial enforcement mechanism focus on inadequate compensation and 
less than desirable efficiency in case-handling.143  
Nonetheless, to take one example, the 2015 Draft Patent Law proposed (in its second draft 
published in December 2015) a drastic increase of compensation level as far as patent 
infringement is concerned: from RMB 100,000 to RMB 5,000,000 (€14,000-€700,000) (Art. 
68, Draft Patent Law, 2015). This is a tenfold increase in compensation for patent 
infringement compared to the 2008 Patent Law.144 Additionally, Article 68 states that, in 
case of a wilful act of patent infringement, the damages may be increased by between one 
and three times the amount, in addition to the usual damages calculated based on “the 
circumstance, scale of the infringement and the result of damage caused by the 
infringement”. This being the case, one must wait for clarifications of implementing rules or 
judicial interpretation to ascertain how the provision will be implemented in practice.145  
As to case-handling capacity, oft-heard complaints are that decisions laid down by some IP 
chambers appear inconsistent and other IP chambers lack expertise, especially when 
technologically challenging matters are involved.146 However, the situation is improving. 
Since November 2014, IP-specialised courts have been established in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou as part of a three-year experiment to adjudicate technologically complex cases 
of first and second instance and comprising both civil and administrative matters. Under the 
specialised IP courts, which have the status of an intermediate court, technology experts will 
serve as assistants to judges.  
China’s overall complex and opaque legislative framework and interwoven and overlapping 
institutional structure also adversely contribute to weak enforcement. Tracking laws, 
                                                   
143 See China – Measures affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
(DS362). The US complained that the thresholds for criminal procedures are high and certain 
infringement acts are excluded from criminal liability. 
144 Under Art. 65 of the Patent Law 2008, the amount of compensation is in the range of RMB 10,000 
to RMB 1,000,000 (€1,400-€140,000), which is a twofold increase in compensation for infringement 
compared to the 2000 Patent Law. The 1984 and 1992 Patent Laws did not provide any 
compensation at all. 
145 It is noted that there are no changes concerning criminal liabilities for patent infringement in the 
2015 Draft Patent Law.  
146 China established IP-specialised chambers as early as 1993. Currently, there are about 560 IP 
chambers and 3,000 IP judges at four levels of court: basic, intermediate, higher and supreme. 
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regulations and administrative rules promulgated at central and local governmental levels is 
a difficult task, which brings the complaint of “non-transparency” to the already complex 
IPR legislation framework.  
Additionally, as local administration is empowered to legislate, and since local judges are 
appointed (and removed) by local governments, it’s highly possible that local interest 
prevails in adjudication when the issue of cross-jurisdiction occurs. By the same token, 
decisions laid down by the central government may not be implemented faithfully at various 
local levels. The old Chinese saying of “the sky is high while the emperor is far away” is an 
illustration of this situation and appears to still hold true.  
13.4 IPR protection and enforcement measures in China’s FTAs  
China has so far implemented 13 FTAs.147 Except for the first two FTAs with the ASEAN and 
Pakistan, an IPR chapter is in every agreement, although the degree and scope of IPR 
protection vary. The trend is that the more recent the FTA, the stronger the TRIPS+ 
approach covering the whole spectrum of IPR, including copyrights and related rights, 
trademarks, patents, genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore, plant variety, 
etc. In 2015, the respective IPR chapters in the China-Korea and China-Australia FTAs 
provided in great detail the country-specific degree and scope of IPR protection within the 
framework of a series of WIPO-administered international IP treaties as well as the TRIPS 
Agreement in the case of the China-Korea FTA,148 and all international IPR treaties if both 
parties acceded in the case of China-Australia FTA. In terms of standards for protection and 
enforcement, measures provided in both FTAs are regarded by parties as the minimum 
standards, not just the minimum standards set by TRIPS (Art. 15.4 of the China-South Korea 
FTA; Art. 11.3 of the China-Australia FTA). 
The China-Korea FTA was signed on 2 June 2015. Perhaps because Korean pop music and TV 
dramas draw huge fervent followers in China, which has made the sector vulnerable to 
                                                   
147 As of 5 January 2015. Details are available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml. 
148 For example, according to Art. 15.3, the international IPR treaties covered by the China-South 
Korea FTA include the TRIPS Agreement, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty, the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of 
Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, the Nice Agreement Concerning the 
International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, the 
Protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement concerning the International Registration of Marks, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms Treaty, the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, the Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against 
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, the International Convention for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants 1978 and the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation.  
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infringement, the China-Korea FTA particularly emphasises protection of copyrights and 
related rights, as well as border measures with regard to IPR enforcement. For IPR 
enforcement in general, the China-Korea FTA firstly stresses a fully-fledged commitment to 
information-sharing between the two parties, at the government, right holder and public 
levels (Art. 15.22 General Obligation, China-South Korea FTA). The clauses on damages 
emphasise compensation, including court costs and attorney’s fees, sufficient to deter 
future infringers. The judicial authorities are provided with much power in terms of seizure 
of infringing goods, collecting evidence, imposing sanctions and may even, for example, act 
“inaudita altera parte” (Arts. 15.24-25 Provisional Measures, China-South Korea FTA). The 
China-Korea FTA has a comprehensive part on special requirements on border measures, 
which basically summarises the relevant provisions contained in (at least the Chinese) 
national legislation, but the FTA emphasises that, with regard to trademark-infringing goods, 
the simple removal of the infringing trademark will not be sufficient to permit the goods to 
be released to the market. The China-Korea FTA also establishes the Committee on IPR to 
review and monitor the implementation of the IPR protection and enforcement measures.  
The China-Australia FTA was signed on 25 June 2015, and emphasises patent protection and 
enforcement (envisaging work-sharing in patent examination, improvement on patent 
examination quality and efficiency, see Art. 11.23.3, China-Australia FTA) as well as plant 
breeders’ rights “with a view to better harmonising the plant breeders’ rights administrative 
systems of both Parties” (Art. 11.16(a), China-Australia FTA). For example, while the China-
Korea FTA focuses on information-sharing enforcement decisions, judicial and 
administrative, etc., the China-Australia FTA insists on information-sharing on databases of 
granted and applied patents, plant variety protection, geographical indication and 
trademarks. Patent applicants will be able to make amendments, corrections and 
observations in connection with their applications in accordance with each party’s laws, 
regulations and rules. The China-Australia FTA also establishes a Committee on IPR, which 
undertakes the similar functions as the Committee established under the China-Korea FTA, 
save for the function of resolving disputes arising out of the IPR chapter.  
13.5 IPR protection and enforcement measures in EU FTAs  
The IPR chapter in the EU’s FTA – taking the IPR chapter in the EU-Korea FTA as an example 
– covers almost every aspect of IPR protection and enforcement, in great and country-
specific detail. It complements and specifies the rights and obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement, but the scope of the chapter goes far beyond TRIPS and includes other 
international IPR treaties that both parties are signatories of, such as the Trademark Law 
Treaty and the Patent Law Treaty.  
The presumption is that the EU and China should be able to reach an IPR agreement in an 
FTA, because China’s IPR chapters with Korea and Australia are ambitious, and as it is in its 
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own domestic interest that China’s IPR laws are compatible with international IPR treaties. 
The only problem on the Chinese side is implementation (delays, inconsistency), as is noted 
by the EU chamber position paper and the US Special 301 Report. This is why, in both the 
Korea and Australia FTAs, an IPR Committee reviews and monitors the implementation of 
the IPR chapter. Another problem could be transparency. For example, the China-Korea IPR 
chapter requests in great detail what should be published in terms of IPR enforcement 
decisions while the China-Australia IPR chapter requests data base-sharing concerning, for 
example, granted and applied patents. Language could be one barrier for effective 
information-sharing, as China may well lack qualified English speakers to translate every 
legal decision or patent (but then Korea is also not an English-speaking country – perhaps 
Korea has a less complex judicial system/framework of laws than China?). That’s probably 
why, in the China-Korea IPR chapter, sharing information in the “national language” is 
envisaged.  
13.6 Geographical Indications 
13.6.1 General background to geographical indications legislation, China and the EU 
Geographical indication (GI), just like other forms of IPR, yields high value for local economic 
development but is also subject to misuse and counterfeiting. The EU, where the concept of 
GI protection originated, has taken the lead worldwide in identifying and protecting its GIs. 
China, as a latecomer to GI protection, has a range of local products that correspond to the 
concept of GIs but only a few already known or protected globally. GI protection in China is 
handicapped by fragmented registration and protection systems, which are often embroiled 
in disputes between business interest groups. At the end of 2012, 10 Chinese food names 
received protected status in the EU as GIs, as a result of the EU-China Geographical 
Indications “10 plus 10” Pilot Project (European Commission, 2012b). Since then, there has 
been no application for the protection of extra Chinese GIs.  
The market for imported foods in China is large and growing. China is now the world’s 
fourth largest importer of food and the food and grocery retail market is set to grow by 15% 
annually (China IPR SME Helpdesk, 2014). Additionally, as Chinese domestic consumers have 
deep concerns over food safety and the quality and origin of ingredients, the EU stands to 
benefit from excellent opportunities for huge commercial gains if only it can penetrate the 
market and, in the meantime, execute effective measures to protect its GIs products. China 
is among the EU’s top five GI export countries (agricultural products, foodstuffs, wines and 
spirits).149 
                                                   
149 For example, in 2010 the total value of GI exports to China amounted to more than €650 million. 
Wines and spirits represent the biggest part in terms of value: between 2005 and 2010 the exports 
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The EU is currently negotiating with China a bilateral agreement on the protection of GIs, 
aiming at providing protection in China of a first list of 100 EU GIs for agricultural products, 
including dairy and meat products, and vice versa.150  
At multilateral level, Articles 22 and 23 of the TRIPS Agreement provide GI protection with 
regard to the standard level of protection and a higher level of protection for wines and 
spirits.151 In the latter case, subject to a number of exceptions (Article 24), the products 
have to be protected even if misuse would not cause the public to be misled. As to the legal 
means of GI protection, TRIPS recognises that different branches of laws for protection are 
used by different countries, such as specific GI laws, trademark law or consumer protection 
law. All are valid, since under the TRIPS countries shall enjoy the flexibility of not putting in 
place a judicial IPR enforcement system other than what is already in place for judicial 
enforcement in general. However, under an FTA the opposite may be true.  
Although China has long had many products known by their place of origin, it started to 
offer GI protection in 1985 after the country acceded to the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property. The first amendment to Trademark Law, in 1993, and the 
second, in 2001, established definite rules and regulations for protecting GIs via certification 
or collective marks (Liang, 2006). Therefore, GI marks are provided with the same level of 
legal and economic protection as any other logo, name or mark registered as a trademark. 
In addition to protection under the Trademark Law – which aims to protect consumers from 
confusion and deception – GI protection may be undertaken in China by the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) with respect to 
agricultural products such as food, traditional Chinese medicine, handicrafts, etc., while the 
Ministry of Agriculture lays down a system of registration of raw products like fruits, tea, 
rice, vegetable, poultry, flowers, beans, etc. (Liang, 2006).  
In China’s case, although such an arrangement exists in other countries as well, 
juxtaposition of the trademark and the GI schemes has caused serious conflicts between the 
two series of rights in China (Wang, 2006:920). The dispute concerning Jinhua ham, a 
famous Chinese traditional product from Zhejiang Province, is a case in point. Ironically, the 
settlement of the dispute was based on two different series of rights (trademark rights and 
                                                                                                                                                              
of EU GI wines and spirits to China increased fourfold, i.e. by more than 400%. European Commission 
(2012b), op. cit. 
150 Question for written answer to the Commission – Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL) – 26 June 2015, 
European Parliament.  
151 Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, the Paris Convention, the Madrid Agreement, and the Lisbon 
Agreement, had all dealt with issues related to GIs. The first two have provisions on indications of 
source (the Paris Convention also mentions appellations of origin), while the last one specifically 
aims at protecting appellations of origin. For detailed discussions on the three agreements, see 
Wang (2006), pp. 908-11. 
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GIs), owned by two different entities (the Zhejiang Province Food Product Company and 
producers from the two GI localities concerned) and managed by two different 
administrative agencies (the trademark office and the State Bureau of Quality and Technical 
Supervision), having coexisted ever since both GI protection schemes became available in 
China.152 Though the coexistence argument drew no objection, more confusion arose after 
the court ruled in a case concerning Jinhua ham that the exclusive rights under the 
trademark should be protected, while at the same time the registration of the exclusive 
trademark rights did not prevent the legitimate use of the mark or the term “Jinhua ham” 
by others as a GI simply because it was registered under the AQSIQ (Bashaw, 2008). Such 
conflict causes institutional rivalry, induces a state of chaos, results in confusion among 
consumers, increases business operation costs, and ultimately creates uncertainty about GI 
protection among right holders.  
In China, GI protection is provided by the Trademark Law, Agriculture Law, Law against 
Unfair Competition, Product Quality Law and Consumer Rights Law, as well as by the various 
administrative measures on GI protection of agricultural products.153 Note, however, that 
China does not yet have clear implementing regulations for foreign GIs,154 while the “10+10” 
pilot project undertaken between the EU and China was intended for both sides to 
understand better each other’s registration process.  
Nonetheless, it sometimes seems that registering GI protection in China may be achieved 
through other channels, such as bilateral relations, to surmount the restrictions confined by 
national GI legislation. It was reported that, on 25 March 2014, on the recommendation of 
the French government, the Bordeaux Wine Council presented its application to AQSIQ for 
GI protection on wines sold in China.155 Whether that application was successful is unclear. 
At the moment, foreign GI products are only protected by AQSIQ and SAIC, but not under 
the Agriculture Law and its implementing regulations. However, one may be surprised to 
read that, as early as 17 December 2009, Cognac became the first foreign product registered 
                                                   
152 For details of the ‘ham war’, see Wang (2006), pp. 931-932. 
153 For details, see www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/results.jsp?countries=CN&cat_id=5. 
154 Art. 26 of China’s Provisions of the Protection of Products with a Geographical Indication (16 May 
2005) stipulates that specific provisions shall be separately formulated with regard to the 
applications for registration and protection of foreign GIs in China. Concerning GI registration and 
protection of agricultural products from foreign countries, the same position remained by virtue of 
Art. 24 of the Measures for the Administration of Geographical Indications of Agricultural Products, 
which is China’s most recent implementing rules on GI protection, issued on 25 December 2007.  
155 It is also noticed that up to 2013, the number of European products registered for GI protection in 
China reached 12. Two more products, Cognac and Scotch whisky, were added to the list of EU 
products registered for GI protection in China, after the conclusion of the “10 plus 10” project in 
November 2012. Guide to Geographical Indications in China, China IPR SME Helpdesk, 2014. 
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for GI protection in China under the AQSIQ scheme. Scotch whisky experienced the same 
luck for GI protection in China in 2010.  
Within the EU, GIs are protected by a series of regulations on agriculture products and 
foodstuffs, spirit drinks and wine sector products, food laws, etc., issued by the Council and 
the Commission.156 Two EU schemes, known as PDO (protected designation of origin) and 
PGI (protected geographical indication) promote and protect names of quality agricultural 
products and foodstuffs.157 The EU legal framework provides for general rules on state 
control and supervision, while leaving some margin of discretion on the actual supervising 
system to be enacted by member states. Associations of producers promote GI products 
and prevent abuses, which have been identified in the approval process as much as in post-
registration mechanisms.158  
Cooperation between the EU and China focuses on technical matters emphasising 
supervision, post-registration controls for and verification of compliance, as well as 
enforcement encompassing rights and obligations entailed in using GIs, certification, and 
ensuring an independent, transparent, predictable and efficient control system, etc.  
13.6.2 Enforcing GI protection in China 
In addition to issues arising from weaker IPR enforcement, what is unique in GI enforcement 
in China is that there is often a dispute over which department should be the responsible 
legal enforcer against counterfeiting or illegal certification and GI and other marks: the food 
and drug supervision administration or the general quality supervision bureau. Some 
suggest fostering inter-departmental synergies in supervision, or establishing a joint 
enforcement and information-sharing mechanism between the quality and technical 
supervision authorities and the food and drug supervision administration.  
As far as administrative enforcement is concerned, identifying applicable national 
enforcement legislation sometimes appears to be a challenge, although legislation on food 
safety, IPR protection, quality control, consumer protection, etc., is ample. Under such 
                                                   
156 Such as Regulation (EU) No. 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, and Regulation (EC) No. 
110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 on the definition, 
description, presentation, labelling and the protection of spirit drinks. For details, see 
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/results.jsp?countries=EU&cat_id=5. 
157 Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) covers agricultural products and foodstuffs which are 
produced, processed and prepared in a given geographical area using recognised know-how. 
Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) covers agricultural products and foodstuffs closely linked to 
the geographical area. At least one of the stages of production, processing or preparation takes 
place in the area. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes/index_en.htm. 
158 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes/index_en.htm. 
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circumstances, local legislation, for example provincial legislation, prevails. But such a 
solution tends to result in enforcement/protection discrepancies between provinces, 
leaving GI protection in China subject to a significant degree of uncertainty.  
China is keen on promoting a modern and efficient GI implementation system, which brings 
about huge economic rewards.159 Registering in the EU, then further expanding GI 
protection in the global market is a strategy that some Chinese authorities have been 
contemplating (Shao, 2014),160 but they are hesitant owing to the country’s inexperience in 
managing a GI protection system and the system’s lack of sophistication, as illustrated 
above.  
13.6.3 GI protection in China’s FTAs 
Perhaps because it is yet to consolidate the fragmented domestic measures on GI 
protection, China seems very hesitant or is perhaps unable to provide bilateral GI protection 
under FTAs. Among the 13 FTAs that the country concluded so far, bilateral GI protection is 
only a component in the FTAs with Peru, New Zealand, Australia and Switzerland, while the 
provisions appear to have been drafted in the style of ‘best practice’. For example, under its 
latest, the mid-2015 China-Australia FTA, Article 11.15 is the only article on GIs which 
merely recognises that “GIs may be protected through a trade mark or sui generis system or 
other legal means” by both parties. Under the China-Peru FTA, both parties pledged to offer 
GI protection to products detailed on the two very short lists offered by both sides (22 
products from China, three from Peru), although the FTA foresees the lists expanding.161  
13.6.4 GI protection in EU FTAs 
Being the place of origin of GI protection, the EU is active in exporting to other countries its 
full-fledged GI protection system, which may be illustrated by the EU-Vietnam FTA. The 
                                                   
159 For example, in 2012, as one of the Chinese products registered for GI protection in the EU under 
the EU-China “10+10” pilot project, Zhenjiang Vinegar became the first-ever Chinese condiment that 
obtained GI protection in the EU. Since then, Zhenjiang Vinegar has witnessed rapid growth in terms 
of both industrial development and brand value. Its annual output has increased from less than 
100,000 tonnes before GI protection to over 300,000 tonnes by the end of 2014. The number of 
specialised producers has risen from three to 26, with an annual total output value of nearly RMB 1 
billion (€14 million). Today, Zhenjiang Vinegar, the top vinegar product exported by China, is sold to 
over 60 countries and regions around the world. See Shao (2014). 
160 See also the discussion on divergence between the trademark and AOC systems on GIs 
registration in Wang (2006), pp. 940-941. 
161 The WIPO database shows that GI protection is also a component of China-New Zealand and 
China-Switzerland FTAs, but no such clauses are found in the two agreements.  
180 │ PART II. DESIGN AND SUBSTANCE FOR AN EU-CHINA FTA 
 
agreement162 foresees a high level of protection in Vietnam for 169 EU GIs annexed to the 
future agreement, which is expected to come into force by the end of 2018 or early 2019 at 
a comparable level to the one under the EU GI legislation. This protection will be assured on 
the Vietnamese market by appropriate administrative action, including upon request by an 
interested party. The listed GIs will benefit from direct protection through the agreement 
and will be able to coexist with prior registered trademarks in Vietnam. The EU GIs can 
neither become generic nor can they unilaterally be invalidated by the other party. Finally, 
new GIs can in principle be added in the future. Exceptions to the full protection are 
restricted to a reduced number of EU GIs.163  
13.6.5 GI registration and protection under an EU-China FTA 
The EU and China are presently negotiating a “comprehensive” agreement on GIs, aiming to 
strengthen cooperation in the field of GI protection and supervision, and combating 
counterfeiting. Although the terms of negotiation are unknown, one may guess that the 
focus of the negotiations will be technical assistance to China for streamlining GI registration 
and protection mechanisms, and for formulating legislation on recognising foreign GI-
protected products in order to pave the way for more European GI-protected goods to 
penetrate the Chinese market, and vice versa on a reciprocal basis. GI enforcement is a 
crucial area for bilateral cooperation, too, especially since, for certain cases, joint-
enforcement is required.164 On the other hand, China needs to eliminate the conflicts of 
interest among domestic businesses that compete for the use of domestic GIs, as the case 
of “Jinhua ham” illustrates.  
MOFCOM is optimistic that EU Regulation No. 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural 
products and foodstuffs, which came into force in January 2013, provides more export 
opportunities for China’s 10 GI-protected products since, among others, mutual recognition 
of products from third countries is now undertaken through relevant bilateral agreements. 
Before 2002, products from third countries had to go through the process of single product 
application (Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 2015).  
As concluding an EU-China comprehensive GI protection agreement is on the EU’s EU-China 
2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, perhaps once the agreement is signed both sides 
will have a more solid basis for taking the next step forward in their FTA negotiations. 
                                                   
162 Art. 6 Geographical Indications, Chapter 12 Intellectual Property, EU-Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement.  
163 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/newsroom/243_en.htm.  
164 See the case of enforcing GI protection of Cognac in China when the Bureau National 
Interprofessionnel du Cognac (BNIC) checked shipments from Trade House located in the Cognac 
delimited area to the Chinese importer located in Shantou. The enforcement of the GI Cognac in 
China, 11-12 December 2014, Beijing. 
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14. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and competition policy 
Some of China’s SOEs are the world’s largest companies. Reflecting on the Fortune Global 
500 (2015), SINOPEC ranks second, China National Petroleum Corporation fourth and State 
Grid seventh. Twelve additional Chinese companies have made the top 100, such as SAIC 
Motor, China Mobile Communications, China Railway Construction, China Railway 
Engineering, China Life Insurance and Peng An Insurance. All of them are SOEs, from the oil 
and gas, petroleum refining, construction, automobile, telecoms, utilities and banking 
sectors, where Chinese SOEs hold dominant positions domestically. 
It is thus easy to understand that effective market access in the case of China is influenced 
heavily by the overwhelming presence of SOEs. As will be shown, this is not the case for 
Chinese companies coming to the EU or exporting to it. There can be no doubt that 
whatever FTA would be negotiated, the considerable distortions caused by SOEs (and their 
treatment by the government) and the at times unchallenged (super)dominance of SOEs in 
some markets would have to be dealt with satisfactorily.  
14.1 The SOE problem in China and early reforms 
China’s SOEs have gone through sweeping reforms in the past three decades. Nowadays, 
the Chinese government often states that SOEs are no longer a special problem, i.e. they are 
ordinary players disciplined by market rules and exposure to competitive pressures. This is 
not how independent observers and foreign businesses see SOEs; they rather see them 
enjoying continued privileges in the form of preferential treatment in policies and funds. As 
a result, SOEs remain a source of friction between China and its trading partners with regard 
to effective market access, overcapacity, public procurement and the (non-)application of 
competition policy. Such frictions are twofold. Domestically, European businesses in China 
are frustrated because they are discriminated against – there simply is not a level playing 
field vis-à-vis Chinese SOEs – while Chinese businesses in the EU enjoy national treatment, 
with access to judicial review if necessary. Thus EU businesses in China express frustration 
and long for reciprocity. Internationally, Chinese SOEs are the frontrunners of the country’s 
global investment, helped by guaranteed access to government coffers (frequently including 
provincial and local ones) that seem bottomless. Their success in FDI may sooner or later 
backfire and begin to undermine the benefits from international trade and investment 
based on non-discrimination and respect for market principles (Büge, 2013).  
The EU has relatively few state-owned firms. Given the single market regime, SOEs have lost 
any actual or potential advantage for the state. There are strict rules about the transparency 
of the financial relationship a member state has with its state-owned enterprises; state aids 
are basically forbidden, except for some specific, justifiable reasons, under direct 
supervision of the European Commission as the watchdog – the reporting on those state 
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aids is fully public. Other possible anti-competitive behaviour is dealt with by competition 
law against the abuse of the dominant position. The latter is also a component of China’s 
Anti-monopoly Law, in force since August 2008. However, how Chinese SOEs may be 
disciplined by any antitrust authority is puzzling, since SOEs’ “lawful business” shall be 
protected (Art. 7, Anti-monopoly Law). Until now, China has not published any 
implementing rules drawing clear demarcation lines between lawful and unlawful business. 
Whilst Chinese central and local governments hold the keys to policies and coffers that 
generate SOEs’ success, if not guarantee their survival, these close relations have derailed 
the system. Collusion between ‘mandarins’ and businessmen kept many inefficiencies alive, 
undermining productivity, distorting the proper functioning of markets and engendering 
corruption. Many of those involved have been replaced following corruption charges in 
China’s recent anti-corruption campaign against both officials and business persons.  
China’s overall economic reforms have long focused on SOE reforms. It started in the late 
1970s after the Cultural Revolution. In the run-up to China’s WTO accession, China stated its 
SOEs “basically operated in accordance with rules of market economy” and elaborated that 
“the government would no longer directly administer the human, finance and material 
resources, and operational activities such as production, supply and marketing. The prices of 
commodities produced by state-owned enterprises were decided by the market and 
resources in operational areas were fundamentally allocated by the market. The state-
owned banks had been commercialized and lending to state-owned enterprises took place 
exclusively under market conditions”. The government pledged to further reform SOEs and 
establish a modern enterprise system (WTO, 2001). Of course, although at the time SOE 
reforms were far from being completed, it is undeniable that, by 2001, Chinese society had 
already been transformed profoundly due to the reforms preceding the country’s WTO 
accession. Indeed, in order to become an eligible candidate leading towards WTO 
membership, the old planned economy on which the Chinese way of life was built since 
1949 had to be dismantled. The SOEs were the principal protagonists of the planned 
economy.  
To terminate SOEs’ easy access to public funds and remove their privileges under 
government policy, China’s entire SOE structure has gone through reorganisation, 
corporatisation and privatisation, and they are expected to apply proper accounting rules 
and increase corporate productivity driven by market exposure.  
SOE reform took place in stages. The first stage focused on “decentralisation and profit-
sharing” when the SOEs and employees began to have autonomy in making operational 
decisions as well as in enjoying profits. Reforms in the second stage (1987-92) saw SOE 
ownership separated from management in order for further operational autonomy. The 
third stage consisted of restructuring, converting them into modern corporate entities, e.g. 
joint stock companies, while the government only sought to exercise its control on large 
monopolies and strategic resource sectors. After China’s WTO accession, SOE reforms 
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emphasised corporate and state governance concerning, for example, the misuse of state-
owned assets. For this purpose, the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) was established in 2003,165 and the Law on State-owned Assets of 
Enterprises166 was promulgated in 2008. Following the Third Plenum in 2013, China 
announced a new wave of SOE reform measures, which aimed to dilute state holdings.167 
Amidst SOE reforms, employees went through some very painful, if not devastating, 
experiences. Permanent employment, the so-called ‘iron rice bowl’, which might last for 
generations in the family, disappeared. SOE employees were laid off en masse168 with only 
meagre compensation. The national health care system, which was linked to SOE 
employment, was reduced to minimum coverage, before health insurance schemes were 
introduced. The upshot was that the vast majority of laid-off SOE employees could no longer 
afford to get sick.169  
14.2 Reformed SOEs and barriers to market access 
The question today is whether SOEs have become truly market oriented, with full exposure 
to competitive forces and without privileges, or guarantees or preferential subsidies in any 
form, as China declared in the run-up to its WTO accession. The present authors are not able 
to give a clear-cut answer, because the picture is mixed.  
                                                   
165 SASAC is responsible for managing government assets and reform of non-financial SOEs. SASAC’s 
basic function includes drafting laws, regulations and departmental rules relating to the 
management of state-owned assets. In 2006, SASAC managed 40% of total SOE assets.  
166 The law aims to, inter alia, consolidate and develop China’s SOE assets and enable SOEs to play a 
dominant role in the national economy, especially in key sectors. Specific provisions of the law are 
designed to reduce administrative interference in state-invested enterprises (SIE) and require the 
government to perform its investor function according to law. Still, the State Council may decide on 
the “important” wholly state-owned enterprises and companies and state-holding companies whose 
merger, separation, dissolution, bankruptcy, and other important matters need to be approved by 
the government (Art. 34). Agencies performing investor functions are also entitled to appoint and 
remove an SIE’s management or make suggestions on such appointments and removals (Art. 22). 
167 Such measures include introducing private shareholders, extracting more profit from SOEs to 
finance public expenditures, specifying which industries legitimately require state control, and 
making clear that when the state remains a non-controlling shareholder in a competitive industry, 
normal market competition should apply. See Covington & Burling (2015), pp. 60-61.  
168 During 1998-2003 alone, the SOE workforce was slashed by 35%: 40 million SOE employees lost 
their jobs. See Breakingviews (2013).  
169 The scale of lay-offs in China is beyond imagination for many. In mid-December 2015, as a 
measure to reduce overcapacity, it was reported that the Wuhan Steel Plant would lay off 11,000 
employees within three months. Some lay-offs would be in the form of early retirement and no-pay 
leaves. See “Wuhan Steel Plant may lay off more than 10,000, officials denied”, Xinhua Net, 15 
December 2015. Available at www.gd.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2015-12/15/c_1117461742.htm. 
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According to Nicholas Lardy, these days SOEs appear to be a reduced portion of the Chinese 
economy. They account for between one-third and one-quarter of GDP and only 20% of 
manufacturing output. State-employees are fewer than those in France as a percentage of 
the labour force (Wall Street Journal, 2014). SOEs’ contribution to China’s gross industrial 
output is in steady decline. Based on the statistics released by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, the proportion of production by SOEs has fallen from nearly 50% in 1999 
to 26% in 2011, while production by the private sector has risen from around 5% to 45% 
during the same period (Bergsten, 2014:304).  
At the same time, the Fortune Global 500 (2015) listing shows that all but two of China’s top 
40 firms are SOEs; the exceptions are Huawei and Lenovo, which rank 39th and 40th. A 2013 
study showed that China ranked first in SOEs’ presence (96%) among 16 countries’ top 10 
firms, using an average of shares of SOEs in sales, assets and market value. While the size of 
these shares decreases when the coverage is extended to countries’ 200 largest firms, the 
relative size remains unchanged. A trend is thus easy to detect and over the last couple of 
years SOEs’ strengths have been further consolidated. By and large, Chinese SOEs hold 
dominant positions in the sectors of the extraction or treatment of national resources, 
construction, energy and heavy industry, as well as in service sectors, such as 
telecommunications, financial intermediation, warehousing and engineering activities and a 
few manufacturing sectors (Büge, 2013).  
Figure 14.1 SOEs’ shares among countries’ top 10 firms (%) 
 
Note: Only countries with shares above 10% are shown (Kowalski et al., 2013). 
11% 13%
15% 16% 17%
23%
37%
48% 50%
59%
67% 68% 69%
81%
88%
96%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 185 
 
These three facts essentially reflect the status of China’s SOEs of today. After decades of 
reforms, the number of SOEs is considerably reduced, but their power is consolidated and 
strengthened. Some SOEs have become the world’s leaders in certain industrial sectors. 
Some loss-making SOEs were closed down or restructured as holding companies listed on 
stock exchanges in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Singapore, London or New York. SOEs 
are of course champions of the sectors mentioned above, and their force in global 
expansion is unparalleled. SOEs are forerunners of China’s outbound direct investment in 
recent years across the globe. But, as described above, China’s SOE reforms have focused so 
far on structure and less on operations.  
The threats that China’s SOEs are exposed to are equally high. SINOPEC, China’s top SOE, for 
example, suffers from such inefficiency that in 2014 it was forced to sell a stake in its fuel 
marketing division to private investors. A number of top executives from the company’s 
headquarters and subsidiaries have been removed on corruption charges. China National 
Petroleum Corporation, the country’s second largest SOE, has been one of the prime targets 
of the anti-corruption campaign over the past two years. On the eve of the Chinese New 
Year in 2016, it was reported that the company’s president, who took office in August 2014, 
was under corruption probe.170 His predecessor was sacked on corruption charges, too.  
Overall, SOEs’ leading positions in the national and international economies may not be a 
result of management strength but rather preferential government industrial policy, laws 
and regulations (including those issued by government agencies), as well as easy access to 
government funds. This policy drive results in discriminatory treatment of other players in 
the market, hampering competition and recklessly pursuing overcapacity, which remains a 
serious issue (although China is trying to tackle it). A core question for EU observers (and, 
indeed, for EU competitors) is how is it possible to sustain massive overcapacities. In any 
market economy, such firms would long be bankrupt and exit the market or be broken up 
and the competitive parts divested as separate, viable firms or sold to national or foreign 
investors.  
Policy favouritism translates into barriers to market access in the form of discriminatory 
treatment of foreign investors. A recent Covington & Burling study (2015) shows that the 
majority of SOE-supporting measures are applied at the pre-establishment stage with regard 
to market access restraints, the most notable exception being government financial support 
provided at sub-central level. Some discriminatory legal measures supporting SOEs are 
explicit; for example, in the telecom industry private business players are excluded from 
entering the market.171 When it comes to differentiated treatment, at the post-
                                                   
170 Available at www.ccdi.gov.cn/yw/201602/t20160207_74169.html (Chinese). 
171 For example, the Measures on the Administration of International Communication Access provide 
that the “establishment of an International Communications Gateway Exchange (‘ICGE’) shall be 
applied for by a wholly state-owned telecommunications business operator, who shall undertake the 
operation and maintenance of the ICGE. Without approval of the Ministry of Information Industry, 
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establishment stage, it encompasses land allocation, financing, government procurement, 
and direct government financial support. For all of these interventions, government 
exercises great discretion and commercial terms give way to political needs. For example, 
the state may allocate land as state investment to SOEs whose business links to industries 
important to China’s economy and national security. Local governments follow suit, and all 
is done in the name of supporting enterprise development.172 With regard to easy financing, 
note that in the mid-1990s, as a reform measure, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji disciplined 
banks and forced them to slow reckless lending. Non-performing debts were later cleared 
from lenders’ books through the creation of special “asset management companies”, which 
facilitated turning big banks into commercial businesses (Breakingviews, 2013). However, 
even when Zhu was still in charge, less commercial lending guidelines came into play; for 
example, the People’s Bank of China, China’s central bank, whose reform was overseen 
personally by Zhu, pronounced guidelines to support loss-making SOEs in the form of 
supporting their production of marketable and profitable products.173 In parallel, Chinese 
banks provide SOEs direct financial aids sometimes in order to ensure a rapid 
implementation of government policy. Such a Jekyll and Hyde tendency has continued ever 
since. This practice backfired nonetheless since many Chinese SOEs seem to rely heavily on 
debt rather than equity capital. HSBC calculates that China’s SOEs’ average debt-to-asset 
ratio is about 65%, above the 40-60% range acceptable by private investors (UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2014). At the moment, China’s 10 largest lenders, which are all large 
SOEs on the list of the Fortune Global 500 (2015), reported the highest proportion of bad 
debts since 2009 while overdue loans reached RMB 588 billion (€80.24 billion) at the end of 
2013, a 21% increase from a year earlier (Bloomberg News, 2014).174 
                                                                                                                                                              
no entity or individual shall establish an ICGE in any form.” Art. 5, Measures for the Administration of 
International Communications Gateway Exchanges, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
(October 2002). For detailed discussions on pre-established SOE-supporting measures, see 
Covington & Burling LLP (2015), pp. 65-67. 
172 Art. 2, Several Opinions of the Ministry of Land and Resources on Further Control over Land 
Assets and Promotion of the Reform and Development of State-owned Enterprises, Ministry of Land 
and Resources (25 November 1999) & Art. 19, Opinions on Further Deepening Shanghai SOE 
Reforms to Promote Enterprises Development, CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee and Shanghai 
Municipal People’s Government 18 December 2013).  
173 Notice jointly Issued by People’s Bank of China and State Economic & Trade Commission on 
Supporting Production of Marketable and Profitable Products of State-owned Industrial Enterprises 
in Loss (PBOC, MOFCOM, 11 September 1997) & Supplementary Notice by People’s Bank of China on 
Further Supporting Production of Marketable and Profitable Products of State-owned Industrial 
Enterprises in Loss (PBOC, 9 June 1998). 
174 There are also informal suggestions about debts to suppliers and other business which are simply 
not paid. The authors have not been able to verify this assertion.  
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Figure 14.2 China’s outstanding loan growth 
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com People’s Bank of China. 
It is thus not difficult to understand why overcapacity persisted in China in recent decades 
and has only worsened in recent years. On the other hand, although China should have 
ended such subsidies after joining the WTO due to China’s obligations under the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Covington & Burling (2015) maintain that, for 
example, SINOPEC and CNPC, reportedly obtained subsidies of around RMB 76 billion 
(€10.35 billion) in 2007 (Covington & Burling LLP, 2015:68-69). Local governments allocate 
special funds for SOEs, too. Recently, in the name of stimulating “people innovation for an 
innovative era”, the Shanghai government announced that the municipality would 
compensate/subsidise “Angel Investment Fund” losses. “Angel Investment Fund” is a policy 
tool to complement the stimulating measures implemented in 2006 concerning allocating 
dedicated “rescue funds” to top up investment in innovative start-ups. It was announced 
that the new policy was implemented in order to mitigate the “less effective” measures 
announced in 2006 due to its high thresholds.175 Apparently, similar compensation/subsidy 
schemes were already announced in other provinces, such as Guangdong and Jiangsu 
(Caixin, 2016). The new policy attracted fierce criticism from economists and fund investors 
in Shanghai, although their focus is on, for example, easy fraud, far less on the government’s 
financial subsidies/compensation responding to policy without due consideration of risk 
assessment. Based on prevailing policies, SOEs in certain sectors may also qualify for tax 
incentives;176 in recent years business linked to innovation guarantees a higher chance of 
success.  
                                                   
175 The alleged high thresholds included that the funds were only applicable to enterprises and 
industrial applications of high technological innovation, and the same amount of risk reserve funds 
must be fully paid up by investment firms. 
176 See, for example, Art. 2(4) of the Notice of Issuing Several Rules on Further Strengthening 
Technical Renovation and Investing and Promoting Technical Improvement by Enterprises, People’s 
Government of Guangdong Province, 10 June 1999. 
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Policy and financial support of SOEs comes in many forms. It is evident that some SOEs’ 
success, or sometimes their survival, hinges on support from the government. Government 
officials therefore were highly sought after by businessmen in order to solicit favourable 
treatment. With the dependent links between the two, it is clear as to why so many 
government officials, who held the keys to policy changes and funds, have been sacked on 
corruption charges in recent years. The evils of mandarin-businessman collusion had to be 
stopped. According to a report by China’s Central Discipline and Inspection Commission in 
January 2016, between 2014 and 2015, 64 senior officials, more than half of them chiefs, 
from 55 SOEs under the central government’s direct control, and mostly in the sectors of 
energy, telecom, transport and logistics, were caught for serious corruption, expelled and 
await further party discipline and judicial prosecution.177 
To summarise the modus operandi of China’s SOEs today, after decades of reforms: it is 
discriminatory policy and easy access to bank loans with preferential rates and terms 
leading towards a distorted market, with an unlevel playing field and diminished effects of 
principles in international trade agreements, such as national treatment, most-favoured-
nation treatment and transparency.  
Therefore, for an EU-China FTA chapter on SOEs to be successful, the EU should create rules 
which confine SOEs to market-oriented behaviour by eradicating government interventions. 
Only in this way can all market players count on a level playing field. Before negotiating with 
the EU on SOEs, China could prepare by actually implementing the SOE reform measures 
announced at the Third Plenum in November 2013; these include factor-price reforms, 
reducing the subsidies that SOEs have enjoyed and developing a ‘mixed-ownership 
economy’.178 Nonetheless, it remains to be seen how China can implement all these 
measures effectively, within the period up to 2020 set by the Third Plenum.  
14.3 Can the EU and China reach an agreement on SOEs? 
The EU signed a standalone chapter on SOEs in its FTA with Vietnam. China has not signed 
any standalone chapter on SOEs with its FTA partners. Usually, SOEs are the not the subject 
of a standalone chapter, while the relevant provisions are often blended into chapters of, 
most noticeably, trade in services and technical barriers to trade. The EU’s stance on SOEs in 
                                                   
177 Sixty-four central government chiefs who controlled SOEs were sacked, nearly 40% were from the 
energy sector, Central Discipline and Inspection Commission, 4 January 2016 (Chinese). Available at 
http://china.eastday.com/c/20160104/u1a9167083_K26843.html. 
178 Reforms on SOE ownership in the 1990s aimed to solve the deficit issue and many central SOEs 
began to list a minority of their shares on stock exchanges to attract private capital. The “mixed 
ownership economy” measures announced by the Third Plenum should change the governance 
structure of SOEs, encouraging private investors to take a controlling interest, and allowing 
employees to hold shares. See UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014). 
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its FTAs is determined by non-discriminatory treatment and commercial considerations, by 
virtue of Article XVII GATT (1947). Moreover, an ambitious FTA for the EU would include 
agreed terms on SOEs that must take precedence over domestic laws in case of conflict, as is 
the case of the EU-Singapore FTA with regard to specific commitments on financial services.  
One may wish to draw an analogy between China and Vietnam since Vietnam also has a 
history of a planned economy with a significant presence of SOEs. For the issue of SOEs, 
Chapters 8 and 10 of the EU-Vietnam FTA must be read together. With regard to trade in 
services, investment and e-commerce in Chapter 8, the provisions emphasise better 
regulation and reiterate well-established principles, such as national treatment and most-
favoured-nation treatment (though there are qualifications179); the FTA will not override 
measures previously adopted and maintained by Vietnam even though they may be 
inconsistent with the FTA (Art. 3(3), Chapter 8, EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed 
text as of January 2016). There are also exceptions favouring typically SOE-dominant 
sectors, such as telecoms services, mining (including oil and gas), and in which case most-
favoured-nation treatment shall not apply (Art. 4(3), Chapter 8, EU-Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement: Agreed text as of January 2016). Therefore, since the EU-Vietnam FTA is not 
ambitious enough to “specify and complement” the existing international trading rules, i.e. 
not taking a WTO+ approach, it is not advisable to look at the EU-Vietnam FTA as an 
inspiration for China on SOE negotiations with the EU.  
Reflecting on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), SOEs’ activities are governed by the 
principles of commercial considerations and non-discriminatory treatment, within the 
meaning of Article XVII GATT (1947). What is new in the TPP on SOEs is that these two 
principles are upheld even when exceptions are applied. For commercial considerations, TPP 
countries agreed to not cause adverse effects, including injury to another party’s domestic 
industry and to other TPP countries when applying non-commercial considerations within 
the remit of the agreement. Non-discriminatory treatment extends to judicial enforcement 
over commercial activities of foreign SOEs so that a foreign SOE operating in a TPP country 
will not be able to claim immunity on grounds of sovereign immunity. It sets a good example 
of restraining SOEs’ non-market behaviour even when “exceptions” are applied. For 
example, with regard to supplying financial services under a government mandate by an 
SOE in order to support exports and imports (in which case non-discriminatory treatment 
and commercial considerations may not apply), these services must displace commercial 
financing, and the terms offered must not be more favourable than market terms (Article 
17.4.1, the Trans-Pacific Partnership). However, though the TPP sets a good example of 
rejecting exceptions to SOE-governing principles, it is a regional trade agreement which 
                                                   
179 For example, with regard to sectors as well as to investors, only “in like situations”, national 
treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment will apply. Arts. 3(1)(2) and Arts. 4(1)(2), Chapter 8, 
EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed text as of January 2016. 
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does not “specify and complement” rules. Therefore, copying the TPP as a template for 
bilateral EU-China SOE negotiations may not be appropriate.  
China is rather cautious concerning SOEs in its concluded FTAs and less consistent in detail. 
After all, the country has not offered SOEs as covered entities under its GPA offers. But 
some inclination toward opening up typically SOE-dominant sectors can already be 
detected. For example, under the China-Korea FTA, the financial services and telecom 
sectors, two SOE-dominant sectors, are open to competition. Especially under the telecom 
chapter, access to and use of public telecoms networks or services, competitive safeguards, 
independent regulatory bodies, universal service, freedom to choose the technologies for 
service and enforcement, etc., are guaranteed. In China’s sixth GPA offer, activities in the 
fields of drinking water, electricity, energy, transportation, telecoms or postal services are 
now offered for procurement activity coverage, too, as is mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Also, amidst the ongoing SOE restructuring exercise, China started to employ the 
“public-private partnership” (PPP) model in certain sectors in order to diminish SOEs’ 
dominant position. For example, in the utility sector, for water supply, Vivendi and Thames 
Water are the biggest investors while water pricing remains under the state control.180 The 
website of China’s Central Government Procurement under the Ministry of Finance has a 
dedicated subsite on PPP in order to post tender notices published by all provinces, and to 
share best practices, relevant laws and regulations, research outcomes and domestic and 
international case studies.181  
Interestingly, the China-Australia FTA looks like the EU-Vietnam FTA on SOEs as both 
reiterate established principles of national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment, 
and tolerate ample non-conformity rules. Under the China-Australia Agreement, after the 
positive listing approach setting out governing principles on the schedule of specific 
commitments, national treatment, market access and most-favoured-nation treatment, the 
chapter on trade in services starts with a negative listing approach and affirms that the 
above-mentioned principles shall not apply to non-conforming measures maintained, 
continued or renewed, by the central government of a party or a regional level of 
government as far as services and service suppliers are concerned (Arts. 8.9-8.12, Chapter 8 
Trade in Services, China-Australia FTA). Having said that, further negotiations on progressive 
service liberalisation are foreseen by both parties (Art. 8.24, Chapter 8 Trade in Services, 
China-Australia FTA). 
                                                   
180 Based on interview conducted in Beijing, 29 November-4 December 2015. 
181 Little known is that PPP is identified as a key reform area by the State Council. It is regarded as a 
vital tool to transform government functions, stimulate the market and generate new economic 
growth. The ultimate objective is for the public to enjoy quality and efficient services. Available at 
www.ccgp.gov.cn/ppp/ (Chinese). 
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On the other hand, the EU-Singapore FTA might suggest a possible, though ambitious, 
approach to resolving EU negotiations with China on SOEs. SOEs have a strong presence in 
Singapore and dominate a few sectors, such as financial services and transport. Via GIC and 
Temasek Holdings, some Singaporean SOEs have become very successful in overseas 
investment, too. Nevertheless, there are contrasting qualities between Singaporean and 
Chinese SOEs. SOEs in Singapore are profitable, such as SingTel, DBS and SMRT, and 
overcapacity is irrelevant to them, as it is to Singapore as a country. In addition to horizontal 
commitments in Singapore’s Schedule of Specific Commitments, which is an appendix to the 
EU-Singapore FTA totalling 129 pages encompassing almost all service sectors, specific 
commitments on financial services forms a separate component of the FTA.182 In general, 
the specific commitments are entirely subject to all relevant Singaporean domestic laws as 
long as “they do not circumvent Singapore’s obligations” under the specific commitments. 
Singapore also relinquished some regulatory authority in terms of financial services under 
Appendix 8-B-2.183  
With respect to a possible Chinese offer on SOEs, three factors should be taken into 
consideration. First, SOEs collectively form a highly protected protagonist in China’s 
economic life. After all, despite pressure from WTO members, China has offered no SOE as a 
covered entity under its GPA offers. Secondly, China certainly wishes to further its SOE 
reforms since the SOE sector remains a huge drain on the economy; overcapacity is the 
clearest but by no means only element. The question is can China afford the possible 
collapse of these colossal SOEs after they lose their privileged access to bank loans and the 
government’s policy favouritism and can be subject to bankruptcy. Third, China has 
reiterated its wish to welcome “external pressure” in order to further deepening reforms, 
especially after seeing the benefits accrued from opening up the country under WTO rules 
in the run-up to accession.184 Nonetheless, anyone exerting “external pressure” will be 
unable, or rather unwilling, to succeed if China’s domestic environment is not ready to 
embrace the changes. The Third Plenum pledged many reform measures, but as it set 2020 
as a deadline for implementation, the progress has indeed been slow and much remains to 
be implemented, which is confirmed by the reality check conducted by the European 
Chamber of Commerce in China in its Position Paper (2015-16). With regard to the SOE 
reforms, which are complicated by vested interests including the government’s authority to 
appoint senior SOE executives, the next step remains unclear. For example, the term 
‘mixed-ownership’ has still not been fully explained.  
                                                   
182 Appendix 8-B-2, EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (authentic text as of May 2015, not yet 
ratified).  
183 For example, by virtue of Art. A.1 of Appendix 8-B-2, “Singapore shall not require product filing or 
approval for insurance products other than for life insurance products, Central Provident Fund-
related products and investment linked products.” 
184 Based on interview conducted in Beijing, 29 November-4 December 2015. 
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Based on the above-mentioned three considerations, it can hardly be surprising that China’s 
approaches to its FTA partners on SOEs are not consistent in detail. As mentioned above, 
under the China-Korea FTA, the two SOE-dominant sectors of financial services and 
telecoms are open to Korean investors for competition. It remains to be seen what this 
openness will mean in actual practice – that is, in light of Annex 8-A-2, China’s list of specific 
commitments, and follow-up negotiations (see also Schott, Jung & Cimino, 2015). In the 
China-Australia FTA, the principles of transparency, national treatment and most-favoured-
nation treatment are repeated in a few chapters, such as those on technical barriers to 
trade and trade in services. Specifically, “parties’ obligations” under the FTA shall take 
precedence over monopolistic behaviour of service suppliers (Art. 8.23.1, China-Australia 
FTA). Subsequently, taking the ‘negative listing’ approach, the chapter on trade in services 
states that the principles enshrined in Article XVII of GATT 1947 shall not apply to ‘non-
conforming measures’ maintained, continued or renewed, by the central government of a 
party or a regional level of government as far as services and service suppliers are 
concerned,185 although, as mentioned above, further negotiations on progressive service 
liberalisation are foreseen by both parties and will maintain the negative listing approach. 
Given the distinct points of departure, reaching an overall agreement on SOEs in the 
framework of an EU-China FTA will most likely start by negotiating on China’s offering its 
SOEs as covered entities under the country’s GPA offer. In addition, on the basis of Article 
XVII of GATT 1947, it is to open SOE-dominated sectors, for example energy, financial 
services and telecoms, to European businesses. To set the ambition a level higher, it will be 
TPP-like, rejecting exceptions to the “GATT principles” on SOEs; while the greatest ambition 
will be to reject all non-conformity measures on SOEs while only the clauses contained in 
the FTA shall prevail. There is no doubt that China seeks to renew momentum, i.e. external 
pressure, in order to further SOE reforms. At the end of 2015, the government already 
announced that private businesses are welcome to compete in SOE-dominant industries 
such as transport, energy, telecom, etc. However, the government will have to remove 
hurdles to market access, the so-called ‘industrial structural policies’, to make entry into the 
private sector possible. Formal openness does not amount to much in the presence of 
super-dominance and lingering obstacles. Thus no foreign insurers were able to enter the 
market dominated by ‘five brothers’, although the government had long since announced 
that the sector was open to foreign players.186 Finally, as to the level of ambition in reaching 
an agreement on opening up SOEs, given the EU’s manifest desire to conclude “deep and 
comprehensive” FTAs, the question becomes how far China is willing to pursue SOE reforms 
by relinquishing its regulatory authority, as Singapore did in financial services. 
                                                   
185 When services are liberalised based on ‘negative listing’, there are usually several annexes with 
exceptions, called ‘non-conforming measures’.  
186 Based on interview conducted in Beijing, 29 November-4 December 2015. 
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14.4 Competition policy 
China is probably the world’s youngest and increasingly ‘must visit’ jurisdiction for global 
mergers, but its competition policy has attracted much controversy since its Anti-Monopoly 
Law (AML) came into force in August 2008. The AML takes EU Competition Law as its main 
reference point, as the AML regulates against anti-competitive agreements, abuse of 
dominant position and concentration, which are echoes of Articles 101 and 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and the EC Merger Regulation. By virtue of Article 2, the 
AML covers monopolistic operations that have an effect on the Chinese market, which 
means operations within China as well as activities outside the territory of China that may 
have eliminative or restrictive effects on competition in China's domestic market will all be 
subject to the AML. This being the case, antitrust investigations conducted by Chinese 
authorities increasingly involve EU and other foreign industry at the same time. A large gap 
between the EU and China on competition exists in enforcement practices, and this is where 
controversy erupts. Additionally, China’s competition policy appears less transparent and 
therefore enforcement may often look ambiguous. There are still concerns about 
procedural impartiality, lack of information on AML infringement, as well as the procedural 
steps and possible consequences if found guilty of AML infringement. Judicial review 
relating to the AML has yet to be developed further (European Commission, 2015d). The 
deficiency has significant impact on EU businesses. No complaints are heard from Chinese 
businesses in Europe about EU competition policy.  
However, it is generally agreed that over the years China’s anti-monopoly authorities are 
making progress in improving their case-handling capacity. For example, as far as AML 
implementation is concerned, MOFCOM has been known for being very slow in clearing 
merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, especially in the first few years after the AML 
came into force. It took 336 days to conditionally approve the transaction between Western 
Digital and Hitachi (March 2012), and 417 days to approve that between Mediatek and 
MStar (August 2013) (US-China Business Council, 2015). This is contrary to the time limits of 
90 days for review and 60 days for an extension prescribed by Article 26 of the AML.187 
MOFCOM published Provisional Rules on the Applicable Criteria of Streamlined Cases 
Regarding Concentrations of Undertakings in March 2014, which established a procedure 
for accelerated review.188 The Chinese anti-monopoly authorities also improved AML 
                                                   
187 Art. 26 of the AML states that if an anti-monopoly authority decides to conduct a review, the 
review should be completed within 90 days. The review period may be extended for 60 more days 
under certain circumstances.  
188 In the first few years when implementing the AML, MOCOM was also known for placing unusual 
conditions on the transactions before clearing them. For example, when MOFCOM blocked Coca-
Cola’s acquisition of Huiyuan, the explanation it gave was related to a “conglomerate effects” theory 
that fell outside international norms. See Bergsten C. et al. (2014), p. 333.  
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enforcement by enacting implementing rules189 and conducting cooperation with other 
jurisdictions on case reviews, and MOFCOM established the practices of public consultation 
and engaging external consultants for expert assessment of some case investigations, e.g. 
P3 Network Alliance.  
China’s competition policy consists of laws,190 administrative regulations or implementing 
rules191 and ministerial rules, while enforcement is jointly undertaken by three agencies. 
MOFCOM is responsible for reviewing M&A transactions and other types of proposed 
business concentrations. The State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) is in 
charge of investigating non-price-related monopolistic behaviour, including monopoly 
agreements, abuse of market dominance, and monopoly control. The National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) manages enforcement of price-related conduct, including 
investigations of pricing practices by companies, price-related aspects of monopoly 
agreements, and company abuse of dominant market position to set or control prices. This 
enforcement structure embeds fragmentation and confusion – three cooks spoiling the 
broth – but it nonetheless carries the legacy of the three institutions’ analogous functions. 
For example, SAIC at different administrative levels was responsible for enforcing all the 
competition laws promulgated prior to AML, such as the Law for Protecting Consumers’ 
Rights and Interests (1993), the Law of the People’s Republic of China for Countering Unfair 
Competition (1993) and the Regulations on Development and Protection of Competition 
(1980). The Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State Council, which has overall responsibility 
for organising, coordinating and guiding anti-monopoly work in China, coordinates the 
competition policy implementation and enforcement work carried out by the above-
mentioned three agencies. All three agencies may issue administrative penalties, including 
fines, confiscation of illegal gains and cease-and-desist orders. Additionally, parties injured 
by monopolistic behaviours may take judicial action by bringing their case to the courts. 
                                                   
189 For example, China promulgated 1) Measures Concerning the Divestiture of Assets or Business 
when Implementing Concentrations of Business Operators (December 2014); 2) Provisions to 
Prohibit Intellectual Property Abuse to Eliminate or Restrict Competition (April 2015). Draft 
Interpretation on Issues Related to the Application of Laws in Reviewing Act Preservation Cases of 
Disputes over Intellectual Property Rights and Competition was released for public consultation. 
190 The framework of China’s competition laws includes Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), the Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law, and the Rules on Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises and the Price Law. 
191 Implementing rules issued so far are related to mainly abuse of dominant position, or 
administrative monopoly and price fixing. For example, in December 2010, SAIC issued a series of 
implementing rules such as Regulations on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Agreements, Regulations 
on the Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position, Regulations to Stop Acts of Abusing 
Administrative Power for the Purpose of Eliminating or Limiting Competition, and Regulations 
against Price Fixing. In the same month, the NDRC issued the Regulations on the Administrative 
Procedures for Law Enforcement against Price Fixing.  
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EU competition law pursues market efficiency and integration (Szyszczak, 2007). 
Competition policy is crucial to the EU for two main reasons. First, there is the underlying 
idea that competition and competitive markets are the principal way to serve the economic 
aims of the treaty. Second, the internal market may fail or yield unsatisfactory results if 
restrictive business practices could form effective barriers against competition from other 
member states (Pelkmans, 2006).  
Within a broader framework of EU-China bilateral trade relations, the EU’s assistance to 
China’s competition policy-building preceded the country’s AML promulgation. The EU-
China Competition Dialogue was set up in 2004.192 In 2012, the EU and China signed the 
MoU on Cooperation in the Area of Anti-Monopoly Law, in order to enhance cooperation 
and coordination on competition legislation by exchanging views in various areas, and 
particularly in terms of anti-monopoly legislation and enforcement in both jurisdictions.193 
Thanks to the MoU, DG Competition and MOFCOM cooperated in a few merger reviews, 
while both sides agreed a guidance document for Cooperation on Reviewing Merger Cases 
to further improve case cooperation. In the meantime, DG Competition also cooperated 
with the NDRC and SAIC to strengthen antitrust cooperation. 
14.4.1 China’s Competition law and EU business concerns in enforcement 
A Communist planned economy, China’s market model was structured to benefit the 
state/community but not so much individual consumers. Based on this premise, China has 
many laws and regulations194 that concentrate production in certain sectors into 
monopolies, near-monopolies, or authorised oligopolies which are typically led by SOEs. As a 
result, it is said that drafting the AML was a highly contentious undertaking and met with 
strong opposition from powerful SOEs which perceived AML as a threat to their prerogatives 
                                                   
192 The Dialogue is a permanent, institutionalised set-up based on an equal footing, with no legally 
binding obligations on either side. It provides a forum of consultation and transparency between 
China and the EU on competition law and policy, and aims to enhance the EU’s technical and 
capacity-building assistance to China. See European Commission (2003).  
193 China conducts international cooperation on competition policy issues with other major 
competition authorities in the world, too. For example, in July 2011, the NDRC, MOFCOM and SAIC 
signed an MOU on Anti-Monopoly/Anti-Trust Cooperation with the U.S. Department of Justice and 
the Federal Trade Commission. Also, China participates in competition policy-related activities in the 
context of APEC, the OECD, and UNCTAD. China is not a member of the International Competition 
Network and there is no a clear timeline for China to consider joining the network. See WTO (2014), 
p. 94. 
194 These measures are focused in capital intensive sectors, like electricity and transportation, or in 
industries such as fixed-line telephony and postal services (e.g. for ‘universal service’ with national 
coverage), as well as in sectors vital to national security and economic stability, including defence, 
energy, and banking. Examples of such laws and regulations include the Law on Electricity (1996), 
Civil Aviation Law (1995), Regulations on Telecommunication (2000), Postal Law (1986), Railroad Law 
(1991), and Commercial Bank Law (amended in 2003). See U.S. Department of State (2015), p. 13. 
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(Bergsten et al., 2014). Perhaps as a compromise, SOEs’ dominant position and state 
monopolies seem less affected by the AML. Article 7 of the AML states that the state 
protects the “lawful business” conducted by “industries controlled by the State-owned 
economy and concerning the lifeline of national economy and national security or the 
industries implementing exclusive operation and sales according to law”. At the same time, 
the state will continue to regulate and control “their business operations and the prices of 
their commodities and services so as to safeguard the interests of consumers and promote 
technical progresses.” It is still unclear how Article 7 will be implemented. Nonetheless, this 
AML arrangement will prove to be an obstacle to the EU and China reaching an agreement 
on competition under an FTA, as will be explained later in the chapter. The three AML 
enforcement agencies have publicly stated that the law applies to SOEs, and have pursued 
some enforcement actions against them. But the overall message is mixed. For example, in 
February 2013, the NDRC imposed a fine of €68 million on two state-owned liquor 
companies for setting a minimum resale price for distributors of white spirit products (David 
et al., 2013). But on the other hand, it is also said that MOFCOM blocked the transaction of 
P3 Network Alliance because of Chinese container shipping conglomerates’ lobby effort.  
The aim of China’s AML mirrors competition laws in other jurisdictions, which is to restrain 
monopolistic conduct, protect fair competition, promote market efficiency and safeguard 
consumers’ welfare. Besides penalising anti-competition behaviours, the AML restricts 
regulators from abusing administrative monopolies,195 and this also appears in the NDRC’s 
and SAIC’s implementing regulations. China amended its Administrative Procedure Law in 
2014 to allow private parties to sue government regulators for restricting competition 
through abuse of administrative power. Additionally, Articles 32-37 of the AML restrains the 
abuse of administrative power meant to eliminate or restrict inter-regional trade in China’s 
domestic market.196 There is certainly a reason for such precaution. As reiterated in 
previous chapters, being a component of China’s legislation process, local governments are 
competent to promulgate rules enforceable within the locality concerned. Such competence 
becomes, nonetheless, often spoiled and distorted to evolve into local protectionism. This is 
no exception in the context of competition. Therefore, although competition policy in the 
EU and in China somewhat resemble each other, China’s AML carries its own characteristics 
derived from the country’s political, social and economic context. In addition to the special 
treatment of SOEs, the AML’s position against administrative monopolies is another 
example.  
                                                   
195 Art. 8 of the AML states that an administrative organ or organisation may not abuse its 
administrative powers in order to eliminate or restrict competition. 
196 For example, Art. 33(1) prohibits imposing discriminative charge items, discriminative charge 
standards or discriminative prices upon commodities from outside the locality, while Art. 33(5) 
prohibits conduct for the purpose of hampering commodities from free circulation between regions. 
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EU businesses’ complaints against China’s competition policy are many, and one of them is 
that the AML seems to target only foreign businesses. In reality, this allegation may have 
some truth only in relation to M&A transaction reviews conducted by MOFCOM, while the 
blanket allegation may be a result of a few high profile AML cases that took place in the 
summer of 2013.197 In effect, among the firms investigated for price-fixing, there is a fair 
distribution between foreign and domestic firms. Even with regard to the extraordinary 
price-fixing investigation against pharmaceutical companies conducted by the NDRC in July 
2013, only six of the 60 investigated companies were involved in the Chinese domestic 
affiliates of international pharmaceutical companies, such as GSK China. Based on the 
information compiled by the US-China Business Council, 25% of the pricing investigations 
carried out by the NDRC have involved foreign companies, while approximately 75% have 
involved Chinese companies; 97% of 1,058 M&A transactions since 2008 have been 
approved by the MOFCOM without conditions, while all of the 26 rejected or conditionally 
approved transactions have involved foreign companies; and all of the 22 completed 
monopoly investigations conducted by the SAIC have involved Chinese companies, while 
foreign companies are involved in two ongoing cases yet to be decided (US-China Business 
Council, 2015). 
There is no doubt that within the context of China’s competition policy implementation, it is 
the M&A reviews which have caused most controversies revolving around AML application, 
practice and procedures. This may be best illustrated by the P3 Network Alliance merger 
review,198 which was concluded in June 2014. The proposed transaction was eventually 
rejected by MOFCOM after negotiations on remedies failed, and this caught many by 
surprise particularly because the US Federal Maritime Commission approved the merger 
and the European Commission decided not to intervene, although one must note that 
different jurisdictions do sometimes decide a particular case differently, and after all the 
investigated markets among the three competition jurisdictions were different. The P3 
Network Alliance case was nonetheless MOFCOM’s second prohibition decision (the first 
prohibition decision was on Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, in 2009) since China’s AML came into force, 
                                                   
197 In August 2013, the NDRC imposed a fine of €100 million in total on the six foreign infant formula 
companies (i.e. Abbott Laboratories, Biostime International, Dumex, Fonterra, Mead Johnson and 
FrieslandCampina) for price-fixing. This was the largest fine China has ever levied for AML violation. 
In July 2013, 60 pharmaceutical companies (including the domestic affiliates of half a dozen 
international groups, such as Astellas of Japan, Merck of the US and GSK of the UK) were also 
investigated by the NDRC for controlling input costs and setting drug prices; in the same week SAIC 
launched an investigation against Tetra Pak for abuse of dominant position. 
198 On 17 June 2014, after negotiations on remedies failed, MOFCOM issued its decision of 
prohibiting the proposed P3 Network Alliance merger transaction among the world’s three largest 
container shipping lines, i.e. Denmark’s Maersk, Switzerland’s MSC and France’s CMA CGM.  
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and the first time that MOFCOM prohibited a foreign-to-foreign international transaction.199 
Controversies derived from the P3 Network Alliance review typically involve the following.  
Firstly, and generally, there is the question of MOFCOM’s jurisdictional grounds for 
conducting a transaction review or, in other words, at which point in time a consortium or 
other forms of cooperation may give rise to a reviewable transaction.200 In MOFCOM’s 
decision this question was not addressed, and this would make it difficult for companies to 
conclude definitively that no MOFCOM filing would be required in at least some cases. 
Indeed, the question concerning notification of antitrust review is a complicated one. This is 
because, in addition to the relevant governing provisions provided by the AML (chapter 4) 
on the definitions of concentration, the 2008 State Council Regulations on thresholds, 
MOFCOM can also conduct within its competence an investigation of concentrations 
between undertakings which do not reach the notification thresholds, if there are 
indications that the concentrations are likely to have the effect of eliminating or restricting 
competition.201 This is said to be an antitrust practice in the US and the EU, but it was not 
until June 2014 that MOFCOM published the revised Guidance on the Notification of 
Concentrations of Business Undertakings, which sets out, inter alia, the factors it will 
consider when determining whether a transaction results in “control” or “decisive 
influence” within the meaning of the AML (triggering a duty to file if the applicable turnover 
thresholds are met). It is also noted that significant commercial relationships, cooperation 
agreements, etc., between the transaction parties would establish jurisdiction for review.  
On AML application, there is also a debate with respect to whether the AML is an 
instrument for protecting domestic industry rather than promoting fair competition, 
because of the way that MOFCOM assesses M&A transactions. As opposed to the EU, which 
often imposes structural remedies, MOFCOM extensively uses behavioural remedies as a 
condition to authorise a merger transaction, which involve a commitment to engage in a 
                                                   
199 Following a nine-month review period, MOFCOM concluded that the merger among the three 
container shipping firms would lead to the market becoming highly concentrated, increase barriers 
to entry and confer market power on the three parties of the alliance. The decision was based on the 
following considerations: (i) the degree and scope of cooperation resulting from the alliance, (ii) 
market shares, (iii) market concentration level, (iv) barriers to entry, and (v) the impact of the 
merger on competitors and the industry. See Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Briefing (2014). 
200 This specific question was raised because of MOFCOM’s assessment on the degree and scope of 
cooperation resulting from the perceived alliance. MOFCOM’s review finding was that the P3 
Network Alliance would result in a “tight consortium”, different from a traditional “loose shipping 
alliance”. Nonetheless, MOFCOM’s decision did not explain whether MOFCOM was assessing the 
jurisdictional basis for its intervention in this case or whether it was, in fact, expressing concerns in 
relation to the perceived competitive harm arising from the transaction. See Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer Briefing (2014).  
201 Art. 4, State Council Regulation on the Notification of Thresholds for Concentrations of 
Undertakings. 
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specific conduct to preserve the same competition conditions after completing the merger. 
The end result of this practice is that the same competition conditions would remain after 
the transaction.202 Thus the ambiguity over whether MOFOM’s philosophy for transaction 
review is to protect competitors or to promote competition.  
Secondly, on AML application concerning review criteria, it was suggested, for example, that 
MOFCOM did not pay sufficient attention to the significant cost savings and other 
efficiencies the transaction would have created since they were not discussed in MOFCOM’s 
decision. On the other hand, the proposed Alliance did present the case and the US Federal 
Maritime Commission found that the Alliance would create significant efficiencies for the 
benefit of consumers.  
Thirdly, on how transaction reviews are conducted and in which case it may be related to 
MOFCOM’s overarching jurisdictional authority, by virtue of Article 28 of the AML, 
MOFCOM is competent to approve a transaction with perceived anti-competitive effects if it 
can be proved that there is more positive than negative impact on competition or that the 
transaction is in the public interest. Therefore, it was suggested that MOFCOM’s decision to 
reject P3 Network Alliance’s transaction was based on industrial considerations, i.e. public 
interests. There was speculation that the proposed transaction was thwarted because of the 
opposition expressed by China’s shipping industry at the public consultation. It was also 
suggested that MOFCOM’s rejection was influenced by the fact that the Alliance’s Asia-
Europe route, which MOFCOM’s investigation focused on, was a strategic and lucrative 
trade route for China’s exporters, ports and container shipping lines, which is a sector facing 
overcapacity issues and rising costs.  
Fourthly, review procedure with regard to transparency, impartiality and consistency was 
raised because, for example, during the consultation period, MOFCOM engaged external 
consultants to assist its review, but it was unclear if the Alliance parties had the opportunity 
to engage with the external consultants while in general parties did not have such 
opportunities.  
Besides the above concerns, domestic companies’ merger notification is equally an issue of 
worry for the sake of transparency. Domestic mergers are not reported as they should be 
and there are no punishments for failure to report. So far, none of the 26 rejected or 
conditionally approved transactions under MOFCOM’s investigation involved domestic 
companies, including SOEs; their transactions are often left uninvestigated (while some of 
                                                   
202 Behavioural remedies include, for example, price caps; mandatory licensing provisions; and 
prohibitions on the sharing of information within the merged entity. The EU uses more structural 
remedies which require the divestment of some of the involved companies’ assets in favour of actual 
or potential competitors in order to maintain the same level of competitive pressure in a market 
which would otherwise be too concentrated post-merger. See Mariniello (2013). 
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their transactions are not reported to MOFCOM in the first place).203 Statistics reveal that 
the largest 110 Chinese SOEs conducted over 900 M&A deals in 2012; of the 20 merger 
deals evaluated and cleared that year, the only one involving an SOE was the acquisition of 
one by a foreign buyer (Bergsten et al., 2014:337). This reality has further fuelled the 
complaint that remedies imposed by MOFCOM on M&A conditional approvals often aim to 
protect domestic competitors from the potential increase in the competitiveness of the 
merged companies. 
For price-related investigations, the number of cases undertaken by the NDRC has 
significantly increased in recent years and peaked in 2014 when, taking pricing 
investigations alone, there were 335 investigations conducted by the NDRC and its 
provincial branches (as of September 2014)204 – only 20 price-related investigations at 
central and provincial levels took place between 2008 and 2012. However, enforcement 
activities are slow. The NDRC and its provincial branches announced only two cases as of 
May 2015, and fined Qualcomm RMB 6.088 billion (€882.4 million), and Mercedes-Benz CNY 
350 million (€48.8 million). Nonetheless, information on many of these investigations 
conducted by the NDRC is missing, making it difficult to determine their objectives, process 
and outcomes.205 Consequently, there are also complaints against uneven enforcement in 
different parts of China due to local interests/protectionism, or favouritism often tied 
primarily to employment concerns. Moreover, reflecting on the couple of high profile cases 
concerning infant formula and pharmaceutical companies in the summer of 2014, there is 
uncertainty over whether the remedy of lowering prices imposed by the NDRC is not 
motivated by policy considerations, for example on fighting inflation, i.e. perhaps the 
market should determine the remedy based on the merits of competition. Overall, the 
NDRC has investigated sectors of pharmaceuticals, telecoms, banking, food and beverage, 
infant formula, tourism and chemicals. It is said that the NDRC’s next major focus on AML 
enforcement will be the abuse of intellectual property rights. 
Since the AML came into force in 2008, SAIC has also increased its enforcement activities, 
although many of the investigations were concluded without imposing penalties. Like the 
NDRC’s investigations, publically available information with regard to SAIC’s investigations is 
                                                   
203 The website of MOFCOM’s Anti-Monopoly Bureau (http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jyzjzjyajgs/) 
publishes “notification of simple case” concerning mergers applied by domestic and foreign firms in 
China and abroad.  
204 Ten per cent of these investigations involve foreign companies. See US-China Business Council 
(2015). 
205 For example, for the 335 pricing investigations conducted by the NDRC and its provincial 
branches, a number which was unveiled by senior Chinese officials, the US-China Business Council in 
fact only uncovered 36 of them; based on public information about completed cases, 10 were 
investigated by NDRC at the central level, 16 by NDRC at the provincial level, and one case was 
investigated jointly. See US-China Business Council (2015). 
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incomplete and contradictory. It was said that altogether 30 investigations were conducted 
between 2008 and 2014, but only 14 of these cases were publicly announced (US-China 
Business Council, 2015). Much information on the investigations as well as on the decisions 
is not available. Therefore, for the EU, the challenge is to achieve converging rules and 
procedural standards, in particular with respect to procedural rights of parties to an 
investigation. On the other hand, the EU has yet to forge enforcement cooperation with the 
NDRC and SAIC (European Commission, 2015d).  
14.4.2 Competition in China’s FTAs 
Give that the AML came into force only in 2008, FTAs that China signed prior to 2008 do not 
have a competition chapter. But since then, competition has become a component of every 
FTA that China has signed with its trade partners, including Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, 
South Korea and Australia. Prior to the China-South Korea FTA, the competition chapter 
under China’s FTAs merely affirmed the importance of competition, sometimes including 
the application to SOEs but only very broadly, unlike Article 62.2 of the China-Iceland FTA, 
which sets the framework of cooperation such as exchange of information, and asserts the 
commitment for cooperation as well as for consultation when disputes arise. In general, the 
provisions on competition are broad, often without binding effect (unlike Article 62.3 of the 
China-Iceland FTA and Article 10.3 of the China-Switzerland FTA) and not subject to the 
dispute settlement mechanism (Article 10.6 of the China-Switzerland FTA). 
However, the competition chapter under China’s FTA signed with South Korea and Australia 
contains much more substance and details, and has greater ambition. For example, the 
scope of the competition chapter under the China-South Korea FTA is wider. It covers, 
among others, enforcement principles with transparency, non-discrimination, and 
procedural fairness as well as the MFN treatment of persons of each party in like 
circumstances as far as enforcement is concerned, transparency with regard to making 
available information on competition laws and regulations, written decisions, cooperation in 
enforcement and the obligation to notification. Notably, all undertakings will be subject to 
the competition chapter, including those of public enterprises and enterprises entrusted 
with special rights, which effectively means monopolistic enterprises created by either 
government as provider of goods and services.206 Both parties are also under the obligation 
to eliminate anti-competitive business practices which will prevent trade liberalisation; such 
practices include abuse of dominant position, concentration and concerted practices, etc., 
meant to thwart competition. But as the provisions are all rather principle-based, it remains 
                                                   
206 Special rights are defined as rights granted by a party government when it designates or limits to 
two or more the number of enterprises authorised to provide goods or services, other than 
according to objective, proportional and non-discriminatory criteria, or confers on enterprises legal 
or regulatory advantages which substantially affect the ability of any other enterprise to provide the 
same goods or services. See footnote 51, China-Korea FTA. 
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to be seen how they can be implemented in the context of the FTA. Nonetheless, such 
principles, which are all universally recognised since they also appear in EU FTAs, provide a 
good basis for the EU and China to open negotiations on competition. Competition is, 
nonetheless, not an independent chapter under the China-Australia FTA, but rather falls 
under Chapter 16 on general provisions and exceptions. Article 16.7 of the China-Australia 
FTA sets out the provisions on competition cooperation and the scope of cooperation does 
not go beyond what was signed prior to the China-South Korea FTA and is thus limited to 
cooperation, which is very surprising  
14.4.3 Competition in EU FTAs 
The EU has preferred to include detailed provisions on competition in trade agreements 
with third countries but not soft law approaches to substance, such as in the Global 
Competition Forum and bilateral agreements on cooperation between competition 
authorities (Mustilli, 2015). Two EU FTAs will be examined below, one with Singapore, a 
country with a large presence of SOEs, and Vietnam, a country with a Communist and 
planned economy past. This is based on the consideration that the EU may be able to draw 
some reference from its experience in competition negotiations with the two countries as 
they share similar social and economic characteristics with China. For the same reason, 
China can also find the benchmark and appreciate the EU’s disposition towards competition 
negotiations. 
Looking at the EU-Singapore FTA, the chapter on competition and related matters is 
applicable to public undertakings, as well as undertakings entrusted with special or exclusive 
rights and state monopolies.207 Section B of the chapter lays down more detailed rules to 
govern public undertakings, including state monopolies, while both the EU and Singapore 
are committed to adjusting state monopolies of a commercial character in order to ensure 
that no discrimination is exercised while procuring and marketing goods and services from 
the other party.208 Notably, prohibited subsidies are listed under Article 12.7: any 
governmental legal arrangement meant to cover debts or liabilities of certain undertakings 
without any limitation; and support to insolvent or ailing undertakings in whatever form 
without a credible restructuring plan.  
As to the competition chapter under the EU-Vietnam FTA, following the principles which are 
similar to what China and its FTA partners committed to, there is a specific subsection that 
                                                   
207 Art. 12.3.2, Section B: Public Undertakings, Undertakings Entrusted with Special or Exclusive 
Rights and State Monopolies, Chapter Twelve Competition and Related Matters, EU-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement (authentic text as of May 2015). 
208 Art. 12.4, Section B: Public Undertakings, Undertakings Entrusted with Special or Exclusive Rights 
and State Monopolies, Chapter Twelve Competition and Related Matters, EU-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement (authentic text as of May 2015). 
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first addresses subsidies with a detailed scope of application and definition, and, as 
expected, both private and public enterprises are subject to the agreed rules.209 As is the 
case of the EU-Singapore FTA on competition, there are also provisions governing specific 
subsidies which may be legal only when certain conditions are met. Those specific subsidies 
are the same as those listed in the EU-Singapore FTA, which are the government’s legal 
arrangement meant to cover debts or liabilities of an enterprise and the government’s 
support to insolvent or ailing enterprises in various forms.  
14.4.4 Conclusion 
Comparing the FTAs signed respectively by China and the EU, both sides uphold the same 
principles on competition, including state monopolies, but China fell short regarding 
“specific subsidies”, namely those subsidies prohibited by the EU in its FTAs with Singapore 
and Vietnam. This is exactly where challenges will emerge. The EU’s attitude is that such 
specific subsidies would be legal only under certain conditions, while blanket and unlimited 
subsidies are prohibited. This aspect is highly sensitive, because it directly links to China’s 
ambiguous position, and its often unconditional and substantial subsidies, towards SOEs. 
China has yet to specify what Article 7 of the AML means in terms of, for example, “lawful 
business” and “lifeline of national economy”. As to those issues such as procedural rules, 
transparency, cooperation, capacity-building exercises, etc., which are components under 
the EU’s competition policy in its FTAs, they are presently within the remit of the ongoing 
EU-China competition dialogue. China pledged the same commitments in its FTAs, too, but 
will need to improve its technical competence in these issues. One hopes that China can 
progress in a more expedited manner, so that the gaps between the EU and China are 
narrow enough to foster a foundation for reaching an agreement on competition policy.  
  
                                                   
209 Art. x2(3) Section II: Subsidies, Chapter 11 Competition Policy, EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement 
(agreed text as of January 2016). 
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15. Investment and the BIT 
As noted in chapter 1, the current Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) 
negotiations are a derivative of the PCA negotiations, in particular, of the trade and 
investment pillar. The CAI has been negotiated since September 2012. In January 2016, the 
two parties decided to assume a wide scope of the negotiations which should improve 
market access opportunities for their investors, guarantee that they will not discriminate 
against their respective companies, and provide a high and balanced level of protection for 
investors and their investments. Key challenges of the regulatory environment, relating to 
transparency, licensing and authorisation procedures, are also within the scope of 
negotiations (European Commission, 2016). The CAI is a stand-alone negotiation because in 
the aftermath of the PCA talks China declared that it took no interest in an FTA with the EU. 
This probably started to change already in 2012. However, early in 2014 China made explicit 
at top political level that it was interested in exploring an FTA with the EU. On 31 March 
2014 in Brussels, President Xi made a plea for exploring the idea of an EU-China FTA and 
repeated it in Bruges on 1 April. This might have been inspired by the newly announced 
reforms in China, a stronger stance than the previous government, which seemed to shy 
away from “WTO plus” commitments on liberalisation of tariffs and services (European 
Commission (2013:17). Given the present study, one may query whether negotiating a CAI 
might be incorporated in a future FTA. The EU so far has maintained the position that it 
wants to see a good outcome on the CAI negotiations before taking the next step of 
exploring, let alone launching, a possible EU-China FTA.210 In this chapter, realistic options 
for the CAI negotiations will be examined, leaving open the option of – perhaps later – 
incorporating the CAI in a China-EU FTA. However, with the recent decision to address both 
investment protection and access for investors to Chinese markets – of course, also for 
Chinese FDI in the EU – in the CAI, there is a de facto overlap with a segment of a future 
FTA, in particular but not only for services (see also chapter 11).  
15.1 Why a CAI? 
The primary objectives of a CAI are to achieve market access for EU and Chinese investors, 
and modern investment protection. Far-reaching restrictions on foreign investors from 
entering and/or doing business in many Chinese services and goods markets generate a 
powerful motivation to negotiate a CAI. A second motivation is the fragmentation of 
investment protection for European firms due to national bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
with China, some of which are also hopelessly outdated. A modern EU-wide investment 
protection agreement would be a valuable improvement. Market access depends essentially 
                                                   
210 In addition, the EU wants to see the results of China’s internal reforms by giving the market a 
decisive role and the country’s leadership in multilateral trade negotiations. See Malmström (2016). 
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on the reach of ‘national treatment’ as well as MFN and the exceptions specified in the 
treaty (compatible with each economy’s GATS commitments). For this purpose, one can 
employ negative listing (a list of exceptions to national treatment, also called ‘non-
conforming measures’, both at EU and member state level) or positive listing (a list of 
‘specific commitments’ to provide access, which is typically EU-wide) without any further 
clarification about the restrictions or bans which fall outside the positive list. There is no 
such thing as a perfect and completely open investment regime, if only for reasons of 
security or defence. But the ambition to grant degrees of effective national treatment 
differs enormously between WTO members. Partly, this is so because the WTO does not 
incorporate the basics of a WTO-led regime for FDI, except for TRIMs, which is only 
applicable to trade in goods.211 And there is no other world institution dealing with 
investment. Among the 58 most important trading countries, including all OECD and G20 
countries, China is known to have the most restrictive FDI regime and covers 22 sectors, 
such as agriculture, mining and quarrying (including oil extraction), manufacturing, oil 
refinery and chemicals, retail and transport. Thus China creating a level-playing field for 
foreign companies already in China or for potential entrants is a very tall order. Once in 
China, effective and predictable (bilateral) investment protection is equally crucial and 
represents the classical core of BITs in the world since the 1960s.  
Figure 15.1 FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index in 2014 
 
Source: OECD (2016). 
                                                   
211 TRIMs address the worst restrictions of investment in trade in goods, e.g. protectionist 
performance requirements (Annex). Also, in relation to transparency, each member is required to 
accord “sympathetic consideration” to requests for information-sharing, and afford adequate 
opportunity for consultation, raised by another member for matters arising from the agreement 
(Art. 6).  
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Figure 15.1 depicts the OECD 2014 FDI Restrictiveness Index for 28 of the 58 countries, all 
non-EU ones. China’s bans and restrictions add up to an even higher index than notoriously 
difficult cases such as Saudi Arabia and Myanmar, and also far higher than the index for 
other BRICs. The EU index is not given but it is lower than the OECD average (the last bar). 
There has been some discussion whether or not recent changes in, e.g. the Chinese 
Catalogue for Foreign Investment (cf. ch. 11), have been in the direction of a slow opening 
up. Figure 15.2 shows the index for China over time, indicating clearly that it has been flat 
for a decade now: the index has not decreased from its high level. One possible explanation 
might be that the Catalogue is only one of very many legal and other instruments (at more 
than one level) to regulate FDI and the other ones have, on average, not become more 
liberal. Figure 15.2 does not seem to accord well with what the reform process in China 
pretends to do. If reforms are apparently incapable of reducing the worst FDI restrictions 
among all relevant WTO countries, the credibility of the entire reform process risks being 
lost.  
Figure 15.2 China FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index since 1997 
 
Source: OECD (2016). 
In the context of EU-China bilateral investment relations, Chinese companies have relatively 
easy access to the European market, whereas EU companies face serious access problems in 
China. Investment obstacles in China are of two types. The first type consists of an overall 
investment strategy not so much based on principles of free markets (with an exception 
here or there) but rather on categorising FDI in four classes: prohibited, restricted, allowed 
and encouraged. The strategy is adapted over time so that it amounts to an industrial 
strategy or what are called ‘structural policies’ fitting the five-year plans of China. Therefore, 
access issues are found in the first three classes in various ways. Even the fourth class 
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(encouraged) might be no longer ‘encouraged’ in the next period of industrial policy-making. 
The second type refers to ‘post-establishment’ when EU (and other foreign) investors 
experience an unlevel playing field for doing business, that is, a myriad of policy restrictions 
and forms of discrimination.  
Over the last decade or so, China has prudently and selectively reduced post-establishment 
FDI restrictions, although the pattern is not always very clear (as Figure 15.2 confirms). 
However, one has to realise that this prudent relaxation started from an even more extreme 
position of restrictiveness and that the OECD FDI restrictiveness index for China today still 
remains the highest of all. As China continues to pursue reforms to further open up its 
economy, especially in unlocking its service sector, prohibitions on investment these days 
might be lifted, except perhaps in sectors concerning national security (which, however, is 
interpreted very widely by China). More often than not, FDI restrictions protect SOEs’ 
interests, in order to help maintain their dominant positions in the economy. The so-called 
‘structural policies’, which may come in many forms and be enacted by various 
governmental administrations at different legislative levels, frequently ignore the principles 
of non-discriminatory treatment and commercial considerations enshrined in GATT, Article 
XVII.  
As far as investment protection is concerned, all EU member states except Ireland have a 
BIT with China, though about half are outdated, having been concluded in the 1980s. It is 
also clear that an EU-wide BIT as part of the CAI will be more attractive than a collection of 
national ones, as the EU’s size and prominence as an investor in China should be a non-legal 
but nevertheless crucial advantage (see chapter 15.2). ‘Fair and equitable treatment’ is the 
minimum standard for investment protection, besides the basic provisions on expropriation 
and ‘indirect’ expropriation. At the moment, the BITs governing the investment protection 
relations between China and the EU member states (except Ireland) comprise various 
protection instruments resulting in different levels of investment protection. At the same 
time, EU businesses complain that China’s anti-monopoly laws only target foreign 
investments. Although chapter 14 shows that this assertion is a fallacy, it nevertheless casts 
doubts on “full protection and security” – as the minimum – for investment protection, 
without discrimination against EU business in China. 
Chinese investors, though not as vocal as their European counterparts, do have complaints 
about FDI in the EU, too, arising chiefly from a fragmented, instead of a single, market. 
Another major problem concerns mode 4 of the GATS, the movement of (business) people 
relevant for the potential entrant or an already established (Chinese) investor, although 
there are signs of limited relaxation which will be highlighted later. Perhaps this problem is 
less appreciated by EU citizens since “the free movement of people” is a way of European 
life. Moreover, EU citizens enjoy a “visa-waiver” in many countries as a visitor. Chinese 
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citizens’ movement to, as well as inside, the EU is subject to visa restrictions, while obtaining 
a temporary leave to stay for business purposes is a tough undertaking.212 This can be a 
problem, if not an irritant for Chinese business persons when visiting Europe. Mode 4 is a 
complicated amalgam of aspects. First, visa problems are a genuine irritant for Chinese 
business persons, no doubt, but they cannot be negotiated in a CAI with the EU, for the 
simple reason that the member states and not the EU level (hence, not the Commission as 
the EU negotiator) are competent in the matter. Of course, EU member states could jointly 
try to formulate a common facilitating arrangement, as an accompanying move of the CAI, 
but that is bound to be very cumbersome to achieve. In January 2016, as one of the 
recommendations for TiSA negotiations, the European Parliament voted to state that the 
EU’s commitments should be limited to “highly-skilled professionals providing a service for a 
limited period of time and under precise conditions stipulated by the domestic legislation of 
the country where the service if performed”.213  
The CAI stands for ‘comprehensive’ but what does comprehensive imply? At the moment, 
only some sketchy information on the scope of the prospective CAI is available. The only 
way to acquire some understanding of this property is to compare different FTAs with an 
investment chapter aiming at more than a pure BIT such as CETA (as the highest standard in 
the world), i.e. EU-Vietnam, EU-Singapore and EU-South Korea. For China, which is only 
beginning to practise this wider approach, the candidates can be China-South Korea214 and 
China-Australia. The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) 
concluded between Canada and China (and came into force on 1 October 2014) is worth 
examining, too, since it is regarded as a “high-standard agreement with comprehensive 
scope and coverage”.215 
                                                   
212 According to the Visa Restrictions Index, a global ranking of countries based on the total number 
of other countries which they can access visa-free, the Chinese passport ranks 87th in the world (tied 
with Cambodia). As of 1 January 2016, holders of Chinese passports are granted visa-free/visa-on-
arrival in 50 countries and territories. All EU member state passports were ranked in the top 20 
except Bulgaria and Romania, which are tied at 21st. See Henley & Partners (2016). 
213 Recommendations included having EU TiSA negotiators deliver international rules and more 
opportunities for EU firms to supply services such as transport and telecoms in third countries. But 
“nothing should prevent EU, national and local authorities from maintaining, improving and applying 
their laws”, notably on labour and data protection. See European Parliament (2016b). 
214 One might also study the investment chapter of TPP, as this is now the highest standard in APEC 
and which might, sooner or later, become relevant for China, too.  
215 Available at www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/ 
china-chine.aspx?lang=eng&view=d. 
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15.2 Why are the existing BITs insufficient?  
Currently, 26 BITs216 have been concluded between individual EU member states and China 
since 1982. The BITs cover all EU member states but Ireland. Obligations pertaining to these 
BITs are with regard to national treatment and MFN treatment, investment promotion, 
guaranteeing the freedom to invest as well as free transfer of proceeds. Foreign firms are 
protected against expropriation and ‘indirect’ expropriation. Disputes between contracting 
parties are settled through diplomatic channels, by (domestic) litigation or by arbitral 
tribunal for disputes arising between the hosting contracting party and the investor. 
Although some BITs were signed in the early 1980s, they were updated about a decade ago. 
Changes typically included a wider scope of investment and possible recourse to a new 
dispute settlement mechanism, i.e. investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). For example, 
IPR protection is included in the updated China-Germany BIT concluded in 2003, updating 
the 1983 version. Some EU member states have not updated their BITs with China, such as 
Austria, Denmark, Italy and the UK. Their BITs signed in the 1980s are still in force. This 
brings about an uneven level, as well as standards, of protection for European investors, for 
example concerning dispute settlement. Second, the scope of the existing BITs does not 
respond to the needs and demands of today’s foreign investment. The existing BITs focus on 
investment promotion and the freedom to invest (and to transfer proceeds) rather than on 
market access for investors, where the foreign investment in China is hindered the most. 
Hence, beyond the basic protection against expropriation, existing BITs serve little purpose. 
Furthermore, with 26 scattered BITs, the EU is not able to assert its role in enabling the 
member states to collectively advance their shared interests in investment. Indeed, there 
are often complaints about China for playing the game of ‘divide and rule’.217 In the 
meantime, one should realise that China, too, needs an updated CAI with the EU for two 
reasons: for advancing its increasingly ambitious foreign investment needs and for 
accelerating domestic reforms. In the process of ‘going global’, Chinese investors have 
encountered many obstacles to market access which frustrate their ambition. This issue will 
most likely become more accentuated once the implementation of the ‘one belt one road’ 
initiative reaches Europe. In parallel, China is struggling to advance SOE reforms. The 
benchmark is to adhere to two ‘GATT principles’ (i.e. non-discriminatory treatment and 
commercial consideration), in addition to an effective enforcement mechanism. In order to 
accomplish this, China has to first tackle SOEs’ dominant positions in the economy, to 
remove their privileges of policy protection under various forms, including easy access to 
financial assistance, loss coverage and lower capital costs (see also chapter 14), in order to 
                                                   
216 For the list of BITs concluded between China and the EU member states, see 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/bilateralchanges/201309/20130900300306.shtml). 
217 On the other hand, it is quite obvious that China will pursue its own interests single-mindedly and 
to target individual countries by picking the easiest interlocutors to deal with in order to achieve its 
aims. See House of Lords, European Union Committee (2010), p. 20.  
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create a level playing field – that is, non-discriminatory market access – for the benefits of 
its own private businesses as well as of foreign investors. But this is exactly where the 
impediments lie at the moment. The country announced its new SOE reform goals at the 
Third Plenum in November 2013, but it has, so far, not announced any implementing rules; 
such delay hinders China’s reforms in other aspects of the economy, such as the 
competition policy for which SOEs’ interest is still a taboo but nonetheless must be 
addressed sooner rather than later, if China wishes to negotiate an FTA with the EU. 
Somehow, the internal difficulties, perhaps mainly due to the vested interests, may be 
solved by “external pressure”,218 e.g. an EU-China CAI, in which case vested interests must 
give way to a bilateral legally-binding agreement once it is incorporated into national laws. 
China’s international treaty obligation will then become paramount, and the internal 
frictions will subside and (ideally) die down eventually.  
15.3 Investment issues an EU-China CAI should address 
The scope of investment is wide, encompassing almost the whole economy and “every kind 
of asset which is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by investors of one Party in the 
territory of the other Party, which has the characteristics of an investment”.219 The 
movement of natural persons falls within the remit, too. But to answer this specific question 
as to what investment issues an EU-China CAI should address, one has to see the 
controversies surrounding existing investment between the EU and China with regard to 
market access and protection. As a general observation, both the EU and China allege rising 
protectionism by the other side against their investment.  
Box 15.1 On investment, pre-market access for investors and establishment 
In a CAI dealing with pre-market access and not only with investment protection, one has to 
appreciate the terminology, gradually developed by trade and investment negotiators, and its 
meaning. As noted in the main text, investment is usually defined rather broadly, even 
stretching so far as to include elements of portfolio investments. But the notion of pre-market 
access here does not strictly relate to ‘investment’ but to ‘establishment’. This is not 
immediately obvious from the four modes of GATS. The principal reason is that GATS is about 
services, hence, mode 3 is about investment in services. However, the EU and other countries 
have introduced ‘establishment’ for purposes of negotiating ‘pre-market access’. On the face of 
it, ‘commercial presence’ (GATS terminology for mode 3) and establishment are one and the 
same thing. One can of course argue that post-box companies need to be avoided (they are not 
                                                   
218 This argument was repeatedly brought forward by the Chinese policy-makers and think tanks 
during the authors’ interviews conducted in Beijing, 29 November-4 December 2015. 
219 Art. 1(p), Chapter 1 General Provisions, Section 8 Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce, 
EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (agreed text as of January 2016).  
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really a ‘commercial presence’ in a substantive way, hence, one may require ‘substantial 
business operations’), but otherwise the introduction of the term ‘establishment’ seems to 
serve no purpose. The point is, however, that pre-market access for investors relates to 
‘establishment’ in every sense, that is, not only the legal idea of a company but also building a 
factory or a storage facility, etc. Because of this meaning, the terminology has been 
‘disconnected’ from the GATS: establishment rights under ‘market access’ relate just as much to 
goods activities as to services, whereas mode 3 of GATS is only services-related. Market access 
in the CAI is therefore also of importance to manufacturers wishing to build a plant or extend 
one or create their own distribution centre, as it is to FDI in services, unless an activity in the 
relevant sector has been explicitly excluded.  
The EU sees plenty of barriers and high potential for investment in China at the same time. 
The size of the Chinese market and sustained high economic growth is tempting. Although it 
dropped to less than 7% in 2015,220 this growth rate is higher than that of any of the other 
major economies surveyed by the World Bank, with the possible exception of India.221 China 
surpassed the US in 2014 as the world’s top destination for annual FDI inflows when the 
country attracted $120 billion of investment. However, the restrictions on foreign 
investment in China are numerous and in various forms, such as industrial structural 
policies, equity caps (especially the imposition of joint ventures) and other disturbances, 
such as a lack of transparency, corruption and an unreliable legal system (U.S. Department 
of State, 2015). The mixed picture of potential high reward and pre- and post-establishment 
restrictions may be best illustrated by foreign insurance companies’ performance in China: 
their (low) market share is steadily increasing and premium totals increased by as much as 
22.95% from 2014 to 2015. The China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) admits 
nonetheless that foreign insurers’ business scale remains limited in China.222 It was also 
revealed that some foreign insurers were compelled to withdraw from China due to the 
discriminatory structural policies, which only the ‘five brothers’ (who all made the 2015 
Fortune Global 500) may profit.223 
                                                   
220 China’s GDP grew by an estimated 7% in 2015, according to the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC). It is down from the 7.3% growth in 2014. UBS Securities predicted that 
2016 will be a “difficult year” in terms of economic development, and GDP growth will slow down 
further to 6.2% for the whole year. See Flanders-Chinese Chamber of Commerce (2016). One should 
add that there is widespread mistrust, but no proof, of China’s growth figures.  
221 Available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. 
222 During 2014, the market share for foreign players reached 4.5% compared with 3.9% in 2013. The 
market share for foreign life insurance companies showed a steady increase rate during the past 
year and reached 5.78%, while foreign property insurance companies managed to gain a 2.22% 
market share. The premium for foreign insurance companies in 2014 was RMB 734 billion in total, a 
jump of 22.95% year-on-year. See European Chamber of Commerce in China (2015), p. 377. 
223 Based on interviews conducted in Beijing, 29 November-4 December 2015 
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Box 15.2 Chinese FDI and centralising EU investment policy at home?  
The EU has no FDI screening or approval regime at EU level. EU member states differ in this 
respect, from having no regime whatsoever (for many) to various forms of screening. This is in 
sharp contrast to China where FDI may be forbidden or restricted in a number of sectors but 
when allowed or even encouraged, there is still an approval system on a case-by-case basis 
which creates permanent uncertainty and a sense of arbitrariness. Countries like the US, Canada 
and Australia all have screening/approval regimes, the key criterion being national security 
(which can be stretched to include national economic security)224.  
In the EU, there is occasionally a debate on whether or not Chinese FDI should be subject to 
scrutiny. During the financial crisis, several Commissioners and some MEPs advocated such an 
approach but no proposals were ever tabled. But the unease about Chinese FDI in the EU has 
recently increased again, with a fairly sharp rise in incoming FDI from China in 2014 and 2015, 
including some spectacular takeovers. Strictly speaking, this is not an FTA issue. But given the 
CAI negotiations and the importance of Chinese FDI in Europe nowadays, it is important to be 
aware of this debate and the thrust of it. Much of the debate can be appreciated by the contrast 
between two recent contributions, one by Alan Riley (2016) arguing strongly for detailed 
scrutiny and some prior conditions (but not primarily focused on security), and one by Cora 
Jungbluth (2016) emphasising the positive contribution of Chinese FDI in Europe and reminding 
readers of the logic of Chinese business ‘going global’.  
Riley’s many points cannot all be reiterated. He emphasises the lack of reciprocity, but, above 
all, the opaqueness of Chinese corporate law obligations (such that elementary information is 
not available for some large companies – the stunning example being an insurance company 
suddenly attracting capital from 31 investors and thereby becoming six times as big, 
subsequently making a series of sizeable takeovers on a cash basis and not having to report at 
all), the omnipresent, ‘invisible’ hand of the Party and the state in influencing Chinese business 
(and private life) (in court, not disclosing the hand of the Party could be regarded as a ‘material 
non-disclosure’), the practical options for Chinese ‘zombie’ companies (loaded with debt) to still 
go for M&A in Europe, and some problematic features about tacit collusion between Chinese 
companies coming to the EU.  
Jungbluth compares screaming headlines in European newspapers ever since 2006 (about a 
Chinese tsunami, etc.) with the hard data available about Chinese FDI in the EU, flows and 
stocks (see also chapter 3) which do not confirm anything even remotely close to ‘buying 
Europe’. She recalls the ‘recognisable bias’ of the US CFIUS (approval/scrutiny organ) and argues 
that Chinese investors in the EU typically do not behave short-term but rather like strategic 
investors do. She also notes that Chinese FDI does not even reach 1% in the OECD countries, and 
two-thirds of the Chinese FDI flow went to Asia. The author laments the fragmented EU stance 
(member states competing against each other) vis-à-vis Chinese FDI. 
                                                   
224 For a careful survey with data on the US approval (CFIUS) of Chinese FDI, see Bergsten, Hufbauer 
& Miner (2014), pp. 273-279. 
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The regime governing China’s foreign investment is over-regulated. In addition to the three 
core laws, i.e. the China-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise Law, the China-Foreign 
Cooperative Joint Venture Enterprise Law, and the Foreign-Invested Enterprise Law, the 
State Council, many ministries as well as local legislatures and governments are all 
competent to, and they do, enact rules and issue regulatory documents, making the 
country’s FDI legal system very opaque.225 Moreover, as the divide between policy and law 
has become increasingly blurred in recent years, since government policy announcements 
may become guiding legal instruments as well, significant and indeed disturbing policy 
discretion is observed especially when the government wishes to adapt decisions to 
changing circumstances.226 The five-year plans, as well as measures issued pursuant to the 
Third Plenum, illustrate this tendency. This practice causes the whole investment regime 
(and other trade regimes, too) to be unpredictable, arbitrary and discretionary. Worse still, 
despite all the investment laws, rules and policies, China approves foreign investment on a 
case-by-case basis following reviews conducted by multiple government agencies, which 
culminates in conflicts of interest and inconsistencies. This is the more so as Chinese 
provinces often compete to acquire attractive FDI and use visible and invisible forms of 
persuasion. As a result, exceptions to the governing laws unexpectedly emerge and 
corruption is easy to embed. Foreign investors may be lucky enough to benefit when they 
can exploit their local connections or political influence, but this only happens to big market 
players. SMEs rarely benefit, and often fall victim to the opaque and discretionary 
investment regime. Of course, none of this helps to remedy the lack of a level playing field.  
Against the backdrop of the EU single market and its FDI regime, the “country report” (on 
the EU) compiled by MOFCOM highlights a general complaint among the Chinese investors 
in Europe: the lack of harmonised policy towards foreign investment. Different member 
states have their own laws, policies and practices and these are thought to have a greater 
                                                   
225 It is reported that there are over 1,000 FDI rules and regulations issued by government ministries, 
such as the Guiding Catalogue of Foreign Investment Industries, the Provisions on Mergers & 
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, etc. This is in addition to FDI laws, such as 
the China-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise Law and the Foreign-Invested Enterprise Law; 
administrative regulations governing FDI issued by the State Council, such as the Implementation 
Regulations of the China-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprises Law and the State Council 
Provisions on Encouraging Foreign Investment. There are equally local legislature and governments 
that enact their own FDI rules and regulations. See U.S. Department of State (2015). 
226 As is always the case, industrial promotion policies are announced as law and often promote 
national strategic sectors. An obvious example is the country’s Five-Year Plan. The consequence is 
that foreign investments are restricted and often the chances for fair competition are reduced. For 
example, a major goal stated in the 12th Five-Year Plan is to encourage the domestic development 
of technological innovation and know-how. Thus investment projects that involve the transfer of 
technology or the potential for “indigenous innovation” tend to be favourably received by China’s 
investment authorities, while domestic firms receive favourable treatment with, very often, easy 
access to bank loans or investment funds, especially as a start-up. 
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impact on Chinese investors than the EU policies, although, according to the Lisbon Treaty, 
foreign investment has shifted to EU competence. This begs the question whether EU 
powers (should) imply uniform EU rules without national exceptions, or allow lingering 
national restrictions. The FDI policy transition from the member states to the EU-level has 
yet to be completed after the Lisbon Treaty came into force. This may easily take another 
decade or so. The above perception may explain why, in investment, China prefers to deal 
with the member states, and this is interpreted in EU circles as an approach of ‘divide and 
rule’.227  
At the level of member states, Chinese investors frequently complain about rising 
protectionism in the form of investment restrictions, especially in the sectors of real estate, 
fisheries, transport, agriculture and media, often on equity holding. Amongst EU member 
states, Poland and Greece set the highest thresholds for setting up businesses. Another 
issue of fragmentation in the EU market is that, for example, the tax base and rates of 
corporate taxation are not uniform. The average tax rate is 23.2%, while Malta has the 
highest rate at 35%.228 Moreover, in the case of investment coming from third countries, EU 
countries impose restrictions on qualifications of expatriates (such as the recent European 
Parliament recommendations on TiSA negotiations) as well as on trade reciprocity. 
Reciprocity requires favourable business considerations to be obtained via bilateral 
cooperation on market access. Although in principle such demands hold some merit, when 
different reciprocal sectors multiply by 28 (member states) it may become a very 
challenging maze for foreign investors to navigate. For example, Austria requests mutual 
market access on large-scale mineral extraction, processing and storage; refinery 
operations, gas, gas stations and geothermal production; fuel trading; transportation 
services investments, including road freight, taxis and buses; the establishment of tour 
operators as well as sale points. Reciprocity requirements in Ireland will arise when foreign 
companies acquire Irish vessels. Italy has reciprocal market access demand on exploration 
and exploitation of liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons (Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 
2015:27-28). 
                                                   
227 A House of Lords report in 2010 suggests that China has difficulty with the political nature of the 
EU and its decision-making process and finds it complex and incomplete as a system of governance. 
For this reason, China often feels more comfortable with the member states where lines of authority 
are clearer. This view may change if the EU becomes more effective in unifying its FDI regime, 
following the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. See House of Lords, European Union Committee 
(2010), p. 20. 
228 It is well known that nominal corporate tax rates say practically nothing about the effective tax 
burden of companies. The latter is better approximated by the so-called ‘effective corporate tax 
rates’ which depend on the tax base and all kinds of special rules and exemptions. For the great 
differences between effective and nominal corporate tax rates, see, e.g. Devereux & Sorensen 
(2006).  
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Certainly, despite the restrictions, China sees lots of potential in its investment in the EU, 
which is yet to be fully realised. Despite the investment surge in recent years, Chinese FDI in 
the EU is still lower than what the EU invests in China, which accounts for some 2-3% of the 
Union’s overall investment abroad.229 In fact, overall, Chinese FDI is increasingly attracted to 
large markets in the OECD group instead of its initial focus on non-OECD countries with large 
natural resources and poor institutions (Copenhagen Economics, 2012:20). The investment 
sectors have become much more diversified, too. For example, there was just one overseas 
M&A deal involving a Chinese environmental company in 2012; in 2015 there were eight, 
the biggest involving the Beijing Capital Co. buying a 65% stake in BCG NZ Investment 
Holding, a New Zealand waste management company. It was reported in January 2016 that 
China Tianying, a Jiangsu province-based solid waste treatment company, was eyeing the 
possible $1.8 billion takeover of German rival EEW, which is considered Europe’s market 
leader in waste-to-energy conversion. State-owned Beijing Enterprises Group Co. is also 
believed to be among the suitors bidding for EEW. In the same month, Haier Group, China’s 
biggest manufacturer of household appliances, agreed to buy GE’s appliances business for 
$5.4 billion (€4.9 billion) in cash. With a 10.2% global market share, Haier was the world’s 
largest household appliances brand in 2014 for the sixth straight year, according to 
Euromonitor.230 On the other hand, one has not heard any Chinese complaints about 
investment protection in Europe so far.  
Summarising the above-mentioned obstacles to market access as well as impediments to 
effective investment protection, the scope of CAI may encompass better regulations 
(streamlining and harmonisation in both parties’ regimes), selective facilitation of 
movement of business-related persons under mode 4 and effective enforcement and 
predictability of FDI protection. Following the EU’s modality of FTA negotiations, the CAI 
should “specify and complement” the existing universally applicable investment rules and 
principles. 
15.4 EU approach to CAI 
In the following, inferences about the CAI will be derived from a few FTAs the EU has 
concluded which include investment. Note that the EU gained its exclusive competence in 
FDI thanks to Article 207(1) of the Lisbon Treaty, after it came into force in 2010. Before 
2010, investment fell within the joint competence shared between the EU and its member 
states. Referring to the EU-Vietnam FTA, measures on investment are brought together with 
trade in services and e-commerce under Chapter 8 (a combination also practiced in CETA). 
                                                   
229 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/. See also 
chapter 3 for bilateral FDI trends.  
230 The deal is expected to be completed in the second quarter of 2016, pending regulatory approval. 
See Flanders-Chinese Chamber of Commerce (2016).  
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The scope of investment is wide. The chapter provides full protection and security of 
investment by incorporating consultation, negotiations and mediation as the lighter and 
alternative dispute resolution which may be used prior to bringing a dispute between an 
investor and the hosting state to the investment tribunal. Procedures, code of conduct for 
members of the tribunals and for mediators, etc. are specified in the agreement. Equally 
specified are provisions concerning temporary presence of natural persons for business 
purposes, while the EU and Vietnam will hold discussions to review possible movement of 
independent professionals in five years’ time after the entry into force of the FTA. The 
agreement abolishes the “performance requirements” in both trade in goods and trade in 
services, which goes beyond the remit of TRIMs. With annexes on schedule of commitments 
on establishment, mode 4 and cross-border supply of services governing both sides, Chapter 
8 under the EU-Vietnam FTA resembles a CAI. 
China has a more matured foreign investment system (although it does not bring about 
more openness) because China opened up its market to foreign investors decades earlier 
than Vietnam did, while the scale of foreign investment in China is also much bigger. For 
example, in 2015, EU investors committed a total of $1.3 billion (€1.1 billion) in FDI and 
became Vietnam’s third largest foreign investor partner. But compared to China, the size of 
the EU’s FDI in Vietnam counts for less than one-hundredth since the EU FDI stocks to China 
reached €127.7 billion in 2013. Therefore, one may wish to examine another alternative 
modality as a reference for the EU-China CAI negotiations. 
In recent years the EU and Singapore have seen regular growth of trade in goods (17% 
between 2008 and 2014), trade in services (40% between 2008 and 2013) as well as in 
bilateral foreign direct investment. After all, Singapore is a major destination for European 
investments in Asia, as well as Asia’s second largest investor in the EU (after Japan). In 2013, 
the existing stock of bilateral foreign direct investment between the EU and Singapore was 
roughly €140 billion.231 In addition, Singapore has a considerable presence of SOEs, as 
mentioned in chapter 14. Based on these considerations, the investment chapter in the EU-
Singapore FTA might be a more suitable example for EU-China negotiations.  
However, one should note that the specific investment chapter (Chapter 9) under the EU-
Singapore FTA is on investment protection only, while the question of market access and 
essentially of services and establishment is to look at the whole FTA for, for example, 
services, establishment and electronic commerce (Chapter 8) which also sets down specific 
commitments for cross-border supply of services (Appendix 8-A-1), establishment (Appendix 
8-A-2), key personnel, graduate trainees and business services sellers (Appendix 8-A-3), 
government procurement (Chapter 10) and IPR (Chapter 11). Under Chapter 9, investment 
protection has blanket coverage so that all investments (as well as its investors), regardless 
                                                   
231 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/singapore/. 
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of whether they were concluded before or after the entry into force of the agreement, are 
covered by the provisions of the chapter (Art. 9.2.1, EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement; 
authentic text as of May 2015). At the same time, provisions on investment protection are 
very elaborate, too, as is the case of the EU-Vietnam FTA with the same depth and breadth. 
The EU-Singapore FTA offers ISDS as a means of protection as well as of alternative dispute 
resolution such as consultation and mediation, with details on procedures of mediation, 
code of conduct of mediators and arbitrators, etc. The EU-Singapore FTA provides an 
additional guarantee on public access to information, concerning documents, hearings and 
the possibility for third persons to make submissions. A number of sectors/activities, such as 
government-supported loans, guarantees or insurance, are outside the coverage of the “fair 
and equitable treatment” obliged by the chapter232 but are addressed in other chapters. For 
example, the issue of government subsidies is addressed in Chapter 12 on competition 
policy and related matters. 
Taking a negative-listing approach, the EU-Canada Trade Agreement (CETA) is applicable to 
all investors and investment with regard to establishment as well as to operation, but air 
services fall out of the coverage while financial services under bilateral trade are dealt with 
in a separate chapter. On establishment, audio-visual as well as cultural services are 
reserved sectors for Canada and for the EU, respectively. Under the Investment Chapter, 
Section 5 imposes restrictions and exceptions in relation to national treatment and most-
favoured-nation treatment which encompasses investment areas of IPR, government 
procurement, etc., in which case pre-existing non-conforming rules remain. In respect of 
investment protection, again a whole package of protection means is in place, from 
consultation, mediation to ISDS, with lengthy stipulation on procedural rules, including 
enforcement. “Performance requirements” are completely prohibited under CETA.233 CETA 
also ensures that appointment of senior management and boards of directors is not 
restricted by nationality.234 CETA is advanced and ambitious also in aspects of mode 4. A 
similar protection provision is equally hailed as an achievement by TPP and is also identified 
in FIPA signed between Canada and China in Article 7,235 but it is absent in China’s FTAs. This 
                                                   
232 Moreover, a government’s decision not to issue, renew or maintain a subsidy or grant shall not be 
considered a breach of the “fair and equitable treatment” principle or an expropriation provided the 
decision itself does not contravene with the relevant domestic laws or conditions attached to such 
subsidy or grant. Art.9.2.2, EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.  
233 Art. X.5, Performance requirements, Section 2: Establishment of investment, Chapter 10 
Investment, EU-Canada Trade Agreement. Note, however, that some problems might nevertheless 
arise under the Domestic Regulation chapter (e.g. licensing).  
234 Art. X.8, Senior Management and Boards of Directors, Section 3: Non-discriminatory treatment, 
Chapter 10 Investment, EU-Canada Trade Agreement. Note that this provision does not apply to 
non-conforming measures. Art. X.14.1&2, Section 5: Reservations and Exceptions, EU-Canada Trade 
Agreement. 
235 Art. 7 of the FIPA stipulates that for senior management positions, there should be no specific 
requirement of any particular nationality. For the board of directors, a particular nationality may be 
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suggests that on specific issues China’s CAI modality could become indeed very advanced 
and ambitious – perhaps when the counterpart has the right powerful leverage. Coming 
back to CETA, it is interesting because it is the first important FTA where the EU has agreed 
to negative listing. This matters for the China-EU case because China also started to engage 
negative listing, for example in its BIT negotiations with the US and in the Shanghai Pilot 
Free Trade Zone which is seen as an incubator for China’s further economic reforms in the 
areas of trade openness, investment liberalisation, administrative and financial reforms. The 
set-up of the Shanghai pilot project is now being imitated in Tianjin, Guangdong and 
Fujian.236 And it is said that the whole package would eventually be extended to the entire 
country. This can be interpreted as both good and bad news. The good news is that negative 
listing would compel the Chinese government to be precise and detailed about lingering 
restrictions (on the negative list) beyond which no interventions would be allowed. This 
alone would very significantly improve legal certainty and clarity about the 
investment/establishment regime, in sharp contrast to the situation today. The Chinese 
government may well be motivated to go for negative listing in its future FTA negotiations 
as an extra incentive to make a clean sweep of the maze of restrictions and rules of (too) 
many ministries, agencies and other authorities, the very over-regulation indicated before. 
The bad news is, presumably, that negative listing will remain at the central government 
level. For FDI it would be very difficult for the central government to implement the 
obligations at the provincial, or lower administrative, levels. (Or, possibly, discrepancies 
between the central and lower administrative governmental levels in terms of investment 
restrictions/liberalisation would remain, given China’s multi-tiered administrative structure, 
as pointed out in various chapters of the study.) Moreover, it is, above all, the US 
government which has been pushing China for many years to adopt a negative listing 
approach for investment. While it succeeded in the ongoing US-China BIT negotiations, it is 
the same US government which has been extremely casual (to say the least) about the sub-
central level in the TTIP discussions whilst having excluded it in TPP. With even TPP 
excluding the sub-central level so that negative listing fails to bring clarity, there is almost 
certainly no way China can be convinced to adopt negative listing other than at the central 
level. In CETA, however, Canada and the EU have introduced negative listing for both central 
and sub-federal levels.  
                                                                                                                                                              
required but provided the requirement does not affect investor’s control over its investment. 
However, Art. 7 is subject to the exceptions listed by Art. 8.2 as to “non-conforming measures”.  
236 Reflecting on the authors’ interview trip conducted in Beijing, 29 November-4 December 2015, 
reactions to the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone project were mixed. While Chinese interviewees 
were more enthusiastic and looked forward to the success of the zones’ experiments, their 
European counterparts were much more cautious. One reason for that is that the four zones’ 
opening-up is no different from what the Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue has 
defined. Besides, the four zones test only methods (to test trade facilitation measures, for example) 
but not outcomes. Therefore, the four FTA zones have shown no evidence of accelerating the 
opening-up, impact or concrete outcomes.  
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15.5 China’s approach to CAI 
In the China-South Korea FTA on investment, the movement of business-related persons is a 
standalone chapter (Chapter 11) with lengthy rules on visa facilitation, and preceding the 
investment chapter. Therefore, investment facilitation with regard to mode 4 movement is 
identified as a specific commitment and precedes investment, which shows that mode 4 
carries greater significance for China than for other countries. As noted before, this is quite 
understandable, as at the moment holders of Chinese passports managed to rank only 87th 
in the worldwide Visa Restrictions Index listing, while obtaining temporary leave to stay 
could be a tough undertaking for business visa holders. In terms of investment operation, 
the investment chapter permits some degree of reservations and exceptions such as, for 
example, ‘non-conforming measures’ existing before the entry into force of the FTA (Article 
12.3.2), but both parties pledge to progressively remove all these non-conforming 
measures. “Performance requirements” are in compliance with TRIMs, and therefore only 
performance requirements for trade in goods concerning export and technology transfer 
are abolished. Local content and localisation are permissible as long as the measures are in 
conformity with the TRIMs (Article 12.7.1), which is incorporated in the agreement. 
Provisions on investment protection are brief, although the ISDS mechanism is available, in 
addition to consultation. While the minimum protection standard must be “fair and 
equitable”, the relevant provisions are much less elaborate than in the FTAs mentioned 
above as well as in CETA, where a precise definition is provided and five (non-exhaustive) 
examples have been incorporated in the text. Bilateral investment negotiations on market 
access are scheduled to commence two years after the agreement enters into force. As to 
investment protection, the pre-establishment phase of investment is not covered under 
national treatment, which covers only the “management, conduct, operation, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment and sale or other disposition of investments”. Moreover, national treatment 
does not apply to existing non-conforming measures.  
Looking at China’s latest FTA concluded with Australia on 17 June 2015, the investment 
chapter (9) in the China-Australia FTA is in fact a tentative agreement, since it is foreseen 
that in three years after the entry into force of the FTA both parties shall conduct a review 
to determine whether negotiations of a comprehensive investment chapter could be 
envisaged. Article 9.9.3 of the agreement provides a long list of foreseen negotiation topics, 
including minimum standard of treatment, expropriation, performance requirements, senior 
management and board of directors, investment-specific state to state dispute settlement, 
the application of investment protections and ISDS to services supplied through commercial 
presence and, most notably, scheduling of investment commitments by China on a negative 
list basis (Article 9.9.3(c)). At the moment, the investment chapter excludes government 
procurement and loans and grants provided by a government (Article 9.2.3). Non-
conforming measures remain, although both parties have pledged to reduce them 
progressively (Article 9.5.4). For investment protection, following the China-South Korea 
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FTA, the “pre-establishment” phase of investment is not covered under national treatment, 
while what is covered are “expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other 
disposition of investments in its territory” (Article 9.3.4). The ISDS measures contained in 
the agreement are as elaborate as those concluded between the EU and the third countries, 
with specified provisions on procedures and conduct of mediators and arbitrators, etc. 
Movement of natural persons is a separate chapter from investment under the China-
Australia FTA, with elaborate provisions, too. Movement of business visitors, intra-corporate 
transferees, independent executives, contractual service suppliers, installers and servicers 
and accompanying spouses and dependants are all facilitated, while movement concerning 
senior management and board directors will be negotiated three years after the agreement 
entered into force.  
After examining the investment chapter under the China-South Korea and China-Australia 
FTA, respectively, it is noticed that both agreements actually overcome only some of the 
investment impediments, in terms of market access and protection. For protection, the 
same ISDS instrument and alternative dispute resolution are available, but the levels of 
precision differ; this modality is also seen with regard to movement of business-related 
persons while the question of nationality of senior management and directors is still left 
unanswered, although this is not the case under the FIPA between Canada and China. The 
commitment concerning “performance requirements” appears half-hearted under the 
China-South Korea FTA while they are completely missing in the China-Australia FTA. It’s 
interesting to see that China and Australia will further negotiate in order to reach a CAI, by 
virtue of Article 9.9.3 of the agreement. This is in the opposite direction vis-à-vis the EU’s 
attitude towards China’s FTA plea, i.e. “CAI first, FTA later”. This begs the question: Does 
sequence matter? Probably not, not least in relation to investment, and this will be 
elaborated later.  
Reflecting on the FIPA, it is probably the most ambitious CAI that China has concluded so far 
with regard to the concession of the nationality of senior management and the board of 
directors. FIPA prohibits “performance requirements” based on the TRIMs requirements 
which cover trade in goods only. This arrangement, though perhaps ambitious for China, is 
short of the EU’s expectation by half. The EU counts on a TRIMs-plus approach, which 
prohibits performance requirements in both trade in goods and trade in services, as in its 
FTAs with Vietnam and Singapore. As to investment protection, disputes are to be settled at 
tribunal. For obligations pertaining to national treatment and most-favoured-nation 
treatment, again, the pre-establishment phase is not covered by national treatment, and 
what is covered by FIPA is all investors and investments “in like circumstances” with regard 
to “establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or 
other disposition of investments” (Articles 5 and 6). Pursuant to the “national treatment” 
obligations, “non-conforming measures” apply (Article 8) but then FIPA does not offer much 
detail. This illustration simply confirms that China’s investment regime is only half-open, and 
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remains so despite all the bilateral negotiations and conclusions on investment. Therefore, 
one must conclude that, comparing what China has offered in its FTA and CAI and what the 
EU has obtained on market access and protection, the gap is wide.  
15.6 What’s next? 
After having examined the modalities of investment negotiations applied by the EU and by 
China, both sides would have to ponder a few questions. First, whether they would accept a 
staged approach to CAI negotiations, recognising the wide gap of expectations between 
them. A first stage would collect what can be agreed on initially, whilst leaving unresolved 
matters for further negotiations but making them explicit and with a time frame. The 
movement of business-related persons should be carefully considered when negotiating 
with China on investment and investors. This is probably why such movement (mode 4) is a 
standalone chapter in China’s two latest FTAs concluded in mid-2015, while MOFCOM raises 
this complaint consistently. Of course, with such a two-stage approach, there is a strategic 
dilemma for the EU: What leverage would the EU still possess in investment negotiations 
with China when China would already obtain visa facilitation (say, with the help of the 
member states) in the first stage? The answer critically depends on the two motives, 
mentioned before, that China has for negotiating a CAI: reform at home and more 
uniformity in the EU with respect to its FDI. If these motives are strong enough, the 
sequencing with visa facilitation may not matter much; otherwise, a single package 
approach seems superior. Second, China may be a ready counterpart for ambitious 
negotiations (at least) on certain aspects of investor/investment; the question is what the 
EU holds as bargaining chips/leverage in order to obtain specific concessions from China. 
Third, which comes first? CAI or FTA? China’s attitude looks flexible, while the EU is 
determined to conclude a CAI first in order to see “a good outcome” as a condition for 
launching possible FTA negotiations with China.  
In any case, it’s easy to perceive that the EU will seek to conclude a very ambitious CAI with 
China, with comprehensive scope and coverage of market access and protection, specific 
schedule of commitments and limited reservations and exceptions. For investment 
protection, the protection means China is capable of providing are as complete as those 
offered by the EU. The only question is how to elaborate more detailed rules for certainty 
and predictability, while the EU will probably request using CETA as an example. Therefore, 
ISDS, which is now in place between China and some member states, will require a serious 
upgrade, with precise and detailed provisions concerning procedures, code of conduct, etc. 
On the other hand, China may insist on including visa-easing provisions (which the EU has to 
organise together with the member states) and the facilitated movement of business-
related persons, since this is an area where Chinese investors have particular complaints. 
After all, EU-China cooperation on visa facilitation is already taking shape. On 29 February 
2016, the EU and China signed an agreement on the short-stay visa waiver for holders of 
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diplomatic passports. This is seen as the first step of facilitating the movement of peoples 
between the EU and China. Bilateral negotiations will continue. The next step will be to 
widen the scope of visa facilitation and extend it to business, tourism and study abroad.237 
15.7 Policy options for an EU-China CAI: A review 
The Commission’s Impact Assessment Report on EU-China Investment Relations points out 
five policy options (European Commission, 2013:22-23) for negotiating an EU-China CAI. 
Based on the controversies surrounding bilateral EU-China investment relations, as well as 
on the modalities of how the EU and China concluded their respective chapters on 
investment, we will provide our assessment of the options as follows. 
Table 15.1 Assessing Five Options for an EU-China FTA  
Options Impact Assessment Report  
1. No agreement – continue 
with the status quo. 
The existing 26 BITs between China and the EU would remain in 
place as the framework for protecting investors.  
Comments:  
‘Do nothing’ is obviously without a basis if one regards the huge difference between the China FDI 
regime and that of the EU, as well as the discrepancies between the existing BITs of the member 
states with China. Still, companies which HAVE invested in China say that the restrictions were not in 
any way decisive for them. But of course, in the margin where restrictions are heavy, this cannot be 
true. Moreover, what the EU and Chinese businesses aspire to is a level playing field with 
predictability and certainty in respect of market access and protection and security. Benefits and 
restrictions should be applicable across the board, not to small players’ detriment and to big players’ 
benefit. By definition, where there are bans, the ‘no effect’ position cannot possibly be correct. The 
economic analysis in CGE in the report is focused solely on firms already in China – and the RIA 
hence loses out completely on this potential. 
2. A standalone investment 
protection agreement.  
This means pursuing the highest level of investment protection 
possible (including labour and environment standards, CSR, SOEs 
and performance requirements), building essentially on member 
states’ best practice, for more legal certainty and consistency with 
EU policy objectives. 
Comments: 
It would improve and update the separate BITs where they are old and insufficient and be 
harmonised at the EU level. Only Ireland does not have a BIT with China, while some member states’ 
BITs (such as Britain) are obviously outdated. For example, disputes are to be settled via arbitral 
tribunals, without detailed rules in the agreement for predictability and certainty. But, even if it 
would be a standalone investment chapter, the question remains as to how large, or how many 
investment sectoral issues should be negotiated under the agreement. One should not forget that 
typically the scope of investment extends to the whole economy, while restricted market access is 
almost a “universal” challenge that EU-China bilateral trade is facing, from trade in goods, trade in 
services, to public procurement, IPR, etc., while China also has complaints against the investment 
regimes in the EU member states. 
                                                   
237 Available at www.chinamission.be/eng/mh/t1344107.htm. 
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3. A separate agreement 
combining investment 
protection with market access.  
A standalone investment agreement which combines option 2 
with market access issues. 
Comments: 
This is a CAI with market access issues for ‘establishment’. The question is, again, how far the market 
access issues for investors can be addressed, given the fact that the question encompasses a large 
spectrum of sectors. Or, it would be an investment agreement looking like the investment chapter 
under the EU-Vietnam FTA which groups trade in services, investment and e-commerce together. It 
was emphasised previously that China is keen for further economic reforms by engaging “external 
pressure”. That suggests that China would wish to group quite a few sectors into a CAI in order to 
expose them to “external pressure”. Therefore, it’s envisaged that the “sectoral group” would be 
much larger than what the EU-Vietnam assembled (three subject matters). For example, public 
procurement is an area for which China is keen to subject its reform to external pressure (see 
chapter 12). The regime has already featured many improvements in recent years, though they have 
been restricted to technical aspects, such as a centralised e-procurement system. Reforms of public 
procurement have not touched on procurement laws, covered sectors and covered activities and, 
most important, SOEs’ monopolies in procurement activities, while these areas are exactly where 
the GPA is to further negotiate on and they are precisely the hurdles that EU businesses are facing – 
therefore, they need to be addressed in a CAI. This urgency is also valid from the EU’s perspective.  
4. Integrating protection into 
the PCA and thus covering both 
market access and protection in 
the PCA. 
An unrealistic option, given the clear gap in mandates and 
ambitions of the EU and China regarding both the political and the 
trade and investment parts of the PCA negotiations.  
Comments: 
Option 4 (even in 2013!), which is to integrate a kind of option 3 in the PCA negotiations, is quickly 
dismissed. One should not forget that “political reforms” are taboo for the Chinese leadership. The 
stagnation of the PCA negotiations is a lesson for the EU, for which it should take another approach, 
for example dialogue, in order to engage China in “political reforms”, such as human rights.  
5. A comprehensive FTA with 
China including investment 
protection and ambitious 
market access for investment. 
This option cannot be considered realistic, since there was, 
according to the Commission, no interest from China to negotiate 
an FTA with the EU in the near future (this probably dates back 
several years).  
Comments: 
President Xi said the opposite on 1 April 2014 in Bruges, Belgium. When framing the options like this, 
it is clear that options 4 and 5 are perhaps not ‘fake’ but seen as hopelessly impractical in 2013 
(when the impact assessment was published). In 2016, however, one can keep the option open to 
integrate the CAI in an FTA eventually. The reality check undertaken above on each side’s modality 
of investment negotiations within the remit of a FTA suggests that it might be possible. The 
proposition would become more apparent when reflecting on 1) the EU-Singapore FTA – investment 
protection is a standalone chapter while the subject of non-discriminatory market access to 
investment operation and investors is addressed in a number of chapters throughout the complete 
FTA; 2) the China-Australia FTA – although with a chapter on investment, negotiations on a CAI are 
envisaged to start in three years’ time. This shows that the question of sequence, and the EU’s 
stance as “CAI first, FTA later”, matters little. The question is how to settle the prevailing frictions in 
bilateral trade confronting businesses on both sides. For the EU, the sequence is more a question of 
leverage, not of functional logic of treaties. 
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15.8 Integrate CAI in FTA 
Here, the alternative of integrating a CAI in an FTA is reflected upon. The policy option of 
integrating a CAI in an FTA is based on the following considerations. Both sides presumably 
realise that investment complaints exist in a few sectors, and investment restrictions 
imposed by China are heavy and in many sectors. On top of these restrictions is the demand 
for reducing needless fragmentation. For China, it implies streamlining and consolidation its 
vast amount of investment laws, rules and regulations (and perhaps agencies). For the EU, it 
implies organising relevant investment directives at EU level to achieve a harmonised 
investment environment across the member states. Judging from the lists of ‘non-
conforming measures’ of EU member states in CETA, this is going to be quite a struggle. 
There is, however, one cardinal difference between the EU and China (or, indeed, with the 
US as well, if ever TTIP would follow this approach): once a Chinese (or US) investor has an 
‘establishment’ in an EU member state, the national restrictions (non-conforming measures) 
become irrelevant, because that establishment is legally an EU firm with full national 
treatment, strictly enforced in the EU. This is not the case in China (nor, for that matter, in 
the US for the most part). Secondly, investment is a trade topic encompassing many sectors 
in the whole economy where, in effect, each is a key to unlocking EU-China bilateral trade 
potential, such as trade in goods, trade in services and public procurement, IPR protection 
(including GIs), etc. This means that when negotiating a CAI, the applicability of non-
discriminatory market access to these sectors would presumably attain an overarching 
effect also in other trade topics. Without this, the CAI would not be ambitious, and the 
purpose of the CAI negotiations would likely be defeated.238  
Thirdly, the China-South Korea FTA, seen so far as the most ambitious FTA China has 
concluded, leaves in fact much to be desired. To begin with, on investment market access 
negotiations have been postponed until 2017. Indeed, what has been left out of the 
agreement covers most of the prevailing complaints that EU businesses are facing in China, 
e.g. market access (except modestly for cross-border services) and performance 
requirements. For “performance requirements”, China so far is only ready to comply with 
the TRIMs requirements, which reduces the EU’s ambition by half. With Australia, for 
example, China does not want to be bound by any obligations. Thus, as a precaution to the 
EU, a CAI alone will probably not settle EU investors’ complaints fully and completely. 
Therefore, a simple question remains: What leverage does the EU have to satisfy its full 
demands in investment in China? China is keen to solicit “external pressure” for continued 
economic reforms. But, however sincere China might be, the whole exercise will only be 
carried out at China’s own pace and, almost certainly, not in tune with the EU’s 
                                                   
238 The purpose of negotiating an EU-China CAI is to improve market access opportunities in the EU 
and China by establishing a genuine right to invest and by guaranteeing both sides will not 
discriminate against their respective companies. See European Commission (2016). 
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expectations. That’s why one hears comments today such as “…in some unfortunate cases, 
China has taken worrying steps backwards” (Malmström, 2016). Fourthly, sequence may not 
matter all that much. So far, the EU insists in concluding CAI first and in negotiating FTA later 
when “conditions are met”, but as is perceived from China’s concluded investment 
negotiations, there is no guarantee that “a good outcome”, one of the two conditions set 
down by the EU Trade Commissioner (Malmström, 2016), will prevail after a CAI is 
concluded. China is not ready to embark on investment negotiations with the same vigour 
as the EU, given the modalities it has engaged in investment negotiations in recent years. So 
far, China has managed to persuade its counterparts to take a staged approach when 
negotiating investment, either on the subject matters of investment, from “negative listing” 
and national treatment to investment in the pre-establishment phase, or, on CAI as a whole, 
which is the case with Australia where an FTA was concluded first – and with an investment 
chapter – while CAI will be negotiated later. Such a staged approach is certainly not what 
the EU aspires to, based on its proven level of ambition in investment negotiations. 
Consequently, how to prompt China to go for the same level of ambition as the EU? 
Presumably, this is a question of ‘leverage’, i.e. the cumbersome visa facilitation process 
might provide the EU with some limited leverage. This hope might be diminishing. The 
process of facilitating the movement of persons at the EU level has already started, as 
demonstrated by the bilateral agreement signed in February 2016. The roadmap of 
extending eased visa rules is already drawn and will eventually benefit investors and 
investment-related personnel. At the level of member states, in January 2016 the UK and 
China also announced new steps to relax visa rules (Xinhuanet, 2016). Other member states 
might follow suit. This means that the “movement of persons” is less likely to serve as 
powerful leverage for the EU in its CAI negotiations with China. So, what does the EU have 
left as possibly powerful leverage? The answer is: the FTA. And this implies integrating CAI in 
FTA.  
When CAI is integrated into FTA, the issue of market access, together with national 
treatment, in investment – at both pre- and post-establishment phases encompassing a vast 
area of trade topics – can be ironed out in its entirety since many subjects fall under both 
headings of CAI and FTA. There is a clear overlap and chapters are interrelated. 
Commitments that the EU is determined to press ahead on with China under a CAI could be 
more effectively tackled in a much broader context. In any case, only an FTA seems capable 
of accommodating a deep and comprehensive investment agreement. China might be 
forthcoming in trade negotiations, but it is “depth and scope” that matters most to the EU. 
Hence, powerful leverage to be used by the EU is the FTA. However, there is one 
counterargument. In China, there is considerable resistance to opening up both to trade 
(especially in services) and FDI. Thus integrating a CAI in the FTA might de facto, even when 
not intended at first, lead to long delays before market access for investors would finally be 
realised. This might be regarded as a plea for the Canadian-Chinese approach (FIPA) where a 
stand-alone approach seemed to have worked.  
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Part III. Potential Economic Impact: A CGE-based simulation 
of effects of the FTA 
16. Introduction 
Part III of the study provides estimates on the potential economic impact of a China/EU FTA 
on the EU, EU member states and China. The identification of the key economic impacts of 
this FTA will be made under the general assumptions of the economic modelling, as well as 
two scenarios about the design of a potential FTA: modest and ambitious. The two FTA 
scenarios are based on a shift to bilateral trade under zero tariffs (as an FTA suggests, of 
course) and a fairly detailed scrutiny of the trade costs for companies under the common 
label of NTMs, that is, non-tariff measures, mainly regulatory barriers of many kinds. The 
costs of NTMs for market access are expressed as a percentage of the invoice price called 
AVE (ad valorem equivalent). Thus an AVE of 25% implies that the costs for exporters to 
access the partner’s market is 25% higher due to NTMs.  
While there has been significant progress in lowering tariff barriers to international trade 
and enlarging or removing tariff-rate quotas,239 the policy relevance of non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) has increased. There are three reasons why greater attention is being paid to NTMs. 
First, as the level of tariffs has decreased over time, the relative importance of NTMs has 
increased. In addition, during this time, significant progress has been made in terms of 
quantifying the effects of NTMs, leading to a better understanding of the costs these 
barriers impose on effectively entering foreign markets. And finally, there is some evidence 
of NTMs being used as a substitute for the tariffs that have been reduced through 
progressive multilateral and bilateral negotiations. As chapters 9 and 10 (on TBTs and SPS 
measures between China and the EU) and chapter 12 (public procurement) show for goods 
and chapters 11 (services), 13 and 14 (on IPRs and GIs, resp. on SOEs and their distortive 
effects) demonstrate for services-related NTMs, and given the relatively low tariffs between 
the EU and China, NTMs have become the core of modern FTAs. It is no different for a 
China/EU FTA. In addition, there is close interdependence between the CAI, discussed in 
chapter 15 on investment, and effective market access for EU and Chinese service providers, 
respectively. 
However, while this study highlights NTM-related trade costs, tariffs can actually prove 
strategically important as well. This means that, as tariffs are easier to negotiate and to 
implement than NTM reductions, there may be scope for gains even from a tariffs-only FTA. 
                                                   
239 See chapter 8 for the relevance of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) in bilateral agro-food trade.  
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At the same time, the variation in protection across sectors, which itself reflects political 
sensitivity, means that expected effects on a sector level may well be just as sensitive. 
Part III is organised as follows: chapter 17 provides an overview of trade and production 
linkages between China and the EU. This includes value added elements of trade (e.g. in 
Global Value Chains, see also chapter 4), and the importance of mass consumer goods. 
Chapter 18 then provides an overview of the trade policy landscape including tariff and non-
tariff trade costs and the scope for their reduction. We provide model-based assessments of 
the effects of an FTA in chapter 19 under the two FTAs. Annexes 3, 4 and 5 summarise 
methodological issues and include some tables underlying the graphs that follow.  
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17. Trade and production linkages 
The focus here will be on two aspects: value-added trade, for which it is possible to make a 
direct linkage with production and with jobs, and mass-consumer goods.  
17.1 Value added and trade linkages between China and EU 
Before examining the implications of an FTA between the EU and China, the focus is first on 
the structure of the existing trade relationship. For this purpose, Table 17.1 presents the 
composition of trade on what is known as a “value-added basis” (see chapter 4). 
In chapters 2 and 3, the trends in bilateral trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) were 
described. In chapter 4, GVCs were discussed briefly, as they are so important in the case of 
EU-China, showing bilateral goods trade in value-added form. One observes that the 
bilateral deficit with China in goods is lower in value-added terms than in terms of 
conventional trade statistics. There is also a brief summary of the jobs connected to bilateral 
(value-added) trade in the member states and in China. Below, a further elaboration of 
bilateral value-added trade is presented.  
Conceptually, “value-added trade” means measuring the EU activity content of trade 
(employment, etc.) contained in EU exports to China, and vice versa. The technical 
methodology is explained in annex IV. In Table 17.1, the value added, for example, 
contained in German exports to China is presented. From column A, this was $62.2 billion in 
2011, including both direct activities (German machinery workers engaged in production for 
exports to China) and indirect activities (e.g. German service workers that supply services 
used in producing German machinery for export to China). Across EU member states, 
Germany has the strongest linkages in terms of German economic activity supporting 
exports to China – $62.2 billion. A second tier includes France at $17.2 billion, the UK at 
$11.8 billion, and France at $17.2 billion. In other words, Germany’s value added contained 
in exports to China are three to five times greater than this second tier of countries. 
A third tier of value added contained in exports to China of between $2.5 billion and $10 
billion includes in descending order: Spain, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Austria and Ireland. Basically, the largest EU economies have the greatest 
connections in terms of domestic value added exported to China, with Germany carrying a 
particularly large share.  
Column B presents “value-added trade” in terms of China’s exports. Again, it is clear that 
Germany is the most important single partner in the EU, accounting for $78.1 billion of 
Chinese production linked to exports. France is the second most important destination, with 
$46.2 billion in Chinese exports on a value-added basis. One may note that, in terms of 
China’s exports on a value-added basis, France, Italy and the UK are relatively more 
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important in column B than in column A. In other words, while Germany clearly dominates 
the offensive interests of the EU on a value-added basis, for China the importance of 
individual EU member states is somewhat more balanced. 
Columns C and D present a different view, that is, gross exports, including imported value 
added. Hence, while China exported $101.5 billion to Germany on a value-added basis (from 
column D), only $78.1 billion actually represents value added from China (from Column B), 
rather than imported parts and components from third countries (the difference between 
columns D and B). 
Table 17.1 EU China trade by member state, 2011 ($ million) 
  Value-added trade Gross trade 
  
A:  
EU to CHN 
B: 
CHN to EU 
C: 
EU to CHN 
D: 
CHN to EU 
Austria 2,991.6 4,246.6 5,095.9 5,498.5 
Belgium 3,622.7 15,705.9 9,244.1 20,314.6 
Cyprus 39.6 843.9 70.5 1,100.5 
Czech Republic 917.2 8,119.3 1,791.4 11,205.9 
Denmark 2,831.1 5,519.5 4,332.8 6,970.7 
Estonia 56.1 935.4 133.4 1,230.8 
Finland 4,022.2 3,448.5 6,224.1 4,448.5 
France 17,225.0 46,231.6 25,864.3 60,092.2 
Germany 62,230.3 78,108.2 93,477.9 101,545.6 
Greece 498.2 3,970.7 691.4 5,120.8 
Hungary 997.4 4,878.4 2,383.1 6,784.9 
Ireland 2,554.9 5,140.8 4,277.6 6,059.3 
Italy 11,651.5 31,929.4 16,194.9 41,241.8 
Latvia 59.8 630.4 104.7 817.8 
Lithuania 86.4 790.7 129.4 1,024.6 
Luxembourg 285.3 424.6 771.8 527.7 
Malta 680.5 1,586.6 876.7 2,047.1 
Netherlands 3,262.3 14,493.0 4,815.3 18,475.7 
Poland 1,262.9 9,410.2 2,004.4 12,381.8 
Portugal 917.8 2,540.5 1,450.0 3,215.0 
Slovakia 1,095.1 2,372.6 3,215.0 3,166.9 
Slovenia 103.7 1,330.1 193.7 1,729.9 
Spain 6,786.8 19,744.4 9,418.9 24,987.6 
Sweden 5,561.1 7,166.3 8,226.8 9,062.4 
United Kingdom 11,863.8 42,040.9 17,746.2 53,854.2 
Bulgaria 209.4 824.2 452.9 1,073.5 
Croatia 82.9 1,313.8 132.5 1,635.5 
Romania 485.3 2,888.3 700.4 3,892.8 
Source: Own calculations from GTAP9 data. 
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Table 17.2 presents an alternative viewpoint and is based on sectors. Here, for the EU as a 
whole, the table presents a breakdown on trade in value added with China on a sector basis. 
Note that two concepts of value-added trade are presented here. The first, forward 
linkages, captures the extent to which output in one sector is sold downstream to other 
sectors for further processing before final export. For example, from column A, $28.4 billion 
in business and ICT services were included in exports to China. However, in terms of gross 
value of exports (column E), the EU exported only $7.5 billion in business and ICT services to 
China, the direct cross-border trade in these services (mode 1). The difference reflects the 
extent to which machinery, vehicles, chemicals, etc., all contain EU business and ICT services 
as inputs, incorporated in their invoice prices (hence the indirect EU export of services).  
The second concept on a sector level is backward linkages. This measures the extent to 
which final exports (for example, motor vehicles) contain not only value added solely from 
motor vehicles, but also embody inputs from upstream, where these also require EU labour 
and capital. For example, as shown in column C, motor vehicle sector exports from the EU to 
China included $20.4 billion in EU value added. In comparing the values in columns A and C, 
it is clear that motor vehicles are not important for the sector itself. In fact, a large share of 
the value added in motor vehicle exports is from upstream sectors (services, metals, etc.). In 
contrast, with business and ICT services, the importance of trade with China is primarily in 
terms of downstream manufacturing firms who use business and ICT services as inputs 
(when comparing columns A and C). 
Table 17.2 EU and China trade linkages in 32 sectors 
  Forward linkages Backward linkages Gross exports 
  
A: 
EU to CHN 
B: 
CHN to EU 
C: 
EU to CHN 
D: 
CHN to EU 
E: 
EU to CHN 
F: 
CHN to EU 
Primary agriculture 1,613 26,434 1,283 2,635 1,640.8 2,757.3 
Forestry 590 4,487 319 62 371.6 65.7 
Fishing 56 1,790 38 39 49.9 42.0 
Oil and gas 457 3,123 3 0 3.8 0.3 
Other energy, mining 1,536 9,873 1,758 811 2,513.9 983.2 
Utilities 2,873 7,813 64 218 82.2 259.5 
Construction 2,248 826 1,355 1,639 1,769.9 1,977.5 
Wood, pulp, paper 937 5,023 1,004 10,369 1,381.2 12,649.3 
Mineral products 1,307 5,613 954 5,507 1,307.3 6,833.2 
Primary metals 5,508 16,127 8,053 7,017 14,195.5 9,756.8 
Fabricated metal prod. 5,966 7,288 3,070 11,625 4,365.1 15,090.7 
Other machinery 30,537 26,891 46,482 55,689 69,333.4 74,812.2 
Electrical machinery 3,158 26,815 4,674 64,390 7,582.6 93,311.7 
Motor vehicles 10,197 2,709 20,386 3,528 37,105.3 4,802.8 
Other transport 2,881 3,329 5,551 7,290 9,938.6 9,554.6 
Other goods 793 14,820 887 23,377 1,517.0 27,208.9 
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Processed foods 1,514 3,661 1,853 4,695 2,567.3 5,405.0 
Beverages and tobacco 906 1,550 1,573 93 2,044.2 107.1 
Textiles 1,052 14,659 1,448 17,928 2,211.5 21,997.8 
Apparel 355 8,964 626 30,131 906.9 36,434.9 
Leather products 595 5,150 961 15,710 1,363.3 18,630.3 
Paper products, printing 3,555 4,102 3,489 2,601 4,484.2 3,238.7 
Petrochemicals 343 1,150 81 960 489.2 2,092.2 
Chem., rubber, plastics 11,081 24,791 15,963 21,730 25,826.6 28,421.0 
Wholesale, retail 6,880 22,511 7,458 6,802 10,130.6 7,284.1 
Air transport 500 1,450 730 2,467 1,628.2 3,288.8 
Land transport, other 4,191 11,920 1,501 3,121 2,446.7 3,633.6 
Maritime transport 127 7,904 172 7,103 353.1 8,723.9 
Recreational, other services 1,697 3,777 624 1,120 718.3 1,245.1 
Communications 2,497 4,584 506 599 596.7 662.4 
Finance 3,616 15,402 152 275 227.4 284.8 
Insurance 1,520 1,180 2,108 464 2,776.5 518.5 
Business, ICT services 28,415 15,625 6,768 5,145 7,544.6 5,818.2 
Public services 2,877 5,295 488 1,494 546.5 1,614.3 
 
17.2 Trade in mass consumer goods 
A good deal of EU imports from China is traditionally found in mass consumer goods.240 In 
particular for consumers and retailers, imports from China have been a boon with large 
volumes at very competitive prices. Figure 17.1 plots recent EU imports from China of these 
products in value terms. These goods were worth $127.4 billion in 2014. The most 
important category is apparel and accessories ($40.5 billion in 2014) followed by domestic 
equipment ($26.7 billion in 2014) and baby goods, toys, and sports equipment ($16.9 billion 
in 2014).  
                                                   
240 Mass consumer goods are defined as apparel and accessories; baby goods, toys, and sports 
equipment; beverages and tobacco; certain foods (meats, fish, and rice); cutlery, domestic 
equipment (white goods, gardening equipment, other household goods); leather and footwear; 
household furniture and related furnishings; glassware and ceramics; musical instruments; perfumes 
and cosmetics; and textiles and fabrics.  
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Figure 17.1 EU 2014 imports of mass consumer goods from China ($ million) 
 
Source: WITS (UNCTAD) trade data, mapped to ISIC3 categories. 
In the other direction (EU to China), exports are far lower but growing. EU exports stood at 
$15.5 billion in 2014 for these goods, up from $8.6 billion in 2010, or 80% in four years. This 
is shown in Figure 17.2. The most important category here is domestic equipment ($2.8 
billion), followed by beverages and tobacco ($2.1 billion), certain foods ($2.0 billion) and 
apparel ($1.8 billion). There has also been rapid growth in perfumes and cosmetics, from 
$0.9 billion in 2010 to $1.6 billion in 2014, an increase of 77.9% in only four years. 
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Figure 17.2 EU 2014 exports of mass consumer goods to China ($ million) 
 
Source: WITS (UNCTAD) trade data, mapped to ISIC3 categories. 
What is clear from the underlying values in Figure 17.1 and Figure 17.2 is that there is a 
particularly strong asymmetry in the trade balance in mass consumer goods. While China 
exported $127.4 billion to the EU in this set of goods in 2014, EU exports to China amounted 
to $15.5 billion. At the same time though, EU exports have grown relatively rapidly in this 
category in recent years, while Chinese exports to the EU have been more or less flat over 
the same period. 
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18. Removing tariffs and reducing NTM costs in a China-EU FTA 
What are the trade-related implications of an FTA between the EU and China? This involves 
a range of changes to policy instruments, including both tariffs and non-tariff measures. 
Table 18.1 presents current applied tariffs at the sectoral level between the EU and China. 
The information is essentially the same as in chapter 6, where an extensive tariff analysis 
has been conducted at two-digit as well as six-digit and, where relevant, eight-digit levels. 
Because Table 18.1 is a direct input for the model calculations in chapter 19, sectors have 
been arranged slightly differently (namely, according to the GTAP classification (used for 
model input) than in chapter 6. While the average tariff for the EU as a whole is roughly 
2.7%, for goods from China the average is 4%. The reason is that China’s exports to the EU 
are more concentrated in sensitive sectors that carry higher tariffs. This includes, for 
example, textiles and clothing, with tariffs of 9.2% and 11%, as well as leather goods with a 
tariff of 10.7%. In the case of China, the average tariff applied to EU goods is 6.9%. High 
rates include ceramics and glassware (aka non-metallic mineral products) at 10.2%, motor 
vehicles at 12.8%, other (primarily consumer) goods at 12.6%, beverages and tobacco at 
11.7%, textiles at 8.6%, and apparel at 15.6%. In both the EU and China, primary agriculture 
is protected with tariffs roughly 50% higher than the average of all tariffs. Table 18.1 
presents a set of relatively aggregate sectors. The TRQs (see chapter 8) are also relevant in 
some agro-food sectors, but they are incorporated in the AVEs employed in the simulation. 
This means that, while the AVE impact of agricultural protection (including TRQs) is included 
in the estimated AVEs for applied tariff regimes in both countries, the simulation is done 
with baseline protection in terms of the trade-weighted AVEs for these aggregate sectors 
(i.e. no explicit modelling of TRQs).241 
Table 18.1 Applied tariffs between the EU and China 
  CHN tariffs  
on EU 
EU tariffs  
on CHN 
EU exports 
to CHN, mill 
USD 
CHN 
exports to 
EU, mill USD 
Primary agriculture 9.4 6.0 1,640.8 2,757.3 
Forestry 1.3 0.9 371.6 65.7 
Fishing 4.7 0.9 49.9 42.0 
Oil and gas 0.1 0.0 3.8 0.3 
Other primary energy, mining 1.1 0.0 2,513.9 983.2 
Wood, pulp, paper 1.8 1.2 1,381.2 12,649.3 
Non-metallic mineral products 10.2 5.1 1,307.3 6,833.2 
Primary metals 1.8 2.5 14,195.5 9,756.8 
                                                   
241 See the documentation on the integration of the ITC/CEPII MacMAPS database in GTAP on this 
point in Guimbard, Jean & Mimouni (2012). 
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Fabricated metal products 8.6 2.9 4,365.1 15,090.7 
Other machinery 5.9 2.2 69,333.4 74,812.2 
Electrical machinery 2.3 1.0 7,582.6 93,311.7 
Motor vehicles 12.8 5.1 37,105.3 4,802.8 
Other transport 3.6 3.3 9,938.6 9,554.6 
Other goods 12.6 2.2 1,517.0 27,208.9 
Processed foods 12.5 13.7 2,567.3 5,405.0 
Beverages and tobacco 11.7 7.0 2,044.2 107.1 
Textiles 8.6 9.2 2,211.5 21,997.8 
Apparel 15.6 11.0 906.9 36,434.9 
Leather products 9.1 10.7 1,363.3 18,630.3 
Paper products, printing 2.4 0.1 4,484.2 3,238.7 
Petrochemicals 3.4 0.3 489.2 2,092.2 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics 6.2 4.3 25,826.6 28,421.0 
Average 6.9 4.0   
Source: WITS (WTO and UNCTAD) tariff data, mapped to GTAP9 trade data. 
In addition to tariffs, both the EU and China face trade costs linked to non-tariff measures. 
Some of these are ‘actionable’, meaning they lead to trade costs that can be reduced in the 
FTA through a mix of negotiation on cross-border liberalisation and harmonisation of 
regulations, instruments and procedures. Others are not, possibly due to the great 
sensitivity of specific domestic regulatory objectives, or to the gaps between or 
misalignment of domestic regulatory objectives of FTA partners. Based on an assessment of 
actionability levels (Ecorys, 2009) and econometric estimates of overall trade costs (see 
annex IV and Table A-7 of Annex V to this report), Table 18.2 below provides a summary of 
the estimates of ‘actionable NTMs’ for China and the EU for goods. These are expressed as 
trade costs, known as AVEs or ad valorem equivalents. They represent the percent increase 
in delivered price because of underlying NTMs. In the same table, NTM estimates for 
services are also reported. These come from recent World Bank estimates of AVEs linked to 
discriminatory trade policies, i.e. since they are only the discriminatory ones, all are fully 
actionable trade costs for services. For the reader, it should once again be stressed that the 
AVEs in Table 18.2 therefore do not include all trade costs of NTMs in services between the 
EU and China, but only the part (in percentage of the invoice price) that can be removed in 
the FTA. From WTO experience in GATS and, even more prominently, from the EU 
experience in the internal market, it is well-known that non-discriminatory NTMs can also 
be a severe hindrance when accessing foreign markets. As an illustration, the famous Cassis-
de-Dijon ruling of the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) of 1979, introducing mutual recognition 
based on free movement, was based on a non-discriminatory restriction by Germany, 
boiling down to an import ban. Similar CJEU case law was later applied to services. 
Therefore, the focus on discriminatory services regulation (in World Bank data) will 
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necessarily lead to a considerable underestimate of services restrictions hindering bilateral 
China-EU trade.  
On a trade-weighted basis, China’s ‘actionable’ AVEs against the EU (average of 22.3%) are 
considerably higher than the EU’s ‘actionable’ AVEs against China (average of 12.9%). 
Referring to annex IV, which provides estimates of the full costs of NTMs in bilateral trade in 
goods and services, this divergence between the EU and China is not surprising. Ignoring the 
trade involved (hence, simple averages, not trade-weighted), the full NTM costs or AVEs 
encountered for goods entering China is no less than 37.6% (not all actionable) and ‘only’ 
22.8% for goods accessing the EU. For services, mode 1 trade from the EU to China would 
encounter 43.5% whereas Chinese services accessing the EU encounter ‘only’ 20.9%. 
However, because goods exports from the EU to China are concentrated in relatively few 
sectors with full NTM costs much lower than the simple average of 37.6%, whilst EU exports 
in two very high NTM cost sectors (agro/fishing and beverages) are small, it is still possible 
to arrive at lower trade-weighted averages. Once services are included, the average trade-
weighted full NTM costs are 25.7% and 22.3% for actionable NTMs. For EU exports of 
services to China, NTM costs per unit of services are mostly high, but roughly half of the 
services export value (mode 1) is in wholesale/retail (with a NTM cost of 12%) and land or 
other transport without any (known) NTM cost, which helps to push the weighted average 
down. For Chinese services exports to the EU, the obverse happens: they encounter a 
(simple) average of full NTM costs of 20.9%, but this is pushed up slightly (to 26.3% for 
trade-weighted) due to three sectors with much higher NTM full costs. For actionable NTM 
costs this is, in turn, cut by half to a trade-weighted 12.9%.  
Table 18.2 Estimated actionable NTBs, expressed as AVEs (ad valorem equivalents) 
  CHN AVEs  
on EU 
EU AVEs  
on CHN 
EU exports 
to CHN, mill 
USD 
CHN 
exports to 
EU, mill 
USD 
primary agriculture 38.5 42.4 1,640.8 2,757.3 
forestry 38.5 42.4 371.6 65.7 
fishing 38.5 42.4 49.9 42.0 
oil and gas 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.3 
other primary energy, mining 0.0 0.0 2,513.9 983.2 
utilities 16.0 7.7 82.2 259.5 
construction 16.0 7.7 1,769.9 1,977.5 
wood, pulp, paper 5.1 13.6 1,381.2 12,649.3 
non-metallic mineral products 4.5 11.7 1,307.3 6,833.2 
primary metals 9.1 11.5 14,195.5 9,756.8 
fabricated metal products 9.1 11.5 4,365.1 15,090.7 
other machinery 8.3 4.6 69,333.4 74,812.2 
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 237 
 
electrical machinery 12.8 7.1 7,582.6 93,311.7 
motor vehicles 63.8 38.9 37,105.3 4,802.8 
other transport 8.8 4.9 9,938.6 9,554.6 
other goods 18.4 25.5 1,517.0 27,208.9 
processed foods 17.0 15.6 2,567.3 5,405.0 
beverages and tobacco 139.4 92.3 2,044.2 107.1 
textiles 14.5 20.1 2,211.5 21,997.8 
apparel 14.5 20.1 906.9 36,434.9 
leather products 14.5 20.1 1,363.3 18,630.3 
paper products, printing 16.8 23.2 4,484.2 3,238.7 
petrochemicals 33.0 34.3 489.2 2,092.2 
chemicals, rubber, plastics 15.8 17.8 25,826.6 28,421.0 
wholesale, retail 6.0 1.4 10,130.6 7,284.1 
air transport 68.0 15.8 1,628.2 3,288.8 
land transport, other 0.0 24.5 2,446.7 3,633.6 
maritime transport 53.0 7.8 353.1 8,723.9 
recreational, other services 16.0 7.7 718.3 1,245.1 
communications 7.5 2.1 596.7 662.4 
finance 22.0 1.8 227.4 284.8 
insurance 21.0 11.0 2,776.5 518.5 
business, ICT services 39.3 19.7 7,544.6 5,818.2 
public services -- -- 546.5 1,614.3 
total trade-weighted 22.3 12.9 
goods 22.5 13.1 
services 21.0 10.8 
Source: Authors’ estimates (see annex and text), World Bank and EUROSTAT. Note: Services AVEs are from the 
World Bank (Jafari & Tarr, 2015). Estimates for goods are discussed in the appendix. Actionability rates for 
goods are from ECORYS (2009) and are applied to overall estimated trade costs. Note that liberalisation in 
public services is not explicitly modelled.  
The estimates of the potential reduction of the costs of NTMs in bilateral EU-China trade in 
goods and services, as derived here, will be used in chapter 19 to estimate the economic 
impact of the FTA. Note that China has substantially higher relative NTM levels for motor 
vehicles and services, while the EU has relatively higher NTM levels in low-wage sectors like 
textiles, clothing and footwear, paper and metals.  
Box 18.1 alerts the reader to some of the problems involved with NTM calculations. The 
latter are notoriously difficult due to a host of reasons. The AVE estimates that do exist may 
differ in sectors and/or between countries and such differences can, at times, be worryingly 
large. This reflects an uncomfortable dilemma, namely, that lengthy qualitative descriptions 
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of NTMs or regulatory barriers (cf. chapters 9-14) in trade (chapter 15) or investment often 
leaves the reader bewildered about the overall significance of ‘reducing the costs of 
regulatory barriers’, while at the same time, the state-of-the-art quantification efforts of 
AVEs have surely made progress but do not yet represent a very reliable alternative.  
Box 18.1 AVEs: What it takes to obtain them and lingering problems 
When regulations of the two FTA partners differ, there will be extra costs to exporting firms 
trying to meet the regulatory requirement of the importing country. Expressed in a percentage 
of the delivery price, these costs are called AVE (ad valorem equivalent, like a tariff). There are 
many reasons why estimated AVEs differ, and occasionally differ a lot. One is the database. 
Recent databases of the WTO, OECD and World Bank are far richer and more detailed than old 
ones: more countries and sectors and a much finer registration of the restrictions applies. One 
example: older databases (such as TRAINS from the WTO) often used ‘binary’ (i.e. zero or one) 
listing of restrictions, which risks leading to overestimates, whereas nowadays numerous details 
can be included both for goods (typically TBTs and SPS) and services. That means that there are 
many cases with intermediate levels of restrictions between zero (no cost for access) and one 
(imports blocked). For services, the recent STRIs from the World Bank and the OECD (see Figures 
11.1 and 11.2), with distinct methodologies, represent a major improvement. However, as 
noted in section 11.2, even these great efforts in obtaining ‘good’ STRIs have not yet generated 
fully reliable estimates of the restrictiveness for market access, as has been exemplified with 
telecoms and transport. Another set of reasons is found in the methodologies, which may go 
too far here (gravity versus regulatory restrictiveness indices, which have to be converted into 
AVEs; both have their problems). A third set of reasons is directly a result of various inevitable 
simplifications, such as choosing (somewhat arbitrary) ‘weights’ in STRIs or (as in Fontagne et 
al., 2013) choosing a benchmark country for the ‘free market access’ case (which is intrinsically 
problematic as risk regulation usually has justifications, such as health, safety and environment, 
which cannot be pursued without regulation nor, thus, without costs). Yet another reason 
consists in a database with solely non-discriminatory restrictions (e.g. World Bank STRIs) as 
against a set comprising any regulation imposing costs on would-be imports. Finally, so-called 
‘actionability’ of NTMs (that is, what part of bilateral NTM costs can be removed in an FTA) is 
extremely hard to ‘guesstimate’ as well.  
For the present empirical simulation of a China/EU FTA, two methods of estimating the AVEs 
first have been combined: for goods, a separate gravity analysis was undertaken (see annex IV), 
and for services, the AVEs are taken from Jafari & Tarr (2015) (based on the database underlying 
the World Bank’s STRIs), the most advanced contribution on AVEs for services at the moment, 
yet it also shows that one has to be cautious in reading too much into these estimates. As will be 
clear from chapter 19, the contribution from bilateral cross-border liberalisation of services to 
the economic gains of the FTA remains quite modest – this has also been found in, e.g. the CEPR 
(2013) study on TTIP. But services is a cardinal problem in an EU-China FTA and it seems 
remarkable that its supposed resolution would not bring much in terms of economic gains. 
Inspecting what could be reasons for this quickly leads one to the AVE issues. The attraction of 
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the new STRIs, here from the World Bank, is that the underlying database is sophisticated and 
exceptionally detailed (a questionnaire of no fewer than 169 pages for 11 services sectors, for 
103 countries, filled in mainly by local law firms; in contrast to the early ECORYS (2009) panel of 
experts which were largely from business itself and only referred to the US and the EU; 
supplementary information from selected country studies). Moreover, the World Bank STRIs do 
incorporate the EU as a preferential regime (unlike the OECD STRIs). But Jafari & Tarr base their 
study to a considerable extent on work on services restrictions for the Australian Productivity 
Commission (Findlay & Warren, 2000). Despite some technical advantages, this leads to a series 
of queries such as somewhat arbitrary weights, coefficients based on services trade of selected 
countries in the late 1990s, no inclusion of (road) transport and telecoms (two key sectors), 
differences in the restrictions identified in the new STRIs and those found by Findley & Warren, 
etc. Moreover, there is the general problem of focusing on mode 1 only, thereby neglecting the 
most prominent mode to supply services, certainly for the EU in China, namely FDI (mode 3). In 
addition, there are complementarities between goods and services, and FDI in services (in 
China) may thus also magnify (EU) exports of goods and services.  
With the help of Berden & Francois (2015), some examples of AVEs can be provided for the EU 
for sectors where AVE results differ greatly, as well as some examples where different studies 
show similar results. Telecoms (also a problem in Figures 11.1 and 11.2) is a typical example of 
the seeming difficulty of verifying AVEs: 11.7% (Ecorys), 38.6% (Fontagne) and 1.1% (Egger et al., 
2015); another one is financial services or banking only, with 11.3% (Ecorys), 51.2% (Fontagne) 
and 1.5% (Egger et al (2015)); yet another case is other business services/professional, with 
14.9% (Ecorys), 32.6% (Fontagne) and 35.4% (Egger). Sectors with similar AVEs for the EU 
include chemicals (21%, Ecorys; 19%, Egger) and agro-food (48.2%, Fontagne; 48.4%, Egger). 
Problems also arise in, e.g. electrical machinery, with 6.5% (Ecorys) and 19.4% (Egger), but a 
large segment of it (office and ICT equipment) has an AVE of 22.9% (Ecorys).  
Coming up with AVEs for China is harder still. First, almost no prior empirical work was done on 
China until very recently. Second, as is clear from chapters 11 (services) and 15 (investment), 
and to some extent from chapter 9 (TBTs), it is far from easy to trace all the laws and 
regulations, including local and provincial variations. There is also a wide degree of discretion 
which renders it difficult to attribute the proper scores for restrictiveness. The actionable AVEs 
in Table 18.2 are not always very refined as yet. For example, primary agriculture, forestry and 
fishing all have actionable AVEs for China of 38.5%; the same is true for three key sectors for 
China, namely, textiles, apparel and leather products. The reason is that the GTAP database 
does not use the same sector aggregation as the HS (two-digit) system. Thus the sectors listed in 
Table 18.2 are not fully identical with HS two-digit sectors (e.g. ‘other machinery’ is not fully 
overlapping with HS 84, or ‘various machinery’), where the EU has a large intra-sectoral surplus. 
In any event, the trade-weighted actionable AVEs for China, for goods and services together, 
seem plausible: an AVE for China of 22.3% as against 12.9% for the EU. Though crude, this would 
appear to be consistent with the wealth of qualitative information in Part II of the study. 
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19. Modelling the FTA between China and the EU 
19.1 A non-technical introduction of the model simulations 
Following the empirical and analytical information in previous chapters, in particular chapter 
18 on the main market access barriers (tariffs and – actionable – NTMs, and their costs), the 
present chapter attempts to simulate the economic impact of two FTA scenarios of a 
China/EU FTA. The simulations are done with the help of a sophisticated model, 
encompassing many sectors and even more countries (including some outside the EU) and 
also incorporating markets other than product or services markets directly relevant for 
trade (e.g. the labour market, with workers with distinct skill levels). Using such a very 
ambitious and complex model has the enormous advantage that the direct trade effects are 
not the only aspect which is studied. And rightly so. Because such effects on EU or Chinese 
exports in turn cause a range of other (so-called ‘secondary’) effects, due to demand (from 
that export sector) for extra material, extra services, extra workers, etc., which, in turn, may 
induce yet other effects, perhaps even on imports of inputs as well. The same goes for 
imports: if bilateral imports from China, resp. from the EU, increase due to the FTA, this 
might reduce the demand of domestic substitute products or services whilst at the same 
time affecting consumption patterns, and possibly even consumptive demand (if these 
imports are cheaper than what was consumed before, disposable income is higher for any 
given quantity purchased). This might also impact on the labour market or segments of it. 
Such models on the overall economy, even if very stylised, are extremely demanding 
technically and in terms of data. Therefore, for the sake of being capable of calculating 
impacts of an FTA, some simplifying assumptions are inevitable.  
One such major simplification is that the economy, as modelled, will return to ‘general 
equilibrium’ (such that markets ‘clear’ via price and quantity adjustments). Hence the name 
of this family of simulation models, namely, CGE or ‘computable general equilibrium’ 
models. This implies not only that goods and services markets clear but also the labour 
market. For convenience – given the tremendous complexity of the exercise – CGE models 
usually fix the level of employment. That ‘given’ employment in the economy excludes a 
priori that the FTA would generate additional unemployment (job losses) in the calculations. 
Labour (within that given total of jobs) may reallocate between sectors in response to wage 
changes, both up and down. Wages would be under pressure in (EU) sectors where less will 
be demanded due to, say, Chinese imports in the EU or a reduction of exports to China, or 
the secondary effects of these first effects. Alternatively, wages in some sectors would rise if 
the opening up of China would induce additional exports, or if secondary effects induce 
greater demand for the output of that sector. Given the sectoral wages rising (or falling), 
labour would reallocate (in the margin) towards (or out of) the sector. These reallocations 
show clearly that CGE models are long-run models where such effects can slowly work 
themselves out and the costs of labour reallocation over time matter much less. Indeed, in 
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reality, labour markets do not easily clear in the short run (and this is often painful), but 
labour reallocation over the medium to long run generally works well in market economies. 
Meanwhile, the costs of adjustment are cushioned by the welfare state in the short run and 
by targeted ‘active’ labour market policies (such as upskilling) in the medium run. This is 
further refined when – as the simulation will do – three skill levels are distinguished.  
As chapter 17 already showed that secondary effects of an immediate increase in exports 
induce effects along the value chains (both intermediate goods inputs and services inputs) 
which are incorporated in the overall effects. This generates incredible complexities that 
could simply not be understood without such comprehensive models. This advantage of 
making a proxy of the entire economy (be it stylised) and its numerous interactions also 
implies that the first-order effects of an FTA (say, the immediate increase in a sector’s 
exports) are not at all an accurate description of the expected impact of an FTA. Although 
one cannot always be sure, usually the overall economic impact (when all interactions have 
worked themselves out) tend to be two to three times the magnitude of the first-order 
effect, which is not found or known with a partial model or from simple business surveys 
(where business will only register the immediate import/export effects for its own activity). 
One can thus find that a sector might fear a small decline in its activity as a result of 
concluding an FTA (with China) whereas the CGE model – incorporating all secondary and 
tertiary effects and interactions, perhaps including an overall increase in activity in the 
economy – may well show that the end result is a net positive outcome for the output of the 
sector (though not necessarily for its own exports).  
Models have limitations and this is no different in the case of CGE. It is good to be conscious 
of what these limitations are, but it is not appropriate to criticise models because they 
abstract from ‘reality’. That is their very function and is inherent to them, because the 
purpose is to comprehend in a stylised way what otherwise would remain vague or 
incomprehensible or at least poorly understood. Sound analytical models can also pre-empt 
or expose assertive ‘framing’ which has little or no analytical basis. The CGE model used 
here is an advanced one. Note that it is not only the model itself which is so comprehensive, 
so is the GTAP-9 database on which the exercise relies. The GTAP database is a most 
formidable one and probably second-to-none in the world, whether in terms of the number 
of sectors, countries inside and outside the EU (110), value-chain interactions (input-output 
relations) or otherwise. Of course, one can employ alternative approaches. However, it is 
hard to identify suitable alternatives if policy-makers and/or business or consumers want to 
acquire a rich menu of effects on all levels, including for sectors (be they goods or services) 
and/or for the labour market (and their skill levels) and all this for each EU member state 
and some third countries. 
It is also important to realise what cannot be expected from a CGE exercise. The temporary 
job losses (if any) in a particular sector and/or the overall effect on (un)employment can 
only be approximated in an interpretative fashion. In the present study, the closest one gets 
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to this result is to regard the inter-sectoral reallocation of workers (at distinct skill levels) as 
the temporary (un)employment effects, if – unlike the model – the wage adjustment 
(especially downward) does not work. However, if one would interpret labour movements 
out of a sector as temporary unemployment, it should not be forgotten that such 
reallocation amounts to a purely theoretical maximum of temporary job losses, which does 
not reflect reality any better than perfect adjustment in the CGE model. In actual practice, 
unemployment will be far lower (even if temporary) because expanding sectors will absorb 
workers and because of the natural ‘turn-around’ of workers – over 10 years in case of an 
FTA – in labour markets on their own initiative, be it because workers anticipate a firm’s 
weaknesses, or they move for other reasons, or invest themselves in upskilling, or move to 
other regions, or retire. Moreover, companies can and do change, and might develop 
strategies to minimise the negative impact by moving upmarket, altering their product 
portfolio or cutting costs in more radical ways. It is well known that labour markets 
demonstrate tremendous job movements every year, and certainly over the medium run. 
Hence, a small sectoral negative job effect may well be (and often is) a minor or even 
invisible ripple. Nevertheless, if job losses are suspected not to be so minor, adjustment 
assistance (such as active labour market policies) and social security are critical for an FTA 
not to have ‘losers’ or at worst only very temporarily so, and without major income loss. 
Section 19.6 on social adjustment to the consequences of the FTA elaborates on this issue 
and in the light of practical experience and other FTA (net) job gains. However, such 
adjustment questions refer to a small segment of industry – the simulation reported below 
will demonstrate that the FTA is likely to generate additional output and exports in many 
sectors whilst increasing economic welfare overall.  
Box 19.1 provides a more technical explanation of the model set-up, underpinned by 
equations and other technicalities in annex V.  
Box 19.1 Technical explanation of the CGE model for calculating FTA economic impacts 
The analysis of FTA scenarios (ambitious versus modest) integrates the trade cost reduction 
estimates discussed in chapter 18 with a computation model of world trade. The computer 
model effectively maps out a multi-sector general equilibrium structure with intermediate 
linkages and trade modelled as in Eaton & Kortum (2002), as extended to a CGE framework by 
Bekkers & Francois (2015). The chapter 18 estimates of trade cost reductions (due to tariffs and 
NTM reductions) are used in the computational model to simulate the effect of an EU-China FTA 
covering both tariffs and NTM-based trade costs. 
The combined theoretical set-up and calibration for the CGE model relies on both the older CGE 
models (cf. Dixon & Jorgenson, 2013), and more structurally based quantitative trade models 
(see Costinot & Rodriguez-Clare, 2013, for an overview). The interaction of both analytical 
frameworks generates important synergies. For instance, following the new quantitative trade 
models, one can improve on the older CGE approach in two fundamental ways. First, trade 
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 243 
 
linkages in CGE are modelled with the micro-founded Eaton & Kortum (2002) framework. 
Second, trade parameters have been structurally estimated and trade costs for goods employing 
a gravity model are derived from the theoretical structure of the CGE model (as discussed in the 
appendix), using the same trade data that is used in numerical simulations. Under this approach, 
one obtains a detailed and consistent dataset for multi-sectors and countries with trade costs 
that explicitly include export taxes, international transport costs and import tariffs varying by 
country pairs and sectors. 
Technical details on the model are covered in the appendix. Key points are that sectors are the 
same as in Table 17.2 above, while there are 110 countries in the model. Data are taken from 
GTAP9, which is benchmarked to 2011. In order to allow a period of adjustment for the FTA until 
2030, IIASA/OECD macroeconomic projections and UN population and labour force projections 
are employed to move these data to 2030. Simulations are then conducted with respect to this 
2030 baseline. The baseline also includes full implementation of recent agreements (especially 
TPP and a stylised notion of TTIP). 
19.2 Simulating economic impacts of ambitious and modest FTAs 
For the purpose of impact simulation, two alternative stylised China-EU FTAs are 
distinguished – modest and ambitious. The first includes tariffs but limited NTM reductions. 
In the second, more ambitious NTM reductions are assumed. More precisely, the two 
scenarios are therefore as follows: 
Modest Scenario 
 Full elimination of tariffs 
 25% reduction in actionable NTMs affecting goods 
 25% reduction in actionable NTMs affecting services 
Ambitious Scenario 
 Full elimination of tariffs 
 50% reduction in actionable NTMs affecting goods 
 50% reduction in actionable NTMs affecting services 
For NTMs, based on firm level evidence (Ecorys) we assume that NTMs involve a 50:50 mix 
of NTMs that raise costs and NTMs that generate rents.242 
                                                   
242 In case regulatory barriers have the effect of reducing or even pre-empting highly competitive 
imports, local suppliers may enjoy high(er) mark-ups (or rents) on top of the cost price. Lowering the 
costs of such NTMs would have an additional pro-competitive effect.  
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19.3 Results of the FTA simulation: Changes in GDP (in % and $) 
Table 19.1 below provides the estimates of the percent changes in GDP for China and EU 
member states in 2030, as impacts of both stylised FTAs, while Table 19.2 provides 
estimates of the annual (in 2030) dollar value of national real income changes. With respect 
to the reference year 2030, GDP is expected to be 1.16% higher in China and 0.43% higher in 
the EU under the modest FTA, but 1.87% higher in China and 0.76% higher in the EU in the 
ambitious scenario. On a percent basis, there is asymmetry in favour of China. On a dollar 
basis, the outcomes are seen to be more balanced: $62.5 (€55.8) billion for China and $54.3 
(€48.5) billion for the EU in the modest case; $99.7 (€89.1) billion for China and $93.2 
(€83.3) billion for the EU in the ambitious case.243 
From the tables, one can also see variation in the effect across member states. While the 
two averages are 0.43% (modest) and 0.76% (ambitious), at individual member state level 
this may range as high as 1.34% (modest) to 1.97% (ambitious) for Slovakia. Indeed, peak 
effects in the table are concentrated in the smaller EU member states, though Germany, 
one of the larger economies within the EU, is estimated to gain almost 1% of GDP with the 
ambitious scenario.  
Table 19.1 Impact of FTA: Changes in GDP (in %) 
  Modest experiment Ambitious experiment 
  A: 
Total 
B+C+D 
B: 
 
tariffs 
C: 
goods 
NTBs 
D: 
services 
NTBs 
E: 
Total 
F+G+H 
F: 
tariffs 
G: 
goods 
NTBs 
H: 
services 
NTBs 
China 1.16 0.56 0.57 0.04 1.87 0.60 1.19 0.08 
European Union 0.43 0.13 0.28 0.02 0.76 0.14 0.58 0.04 
Austria 0.44 0.16 0.26 0.02 0.75 0.17 0.54 0.04 
Belgium 0.75 0.29 0.44 0.02 1.28 0.32 0.94 0.03 
Cyprus 0.62 0.24 0.35 0.03 1.05 0.25 0.74 0.06 
Czech Republic 0.76 0.23 0.51 0.02 1.35 0.25 1.06 0.04 
Denmark 0.36 0.12 0.22 0.02 0.64 0.13 0.46 0.04 
Estonia 0.82 0.29 0.50 0.02 1.42 0.31 1.06 0.04 
Finland 0.36 0.12 0.20 0.03 0.62 0.13 0.43 0.06 
France 0.33 0.09 0.23 0.01 0.59 0.10 0.47 0.02 
Germany 0.53 0.20 0.31 0.02 0.91 0.22 0.65 0.04 
Greece 0.28 0.02 0.25 0.01 0.57 0.02 0.52 0.02 
Hungary 0.81 0.32 0.47 0.02 1.37 0.34 0.99 0.04 
                                                   
243 All values in euros are found by converting expected changes in GDP (dollars) with respect to the 
reference year 2030, using the dollar/euro exchange rate of 23 March 2016. 
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 245 
 
Ireland 0.52 0.11 0.35 0.06 0.95 0.12 0.72 0.11 
Italy 0.43 0.12 0.29 0.01 0.76 0.13 0.60 0.03 
Latvia 0.49 0.14 0.33 0.02 0.88 0.15 0.70 0.04 
Lithuania 0.59 0.14 0.43 0.02 1.08 0.15 0.90 0.04 
Luxembourg 0.28 0.06 0.17 0.04 0.51 0.07 0.36 0.09 
Malta 0.39 0.07 0.32 0.00 0.80 0.07 0.72 0.01 
Netherlands 0.37 0.07 0.27 0.03 0.69 0.07 0.55 0.07 
Poland 0.54 0.16 0.36 0.01 0.95 0.17 0.75 0.03 
Portugal 0.27 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.47 0.09 0.35 0.03 
Slovakia 1.34 0.82 0.51 0.02 1.97 0.88 1.05 0.04 
Slovenia 0.48 0.17 0.30 0.01 0.83 0.18 0.63 0.01 
Spain 0.31 0.06 0.22 0.03 0.58 0.07 0.46 0.05 
Sweden 0.33 0.10 0.22 0.02 0.59 0.10 0.45 0.04 
UK 0.37 0.09 0.25 0.02 0.67 0.10 0.53 0.04 
Bulgaria 0.43 0.07 0.32 0.04 0.83 0.08 0.67 0.08 
Croatia 0.34 0.14 0.20 0.00 0.56 0.15 0.41 0.00 
Romania 0.30 0.07 0.23 0.01 0.57 0.07 0.47 0.02 
Note: Based on changes in GDP, quantity-based index. 
Table 19.2 Impact of FTA: National income change ($ million, 2030 benchmark) 
  Modest experiment Ambitious experiment 
  A: 
Total 
B+C+D 
B: 
 
tariffs 
C: 
goods 
NTBs 
D: 
services 
NTBs 
E: 
Total 
F+G+H 
F: 
 
tariffs 
G: 
goods 
NTBs 
H: 
services 
NTBs 
China 62,521 31,021 29,892 1,609 99,724 33,066 63,480 3,416 
European Union 54,364 21,585 30,522 2,250 93,215 23,633 64,926 4,654 
Austria 1,533 707 771 55 2,503 767 1,623 113 
Belgium 2,540 1,176 1,314 50 4,245 1,306 2,836 103 
Cyprus 62 17 39 5 114 19 84 11 
Czech Republic 965 324 615 27 1,716 356 1,305 55 
Denmark 913 385 482 47 1,552 427 1,028 97 
Estonia 102 36 64 2 181 40 137 4 
Finland 824 419 360 45 1,320 458 769 93 
France 5,795 1,877 3,719 198 10,402 2,054 7,940 408 
Germany 19,294 10,255 8,520 519 30,518 11,202 18,239 1,078 
Greece 124 -142 266 0 428 -145 569 3 
Hungary 725 321 389 16 1,212 348 832 33 
Ireland 895 220 557 118 1,645 230 1,172 243 
Italy 5,528 1,878 3,469 181 9,804 2,094 7,341 368 
Latvia 58 9 46 3 115 10 99 6 
Lithuania 124 11 107 6 251 13 225 12 
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Luxembourg 112 34 65 13 201 36 136 28 
Malta 26 2 23 0 57 3 54 0 
Netherlands 1,885 362 1,342 181 3,583 385 2,820 378 
Poland 1,560 394 1,111 54 2,856 417 2,330 109 
Portugal 244 49 171 24 468 55 362 52 
Slovakia 1,051 720 319 12 1,462 772 665 25 
Slovenia 92 28 62 2 170 31 134 4 
Spain 2,081 246 1,608 227 4,157 281 3,401 475 
Sweden 1,672 669 919 83 2,836 725 1,940 171 
UK 5,764 1,578 3,827 351 10,580 1,731 8,121 728 
Bulgaria 102 -10 97 15 226 -9 204 31 
Croatia 55 4 51 0 113 5 109 0 
Romania 239 14 212 14 500 21 451 28 
Note: Based on ‘equivalent variation’, prices relative to USD price of US GDP in 2011. 
On a dollar basis, the greatest absolute gains accrue to the larger EU economies, led by 
Germany ($19.3/€17.3 billion to $30.5/€27.3 billion), and followed by France ($5.8/€5.2 
billion to $10.4/€9.3 billion), the UK ($5.8/€5.2 billion to $10.6/€9.5 billion), and Italy 
($5.6/€5 billion to $9.8/€8.8 billion).244  
19.4 Results of the FTA simulation: Changes in real wages for three skill groups 
Table 19.3, Table 19.4 and Table 19.5, below, present changes in average real wages, i.e. 
deflated for the cost of consumption, by skill levels (low, medium and high). One observes 
that China’s real wage gains are smaller than overall GDP gains, while EU gains are 
somewhat higher. This reflects the respective patterns of trade. The EU imports much more 
in consumer goods than vice versa – indeed, a large portion of which are mass consumer 
goods which (can) directly raise real disposable income of EU consumers via a reduction in 
the cost of living insofar as such imports from China are cheaper than local substitutes. One 
also observes a wide range of EU member state effects. Focusing on three variations across 
skill levels, the greatest real wage gains in the EU in percent are for low-skilled workers, with 
an EU average of 0.74% (modest FTA) and 1.13% (ambitious FTA). For medium-skilled 
workers this is 0.54% (modest FTA) to 0.84% (ambitious FTA), and for high skilled workers a 
gain of between 0.57% (modest FTA) and 0.88% (ambitious FTA). 
 
                                                   
244 All the values in euros are the expected changes in GDP on a dollar basis with respect to the 
reference year 2030 compared to the dollar/euro exchange rate of 23 March 2016. 
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Table 19.3. Estimated percent changes in real wages, low-skilled workers 
  Modest experiment Ambitious experiment 
  A: 
Total 
B+C+D 
B: 
 
tariffs 
C: 
goods 
NTBs 
D: 
services 
NTBs 
E: 
Total 
F+G+H 
F: 
 
tariffs 
G: 
goods 
NTBs 
H: 
services 
NTBs 
China 0.87 0.47 0.36 0.04 1.34 0.50 0.75 0.09 
European Union 0.74 0.41 0.31 0.02 1.13 0.44 0.66 0.04 
Austria 0.65 0.35 0.29 0.01 1.01 0.38 0.61 0.03 
Belgium 1.33 0.78 0.54 0.02 2.01 0.84 1.14 0.03 
Cyprus 0.59 0.29 0.27 0.02 0.93 0.32 0.57 0.04 
Czech Republic 0.85 0.40 0.43 0.02 1.36 0.43 0.90 0.04 
Denmark 0.94 0.58 0.35 0.02 1.39 0.62 0.74 0.03 
Estonia 1.02 0.56 0.43 0.03 1.57 0.61 0.91 0.06 
Finland 0.92 0.57 0.32 0.03 1.35 0.62 0.67 0.06 
France 0.60 0.31 0.28 0.01 0.95 0.33 0.59 0.03 
Germany 1.30 0.82 0.47 0.02 1.90 0.88 0.99 0.03 
Greece 0.12 -0.05 0.15 0.02 0.30 -0.06 0.30 0.05 
Hungary 0.78 0.39 0.37 0.02 1.26 0.43 0.79 0.03 
Ireland 0.71 0.28 0.39 0.04 1.20 0.30 0.82 0.08 
Italy 0.58 0.30 0.26 0.02 0.90 0.32 0.55 0.03 
Latvia 0.30 0.08 0.21 0.02 0.55 0.08 0.44 0.03 
Lithuania 0.39 0.09 0.28 0.02 0.71 0.10 0.58 0.03 
Luxembourg 0.31 0.09 0.19 0.02 0.53 0.10 0.38 0.05 
Malta 0.33 0.10 0.22 0.00 0.61 0.11 0.50 0.01 
Netherlands 0.53 0.19 0.30 0.04 0.89 0.20 0.62 0.08 
Poland 0.42 0.16 0.25 0.01 0.70 0.17 0.51 0.03 
Portugal 0.03 -0.06 0.09 0.01 0.14 -0.06 0.18 0.02 
Slovakia 1.15 0.80 0.33 0.02 1.58 0.86 0.69 0.03 
Slovenia 0.66 0.37 0.27 0.01 0.99 0.40 0.57 0.02 
Spain 0.44 0.19 0.22 0.03 0.71 0.20 0.46 0.05 
Sweden 0.80 0.44 0.34 0.02 1.22 0.47 0.71 0.05 
UK 0.48 0.24 0.22 0.02 0.76 0.26 0.46 0.03 
Bulgaria 0.20 -0.02 0.19 0.02 0.43 -0.01 0.40 0.05 
Croatia 0.47 0.32 0.16 0.00 0.65 0.33 0.32 0.00 
Romania 0.21 0.04 0.16 0.01 0.41 0.05 0.34 0.02 
The EU average low-skilled workers’ wage gain of 1.13% for the ambitious FTA hides a great 
deal of variation, with Belgian and German low-skilled workers enjoying a 2% increase 
(2.01% and 1.90%), and rather small gains in some lower income EU countries (resp. 
Portugal (0.14%), Greece (0.30%), Romania (0.41%) and Bulgaria (0.43%)). But one cannot 
generalise on lower versus higher income EU countries: UK low-skilled workers would gain 
248 │ PART III. POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACT: A CGE-BASED SIMULATION OF EFFECTS OF THE FTA 
 
0.76% and Czech ones 1.36%, or Luxembourg workers 0.53% and Hungarian ones 1.26%. 
However, the conjecture that (some) EU low-skilled workers might suffer income losses 
from an FTA with China is not confirmed: in all EU countries wages increase in both 
scenarios.  
Table 19.4. Estimated percent changes in real wages, medium-skilled workers 
  Modest experiment Ambitious experiment 
  A: 
Total 
B+C+D 
B: 
 
tariffs 
C: 
goods 
NTBs 
D: 
service
s NTBs 
E: 
Total 
F+G+H 
F: 
 
tariffs 
G: 
goods 
NTBs 
H: 
service
s NTBs 
China 0.64 0.32 0.30 0.02 1.01 0.35 0.63 0.03 
European Union 0.54 0.28 0.24 0.02 0.84 0.31 0.50 0.04 
Austria 0.53 0.28 0.23 0.02 0.83 0.31 0.49 0.04 
Belgium 0.93 0.52 0.40 0.01 1.43 0.56 0.84 0.03 
Cyprus 0.55 0.28 0.24 0.03 0.87 0.30 0.52 0.05 
Czech Republic 0.67 0.32 0.34 0.01 1.08 0.35 0.71 0.02 
Denmark 0.61 0.34 0.24 0.03 0.93 0.36 0.51 0.05 
Estonia 0.84 0.47 0.36 0.01 1.29 0.51 0.76 0.03 
Finland 0.50 0.28 0.19 0.03 0.77 0.31 0.40 0.06 
France 0.45 0.23 0.21 0.01 0.71 0.24 0.44 0.02 
Germany 0.86 0.52 0.32 0.02 1.28 0.56 0.68 0.04 
Greece 0.10 -0.02 0.11 0.01 0.24 -0.02 0.23 0.03 
Hungary 0.57 0.28 0.28 0.01 0.93 0.30 0.60 0.03 
Ireland 0.57 0.20 0.27 0.11 0.99 0.21 0.56 0.22 
Italy 0.45 0.22 0.22 0.01 0.72 0.24 0.46 0.02 
Latvia 0.44 0.18 0.24 0.02 0.74 0.20 0.52 0.03 
Lithuania 0.44 0.16 0.27 0.01 0.77 0.17 0.57 0.02 
Luxembourg 0.30 0.11 0.16 0.03 0.51 0.12 0.33 0.07 
Malta 0.26 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.50 0.07 0.42 0.01 
Netherlands 0.42 0.16 0.23 0.03 0.71 0.17 0.48 0.06 
Poland 0.44 0.19 0.24 0.01 0.72 0.21 0.49 0.02 
Portugal 0.19 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.33 0.07 0.23 0.03 
Slovakia 1.14 0.80 0.33 0.01 1.56 0.86 0.68 0.02 
Slovenia 0.48 0.28 0.20 0.00 0.73 0.30 0.42 0.01 
Spain 0.32 0.14 0.16 0.02 0.53 0.15 0.33 0.05 
Sweden 0.51 0.27 0.22 0.02 0.79 0.29 0.46 0.04 
UK 0.41 0.19 0.20 0.02 0.66 0.21 0.42 0.04 
Bulgaria 0.34 0.09 0.21 0.03 0.62 0.10 0.44 0.07 
Croatia 0.40 0.26 0.14 0.00 0.57 0.27 0.30 0.00 
Romania 0.30 0.12 0.18 0.01 0.51 0.13 0.37 0.02 
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There is less variation between member state medium-skilled workers’ wage gains than for 
low-skilled workers. The EU average of 0.84% for the ambitious FTA includes the highest 
wage gains for Slovakia (1.56%), Belgium (1.43%), Estonia (1.29%) and Germany (1.28%), 
whereas the lowest gains are slightly higher than in the low-skilled workers results: Greece 
(0.24%), Portugal (0.33%), Romania (0.51%) and Spain (0.53%).  
Table 19.5. Estimated percent changes in real wages, high-skilled workers 
  Modest experiment Ambitious experiment 
  A: 
Total 
B+C+D 
B: 
 
tariffs 
C: 
goods 
NTBs 
D: 
services 
NTBs 
E: 
Total 
F+G+H 
F: 
 
tariffs 
G: 
goods 
NTBs 
H: 
services 
NTBs 
China 0.73 0.35 0.36 0.02 1.18 0.37 0.76 0.05 
European Union 0.57 0.30 0.25 0.02 0.88 0.33 0.52 0.04 
Austria 0.57 0.31 0.24 0.02 0.87 0.33 0.51 0.04 
Belgium 0.97 0.55 0.41 0.01 1.49 0.59 0.87 0.03 
Cyprus 0.57 0.29 0.26 0.03 0.91 0.31 0.54 0.06 
Czech Republic 0.73 0.34 0.37 0.01 1.18 0.37 0.78 0.03 
Denmark 0.65 0.37 0.25 0.03 0.98 0.39 0.53 0.05 
Estonia 0.86 0.48 0.37 0.02 1.33 0.52 0.78 0.03 
Finland 0.61 0.37 0.22 0.02 0.92 0.40 0.47 0.05 
France 0.48 0.25 0.22 0.01 0.75 0.27 0.46 0.02 
Germany 0.89 0.54 0.33 0.02 1.32 0.59 0.70 0.03 
Greece 0.08 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.21 -0.03 0.22 0.02 
Hungary 0.64 0.32 0.31 0.01 1.04 0.34 0.67 0.03 
Ireland 0.59 0.23 0.29 0.08 1.00 0.24 0.61 0.16 
Italy 0.46 0.23 0.22 0.01 0.74 0.25 0.46 0.03 
Latvia 0.43 0.17 0.24 0.02 0.72 0.18 0.51 0.03 
Lithuania 0.43 0.13 0.28 0.01 0.76 0.14 0.59 0.03 
Luxembourg 0.31 0.12 0.16 0.03 0.53 0.13 0.33 0.07 
Malta 0.33 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.68 0.08 0.59 0.01 
Netherlands 0.44 0.16 0.24 0.03 0.74 0.17 0.51 0.06 
Poland 0.42 0.17 0.24 0.01 0.70 0.18 0.49 0.02 
Portugal 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.31 0.06 0.21 0.03 
Slovakia 1.13 0.79 0.33 0.01 1.56 0.85 0.69 0.03 
Slovenia 0.54 0.31 0.22 0.01 0.81 0.33 0.46 0.01 
Spain 0.33 0.14 0.16 0.02 0.54 0.15 0.34 0.05 
Sweden 0.58 0.32 0.24 0.02 0.89 0.34 0.51 0.05 
UK 0.44 0.22 0.21 0.02 0.71 0.23 0.44 0.04 
Bulgaria 0.28 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.53 0.06 0.41 0.07 
Croatia 0.41 0.26 0.15 0.00 0.58 0.27 0.31 0.00 
Romania 0.27 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.46 0.10 0.35 0.02 
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For high-skilled workers in the EU, the averages for both scenarios are very similar to those 
for medium-skilled workers. Also the variation between member states hardly differs. The 
highest gains for high-skilled workers in the EU are expected for Slovakia (1.56%), Belgium 
(1.49%), Estonia (1.33%) and Germany (1.32%), whereas the lowest gains are expected for 
Greece (0.21%), Portugal (0.31%), Romania (0.46%) and Bulgaria (0.53%). For both medium- 
and high-skilled workers in the EU, no negative wage impact is found in any one of the 28 
member states. For all three skill levels, Chinese workers are expected to enjoy slightly 
higher gains (resp. 1.34%, 1.01% and 1.18%) than the EU averages for the ambitious FTA.  
19.5 Results of the FTA simulation: Effects on trade 
19.5.1 Aggregate trade flow effects 
Table 19.6 below provides an overview of changes in EU and Chinese trade patterns. EU 
exports to China increase by between 79.2% (modest) and 110.64% (ambitious), while there 
is a tiny drop in exports to the rest of the world. Overall, EU exports go up by between 2.2% 
and 3.2%. China’s exports to the EU increase by between 39.2% (modest) and 56.9% 
(ambitious), with a larger increase in total exports than for the EU. In addition, in the China 
case, there is a slight increase in exports to the rest of the world. Overall (not shown), 
combined EU and China exports to the rest of world drop slightly, by between 0.25% 
(modest) and 0.28% (ambitious). 
Table 19.6 Modest and ambitious FTA: Changes in bilateral trade (in %) 
  Modest Ambitious 
China total exports 9.00 12.90 
EU total exports 2.21 3.18 
EU exports to China 79.20 110.64 
China exports to EU 39.20 56.89 
China to ROW 0.79 0.93 
EU to ROW -0.47 -0.57 
Note: ROW = rest of the world. 
19.5.2 FTA effects on sectoral EU and China’s global exports and imports 
Figure 19.1245 and Table 19.7 present indicators of changes in performance for sectors in 
goods and services for the EU and for China. Performance is defined here as changes in 
sectoral output, in export and imports. The greatest effects are concentrated in machinery: 
non-electrical machinery and equipment; electrical machinery; motor vehicles; textiles; 
                                                   
245 Figure 19.1 is derived from data reported in Table A2 in Annex III. 
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clothing; and footwear. The effect on sectoral output is a combination of the influence of 
exports on sectoral output, together with complex secondary effects. Figure 19.1 and Table 
19.7 are aggregated sector totals, hiding often many distinct products, which, in turn, 
require many inputs, and may in some cases themselves serve as inputs for other products 
too. It may well be that additional exports (to China or elsewhere) might induce extra 
imports (of inputs) from China or elsewhere. Sectors may also comprise segments where 
China has a comparative advantage and other segments where EU producers have 
comparative advantages or developed a competitive edge. Some sectors may not export 
much (or not at all) to China and the FTA might lower trading costs for Chinese exporters in 
selling in Europe. If the Chinese have comparative advantages, this is likely to exert a 
negative effect on EU sectoral output. Against this background, it is important to realise that 
Figure 19.1 and Table 19.7 are not about bilateral trade but about EU and Chinese trade, 
respectively, with the world. Similarly, because of secondary effects, e.g. intermediates or 
other inputs, one cannot assume a direct relationship between the effects on exports and 
imports on the one hand, and sectoral output on the other; there may well be offsetting 
demand from other sectors, for example.  
Focusing on the ambitious scenario for the EU (Figure 19.1), six out of 34 sectors witness a 
decline in output: wood, pulp and paper; electrical machinery; other manufactured goods; 
textiles; clothing (apparel); and leather products. The last three can hardly be surprising 
since China – despite recent wage hikes – still holds a comparative advantage vis-à-vis EU 
countries. As a consequence, output decline in these sectors is considerable (between 
4.85% and 7.31%). Competing with China in these products only makes sense if one targets 
the high-value-added segments in the final markets. Eight sectors increase output by more 
than 1%: construction, primary metals, other machinery (in which EU producers are world 
leader), motor vehicles (with the largest growth of 3.23%), other transport equipment, 
petrochemicals, air and maritime transport. Reading the export and import changes, the 
analysis is too aggregated to fully grasp all relevant determinants. But if EU sectoral exports 
are negatively impacted or increase only marginally whilst imports rise appreciably, sector 
output tends to be negatively affected. There are a few special cases. One is processed 
foods, plus beverages and tobacco, where the EU is a world leader and already enjoys large 
world exports but also maintains significant barriers. The increase in EU exports is relatively 
small in percentages, mainly because EU world exports are already large (and the additional 
exports to China do not count for all that much) and imports increase as well (in part due to 
inputs, from cacao beans to soya; in part because barriers fall away). Another is public 
services. This is a sector (see Table 18.2) where trade is less than 0.4% of EU-China trade (in 
both directions). The limited trade in this sector includes a mix of education and health care 
services. While direct trade liberalisation in this sector is not modelled here, estimated 
changes in output driven by general equilibrium effects are still reported. 
 
252 │ PART III. POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACT: A CGE-BASED SIMULATION OF EFFECTS OF THE FTA 
 
Figure 19.1 FTA effects on EU output, export and import. Change by sectors, ambitious scenario 
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Table 19.7 describes the expected changes, due to the FTA and all its effects, in sectoral 
output, exports and imports of China. A glance at the table shows immediately that sectoral 
output effects in China have similar magnitudes (in percent), though perhaps slightly higher 
than in EU sectors, but that is not at all the case for (its world) exports and imports changes, 
which tend to be much larger in many sectors than for the EU. Focussing first on sectoral 
output changes, 17 of 34 sectors have changes above a 1% increase (with four sectors above 
5%, namely, electrical machinery, textiles, clothing and leather products), and five sectors 
are expected to witness a decline in output, two of which would experience significant 
decreases (other machinery, at - 2.87%; motor vehicles, at - 9.13%). However, changes in 
Chinese sectoral exports and imports are often large, if not very large. For the ambitious FTA 
scenario, Chinese exports always increase and only five out of 34 sectors do this with less 
than 1%. No fewer than 18 sectors increase exports by more than 5%, 11 sectors with more 
than 10% and two of them (other machinery; other transport equipment) even with more 
than 20%. On the import side, no fewer than 13 sectors would have import growth above 
10%, seven of which would be even higher than 20%, with four extremes: fabricated metal 
products (36.27%), other machinery (44.83%), motor vehicles (44.11%) and other transport 
equipment (52.42%). In the two sectors where China would expect a substantial negative 
impact on sectoral output, it is the vast difference between extra imports and extra exports 
which points to a significant adjustment: in other machinery, exports would rise 22% but 
imports 45%, and in motor vehicles, Chinese exports would increase 11% but imports no 
less than 44%. The simultaneity of such export and import growth at the sectoral level 
strongly suggests that there is so-called ‘intra-industry trade’ between the EU and China 
(that is, supplies to the EU of products, e.g. low-skilled-labour-intensive intermediates with 
low/medium technology, and supplies to China made with high-skilled labour and medium-
to-high technology), perhaps even within multinational firms. It can also be noted that in 
the three sectors where China has clear comparative advantages (textiles, clothing, leather 
products) vis-à-vis the EU, Chinese sectoral import growth rates are higher than export 
increases, which may point to value chains ending in China before exporting to the EU. 
Finally, in business/ICT services and especially in air transport, output changes are modest in 
China but sectoral imports are much higher than exports. Both sectors are protected in 
China and the ambitious FTA with the EU might well unleash the potential. However, the 
domestic Chinese market is so big that the effect on sectoral Chinese output remains limited 
(be it that air transport has a slight negative effect).  
Table 19.7 FTA impact: Output and trade effect per sector in China 
  output, % change exports, % change imports, % change 
  modest 
scenario 
ambitious 
scenario 
modest 
scenario 
ambitious 
scenario 
modest 
scenario 
ambitious 
scenario 
primary agriculture 0.73 1.00 2.24 3.50 4.62 6.34 
forestry 0.87 1.44 2.12 3.84 2.76 4.69 
fishing 0.39 0.56 0.25 0.61 4.16 5.92 
oil and gas 0.31 0.49 0.53 0.79 1.05 1.75 
other primary energy, mining 0.14 0.29 0.46 0.78 0.13 0.50 
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utilities 0.48 0.78 1.72 2.84 1.18 2.86 
construction 1.53 2.43 3.28 5.92 5.36 10.81 
wood, pulp, paper 1.46 2.52 2.86 4.77 3.33 5.31 
non-metallic mineral 
products 
1.33 2.11 6.71 8.95 11.30 13.13 
primary metals -0.58 -0.68 5.41 8.40 2.42 4.62 
fabricated metal products 0.85 1.64 10.42 15.60 28.51 36.27 
other machinery -2.16 -2.87 16.34 22.77 32.46 44.83 
electrical machinery 3.55 5.31 6.95 11.01 5.20 9.20 
motor vehicles -6.68 -9.13 7.29 11.14 34.37 44.11 
other transport -0.03 -0.55 14.57 21.17 33.18 52.42 
other goods 1.50 2.81 6.80 11.58 22.64 28.52 
processed foods 0.54 0.69 11.24 13.87 10.25 14.08 
beverages and tobacco 0.28 0.48 0.51 0.51 4.01 2.44 
textiles 4.44 5.58 7.87 10.04 10.37 13.72 
apparel 5.64 7.07 15.22 18.91 16.32 20.54 
leather products 4.71 5.76 10.71 13.28 20.19 26.09 
paper products, printing 0.55 0.83 3.30 6.50 3.62 6.05 
petrochemicals 0.46 0.80 2.33 4.57 1.61 2.74 
chemicals, rubber, plastics 0.55 0.83 6.80 10.01 5.34 7.61 
wholesale, retail 0.55 0.88 0.62 0.99 2.00 3.90 
air transport 0.07 -0.50 3.04 5.20 7.30 16.05 
land transport, other 0.87 1.44 4.50 8.70 0.47 1.01 
maritime transport 0.77 1.17 1.91 2.76 2.16 4.60 
recreational, other services 0.72 1.15 1.38 2.55 2.48 4.73 
communications 0.81 1.27 1.37 2.08 0.49 1.22 
finance 0.84 1.29 1.02 1.50 3.65 7.69 
insurance 0.30 0.29 1.59 2.99 3.69 7.38 
business, ICT services 0.66 0.94 2.80 5.35 5.05 10.29 
public services 0.73 1.19 1.06 1.98 2.71 5.07 
The overall conclusion for sectoral effects is that many sectors benefit in both the EU and 
China, but not all. Combining Figure 19.1 and Table 19.7, one observes a significant 
displacement of Chinese motor vehicle production, with a mirrored expansion in the EU. 
The same holds for non-electrical machinery and equipment. The opposite pattern holds for 
electrical machinery, textiles, clothing and footwear. In all of these, we see a reduction in 
output in the EU, and a shift in production to China. This is also reflected in trade data. In 
motor vehicles, for example, we have an increase in bilateral trade, but with a much larger 
increase in EU exports to China, compared to Chinese exports to the EU (on a percent 
change basis). 
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 255 
 
19.6 Strategies for adjustment to a China/EU FTA 
19.6.1 Globalisation with Chinese characteristics: winners and losers in adjustment 
Economic welfare and income gains for the EU and China arising from FTAs are important. 
However, that is not always how FTAs are perceived in the political debate prior to 
ratification. Identifying winners and losers, certainly in the short run, is a prevalent theme 
for policy-makers and the notion of ‘net positive gains for society as a whole’ is discussed 
less frequently than the minimisation of the damage for temporary losers. But the 
uncomfortable truth is that freer trade and investment tends to accentuate the differences 
between high productivity firms/sectors and those having lost comparative advantage or 
failed in catching up with productivity trends. In other words, unless one would wish to 
‘freeze’ a status quo with low(er) productivity firms surviving behind protection, one 
unfortunately “needs” such sectors or firms, which are lagging behind, to “adjust” (that is, 
improve productivity in many ways, or exit, thereby setting free factors of production to 
move to other, higher productivity sectors246) so that overall productivity trends move up. 
That is the source of economic growth and, here, of the income gains. It is a fact of life that 
adjustment for the winners is far easier than for the losers. The winners are also far less 
voluble in the debate, leading to the (selective) impression in some circles that trade is more 
negative than it really is.  
For a China/EU FTA, similar sentiments and expectations are likely to play a role. However, 
there is probably more to it. This is due to the experience of both the rapid growth of 
Chinese export-led, low-skilled-labour-intensive specialisation ever since the early 1990s, 
and the exceptionally large and swift absorption of hundreds of millions of low-skilled 
workers from the vast Chinese countryside into manufacturing during these two-plus 
decades, creating incessant adjustment pressures in, for example, OECD countries (and to 
some extent in some developing countries). The unusually heavy adjustment pressures are 
said to have led to repeated, if not continuous, job losses – concentrated on low-skilled 
workers and, at times, in EU regions specialised in low-skilled sectors competing with an 
emerging China – and to wage restraints, again for the low-skilled in certain sectors. There 
are even indications that the overburdened adjustment processes in these activities 
widened the wage gap between the low-skilled and other workers, especially in the US but 
possibly also in the EU. Section 19.6.2 will briefly discuss the economic background of this 
adjustment and some empirical evidence. Section 19.6.3 will discuss the temporary job 
losses which might be caused by a China-EU FTA and how they can be minimised.  
                                                   
246 It is of course also possible to relocate the production to low-wage countries. In that case, ‘exit’ 
from EU markets might nevertheless still leave selective activities in the EU as a destination market 
and/or as the origin of high-value-added elements of the value chain.  
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19.6.2 Socio-economic aspects of adjustment to (Chinese) globalisation 
In the case of China-EU trade, a very large part of the adjustment out of comparative 
disadvantage sectors and activities has already happened during the past two or three 
decades. In future, trade and investment with China will increasingly be two-way, within 
sectors. EU sectors which have already adjusted to Chinese and other emerging economies’ 
imports of low-skill-intensive manufactures, and survived, have probably moved upmarket 
in niches which require specialised or higher-skill inputs or particular designs. Bilateral 
growth in goods trade will mainly be in medium-skill, if not high-skill, intensive sectors and 
in services as incorporated in goods or accompanying these goods. Of course, such a process 
of adjustment takes time. Therefore, if a China-EU FTA would be concluded soon, there will 
still be lingering adjustment issues and some sectors are bound to shrink in the margin. The 
overall gains from the FTA in economic welfare and in jobs are likely to outweigh by far any 
job losses and sectoral shrinkage. Nevertheless, a case to be made for or against a China-EU 
FTA cannot be complete without considering the adjustment problem, sectorally, in labour 
markets and in size.  
Economists tend to point out (rightly) that job gains and losses are an ordinary phenomenon 
of each economy every year, indeed every month or day. Jobs may be lost for many reasons, 
including business cycle downturns, loss of competitive advantages of companies vis-à-vis 
other companies, loss of comparative advantages in the world economy, technological 
changes (including labour-saving automation and IT processes), a shift away of demand for 
one’s products or services, bad management, etc. Therefore, from an economic point of 
view, it is anything but obvious why job losses from freer trade and investment should be so 
great that policy and politics get involved. On the other hand, there need not be anything 
wrong with attention for temporary losers as long as, eventually, markets can play their 
role. Moreover, a job loss is only a (temporary) problem if a new job, preferably in the same 
sector if special sectoral skills are giving an advantage to such workers, cannot be readily 
found. But even between sectors, workers move voluntarily all the time. Indeed, workers do 
move between different jobs so massively (so-called ‘churn’), that expected job losses from 
a trade agreement, if any, tend to be a small fraction of this churn. Only workers who are 
regionally concentrated and/or harder to absorb due to age or ‘wrong’ skills pose a 
problem. That problem ought to be recognised and governments should help in addressing 
it.  
Nevertheless, in the past two or three decades, the sheer size of Chinese export efforts has 
had a negative effect on manufacturing jobs in the EU as well as a downward or at least 
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 257 
 
restraining effect on wages in both poor countries competing in similar products 247 and rich 
countries in import-competing sectors. There are also indications that these sectoral wage 
restraints can sometimes be so large that they might spill over to the rest of the economy, 
at least for lower-skill-intensive sectors. In turn, this might cause greater income inequality, 
insofar as skill composition might engender such an impact.248 Recent empirical economic 
literature has provided solid evidence that, in recent decades, Chinese ‘infinite’ supply of 
unskilled workers has exerted a downward effect on (real) wages in the competing sectors 
in the US.249 But there has always been some doubt whether a worsening of wage 
inequality, attributable to trade with ‘China’, also applied to European low-skilled workers, 
or whether real wages and their increase over time were better protected, be it eventually 
at the cost of job losses or company exits from the market.250  
Recent empirical analysis investigated the relationship between trade integration with 
partners like China and undesirable effects such as (large and sudden) labour displacement 
and worsening of inequality. The relevance of distinct skill levels of workers is critical to the 
outcomes of adjustment. Following Lechthaler & Mileva (2015), one should take care to 
distinguish (a) low skills from higher skills, (b) both types of workers in comparative 
disadvantage sectors (D) and in comparative advantage sectors (A), (c) the short run and the 
medium run. In the short run, workers (and other factors) from D sectors will only gradually 
relocate to A sectors, and if the speed of transition is high (as was the case with upcoming 
China), a (temporary) scarcity of workers in A sectors will emerge, prompting rising wages 
for both skilled and low-skilled workers in A sectors. The gradual relocation of workers may 
be slowed down by the necessity of reskilling, upskilling, temporary labour hoarding and/or 
the search for a job in another region; before the actual relocation, there is likely to be 
(temporary) unemployment. The retained (skilled and low-skilled) workers in the D sectors 
will see their wages coming under pressure as demand decreases. In the medium run, the D 
firms survive in a slimmed or up-market form (or indeed exit) and the downward wage 
pressure disappears; the opposite happens in the A sectors, once the relocation and up/re-
skilling is completed and greater experience of the relocated workers begins to matter. Thus 
                                                   
247 For example, after the termination of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in 2005, a number of 
developing countries lost huge export earnings to China due to sudden exposure to Chinese 
competition. 
248 In addition, China has recently built up massive overcapacities in some sectors. However, 
overcapacity is mainly found in capital-intensive industries like steel and aluminium. It might force 
unemployment in some sectors in importing countries and, if the (Chinese) losses from overcapacity 
are covered by subsidies, it is nothing else than a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. But it is hardly a 
question of low wages. 
249 This was already feared by US labour economists in the mid-1990s, famously set out in Freeman 
(1995), pp. 15-32. 
250 This is the theme in Brenton & Pelkmans (1999), confirming this suspicion with empirical analysis. 
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it seems that both job losses and greater wage inequality are temporary phenomena. 
Unfortunately, this is not entirely correct. The continuous, decades-long wage pressures in D 
sectors can have structural effects on the remuneration of low-skilled (blue collar) workers. 
For the US, Autor, Dorn & Hanson (2013) have found that, in total, globalisation (‘China’) has 
reduced the number of jobs for the low-skilled (D) sectors251 and caused persistent wage 
losses, due to permanent adjustment. Whether this applies to the EU is not at all clear. 
Detailed European research on the issue in response to Freeman (1995) in Brenton & 
Pelkmans (1999) showed the complexity of the matter. Most (though not all) scholars 
maintained serious doubts whether EU low-skilled workers, whose employment was surely 
under threat, also suffered from what Freeman called ‘immiserization’ (a rising gap between 
the remunerations of skilled and low-skilled workers, with the effect of keeping blue collar 
real wages at the same level between the mid-1960s and the early 1990s) due to trade. 
However, several authors found empirical evidence that the continuation of (low-skilled) 
wage rises in Europe might have accelerated labour displacement and thus temporary 
unemployment arising from trade with ‘China’. Recent work on German trade with China 
between 1988 and 2008 (Dauth, Findeisen & Suedekum, 2014:1643-1675) shows the 
pattern that Lechthaler & Mileva simulate: substantial job losses in import competing (D) 
sectors and much more job creation in export (A) sectors.  
Moreover, there is another structural effect: with significant adjustment, going on for as 
long as two decades or more, the specialisation patterns in the EU (and the US) have 
themselves been transformed. Specialising in A sectors in Europe implies a structurally 
higher demand for medium- and high-skilled workers, and much less for low-skilled workers 
– this skill premium reflects a (non-reversible) upward shift in real wages in A sectors. This 
would tend to have an adverse effect on wage inequality between more and less skilled 
workers. Indeed, there are trends in Europe showing exactly this, but one has to be careful 
before drawing the inference that this is due to trade, or even more precisely, to trade with 
China. In recent literature on EU labour markets, ‘trade’ is only one amongst a series of 
determinants for what is sometimes called ‘job polarisation’ (see, e.g. Beblavy, Maselli & 
Veselkova, 2014: ch. 7). Other determinants include skill-biased technological progress, 
growth of the service sector (which may actually increase the demand for low-skilled in 
important segments), employer preferences and organisational change. Indeed, there is 
empirical evidence (Ibid.: 142) that recent advances of IT application causes a threat to 
medium-skilled workers more than low-skilled ones. Furthermore, one also has to be careful 
to associate low-skilled workers solely with D sectors. They are found and needed in 
                                                   
251 Indeed, according to the authors, one quarter of the decline in US manufacturing jobs (1990-
2007) can be attributed to increasing trade with China. 
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practically all sectors and this, in and by itself, should facilitate the gradual absorption into 
many other sectors.  
The previous assessment is partially confirmed by Lawrence (2014), analysing the effect of 
Chinese imports on job displacements in the US between 2000 and 2007. He notices that 
displacement has been substantial but represents only one-fifth of the annual total 
displacement in the US manufacturing industry (the sector most affected by strong Chinese 
competition) and less than 5% of the job displacement in the overall economy. This result 
confirms that there is an effect, painful for the affected sectors and workers, but relatively 
modest compared to the overall workforce. According to his calculations, a potential China-
US FTA could bring, in the long run, a job displacement of 1.04 million workers, 800,000 of 
them from manufacturing sectors. To put this into perspective, Lawrence also shows that 
these one million workers (over a period of 10 years) represents a miniscule fraction of the 
‘churn’ in the US labour market, suggesting thereby that US labour markets can easily 
handle such tiny frictions.  
19.6.3 Labour displacement in the EU and how to minimise it 
The CGE estimation does not confirm the conjecture that (some) EU low-skilled workers 
might suffer income losses from an FTA with China, as in all EU countries the workers see 
real wages increase in both scenarios. This probably means that the EU, in the recent past, 
has already adjusted quite significantly to the strongest comparative advantages of China. 
The FTA is likely, in sectors with relatively many low-skilled workers, not to lead to a drastic 
new downward adjustment, although a few shrinking sectors will be observed. It can also be 
interpreted as a result of second-order effects (in general equilibrium), for instance, that the 
overall rise in economic activity – due to the FTA – also benefits the sectors under some 
competitive threat. But these effects have to be understood in the context of the CGE 
modelling where a change in overall employment (which is fixed, by assumption) does not 
take place; jobs may reduce in number in, say, D sectors and increase in A sectors, but there 
will be no change in (un)employment, because adjustment is flexible and immediate. 
Therefore, one has to realise that, in the model, and of course not so fast and not so 
smoothly in actual practice, workers adjust via immediate reallocation between sectors. This 
model-approach has the effect that, on the one hand, workers in marginally contracting 
sectors can minimise a wage decline via the reallocation of some of them, and, on the other 
hand, the mobile workers can immediately join in the expansion of the sectors enjoying 
increasing demand.  
Of course, EU (and Chinese) policy-makers and EU workers alike need to understand how 
the CGE simulations with respect to labour can be best interpreted for the reality of EU 
workers involved: that is, the actual practice of adjusting (over, say, the period) until 2030. 
Trading with a middle-income emerging economy like China can, in actual practice (rather 
than in the CGE model) of adjustment in European labour markets, bring about labour 
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‘displacement’ that may cause temporary unemployment. If and insofar as this would 
happen, the overall benefits to the EU economy would not be enjoyed by, at the least, the 
workers (and at least for a period) losing their jobs. Policy-makers and stakeholders should 
first consider whether and to what extent this might happen, and, second, take effective 
measures to ensure that temporary ‘losers’ are compensated and given new opportunities. 
Labour displacement would occur when workers, leaving a (D) sector having lost 
comparative advantage vis-á-vis China, cannot immediately be absorbed into another (A) 
sector with rising demand (unlike what the model would assume). If one were to pay 
attention only to those sectors where the simulation suggests a contraction in the EU (in 
China, sectoral contractions can be seen to be even larger), it is likely that selected job 
losses would be found. Of course, overall, there are clearly far more extra jobs, but these 
might be different jobs in different sectors and/or be found in different regions or countries.  
Because the CGE model is based on ‘given’ employment, no CGE simulation of induced, 
temporary unemployment can be generated:252 all initial workers retain a job, but perhaps a 
different job in a different sector at a different wage. However, a proxy of the other 
extreme, namely, all relocated workers, i.e. which have to be mobile “in the model” 
between sectors, can be calculated roughly. This approach is very extreme, as it suggests 
that not a single one of these ‘mobile’ workers would be absorbed immediately in another 
sector: all would first become unemployed. This never happens in actual labour market 
practice in such an extreme fashion and it also disregards several other key issues. So, in 
assessing adjustment issues to a China-EU deep FTA at this stage, one is between the two 
extremes: no induced unemployment – as the great flexibility of workers and of their wages 
in the CGE model generates perfect and immediate adjustment – and a theoretical 
maximum ‘labour displacement’, if no adjustment whatsoever would take place, at least not 
immediately. Figure 19.2253 shows the results for all EU countries and China, and for workers 
at three skill-levels, as before. Figure 19.2 shows very clearly that – for all 28 EU countries 
and China – low-skilled workers would theoretically experience the largest displacement. 
With Malta and Slovakia as ‘outliers’, suggesting a theoretical displacement of low-skilled 
workers as high as 8% (Malta) and 5% (Slovakia), the EU average for low-skilled workers 
would be 1.9%. Above this EU average, one also finds countries like Finland, Germany and 
Hungary. Unfortunately, there is no rigorous analytical way to determine in between these 
two extremes, how large or small the job losses caused by the FTA are likely to be. What can 
be done is to provide four critical considerations which go far in mitigating expectations that 
would be too pessimistic. 
                                                   
252 It would require a sub-model of labour markets in which various frictions and labour market 
institutions (including ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’) would generate unemployment. However, it has 
proven very difficult to make such models ‘fit’ the CGE model approach.  
253 Figure 19.2 is based on data reported in Table A3 in Annex III. 
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Figure 19.2 Labour displacement (percent based on weighted standard deviation), ambitious scenario 
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First, CGE models ignore (they are ‘static’) several options of workers in labour markets. 
Jobs are lost every day in labour markets, for many reasons, and workers have options to 
deal with such bad news. In actual practice, workers do anticipate, especially in vulnerable 
sectors, competitive threats and may (and do) seek to work elsewhere; they may seek 
private upskilling or even retraining; they move to other regions (even if, in the EU, such 
mobility is not very high, it is not irrelevant); they retire and if adjustment takes years, this 
does reduce pressures. Second, companies have options, too, and often exercise some of 
them. Only some companies in vulnerable sectors are relocating towards lower-wage 
countries (even inside the EU) or exiting from the market. Otherwise, companies may seek 
to upgrade their product portfolio, thereby reducing their vulnerability vis-á-vis China; 
widen their portfolio; invest in innovative products or variations; or change their business 
model, e.g. with a combination of different ‘tasks’ in global value chains. Third, the design of 
the final FTA may (and usually does) anticipate the adjustment problems by explicitly using 
‘time’ as a factor. In the case of vulnerable sectors with relatively more low-skilled workers, 
the tariff reductions are typically ‘back-loaded’ over the period during which the FTA articles 
are introduced. That means, they are known when the FTA treaty is concluded, but become 
actually relevant only after a number of years (say, beginning after five or seven of the 10 
years assumed throughout this study). This back-loading facilitates the adjustment for 
workers and companies alike, so that labour displacement need not lead to – or leads to far 
fewer – job losses without immediate prospects. Fourth, ‘time’ also plays a crucial role for 
another reason, perhaps even more important. China still grows more rapidly than the EU 
and this will continue for the entire period until, say, 2030. In those 13 years or so, Chinese 
wages will rise quickly and comparative advantages precisely in low-skilled-intensive sectors 
will become less pronounced or fade away. Moreover, the famous ‘unlimited supply of 
unskilled labour’ in China (coming in from the western or central countryside) has not only 
dried up but actually been shrinking in recent years, whilst rapid growth in services (with a 
range of skill levels) will compete with labour demand for low-skilled industrial sectors. Also, 
these developments will slowly weaken China’s edge in several low-skilled labour intensive 
sectors. None of this can be incorporated in the CGE model, even when anticipation of 
income levels in 2030 has been applied. These four considerations together significantly 
brighten the otherwise sombre outlook for low-skilled workers. 
Whereas Figure 19.2 provides details on displacement of workers per EU country as well as 
China, Figure 19.1 identifies sectoral impacts. The sectors in the EU that will suffer most 
from the trade liberalisation in terms of export and output changes are textiles, apparel and 
leather products, whilst the ‘winners’ will be motor vehicles, transport equipment and other 
machinery. As indicated in the previous section, sectors will be affected in different ways in 
the two economies: while (A) sectors such as motor vehicles, non-electrical machinery and 
equipment are supposed to expand in Europe with a contraction in China, other (D) sectors 
as electrical machinery, textiles and clothing, and footwear will contract in the EU and 
expand in China, with more exports to the EU. The shifts in services sectors are also 
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investigated. However, the gains associated to the sectorial shifts in services are dependent 
on the effective reduction of the costs of NTMs, as services have no tariffs. The problematic 
questions that the empirics of estimating AVEs give rise to (see Box 18.1) are especially 
pertinent in services, rendering it difficult to draw firm conclusions on job displacement. 
This does not mean, however, that the service dimension is not important. Quite the 
contrary, it is, and for two reasons. First, the reduction of the costs of NTMs in services can 
create huge gains – even if calculations are not yet a firm guide in services, chapter 11 
leaves no doubt that they are quite high and severely hinder trade between the EU and 
China. Second, under an FTA, one can expect a major role for EU exports in services (and, if 
feasible, FDI in services sectors) due to the current lack of supply of Chinese services. 
Services are a strong EU asset and amount to a major offensive interest for the EU in FTA 
negotiations.  
What labour displacement remains, due to the FTA, even when the periods of temporary 
unemployment are not known in advance, should be properly addressed by explicit and 
clear policy action. Some of the cushioning is automatic, given the national welfare states in 
the EU. However, the ambitions of the welfare states differ considerably in Europe. The 
better approach is to complement national welfare states by ‘active labour market policies’. 
However, whereas the EU decides EU trade policies (in which the member states have 
decision-making power when the negotiation mandate has to be formulated and at the end 
when the FTA treaty has to be ratified), member states decide on their welfare state policies 
as well as active labour market policies. The latter can be costly and some EU countries 
prefer not to develop such instruments very much, fearing claims and entitlements which 
they cannot fully control, given budgetary disciplines. An alternative might be to set up EU 
funding for helping workers to relocate between sectors as a result of the China-EU FTA. 
This could consist of a variant of the EU Globalisation Fund or a special form of adjustment 
assistance under the EU Social Fund, but it might also be conditional funding for EU member 
states to improve on their active labour market policies. Such policies would consist of 
(effective) retraining, upskilling, job search support, etc., preferably with the active 
involvement of the private sector in each EU country (especially the A sectors. A practical 
problem is that the EU is active in concluding many FTAs and it is exceedingly hard to justify 
why the China-EU FTA ought to be singled out as ‘special’, and not the one with Vietnam or 
the upcoming ones with Mexico (upgraded FTA), Malaysia, Thailand or the Philippines.  
Moreover, the focus above is on temporary job losses and how to smoothen adjustment for 
the workers involved. There is also the potential issue of the worsening of wage inequality. 
The socio-political judgment of whether or not this adverse trend, largely a skill premium 
issue in the final analysis, is to be addressed by active new policy-making is not an EU 
competence but clearly in the realm of the member states. It is likely to differ between 
member states, too. As noted before, there is a host of determinants of inequality trends, 
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not just trade (with ‘China’). It is possible to design policy instruments to address inequality 
trends in the short and medium run.254 
                                                   
254 Lechthaler & Mileva (2015) analyse several (e.g. tax) instruments for the short run (but there are 
trade-offs with the incentives to reallocate between sectors, and/or, with the incentives to upskill) 
and for the longer run (principally, subsidies for retraining and upskilling, which – if effective and 
maintained for a sufficiently long period – could eventually slightly reduce the scarcity of skilled 
workers, leading to less inequality to some degree.  
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Part IV. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
20. Policy implications of an EU-China free trade agreement  
The EU focus in its trade policy on bilateral and regional FTAs, in particular with dynamic 
markets in East Asia, finds its logical sequel in an FTA with China. China is, by far, the EU’s 
largest trading partner in the region, if not beyond, at least in goods. For cross-border trade 
in services and investment (often also in service sectors), the interdependence is to a lesser 
degree (due to many and heavy restrictions) but still impressive and can potentially become 
much greater than today. Chinese FDI is steadily increasing in the EU as well. The EU has 
cautiously begun to discuss publicly the option of a China-EU FTA, under two conditions: 
first, concluding successfully the CAI; and second, making the subsequent FTA meaningful by 
realising significant advances in Chinese reforms towards a genuine and more open market 
economy. The logical sequel is therefore beginning to be pursued and is worth exploring in 
earnest. This exploration is exactly what the present study aims to do. Without claiming that 
the present study is exhaustive (which was impossible anyway given time and resources), it 
is nevertheless very broad and encompassing. It can serve as a sound analytical basis for a 
much needed debate on this FTA option.  
China’s policy position is explicit: it is interested in exploring the FTA option with the EU, as 
declared by President Xi Jin Ping in the spring of 2014. China has, so far, been concluding 
rather ‘shallow’ FTAs (mainly focused on tariff removal and directly related issues, and a 
mere cooperative stance on ‘regulatory’ questions, but without incorporating public 
procurement). The ‘new logic’, following the profound Chinese reforms announced in late 
2013, is that China should switch towards a more ambitious trade and investment strategy 
commensurate with its reforms. Doing this together with its largest trading partner and 
major foreign investor (certainly given recent trade policy developments in the region) can 
only strengthen this logic. Government and other prominent Chinese in, e.g. business and 
academia, have invited China’s trading partners to exert ‘pressures’ in order to stimulate 
and further the domestic reforms. The EU’s preference to conclude ‘deep and 
comprehensive’ FTAs is an ideal ‘fit’ for China to support its reform process, as such FTAs are 
intrusive, binding (in terms of domestic regulation and disciplining restrictions) and bound 
to affect many areas of reform as pronounced in the Third Plenum. Such a deep and 
comprehensive FTA is also a ‘partnership’ for functional reasons, including perhaps even a 
‘living agreement’ helping to address complicated regulatory issues over time and 
preferably together. The partnership formula would seem to accord well with the Chinese 
cultural preference to build up long-term relationships combining aspects of commitment 
and active cooperation.  
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An EU-China FTA would represent the new logic, too, by moving firmly beyond today’s 
numerous (approximately 60) bilateral cooperation programmes, as well as by going 
decisively beyond the various plurilateral WTO negotiations via bilateral ‘deepening’. The 
FTA would not be in conflict with either: the plurilateral negotiations on public 
procurement, green goods and trade-in-services with a large group of WTO partners can be 
continued without any problem. Also, cooperation is an often agreed additional element of 
many FTAs whether formally ‘in’ the treaty text or decided and organised separately. The 
present study includes a number of references to highly useful China-EU cooperation 
programmes, including in consumer safety, SPS, IPR, GI and competition policy questions, all 
relevant areas for a deep and comprehensive FTA.  
Besides the ‘new logic’ as an overall strategic approach, the study provides five specific 
arguments which underpin the rationale for an EU-China FTA: the greater economic 
potential of the trade and investment relationship, addressing the issue of comparative 
market access, the incentives from ‘mega-regionals’, the link between Chinese reforms and 
the exposure to foreign competition which an FTA would bring about, and geopolitical 
advantages. Therefore, a China-EU FTA has a powerful rationale. But it is also about jobs on 
both sides. Today, some 2.5 million jobs in the EU are directly involved with EU goods 
exports to China, hence, not even counting jobs linked with cross-border services and the 
EU jobs connected with the large imports from China, e.g. in mass consumer goods ending 
up in the retail sector. A deep FTA would yield a net increase in jobs.  
A deep and comprehensive FTA implies the bilateral removal of (practically) all tariffs. Here 
it is critical that the tariff peaks in goods from industrial sectors where the EU has a 
comparative advantage (machinery, electrical machinery and automotive) are fully 
removed. The same goes for four sectors in agro-food (beverages, sugar and confectionary, 
processed agro-goods and dairy products) where Chinese tariff peaks are quite high. Tariff 
rate quotas are, interestingly enough, more problematic on the EU side than on the Chinese 
side. The EU TRQs should perhaps be simplified and become less numerous anyway. The 
Chinese TRQs are fewer, simpler and often in commodities the EU is hardly or not exporting 
(e.g. wool, rice, cotton, etc.). The outlook for agro-goods may thus be quite good, which is 
helpful because the incipient Chinese demand for EU agro-foods is very strong. Pursuing full 
tariff removal in the FTA, with only limited and few exceptions, should also facilitate the 
sourcing by wholesalers, retailers and other large importers in China, which has already 
proven to be so successful and much to the benefit of European consumers. Both industrial 
and agro-food trade is hindered by technical barriers to trade and food and food safety and 
animal welfare regulatory and inspection barriers. The study makes an effort to chart these 
issues, using various sources of information, but solid, detailed surveys are not available. 
Both TBTs and SPS questions are more problematic on the Chinese side, because of 
profound ‘systemic’ aspects, which are explained in some detail. Both are likely to represent 
legacies of the old planned economy with a dose of institutional overkill and inefficiencies. 
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In both cases, only intrusive reforms (not least, institutional) are required in order to 
overcome the costly difficulties. In SPS, there is also a continued need for capacity building 
of technical expertise throughout the country, hence, the existing SPS cooperation between 
the EU and China should be maintained if not intensified. In TBTs, a major overhaul of the 
standardisation and technical regulation regime was initiated in 2015 and China has recently 
requested consultation input. This multi-annual reform process should be supported 
actively by the EU and the European standardisation bodies.  
Services cannot but be central to the FTA. Negotiations ought to focus on both cross-border 
services trade, now (selectively) restricted severely, and mode 3, FDI in services markets in 
China. The EU has a liberal FDI regime and some lingering restrictions in services, but far 
fewer than in China. Both are important offensive EU interests and their linkage is quite 
essential. The present EU position is a product of the recent past: the CAI negotiations 
already begun in 2012. The EU takes the understandable position that the CAI should first be 
concluded successfully, which means both modern investment protection and good services 
market access (pre- and post-establishment). If that were to happen, this would be a 
splendid stepping stone for an FTA. Indeed, doing away with the most restrictive FDI regime 
of all OECD and G20 countries fits perfectly the domestic reforms in China. The CAI is exactly 
the kind of discipline and ‘pressure’ that China is asking for. But if the CAI negotiations 
would linger too long, without tangible results (note that the US has had 22 sessions with 
China over seven years, the EU so far only eight sessions), the opportunity costs of not 
starting FTA negotiations begin to rise. It is worth considering whether an FTA (with a 
combined chapter on services and FDI as in EU FTAs with Vietnam and Canada) might not 
offer greater opportunities to find a common deal, even when this will take some extra 
time. After all, in EU business and for some EU member states, the plain lack of a level-
playing field with respect to FDI (Chinese enterprises have no problem investing in the EU, 
with full national treatment and judicial review) will become much more of an issue if the 
steady rise of Chinese FDI in Europe continues.  
The study explains in detail today’s predicament of public procurement in China. The origin 
and purpose of the Chinese public procurement regime, installed in recent decades, has 
everything to do with domestic budget disciplines and control and also fits anti-corruption 
campaigns at local and federal level. It is now time China begins to accept more fully that 
public procurement is also a trade openness question. A China-EU FTA cannot be realised 
without China adhering first to the GPA (the WTO plurilateral). China is getting closer to GPA 
membership, after six offers. In the sixth offer, the formal offer and the substantive 
meaning are too far apart (in particular, due to SOEs) and China, at some point, will have to 
bite the bullet. Again, this is a ‘fit for purpose’ contribution to its domestic reforms. If the 
willingness to reform is genuine, this can be shown to the EU (and other trading partners in 
the GPA) by joining under proper conditions. The EU-China FTA negotiations will then form a 
GPA-plus framework. However, if the reforms amount to little more than window-dressing, 
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clearly, a China-EU FTA is not going to be possible in public procurement, or indeed, in other 
areas as well (e.g. services, FDI, standardisation, etc.).  
In contrast, in IPRs and GIs, China has achieved a fairly advanced legislative framework and 
in several of its FTAs, a TRIP-plus approach has been assumed. The EU and China are 
negotiating a stand-alone GI treaty, with (now) up to 100 proposed GIs on the table. The 
prospect of an FTA is good, in principle, with respect to these two areas. “In principle” 
because there is one major problem: seriously deficient enforcement, as is clear from 
numerous reports violating EU companies’ rights (and rights of Chinese companies and 
individuals as well, a huge problem in China) and from the massive amount of counterfeited 
goods arriving at EU borders (over 65% of all detections). China is unique in the inclination 
of countless people and small companies to counterfeit or commit other IPR violations, far 
outdoing any other country. Given the EU’s prominent position in luxury goods and for 
reasons of advanced patent protection, it is the enforcement issue which has to be tackled 
more forcefully in cooperation in an FTA.  
State-owned enterprises in China (hardly any of which exist in the EU) are as much a liability 
as a formidable force. An FTA between the EU and China cannot be negotiated in earnest 
without addressing the biggest-of-all-legacies problem from the old planned economy. 
Explicit or implicit, the SOE question is also the ‘elephant in the Chinese reform room’ and 
addressing the issue decisively therefore amounts to a litmus test. SOEs are often giant 
firms (with three in the top 10 of the Fortune 500). SOEs have privileged positions in some 
manufacturing sectors, e.g. steel, and dominate, often supremely, a range of services 
markets. A number of these markets are also closed or severely restricted for foreign firms. 
They have access to various forms of privileged finance as well as hidden subsidies or loss 
coverage, sometimes at provincial level. Their CEOs are appointed or approved by the Party. 
Their recent privatisation is mostly done via holdings, e.g. listed on the Hong Kong stock 
exchange, but the ‘daughter’ companies remain just as powerful as before and usually 
without competitive challenge. Recent overcapacities in, e.g. steel, have increased for far 
too long, almost certainly because SOEs are heavily involved and have been facilitated (and 
workers are concentrated in certain mono-specialised provinces or localities, which makes 
adjustment extra painful). In the case of SOEs, most of the domestic reform issues coincide 
with the trade and investment issues. A chapter on SOEs in an FTA should be formulated at 
the level of the EU-Vietnam FTA of 2015, as a first stage, with a firm commitment to enter a 
second stage of greater ambition like the SOE chapter of TPP (which China has, so far, been 
loath to join) or (still better) that of CETA.  
The study also includes empirical estimates about economic impact, on the time horizon 
2011-30, of a stylised form of the FTA in terms of GDP (in percent and in euros), GDP of all 
EU member states, bilateral trade (also sectorally) as well as the EU’s and China’s exports to 
and imports from the rest of the world (given second-order effects and repercussions in 
global value chains, etc., calculated in the model), real wage effects for workers with three 
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skill levels distinguished, and, finally, a discussion about adjustment in the light of possible 
temporary unemployment due to labour displacement and the risk of worsening wage 
inequality. The GDP (and presumably other) effects amount to a significant underestimate 
for various reasons, e.g. no investment impact (nor its secondary influence on bilateral trade 
in goods and services) and no dynamic or innovation effects. There are also technical 
imperfections in the empirical techniques applied to the costs of regulatory barriers (NTMs), 
especially in services, as this is exceedingly difficult to do.  
The GDP increase of an ambitious FTA, over the 20-year time horizon considered, amounts 
to 1.76% for China and 0.76% for the EU; all EU member states benefit but with 
considerable variation. It should be noted that 0.76% for GDP (already an underestimate) is 
higher than the estimate for TTIP. Remember that this is bound to be an underestimate. It 
would be too much to expect, however, that one single FTA, an act of one single EU policy – 
namely trade policy – can affect GDP in a massive way. The increase in GDP and sectoral 
activity overall implies many extra jobs for both economies. The same positive impact goes 
for trade and real wages. The impact on bilateral trade is large (for the EU, some extra 
110%). Real wages go up in all member states; indeed, low-skilled workers all benefit in all 
member states. However, the latter is a pure result from the CGE model used for the 
computations. Such models are capable of generating all these many, highly specific results 
but have to employ some simplifying assumptions. One is a ‘given’ employment in the 
economy, together with full flexibility of wages and (costless) ‘immediate’ reallocation of 
workers between shrinking and expanding sectors. This way, markets can always clear and 
all initial workers will have a job after the FTA is in force, albeit perhaps a different job in a 
different sector. Of course, these unrealistic assumptions make it a long-run model when 
adjustment can occur over time. In the short run, unemployment (following labour 
displacement in a few import competing sectors) is likely to occur.  
There are four reasons which EU authorities and workers should consider when assessing 
the risk and magnitude of temporary unemployment. All four tend to reduce the risk, or 
render adjustment smoother and shorter, without eliminating it fully: 1) workers can 
themselves exercise options reducing exposure to such a risk, 2) companies can (and do) 
exercise strategic options, 3) the FTA can be designed in such a way that the most 
vulnerable sectors will be exposed only late in the transition period (so-called ‘back-loading’ 
of, e.g. tariff reductions) and, finally, 4) China will continue to see its wages rise over the 
period to 2030 and also shift to medium-skilled intensive sectors, thereby lessening the 
pressures on the relevant import-competing sectors in the EU. Details are set out in chapter 
19. Member states (and possibly the EU) should accompany the FTA with ‘active labour 
market policies’, possibly in a coordinated action. This should include upskilling (and its 
liberal funding) and effective retraining of low-skilled workers, with the social partners 
involved.  
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An FTA between China and the EU is worthwhile for a host of reasons. The economic 
potential in bilateral trade is shown to be large (more than a doubling) and this does not 
include possibly powerful investment effects and their repercussions for bilateral trade in 
goods and services. Strategically, the FTA should be significant, because it can only succeed 
when China implements the reforms it has announced and complements them with 
additional ones on SOEs and the opening of public procurement. In this sense, the FTA is 
even more beneficial to China than to the EU (the model cannot incorporate these aspects). 
A deep and comprehensive FTA is a perfect ‘fit’ for China at its current stage of 
development, expressing the ‘new logic’ knowing its announced reforms, whilst the EU can 
finally pursue the ‘logical sequel’ in its trade policy vis-à-vis dynamic East Asia. 
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Annex I. European TRQs 
While the Chinese out-of-quota tariffs are all ad valorem and do not differ within the HS 2- 
digit level, the European scheme is far more complicated as it either reports ad valorem 
tariff, specific tariff (euro per tonne or hl) or a combination of both. Furthermore, some 
lines at 8-digit levels are grouped in the same TRQ specification, creating overlapping in-
quota quantities between products aggregation at 4digit level. For example, the “High 
quality meat of bovine animals, fresh, chilled or frozen” TRQ groups together fresh and 
frozen meat, but they are in HS 0201 and 0202, respectively. Hence, the assigned in-quota 
quantity of 37,000 tonnes has to be split between the two consecutive categories; this has 
been marked with a (*) in Table A1. Some out-of-quota duties are also seasonal, leading to 
changes in the specific tariff depending on the period of the year (e.g. “High quality 
oranges” in HS 0805). Another peculiarity refers to those in-quota duties that are specific 
tariff only and change the unit of measure from tonnes, in in-quota, to 100kg, in out-of-
quota (e.g. HS 0203).  
The source used is the Tariff Analysis Online (TAO) facility maintained by the WTO, which 
gives access to TRQs data with product lines at 8-digit levels that then need to be separated 
and re-classified in their 4-digit class. Due to the all the ‘obstacles’ mentioned above, a 
detailed note with all the symbols used follows to simplify the reading.  
Table A1. European TRQs 
HS 
codes 
Products 
No of 
lines 
In-quota duty 
(% if not specified) 
Out of quota duty 
(% if not specified) 
In-quota quantity 
(tonne if not 
specified) 
 Total  269    
01 Live animals 9 
   
0102 
Bovine 
animals, live 
6 6 
10.2 + €93.1/100 
kg/net 
5,000 Head + 
169,000 Head  
0104 
Sheep and 
goats, live 
3 10 €80.5/100 kg/net 39,310  
02 Meat  94 
   
0201 
Meat of 
bovine 
animals, fresh 
or chilled 
5 20 
12.8 + €176.8 to 
€303.4/100 kg/net 
37,800 (*) + 11,000 
(*) + 5,000 (*) + 
4,000 (*) + 300 (*) 
0202 
Meat of 
bovine 
animals, 
frozen 
8 20 
12.8 + €176.8 to 
€304.1/100 kg/net 
37,800 (*) + 5,000 
(*) + 4,000 (*) + 
300 (*) + 53,000 
(*) + 2,250 + 
50,700 +  
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0203 
Meat of swine 
(pork), fresh, 
chilled or 
frozen 
16 €268 to €434/1000kg  
€46.7 to €86.9/100 
kg/net  
15,000 + 5,500 + 
7,000 + 34,000 + 
5,000  
0204 
Meat of 
sheep or 
goats, fresh, 
chilled or 
frozen 
27 10 
12.8 + €90.2 to 
€311.8/100 kg/net 
800 (carcasses 
weight) + 283,825 
(carcasses weight) 
0206 
Edible offal, 
bovine, 
swine, sheep, 
goat, horse, 
etc. 
2 20 
12.8 + €303.4 and 
€304.1/100 kg/net 
37,800 (*) + 53,000 
(*) + 1,500 + 
11,000 (*) + 5,000 
(*) + 4,000 (*) + 
300 (*) 
0207 
Meat & edible 
offal of 
poultry, fresh, 
chilled or 
frozen 
36 
€93 to €512/1,000 kg/net; 0 (-
1410/50/70 and 
 -2710/20/80) 
€18.7 to €102.4 
/100 kg/net; €41.0 
to €102.4 /100 
kg/net 
6,200 + 4,000 + 
15,500 + 700 + 
1,000 + 2,500  
04 
Dairy 
products 
57 
   
0402 
Milk and 
cream, 
concentrated 
or sweetened 
1 €475/1,000 kg/net €118.8/100 kg/net 68,000  
0405 
Butter and 
other fats and 
oils derived 
from milk 
7 
€86.88/100 kg/net (-1011/19); 
€948/1,000 kg/net (-1030/50/90, -
9010/90) 
€189.6/100 kg/net; 
€189.6 or €231.3 
/100 kg/net 
76,667 + 10,000 
0406 
Cheese and 
curd 
43 
€17.06/100 kg/net (-9001/21); €130 
to €1,064/1,000 kg/net 
€167.1/100 kg/net; 
€139.1 to 
€231.3/100 kg/net 
4,500 + 10,250 + 
4,000 + 18,400 + 
5,200 + 15,000 + 
20,000 + 5,300 + 
19,500  
0407 
Birds' eggs, in 
the shell, 
fresh, 
preserved or 
cooked 
1 €152/1,000 kg/net €30.4/100 kg/net 135,000  
0408 
Birds' eggs, 
not in shell & 
yolks, fresh, 
dry, etc. 
5 €176 to €711/1,000 kg/net 
€30.4 to €137.4 
/100 kg/net 
7,000  
07 
Edible 
vegetables 
23 
   
0701 
Potatoes 
(except sweet 
potatoes), 
1 3 9.6 4,000  
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fresh or 
chilled 
0703 
Onions, 
shallots, 
garlic, leeks 
etc,, fresh or 
chilled 
1 9.6 9.6 38,370  
0706 
Carrots, 
turnips & 
other edible 
roots, fresh or 
chilled 
1 7 13.6 1,200  
0707 
Cucumbers 
and gherkins, 
fresh or 
chilled 
1 2.5 
12.8 + €37.8 /100 
kg/net 
1,100  
0709 
Veg. nesoi, 
fresh or 
chilled 
1 1.5 7.2 500 (*) 
0711 
Veg., 
temporarily 
preserved, 
not now 
edible 
11 1.5; 12 (-9040) 
4.8 to 12, 5.1 + 
€9.4 /100 kg/net (-
9030), €13.1 /100 
kg/net (-2090); 
€9.6 + €191.0/100 
kg/net eda  
62,660 + 500 (*) 
0712 
Veg., dried, 
whole, cut 
etc., no 
added prep 
1 10 12.8 12,000  
0714 
Cassava 
arrowroot 
etc., fresh or 
dry 
6 6; 0 (-2090) 
€9.5/100 kg/net; 
€6.4/100 kg/net 
5,500,000 + 
1,325,590 + 5,000 
+ 600,000  
08 
Edible fruits 
and nuts 
15 
   
0802 
Nuts nesoi, 
fresh or dried 
2 2 3.5 or 5.6 90,000  
0803 Bananas 1 €75/1,000 kg/net €680/1,000 kg/net 2,200,000  
0805 
Citrus fruits, 
fresh or dried 
5 
10 (-1010/30/50); 2 (-2090); 6 (-
3010) 
3.2 (from June 1st 
to Oct 15th),16.0 
(from Oct 16th to 
Nov 30th), from 3.2 
to 16.0 + €7.1 /100 
kg/net (from Dec 
1st to March 31th); 
16.0 + €10.6/100 
kg/net; 6.4 + 
€25.6/100 kg/net 
 
20,000 + 15,000 + 
10,000  
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0806 
Grapes, fresh 
or dried 
1 9 
17.6 + €9.6/100 
kg/net 
1,500  
0808 
Apples, pears 
and quinces, 
fresh 
4 0; 5 (-2050) 
4.8 + €23.8/100 
kg/net; 10.4 + 
€23.8/100 kg/net 
600 + 1,000  
0809 
Apricots, 
cherries etc. 
2 10 (-1000); 4 (-2095) 
20.0 + €22.7 /100 
kg/net (from June 
1st to July 31th) 
and 20 
(otherwise); 12.0 + 
€27.4/100 kg/net 
500 + 2,500 + 800  
10 Cereals 33 
   
1001 
Wheat and 
meslin 
2 0 
€95.0 (10019099) 
or €148 
(10011000)/t 
300,000 + 50,000 + 
2,981,600  
1003 Barley 2 €8(-0090) or €16 (-0010)/t €93/t 50,000 + 300,000  
1004 Oats 1 €89/t €89/t 21,000  
1005 Corn (maize) 1 0 €94/t 
2,000,000 + 
500,000  
1006 Rice 25 
€88/t (-
2011/13/15/17/92/94/96/98); 0 (-
3021/23/25/27/42/44/46/48/61/63/
65/67/92/94/96/98 and -4000) 
€264/t; €416/t and 
€128/t (-4000) 
1,000 + 20,000 + 
63,000  
1007 
Grain 
sorghum 
1 0 €94/t 30,000  
1008 
Buck wheat, 
millet & 
canary seed 
1 €7/1,000 kg/net €56/t 1,300  
11 
Milling 
industry 
2 
   
1104 
Cereal grains, 
nesoi, germs 
worked etc. 
1 0 €93/t 10,000  
1108 
Starches, 
inulin 
1 €170.59/1,000 kg/net €166/t 1,300  
16 Prep. of meat 10 
   
1601 Sausages 2 
€502 (-0099) or €747 (-0091)/1,000 
kg/net 
€100.5 (-0099) 
€149.4 (-0091)/100 
kg/net 
3,000  
1602 
Prep. or 
preserved 
meat 
8 €271 to €784/1,000 kg/net 
€54.3 to €156.8 
/100 kg/net 
6,100  
17 Sugars 8 
   
1701 
Cane or beet 
sugar 
7 0 
€33.9 (-1110, -
1210), €41.9 
(-1190, -1290, -
9100, -9910/90)/ 
100 kg/net 
1,304,700 + 85,463  
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1702 Sugar nesoi 1 20 
16.0 + €50.7 /100 
kg/net mas 
4,504  
20 
Prep. of veg., 
fruits, nuts 
7 
   
2003 
Mushrooms 
and truffles 
prep. 
2 23 
18.4 + €191 
(-1020) or €222 
(-1030)/100 kg/net 
eda 
62,660  
2009 Fruit juices 5 
13 (-1199); 40 + 20.6 €/1,000 kg/net 
(-6011); 40 (-6019); 22.4 (-6051, -
6090) 
15.2; 40.0 + 
€121/hl + 
€20.6/100 kg/net; 
40.0 + €121.0/hl; 
22.4 + €131(-6051) 
or + €27(-6090)/hl 
1,500 + 14,000  
22 Beverages 2 
   
2208 
Ethyl alc, 
undenat, und 
80% alc, spirit 
bev 
2 
€0.2/%vol/hl + €0.6/hl (-4010); 
€0.2/%vol/hl (-4090) 
€0.6/%vol/hl + 
€3.2/hl; €0.6 
/%vol/hl 
2,855,000 Liters 
100% alcohol 
23 
Residues and 
waste from 
food 
7 
   
2302 
Bran, sharps 
etc. from 
working 
cereals 
4 
€30.6/1,000 kg/net (-3010, -4010); 
€62.25/1,000 kg/net (-3090, -4090) 
€44/t; €89/t 475,000  
2309 
Prep. Used in 
animal 
feeding 
3 0 (-9031/41); 7 (-9051) 
€23(-9031); €55 
(-9041); €102  
(-9051) /t 
100,000 + 20,000 + 
2,800  
35 Albuminoidal 2 
   
3502 
Albumins and 
albumin 
derivatives 
2 
€617/1,000 kg/net (-1190); 
€83/1,000 kg/net (-1990) 
€123.5/100 kg/net; 
€16.7 /100 kg/net 
15,500 (shell egg 
equivalent) 
Notes: This table separates 8-digit lines, belonging to the same 4-digit category, that have different In-quota 
and/or Out-of-quota duties. Thus, the first out-of-quota tariff before the semi colon refers to the first in-quota 
tariff (and its 8-digit line) before the semi-colon. It stands for the first 4 digits the products have in common; 
the forward slash symbol (/) stands for the digit number 5 and 6 the products have in common.; (*) indicates 
that the in-quota quantity is shared between two or more 4-digit categories. 
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Annex II. Public Procurement in China and in the EU  
China’s public procurement regime is governed by the Government Procurement Law 
(2003)255 and the Tendering and Bidding Law (2000), as well as their respective 
implementing rules. The Implementing Rules of the Government Procurement Law only 
came into force on 1 March 2015. How effective the latter are in opening up the Chinese 
public procurement market, remains to be seen. Surely, European business in China is not 
convinced as yet and provides many examples of how explicit bans and much more subtle 
barriers continue to frustrate their access. As to the public procurement laws, questions 
such as clearer definition as to the scope of application, uniformed national-wide 
enforcement, are yet to be resolved.  
Chinese public procurement regime 
The Government Procurement Law applies to procurement of goods, services and works256 
listed in the Centralised Procurement Catalogue, which does not intend to be an exhaustive 
list but rather used for the purposes of classification and statistical compilation.257  
The Catalogue, revised from time to time, is issued by the Ministry of Finance or provincial 
bureau of finance, depending on whether the purchase of the procurement items comes 
under the central budget or local budget.258 Procurement may be undertaken by centralised 
or decentralised means. For items listed in the Centralised Procurement Catalogue, 
procurement must be undertaken by centralised procurement agencies. Centralised 
procurement accounted for 87.6% of government procurement in 2012, amounting to RMB 
1.2 trillion,259 or €170 billion in equivalence. Decentralised procurement refers to procuring 
items that are not listed in the Centralised Procurement Catalogue, but have a value above a 
certain procurement threshold specified by governments at various levels.260 Decentralised 
                                                   
255 A partial revision to the law came into force on 31 August 2014. 
256 Within the remit of the Government Procurement Law (Art. 2), works refer to construction, 
reconstruction, expansion, renovation, demolition and repair of buildings or building structures. 
257 Cai Ku (Department of Treasury, Ministry of Finance) Ordnance (2000), No. 20: Circular on the 
Issuance of the Catalogue of Articles of Government Procurement.  
258 Art.8 of the Government Procurement Law. 
259 WTO Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, China, WT/TPR/S/300/Rev.1, 17 October 
2014, p.105. 
260 Article 8 of the Government Procurement Law specifies that the thresholds for government 
procurement items under the central budget are prescribed and published by the State Council, and 
the thresholds for items under local budget are prescribed and published by local governments (of 
provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities), or the department authorised by them.  
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procurement may be carried out by a procuring agency itself, or through some centralised 
procurement agencies.  
The Tendering and Bidding Law governs work related to construction projects, and its 
coverage is divided to include voluntary and compulsory coverage. State enterprises, 
government or quasi-governmental institutions, even private purchasers may voluntarily 
bind themselves to procedures specified by the Law when procuring goods, services or 
works through open or restricted tendering.261 Works, including survey, design, construction 
and supervision, of public interest or security, such as infrastructure and utilities of large 
scale including those fully or partially invested or financed by the State; and those financed 
by loans or aid provided by international organisations or foreign governments fall within 
the remit of compulsory coverage.262  
Challenges and inconsistencies with the GPA 
China's public procurement system was established in the 1990s. Previously, as a strictly 
state-controlled planned economy, administration of public procurement was undertaken 
through budgetary control. The legacy nonetheless continues now that China is working 
towards an open economy in the sense that, to date, application of public procurement 
rules are triggered by fiscal funds, but under the proviso that public procurement serves as a 
policy driver for domestic purchase of goods, works and services. In other words, the basic 
idea is a ‘buy-China’ approach. Exceptions are possible only under limited circumstances.263  
On technical terms, China’s government procurement regime does not appear consistent, 
especially concerning coverage since many covered entities at different administrative levels 
are competent to compile their respective Centralised Procurement Catalogue. For example, 
on the one hand, procurement laws emphasise the need for economic efficiencies in 
procurement, which suggests value-for-money; on the other hand, ‘buy China’ is a key 
ingredient in the legal framework. It is not easy to reconcile these objectives; it is also in 
conflict with the basics of the GPA.  
Fiscal funds 
Using fiscal funds as a trigger for applying procurement rules causes accounting 
irregularities in public procurement in China, since one has to first agree on the definition. 
And, this is exactly the source of the problem.  
                                                   
261 Art.2, Tendering and Bidding Law. 
262 Art.3, Tendering and Bidding Law. 
263 Under Art.10, Government Procurement Law, exceptions may be possible when domestic goods, 
works and services are not available, or they cannot be procured on reasonable commercial terms; 
or when their procurement is for use abroad; or the procurement terms are restricted by other laws 
or administrative rules. 
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In China, fiscal funds may involve extra-budget revenues or funds owned or collected by 
government bodies at different administrative levels. Administrative fines collected by 
government bodies may also be kept as expenditure, which is in fact a source of fiscal funds. 
Moreover, it is a common practice for government agencies to have at their own disposal 
some available funds, known as Small Coffers, which form only part of the fiscal funds and 
are thus able to escape from rules, including public procurement rules, applicable to fiscal 
funds. In general, certain procurement, although meeting the criteria of the threshold and 
coverage, is able to defy the procurement rules if the source of fiscal funds can be managed 
under disguise. This may offer part of the explanation as to why the stake of public 
procurement only accounts for 2.7% of Chinese GDP in 2014.  
The problem of accounting irregularities may have prompted the Chinese government to 
provide a definition of ‘fiscal funds’ in its Implementing Rules of Government Procurement 
Law which came into force 12 years after the law was enacted. In effect, rules are now 
reformed and stricter. Fiscal funds are funds within the budgetary control; also, borrowed 
funds used as a source of repayment are fiscal funds. When government departments, 
institutions as well as organisations procure by using a mixture of fiscal and non-fiscal funds, 
the part of procurement that is financed by using fiscal funds must apply the law as well as 
its Implementing Rules; if fiscal and non-fiscal funds cannot be divided while procuring, the 
complete procurement must observe the law and its implementing rules.264 
Procurement coverage usually refers to entity and thresholds. Within the context of China’s 
Government Procurement Law, covered entities are government departments, institutions 
and organisations at the level of State Council (i.e. ministries, departments, etc.), provincial, 
autonomous regions and municipalities. The coverage of China’s Government Procurement 
Law refers to those listed in the Centralised Procurement Catalogue265 and only for sums 
above the thresholds. Covered entities, or their procurement agents, at different 
administrative levels are competent to compile their respective Centralised Procurement 
Catalogue and therefore determine the thresholds, which may indeed appear arbitrary and 
to lack uniformity.266  
                                                   
264 Art.2, Implementing Rules of the Government Procurement Law. 
265 By virtue of Art.2 of the Government Procurement Law, procurement refers to acquiring goods, 
works and services by means of contract with consideration, including purchase, lease, proxy and 
employment, etc. Goods are defined as raw materials, fuel, equipment and products of all forms and 
types. Works are defined as construction projects, including construction, reconstruction, expansion, 
renovation, demolition, repair works of buildings and structures. Services are defined as anything 
except goods and works under the definition of the Government Procurement Law. Further defined 
by Art.2 of the Implementing Rules of the Government Procurement Law, services shall include 
services that are required by the government as well as services that government provides to the 
public. 
266 Art.8, Government Procurement Law. 
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The newly enacted Implementing Rules of the Government Procurement Law provides a 
slightly more precise definition concerning procurement catalogue and entity. The aim is to 
provide a wider coverage. For example, from now on, the Centralised Procurement 
Catalogue shall include items intended to be procured by centralised procurement agents as 
well as by departments. As for decentralised procurement, based on the Implementing 
Rules, it refers to any procurement items that are above the threshold but not listed in the 
Centralised Procurement Catalogue and which should be procured by covered entities 
themselves or by procurement agents.267  
Nonetheless, the Implementing Rules refrain from providing precise thresholds and 
maintain that it should be set by covered entities at different administrative levels.  
This description suggests that procuring the same goods, services and works by different 
entities may fall in or out of the remit of the procurement rules at different administrative 
levels, as entities may apply different funds in financing their respective procurement, and 
discretion may be commonplace as entities are entrusted with great autonomy to decide 
how their procurement items should fit into the centralised or decentralised public 
procurement lists. Thus, in fact, the procurement regime is fragmented as different or even 
conflicting conditions or thresholds are imposed by different parties.  
For example, while some European companies complain that they fall victim to China’s ‘buy 
national’ procurement rules, it is noticed that, from 2008, when China started its GPA 
accession negotiations, until 2014, when the last WTO Trade Policy Review took place, each 
of the four Reviews by the WTO Secretariat pointed out that foreign products are routinely 
procured, but no data are given on the value or proportion.268 This observation confirms the 
experience of one of the authors with a French Shanghai bank in the late 1990s in which 
many Chinese procurement contracts were awarded to French companies, ranging from the 
Three Gorges project to the Pudong Airport, from coaches for the Shanghai Metro to aircraft 
purchasing and leasing, from equipment supply to power plants to the design of the 
Shanghai Grand Theatre. Note that some of the procurement markets were only offered to 
be opened to foreign companies in China’s 4th GPA accession offer submitted in November 
2012, such as architectural services. It should not be forgotten that, before China’s WTO 
                                                   
267 Art.4, Implementing Rules of the Government Procurement Law. For procurement items with 
standardised technologies and services or for routine use, they should be listed as centralised 
procurement items. Regarding centralised procurement items procured by a department, it permits 
items to be procured by bulk order with specifications based on the business nature which should be 
determined by procuring departments or sectors. Art.3, Implementing Rules of the Government 
Procurement Law. 
268 For example, it is noted that: “[A]lthough official statistics do not contain data on procurement by 
foreign suppliers or of foreign products, this appear to occur.” WTO Trade Policy Review, Report by 
the Secretariat, China, WT/TPR/S/300/Rev.1, 7 October 2014, at para 3.182. 
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accession, the country was a less-liberalised economy and, moreover, foreign companies’ 
chances of acquiring Chinese public procurement contracts were often jeopardised by 
political incidents, such as a foreign country’s selling arms to Taiwan.  
Also, some Chinese procuring authorities exercise their absolute discretion by simply 
ignoring procurement rules. Recently, the Chinese Supreme Court brought up a case 
concerning the mishandling of public procurement as typical of the ten sorts of economic 
mal-administrations in 2015. The case goes back to 2012 and concerns the purchase of high-
frequency X-ray radiography equipment for a maternal and child health service located in 
Shanghai Chongming County. The procurement was commissioned by the Procurement 
Agent of the County Government, and its tender document required “top brands from 
Europe or America” with specifications that were in effect in direct violation of the 
government’s procurement policy of ‘buy national’.269 Eventually, the tender was declared 
void and the bidding result annulled because of the discriminatory nature of the tender 
term of “top brands from Europe or America”.270 
Despite or perhaps because of (as many in China hold) the discretion exercised by procuring 
authorities in China, the WTO Trade Policy Review noted in its 2014 on China that, despite 
the “buy national” requirement included in the Government Procurement Law, “… the 
Chinese government has been implementing a policy to facilitate the procurement of foreign 
products since 2007.”271  
The EU’s public procurement directives 
The EU as a whole is party to the WTO GPA. Based on the principles of transparency, non-
discrimination and competitiveness, a uniform EU public procurement system eradicates 
non-tariff barriers in the common market and should guarantee open and fair access to 
procurement goods and services, one of the Union’s fundamental freedoms of movement. 
This also in the interest of member states as they will able to acquire ‘value for money’ and 
efficient use of public funds.  
The EU public procurement market is presently governed by Directive 2004/17/EC and 
Directive 2004/18/EC. Directive 2004/17/EC, also known as the sector Directive, coordinates 
                                                   
269 Art.10, Government Procurement Law. 
270 However, it’s interesting to note that the decision was reached by virtue of Art.22.2, instead of 
Art.10 (concerning ‘buy national’), of the Government Procurement Law that, depending on specific 
requirements of the procurement, procurers may set restrictions on certain conditions of a specific 
procurement but they may not impose any unreasonable conditions to differentiate suppliers 
resulting in discriminatory treatment. (see 
www.ccgp.gov.cn/zycg/zycgdt/qtbw/201510/t20151027_6040498.htm (Chinese).  
271 WTO Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, China, WT/TPR/S/300/Rev.1, 7 October 
2014, at para 3.182. 
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procurement in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors. By virtue of 
Regulation (EC) 1336/2013, the threshold for works contracts is €5,186,000; and goods, 
services and design €414,000. Directive 2004/18/EC, also known as the classical Directive, 
coordinates procurement of goods, services and works,272 for which procurement may be 
undertaken by central government and sub-central contracting authorities, respectively. 
Thresholds under the classical Directive depend on the kind of procurement items – goods, 
services or works – as well as on the procuring authority, which are determined by 
Regulation (EC) 1336/2013. For example, for procurement of works and when the procuring 
authority is a central government authority, the threshold is €5,186,000.273 The two EU 
procurement directives were formulated by consolidating procurement rules previously 
scattered across member states, in order to bring about efficiency and compliance 
discipline, while the thresholds have been maintained.  
Within the remit of the EU public procurement directives, all undertakings, either public or 
private, are guaranteed participation in procurement tendering, as long as a public 
undertaking tenderer’s participation does not cause any distortion to competition vis-à-vis 
private undertaking tenderers. With regard to the eligibility of public undertaking tenderers, 
directly or indirectly subsidised undertakings by the State or other contracting authorities or 
even by the contracting authority itself may legitimately take part in a tendering.274 The only 
criterion that may disqualify a tenderer is when “abnormally low tenders” occur.275 Under 
such circumstances, contracting authorities may reject those tenderers if it’s proven that 
they are recipients of illegal state aid.  
On the other hand, as the CJEU ruled that the public procurement system should enjoy 
direct effect, the 28 member states are therefore granted the competence of elaborating on 
procurement procedures, awarding criteria and evaluation policies. This is intended to 
achieve harmonisation of “two opposite dynamics”: one of a supranational course and 
another national priorities, for transparent public spending, improved market information 
and uniform application of objective criteria of participation in tendering and awarding 
                                                   
272 Both directives will remain in force until 17 April 2016, after which they will be replaced by 
Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement and Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement in the 
sectors of water, energy, transport and postal services.  
273 See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-
implementation/index_en.htm.  
274 Case C-94/99, ARGE Gewässerschutzt v. Bundesministerium für Land und Forstwirtschaft [2000] 
E.C.R. I-11037. 
275 Under such circumstances, the CJEU ruled, with direct effect, that contracting authorities should 
examine the details of the bid before deciding the awarding of the contract and seek from the 
tenderer explanations as to the bid submitted. Case 76/81, SA Transporoute et Travaux v. Minister 
of Public Works [1982] E.C.R.I-457. 
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procedures, etc.276 However, such arrangements sometimes bring about unwanted 
decentralisation in procedures, requirements and substance that cause costly regulatory 
heterogeneity among the member states.277  
Within the context of international trade relations, the EU negotiates public procurement 
agreements with third countries both at bilateral/regional and plurilateral levels. For the 
former, provisions covering public procurement have been included in free trade 
agreements with countries such as Mexico, Chili, Canada (CETA), Korea and Vietnam; while 
on-going negotiations are conducted with the US (in TTIP), Japan, Thailand and the 
Philippines, etc.  
Awarding criteria and evaluation policies  
Contractual performance  
Despite the requirement that performance of a procurement contract must not directly or 
indirectly cause discrimination, the performance criteria may vary among member states 
with a view to, for example, favouring on-site vocational training, safety, the fight against 
unemployment, labour standards or environment protection, etc. as long as such provisions 
and their application comply with the relevant EU law.278 Similarly, specific categories of 
procurement contracts may be reserved. As a result, member states have the right to refrain 
from participating in public contract awarding procedure.279  
The most economically advantageous offer – a rule of reason approach  
“The most economically advantageous offer” approach, which was considered as legitimate 
discretion following the CJEU’s decisions, is now incorporated in the new directives, for 
balancing economic and policy considerations, that contracting authorities may exercise. 
Such Offer280 may include a non-exhaustive list of factors, among which pricing is just 
one,281 to facilitate contracting authorities’ decision-making in evaluation as far as the 
procedure for awarding contracts is concerned.  
                                                   
276 See Bovis (2005). 
277 See Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2012). 
278 When a public contract involves cross-border operations, Directive 96/71 sets the minimum 
requirements which must be observed by the host country with respect to posted workers. Non-
compliance may be deemed as grave misconduct or even an offence as far as the operator is 
concerned. 
279 Art. 19 of Public Sector Directive. 
280 Art.26 of Directive 93/36, Art.30 of Directive 93/37, Art.34 of Directive 93/38 and Art.36 of 
Directive 92/50. 
281 Factors may include price, delivery or completion date, operating costs, cost-effectiveness, 
profitability, technical merit, product or work quality, aesthetic and functional characteristics, after-
TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT │ 293 
 
Following case law precedence, it is legitimate for a contracting authority to exercise 
flexibility and liberty in interpreting a relevant awarding criterion. In the meantime, the 
contracting authority may equally exploit its discretion by selecting one particular factor or 
set of factors they wish to employ in the evaluation, as long as these factors are mentioned 
in hierarchical order or descending sequence in the tendering document or the contract 
documents; therefore tenderers may be able to differentiate and ascertain the scale of 
importance of those factors in their bid. 
Social considerations 
The new directives also recognised that social considerations and specific measures meant 
to fight against long-term unemployment could be included as part of the awarding criteria 
for procurement contracts, especially when the most economically advantageous offer is 
elected. It is now accepted that procuring authorities are entitled to exercise their discretion 
to decide what would be the most economically advantageous factors for the purpose of 
awarding the contract.282 
In respect of selecting tenderers, the procedure is based on a stringent and thorough list of 
technical and financial requirements explicitly set out in the relevant directives. Any 
insertion of extra conditions would not be considered legitimate.  
Environmental considerations 
As long as it is objective, universally applicable and strictly relevant to the procurement 
concerned, while clearly contributing to the economic advantage of the procuring 
authority,283 by virtue of Art.173.1 of the Lisbon Treaty,284 Art.50 of Public Sector Directive 
states that contracting authorities may require certificates, or other evidence, concerning 
environmental management standards based on the relevant European or international 
standards.  
                                                                                                                                                              
sales service and technical assistance, commitments with regard to spare parts and components and 
maintenance costs and security of supplies. 
282 Nonetheless, those social considerations would not be regarded as a selecting criterion, enabling 
contracting authorities to eliminate other candidates that do not take them into account.  
283 Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Filandia v. Helsingin Kaupunki et HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] E.C.R.I-
7213.  
284 Art.173.1 of the Lisbon Treaty states: “[t]he Union and the Member States shall ensure that the 
conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Union's industry exist. For that purpose, in 
accordance with a system of open and competitive markets, their action shall be aimed at … 
encouraging an environment favourable to cooperation between undertakings…” 
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Annex III. Estimated Impacts of a FTA 
Table A2. FTA impacts: Output and trade effects per sector in the EU 
  Output, % change Exports, % change Imports, % change 
  
Modest 
scenario 
Ambitious 
scenario 
Modest 
scenario 
Ambitious 
scenario 
Modest 
scenario 
Ambitious 
scenario 
Primary agriculture 0.14 0.26 0.97 1.32 0.61 1.02 
Forestry 0.05 0.09 0.46 0.71 0.23 0.16 
Fishing 0.15 0.28 0.63 1.03 0.79 1.45 
Oil and gas 0.22 0.37 0.60 0.93 1.04 1.63 
Other primary energy, mining 0.32 0.58 0.69 1.13 1.01 1.64 
Utilities 0.43 0.78 0.59 0.88 0.84 1.40 
Construction 0.90 1.62 1.10 1.81 1.44 2.54 
Wood, pulp, paper -0.35 -0.74 0.04 -0.20 0.93 1.32 
Non-metallic mineral products -0.04 0.09 0.72 0.97 2.96 4.21 
Primary metals 0.85 1.19 1.29 1.87 1.52 2.13 
Fabricated metal products 0.39 0.38 2.06 2.63 3.19 4.77 
Other machinery 2.06 2.88 4.83 6.71 3.13 4.59 
Electrical machinery -1.46 -1.76 -0.33 0.37 2.36 4.00 
Motor vehicles 2.35 3.23 3.32 4.41 1.77 2.60 
Other transport 0.46 1.03 2.38 3.83 2.87 4.16 
Other goods -0.83 -1.64 0.01 -0.56 3.68 6.18 
Processed foods 0.13 0.33 0.93 1.33 1.30 1.83 
Beverages and tobacco 0.33 0.62 0.48 0.68 0.59 1.00 
Textiles -3.64 -4.85 -2.88 -3.83 1.24 1.38 
Apparel -5.10 -6.58 -4.33 -5.68 5.70 6.98 
Leather products -5.62 -7.31 -4.73 -6.19 3.64 4.25 
Paper products, printing 0.38 0.58 0.93 1.40 0.73 1.33 
Petrochemicals 0.68 1.04 1.06 1.63 1.09 1.77 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics 0.31 0.43 0.83 1.12 0.92 1.40 
Wholesale, retail 0.49 0.89 0.94 1.51 0.78 1.42 
Air transport 0.64 1.16 1.04 1.77 0.93 1.57 
Land transport, other 0.63 0.99 1.29 1.85 1.19 2.04 
Maritime transport 1.21 1.84 1.65 2.40 1.14 1.82 
Recreational, other services 0.28 0.47 0.58 0.89 0.82 1.36 
Communications 0.39 0.70 0.56 0.84 0.73 1.24 
Finance 0.32 0.57 0.51 0.80 0.83 1.36 
Insurance 0.44 0.79 0.78 1.42 0.80 1.32 
Business, ICT services 0.48 0.81 0.78 1.26 0.78 1.27 
Public services 0.34 0.68 0.51 0.74 1.12 2.02 
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Table A3. FTA impact: Labour displacement, % (based on weighted standard deviation) 
  Lower skilled Medium skilled Higher skilled 
  
Ambitious 
scenario 
Modest 
scenario 
Ambitiou
s scenario 
Ambitious 
scenario 
Modest 
scenario 
Ambitious 
scenario 
China 1.77 2.42 1.35 1.85 1.12 1.54 
European Union 1.37 1.97 0.79 1.16 0.93 1.35 
Austria 1.04 1.40 0.67 0.91 0.83 1.12 
Belgium 1.13 1.52 0.74 0.98 0.80 1.07 
Cyprus 1.28 1.75 0.79 1.10 0.65 0.91 
Czech Republic 1.34 1.88 0.78 1.10 0.96 1.35 
Denmark 0.83 1.15 0.48 0.66 0.59 0.81 
Estonia 1.20 1.72 0.62 0.90 0.87 1.25 
Finland 1.71 2.31 0.65 0.88 1.27 1.71 
France 0.96 1.38 0.62 0.89 0.75 1.07 
Germany 2.01 2.72 1.37 1.86 1.41 1.91 
Greece 0.92 1.29 0.54 0.76 0.55 0.77 
Hungary 1.62 2.32 0.83 1.20 1.16 1.66 
Ireland 0.84 1.22 0.43 0.62 0.55 0.79 
Italy 1.49 2.09 0.89 1.25 1.02 1.43 
Latvia 1.20 1.68 0.68 0.96 0.76 1.06 
Lithuania 0.92 1.29 0.51 0.69 0.58 0.80 
Luxembourg 0.90 1.26 0.32 0.45 0.39 0.55 
Malta 3.99 7.90 2.62 5.80 2.75 5.68 
Netherlands 0.95 1.49 0.70 1.09 0.47 0.74 
Poland 1.21 1.66 0.72 0.98 0.79 1.08 
Portugal 1.50 1.99 0.67 0.89 0.79 1.05 
Slovakia 3.67 4.79 2.13 2.77 2.31 3.01 
Slovenia 1.26 1.74 0.78 1.07 1.07 1.48 
Spain 0.99 1.37 0.42 0.58 0.67 0.93 
Sweden 0.88 1.20 0.46 0.62 0.66 0.88 
UK 1.12 1.51 0.68 0.91 0.94 1.26 
Bulgaria 1.30 1.73 0.56 0.75 0.86 1.14 
Croatia 0.78 1.07 0.57 0.78 0.70 0.96 
Romania 1.35 1.80 0.86 1.15 0.94 1.27 
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Annex IV. Total AVEs for NTBs for Goods and Services 
Table A4 presents the estimates of the costs, in %, that is, as AVEs, of total Non-Tariff 
Measures between China and the EU. As chapter 18 explains, the methods of arriving at 
these AVEs are different between goods and services. For goods, the total trade costs are 
derived from the gravity analysis presented in annex V. In order to get the results of Table 
18.2 – still for goods – ‘actionability rate estimates’ have been applied to the results of the 
gravity analysis. This means that the estimates, dating back to ECORYS (2009), have been 
applied to goods : if ‘actionability’  of the costs of a NTM is (say) 50%, the total AVE  could be 
(say) 34% and the actionable AVE is 17%. Actionability can only be ‘guesstimated’ in a rough 
manner by experts, certainly if the empirical analysis has to be delivered ahead of the 
negotiations (which might provide greater clarity on ‘actionability’). For services, as noted, 
the source (Jafari & Tarr, op. cit., based on World Bank data), provides only non-
discriminatory AVEs. The main text in chapter 18 emphasises that non-discriminatory NTMs 
can be just as costly – they might even imply import bans, sometimes – but, under WTO 
rules and in many FTAs, they might not be considered ‘actionable’. The principal reason is 
likely to be a trading partner’s “right to regulate”, that is, its regulatory ‘sovereignty’. The 
country is free to stick to its regulation, if non-discriminatory. The source of Jafari & Tarr, op. 
cit., does not comprise non-discriminatory NTMs in services, hence, the total AVE costs 
cannot be calculated. As a rough proxy, the services AVEs, as listed here in Table A-4, have 
been recalculated from the ones in Table 18.2, as if the latter had been derived from total 
AVEs, subsequently subjected to the actionability rates found in ECORYS (2009). Once one 
assumes that derivation, it is easy to trace the total AVEs in services. These are the total 
AVEs for services, listed below in Table A4. Therefore, by definition, these total AVEs in 
services are rough proxies, simply because the total set of services restrictions 
(discriminatory and non-discriminatory) rendering market access in services to China and to 
the EU so costly, are not available. Only non-discriminatory ones are. “ 
Table A4. Total AVEs for NTBs for goods and services 
CHN total 
AVEs on 
EUN 
EUN total 
AVEs on CHN 
EUN exports 
to CHN, mill 
USD 
CHN exports 
to EUN, mill 
USD 
Primary agriculture 73.6 81.0 1,640.8 2,757.3 
Forestry 73.6 81.0 371.6 65.7 
Fishing 73.6 81.0 49.9 42.0 
Oil and gas 0 0 3.8 0.3 
Other primary energy, mining 0 0 2,513.9 983.2 
Utilities 30.1 14.4 82.2 259.5 
Construction 33.4 16.0 1,769.9 1,977.5 
Wood, pulp, paper 8.5 22.5 1,381.2 12,649.3 
Non-metallic mineral products 8.5 22.5 1,307.3 6,833.2 
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Primary metals 16.2 20.6 14,195.5 9,756.8 
Fabricated metal products 16.2 20.6 4,365.1 15,090.7 
Other machinery 15.9 8.8 69,333.4 74,812.2 
Electrical machinery 20.2 11.2 7,582.6 93,311.7 
Motor vehicles 94.0 57.4 37,105.3 4,802.8 
Other transport 15.9 8.8 9,938.6 9,554.6 
Other goods 27.8 38.5 1,517.0 27,208.9 
Processed foods 32.5 29.8 2,567.3 5,405.0 
Beverages and tobacco 266.3 176.2 2,044.2 107.1 
Textiles 27.8 38.5 2,211.5 21,997.8 
Apparel 27.8 38.5 906.9 36,434.9 
Leather products 27.8 38.5 1,363.3 18,630.3 
Paper products, printing 27.8 38.5 4,484.2 3,238.7 
Petrochemicals 55.3 57.4 489.2 2,092.2 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics 26.5 29.8 25,826.6 28,421.0 
Wholesale, retail 12.0 2.7 10,130.6 7,284.1 
Air transport 117.9 27.3 1,628.2 3,288.8 
Land transport, other 0.0 42.4 2,446.7 3,633.6 
Maritime transport 91.9 13.5 353.1 8,723.9 
Recreational, other services 38.3 18.4 718.3 1,245.1 
Communications 11.0 3.0 596.7 662.4 
Finance 42.1 3.3 227.4 284.8 
Insurance 42.2 22.1 2,776.5 518.5 
Business, ICT services 88.7 44.5 7,544.6 5,818.2 
Public services 30.1 14.4 546.5 1,614.3 
Total trade weighted 25.7 26.3 
Goods 36.7 22.8 
Services 43.5 20.9 
Data source: Own estimates (see annex and text), World Bank, and EUROSTAT. 
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Annex V. Technical Overview for CGE Modelling 
This annex provides an overview of the modelling exercise summarised in the main body of 
the study. In the computational model, the “whole” economy, for the relevant aggregation 
of economic agents, is modelled simultaneously. This means that the entire economy is 
classified into production and consumption sectors. These sectors are then modelled 
collectively. Production sectors are explicitly linked together in value-added chains from 
primary goods, through higher stages of processing, to the final assembly of consumption 
goods for households and governments. These links span borders as well as industries. The 
link between sectors is both direct, such as the input of steel into the production of 
transport equipment, and also indirect, as with the link between chemicals and agriculture 
through the production of fertilizers and pesticides. Sectors are also linked through their 
competition for resources in primary factor markets (capital, labour and land). The data 
structure of the model follows the GTAP database structure, and basic models of this class 
are implemented in either GEMPACK or GAMS (Hertel, 1997; Hertel et al., 1997; Rutherford 
& Paltsev, 2000). At its core, the GTAP database is a multi-region input output (MRIO) 
database supplemented with data on taxes and emissions, and organised as a form of 
balanced social accounting matrix. We work here with a GEMPACK implementation of our 
model. The model itself is an extension of the basic GTAP-based multi-sector model of 
production and trade, extended for implementation of the Eaton-Kortum (2002) or EK 
model. A full discussion of the mathematical implementation of the EK structure of the 
model is detailed in Bekkers & Francois (2015). To fit our global data to the theoretical 
model, following Egger & Nigai (2015) and Bekkers et al. (2015), total trade costs and 
technology parameters are fit from actual import shares (calibration), imposing that there is 
a perfect fit between actual and predicted normalised trade shares and that income is equal 
to exports to all destination countries. Changes in trade costs (the CGE experiments 
themselves) follow from gravity-based estimates of trade costs as discussed below, where 
the gravity specification is also based on the EK structure (see Bekkers et al., 2015, for a 
discussion).  
1. Production 
An algebraic version of the GE system is summarised in Equation Tables A5 and A6. We start 
here with a representative production technology. Assume that output qj in sector j can be 
produced with a combination of intermediate inputs  and value-added services (capital, 
labour, land, etc.) . This is formalised in equation 1. Assuming homothetic cost functions 
and separability, we can define the cost of a representative bundle of intermediate inputs 
 for the firm producing  and similarly the cost of a representative bundle of value-
added services . These are shown in equations 2 and 3. They depend on the vector of 
composite goods prices  and primary factor prices . Unit costs for  then depend on the 
z j
va j
z j q j
va j
˜ P w q
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mix of technology and prices embodied in equations 1, 2 and 3. We represent this in 
equation 4, which defines unit cost . In the absence of taxes, in competitive sectors  
represents both marginal cost and price. On the other hand, with imperfect competition on 
the output side (discussed explicitly later) can be viewed as measuring the marginal cost 
side of the optimal mark-up equation, with mark-ups driving a wedge between  and . 
To combine production technologies with data, we need to move from general to specific 
functional forms. We employ a nested CES function, with a CES representation of value 
added activities , a CES representation of a composite intermediate  made up of 
intermediate inputs, and an upper CES nest that then combines these to yield the final good 
qj. Our set-up is based on the assumption we have i primary factors , as well as n 
production sectors that can be represented in terms of composite goods  as defined 
below. These composites may (or may not, depending on the goods involved) be used as 
intermediate inputs. In Equation Table A5, we have also shown the CES substitution 
elasticity for intermediate inputs , the substitution elasticity for value added , and the 
substitution elasticity for our ”upper nest” aggregation of value added and intermediates, 
. In the absence of taxes, total value added Y will be the sum of primary factor income, as 
in equation 5. 
Given our assumption of CES technologies, we can represent value added in sector j as a 
function of primary inputs and the elasticity of substitution in value added . This yields 
equation 6, and its associated CES price index shown in equation 7. Similarly, we can specify 
the CES price index for composite intermediates, as in equation 7. This gives us equation 8, 
where the coefficient  is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs. This is 
assumed to be Leontief (i.e.  = 0). Finally, following Equation Table A5, we will also specify 
an aggregation function for value added and intermediate inputs, in terms of its CES price 
index. This is shown as equation 9. From the first order conditions for minimising the cost of 
production, we can map the allocation of primary factors to the level of value added across 
sectors. This is formalised in equation 10. We can also specify the total demand for 
composite intermediate goods across sectors as a function of the producer price of 
composite input price in each sector, the scale of intermediate demand across sectors 
, and prices of composite goods . This is shown in equation 11. Finally, with the upper 
nest CES for goods we can also map value added  and intermediate demand  in terms 
of equations 7 and 8, output  and the elasticity of substitution between inputs and 
value added. This yields equations 12 and 13, where the terms  are the CES weights 
(similar to those in equation 6) while  is the upper nest elasticity of substitution in the 
production function. 
We define the price of output at industry level as in equation 14. In this case,  is defined 
by equation 9 and represents the price of a bundle of inputs, and equation 14 follows 
P j
va j z j
v
q˜
f s
y
s j
f j
f j
˜ q int,i
Pz j
z j ˜ P i
va j z j
q j y j
g
y j
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directly from average cost pricing and homothetic cost functions. (It can also accommodate 
Dixit-Stiglitz-type monopolistic competition, and the EK model. See Francois, Manchin, and 
Martin, 2013 and Bekkers & Francois, 2015 for explicit derivations.) 
Together, equations 1 through 14 map out the production side of the economy. For an open 
economy, given resources, technology (represented by technical coefficients in the CES 
functional forms), and prices for foreign and domestic goods and services, we can determine 
factor incomes, national income and the structure of production. We close this system by 
discussing the demand side of the economy and basic open-economy aspects in the next 
sections. 
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Table A5. Definition of the Basic CGE Framework 
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Table A6. Table of key variables 
q j  quantity produced in sector j 
z j quantity of intermediates used in sector j 
va j value added used in sector j 
P z vector or prices of intermediate input bundles zj 
PVA vector or value added bundles vaj 
 z vector or prices of output qj 
Y  factor income 
P j price of composite basket for sector j 
w i  vector or factor prices 
v i  vector or factor supply 
  expenditure shares 
U c level of utility from private consumption 
U g  level of utility from public consumption 
D j  domestic absorption 
PU c  price of utility from private consumption 
PU g  price of utility from public consumption 
M j imports 
  rate of time discount 
f j  elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs 
s j elasticity of substitution in value added 
y j  elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs and value added 
s j  elasticity of substitution in consumption 
B  balance of payments 
The reader will have noted that we are working with CES-based demand equations, both for 
intermediate and final demand. In point of fact, this basic functional form for demand 
serves as reduced form for demand in the Armington model, various versions of trade under 
monopolistic competition, and the Eaton-Kortum model. The key difference is in the 
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parameterisation of the model itself and the interpretation of results. With monopolistic 
competition, it is necessary to add side equations reflecting supply- (and sometimes 
demand-) side externalities linked to variety effects. In the Eaton-Kortum model, the 
reduced form trade equation is actually the same as the Armington model (i.e. CES in form), 
although the parameterisation is then different. See Bekkers & Francois (2015) and Francois, 
Manchin and Martin (2013) for formal derivations. 
2. Final Demand 
In the system we have spelled out so far, we have mapped the basic, national structure of 
production. We close the system with a demand specification for a representative 
household. This involves allocation of regional income by the household to composite 
consumption , which is separated over private consumption , public consumption , 
and investment . Each of these components of H involves consumption of composite 
goods and services  indexed by sector j. Where we assume fixed expenditure shares (i.e. 
with  taking a Cobb-Douglas functional form), then we also have a fixed savings rate. 
Otherwise, given the equilibrium allocation of household income to consumption and 
investment, we will denote these expenditure shares by . We maintain a fixed-share 
allocation between public and private consumption. This corresponds to public spending as 
a fixed share of total national income. 
We assume a well-defined CES utility function for personal consumption defined over goods 
. From the first order conditions for utility maximisation, we can then derive the price of 
utility from private consumption  as a function of prices , as in equation 15. The 
corresponding expenditure function is then  where is the level of utility from 
private consumption. Taking national income as our budget constraint, then combining 
equation 5 with the expenditure function yields equation 16. From 16, we can define  
from the expenditure function and income, as in equation 17. Consumption quantities, in 
terms of composite goods, can be recovered from equation 17, as shown in equation 18. 
Like private consumption, the public sector is also modelled with a CES demand function 
over public sector consumption. This implies equations 19-22.  
For investment demand, in the short run, we assume a fixed savings rate. In the long-run, 
the model can alternatively incorporate a fixed savings rate, or a rate that adjusts to meet 
steady-state conditions in a basic Ramsey structure with constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) preferences. We employ the fixed savings (recursive dynamics) version here. 
(Francois, McDonald and Nordstrom 1996, 1999). With fixed savings, and assuming a 
Leontief composite of investment goods that make up the regional investment good, 
investment demand is defined by equation 23. With CRRA preferences, steady-state 
conditions imply equation 24 as well, related to the price of capital . Where 24 holds, the 
additional equation allows us to make the savings rate coefficient  endogenous. In 
H C G
I
q˜
H
q
˜ q
PU ˜ P 
U = U cPU U
c
U c
wk
q I
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equation 24  is the rate of time discount and  is the rate of depreciation. With a short-
run or static closure, investment demand means we apply equation 23. With a long-run 
closure, we also apply equation 25. With a fixed savings rate, we drop equation 24 and 
make  exogenous. This is the case here.  
3. Cross-border linkages and taxes 
Individual countries, as described by equations 1-25 above, are linked through cross-border 
trade and investment flows. With either monopolistic competition or Armington 
preferences, we can define a CES composite good  in terms of foreign and domestic goods. 
The price index for this composite good is defined by equation 26. Given equation 26 and 
the envelope theorem, we can define domestic absorption D as in equation 27, where h 
indexes home prices and quantities. The difference between production  and domestic 
absorption  in equilibrium will be imports (where a negative value denotes exports), as in 
equation 28. Across all countries indexed by r, we also have a global balanced trade 
requirement, shown in equation 29. Similarly, balancing the global capital account also 
requires equations 30 and 31 (where we now index source r and home destination h). In the 
short-run it is somewhat standard to fix B, while in the long-run this is sometimes made 
endogenous (see Hertel, 1997, Chapter 2, and Francois, McDonald & Nordstrom, 1996, 
1999).  
The basic system outlined above provides the core production and demand structure of 
each region, as well as the basic requirements for bilateral import demand, global market 
clearing for traded goods and services, and global capital account balancing. Within this 
basic structure, we also introduce taxes, transport services and non-tariff barriers. These 
combine to drive a wedge between the ex-factory price originating in country r and the 
landed prices in country h inclusive of duties, transport costs, and other trade costs. Taxes 
and rent-generating trade costs mean that Y is also inclusive of tax revenues and rents. All of 
this adds additional complexity to the system outlined above, but the core structure 
remains the same. 
4. Experiment definitions and source data 
As noted in the main text, tariff data come from the WITS database (in turn coming from the 
UNCTAD TRAINS database and WTO integrated database). Our NTB estimates come from 
two sources. For services trade policy, we require a measure of applied rates. There are two 
recent sources of data on services policy, both reflecting massive institutional effort. The 
OECD has recently released its services trade restriction index for 40 countries (Geloso 
Grosso et al., 2015), while the World Bank has conducted a similar exercise for 103 
countries (Borchert, Gootiiz & Mattoo, 2011, 2014). The World Bank also provides a 
breakdown of applied policies vs GATS commitments for the 103 countries in the database 
r d
q I
q˜
q j
D j
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(Borchert, Gootiiz & Mattoo, 2011), while the OECD has just released a preliminary version 
of its own data from a similar exercise for the OECD countries (Miroudot & Pertel, 2015). 
The World Bank has also released recent estimates of trade costs, expressed as tariff 
equivalents, for all 103 countries in the database (Jafari & Tarr, 2015). We work here with 
data from the World Bank, as they provide direct estimates of actionable (i.e. 
discriminatory) trade costs for services. 
For goods, we work with gravity-based estimates of total trade costs, adjusted by 
actionability rates form ECORYS (2009). The approach for specifying our gravity equation is 
similar to Egger et al. (2015) and Bekkers et al. (2015), and here we include domestic 
absorption (trade with self). Following our basic gravity regressions, we then recover total 
trade costs from the importer and exporter fixed effects. If we start with a gravity equation 
for CES-type import demand for sector v of the form 
(32) ln ݍ௜,௝,௩ = lnܣ௜,௩ + lnܤ௜,௝,௩ + lnܥ௝,௩ = ܽ௜,௩ + ௜ܾ,௝,௩ + ௝ܿ,௩  
where ܽ௜,௩  is an exporter fixed effect, ௝ܿ,௩  is an importer fixed effect, and ௜ܾ ,௝,௩ represents 
pair-wise terms, we can show that 
(33) ௝ܿ,௩ = lnܦ௝,௩ − ௝ܽ,௩ − ߪ ln ௝ܶ,௩  
where lnܦ௝,௩  is the log value of domestic absorption, ߪ is the trade price elasticity, and ௝ܶ,௩ 
is the log of the general level of trade costs. Rearranging 
(34) ln ௝ܶ,௩ = ߪିଵ൫lnܦ௝,௩ − ௝ܽ,௩ − ௝ܿ,௩൯. 
Our gravity regressions are reported in Table A7, based on the bilateral trade data in our 
model (year 2011) as well as domestic absorption. Corresponding NTM estimates for the EU 
and China are reported in the main text (where the EU value is an average of individual MS 
values). Data sources are described in Bekkers et al. (2015). The price elasticity is based on a 
combination of tariffs and shipping cost margins. 
Table A7. Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood gravity estimates 
 All goods 
Beverages 
and 
Tobacco 
Chemicals, 
Rubber, 
Plastics 
Electrical 
Machinery Metals 
Price elasticity -5.036 -1.763 -5.441 -14.091 -7.911 
 
(5.39)*** (3.66)*** (5.42)*** (5.02)*** (6.23)*** 
ln(distance) -0.494 -0.487 -0.552 -0.248 -0.414 
 
(12.02)*** (5.59)*** (11.33)*** (2.48)** (8.73)*** 
Political Economy 1 0.125 -0.224 -0.002 0.249 0.05 
 
(5.63)*** (4.90)*** -0.07 (6.41)*** (2.08)** 
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Political Economy 2 -0.111 0.063 -0.197 -0.096 0.069 
 
(4.32)*** -1.08 (5.76)*** (1.91)* -1.2 
Common Colony 0.466 0.285 -0.144 0.794 0.234 
 
(3.19)*** -1.41 -0.87 (2.50)** -0.85 
Common Ethnic Language 0.24 0.365 0.305 0.594 0.303 
 
(3.05)*** (3.10)*** (2.82)*** (3.80)*** (2.89)*** 
Common Border 0.631 0.37 0.424 0.503 0.866 
 
(8.44)*** (2.35)** (4.30)*** (3.79)*** (9.18)*** 
Former Colonial Relationship 0.284 0.812 0.226 0.176 0.482 
 
(3.07)*** (5.08)*** -1.46 -1 (3.36)*** 
Shallow PTA 0.057 -0.533 0.322 0.617 0.48 
 
-0.3 (1.91)* (1.67)* (1.80)* (2.90)*** 
Medium PTA -0.206 0.203 -0.199 0.112 0.022 
 
-1.22 -0.87 -0.98 -0.31 -0.1 
Deep PTA 1.189 1.785 0.903 1.527 0.948 
 
(5.49)*** (4.00)*** (3.57)*** (4.28)*** (3.82)*** 
EUN 0.583 0.878 0.345 1.07 0.338 
 
(4.23)*** (3.14)*** (1.94)* (3.53)*** (1.98)** 
N 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 
pseudo R2 0.9353 0.9875 0.9767 0.9621 0.9789 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table A7, cont. Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood gravity estimates 
  Motor 
Vehicles 
Other  
Goods 
Other (non-
electrical) 
Machinery 
Primary 
Agriculture 
Primary 
Energy 
Price elasticity -3.938 -4.989 -15.204 -2.922 -3.237 
 
(3.25)*** (5.45)*** (8.04)*** (3.05)*** (3.75)*** 
ln(distance) -0.103 -0.403 -0.055 -0.484 -0.825 
 
-1.3 (7.22)*** -0.69 (6.62)*** (7.75)*** 
Political Economy 1 -0.018 0.177 0.124 0.155 0.152 
 
-0.38 (6.01)*** (3.74)*** (4.36)*** (5.13)*** 
Political Economy 2 -0.091 -0.016 -0.122 0.064 -0.131 
 
(1.99)** -0.45 (3.43)*** -1.13 (1.97)** 
Common Colony -0.199 0.436 0.289 -0.107 0.094 
 
-0.56 -1.22 -1.37 -0.61 -0.3 
Common Ethnic Language 0.171 0.25 0.391 0.498 0.452 
 
-1.23 (2.14)** (3.38)*** (4.76)*** (2.37)** 
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Common Border 0.79 1.052 0.792 0.877 0.559 
 
(5.91)*** (10.38)*** (6.78)*** (5.09)*** (2.21)** 
Former Colonial Relationship -0.238 0.323 0.408 0.215 0.879 
 
-1.23 (2.84)*** (3.09)*** (1.82)* (3.67)*** 
Shallow PTA 0.633 0.583 1.589 -0.104 -1.252 
 
(2.02)** (2.25)** (5.44)*** -0.42 (1.98)** 
Medium PTA 1.293 -0.039 0.202 0.484 0.729 
 
(5.72)*** -0.23 -1.06 (2.64)*** (2.45)** 
Deep PTA 2.882 1.398 2.1 2.764 1.152 
 
(10.30)*** (4.39)*** (6.35)*** (9.14)*** (2.95)*** 
EUN 1.834 0.782 0.593 1.541 0.088 
 
(8.98)*** (4.87)*** (2.88)*** (7.82)*** -0.25 
N 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 11,863 
pseudo R2 0.9772 0.9851 0.9768 0.9856 0.9375 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table A7, cont. Poisson Quasi-Maximum likelihood gravity estimates 
  Processed Foods 
Petro-
chemicals 
Price elasticity -5.727   
 
(8.75)*** 
 
ln(distance) -0.406 -0.651 
 
(11.15)*** (10.37)*** 
Political Economy 1 0.044 0.011 
 
-1.63 -0.41 
Political Economy 2 -0.038 0.024 
 
-1.13 -0.43 
Common Colony -0.09 0.368 
 
-0.35 (1.82)* 
Common Ethnic Language 0.372 0.435 
 
(4.64)*** (3.51)*** 
Common Border 0.946 0.444 
 
(11.29)*** (3.04)*** 
Former Colonial Relationship 0.173 0.378 
 
(1.86)* (2.26)** 
Shallow PTA 1.221 0.252 
 
(5.03)*** -1.04 
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Medium PTA 0.179 0.441 
 
-1.52 (2.32)** 
Deep PTA 1.659 2.154 
 
(9.30)*** (7.58)*** 
EUN 0.946 0.353 
 
(6.65)*** (1.84)* 
N 11,863 5,857 
pseudo R2 0.9881 0.9797 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
5. Macroeconomic baseline 
Before implementing our experiment, we define a benchmark or baseline year. The GTAP 
data are benchmarked to 2011. We have projected GDP levels (on a PPP level) to 2030, and 
also implemented within the model a number of recently signed agreements. This includes 
TPP, TTIP, EU-Singapore, EU-Canada, and EU-Korea. This provides the baseline on which 
experiments are then run.  
6. Sectoring scheme 
The basic sectoring scheme for the CGE model is spelled out in the main text. 
